

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: Council, Board, SSC and AP Members

FROM: f Jim H. Branson *JHB*  
Executive Director

DATE: March 22, 1983

SUBJECT: Salmon Fishery Management Plan

*ACTION REQUIRED*

1. *Review and discuss proposed salmon treaty*
2. *Approve 1983 troll salmon management approach*

BACKGROUND

At the request of Governor Sheffield at the January meeting, the Council and Board of Fisheries postponed most action on troll management pending his review of the proposed salmon treaty. Both the Governor and the Alaska State Senate have come out in opposition to the treaty as currently written, hoping to reopen negotiations with Canada. A Canadian Embassy Aide Memoire [item D-1(a)] presents the Canadian view of what the loss of the treaty would mean to them. Rob Morley, Mike Hunter, and Ken Pitre are expected to be at this meeting.

Item D-1(b) is a package of pending proposals to the Board. Those of Council interest are marked with an asterisk. The two main issues requiring resolution are (1) harvest guidelines and proposed season to achieve them, and (2) changing the fishing year. An oral PDT report will be presented on each of these.

SALMON PLAN DEVELOPMENT TEAM  
REPORT - MARCH 29, 1983

Introduction

The Salmon Plan Development Team met on March 28, 1983 to review information and issues pertinent to the 1983 commercial salmon fisheries in Southeast Alaska. This report summarizes the results of that meeting.

1982 Fishery Update

No changes to the 1982 fishery data presented at the January 1983 Council meeting have occurred.

1983 Fishery Update

The winter troll fishery for chinook salmon commenced on October 1, 1982. Through March 14, 1983 about 22,000 chinook have been recorded on fish tickets from which ADF&G projects the total, winter fishery (through April 14) catch will be about 25,000-30,000 chinook. This is substantially above the historical level and has resulted from the combination of good weather, carry-over of 1982 apparent fish abundance levels and higher effort stimulated by high prices and good weather.

1983 Harvest Guideline

In our November 3, 1982 draft report, the PDT identified the stock status, distribution and magnitude of conservation needs of important natural north migrating chinook salmon stocks and recommended a general management approach that would directly address the immediate conservation needs of those stocks.

The Team concluded that many natural chinook salmon stocks are experiencing extreme conservation problems. The Team recommended that to avert the possible loss of some severely depressed stocks as viable contributors to the fisheries, and to promote the recovery of depressed stocks, immediate action

in the form of harvest reductions is necessary. The Team further recommended that chinook harvest quotas or ceilings be developed and implemented for all ocean salmon fisheries beginning with the 1983 season, and that their implementation be coordinated between jurisdictions where stock distributions overlap. In other words, that conservation actions should be coordinated on a coastwide basis.

At subsequent U.S./Canada negotiations in December 1982 the negotiators for the two countries agreed to a coastwide chinook salmon conservation regime based, in part, on the PDT recommendation and recommendations of a joint U.S./Canada Technical Working Group. That regime embodied harvest quotas or ceilings applied to key areas where a high proportion of depressed stocks are caught as well as the commitment to pass chinook salmon savings from areas under quota management through other fisheries and to the spawning grounds. The regime was designed to encompass a 10-year (two cycle) rebuilding program which included reversing the current trend of declining escapements by the second year and gradually rebuilding the stocks over two cycles through a combination of continuing harvest restrictions and enhancement.

The Team believes that the single most important aspect of the regime embodied in the proposed treaty is the coastwide nature of its implementation.

\*In view of this, the Team recommends the following for the 1983 season:

The coastwide chinook salmon fisheries should be managed in a coordinated manner consistent with the goals of conservation and stock rebuilding outlined in the Draft U.S./Canada Treaty. These included (a) arresting declining trends observed in many important coastal chinook salmon stocks by the end of 1984, and (b) rebuilding those depressed stocks to optimum production levels over the next two cycles or approximately 10 years.

With respect to goal (a), (arresting declining escapement trends), fisheries in Southeast Alaska and certain major fisheries in British Columbia should be managed in 1983 at jointly agreed to reduced levels from recent years. Following the 1983 season, the impact of these actions on chinook escapements should be assessed and the necessity for any further catch reductions in 1984 determined.

Without such joint action between the countries, and with the 1982 level of harvest in Canada, it would be necessary to further reduce the Southeast Alaska harvest impacts to achieve conservation goals for southern U.S. stocks similar to the goals embodied in the proposed treaty. The magnitude of this reduction would probably be equivalent to elimination of directed chinook harvest in Southeast Alaska.

#### Modification of the Chinook Salmon Harvest Guideline Counting Period

During the 1981-82 seasons the catch counting period utilized for catch quota or limit management of the Southeast Alaska chinook salmon fisheries was October 1 through September 30. The primary purpose for originally establishing this counting period--rather than a calendar year period-- was to ensure that adequate catch was provided for the winter troll fishery which occurs from October 1 through April 14.

Although the October 1 through September 30 counting period adequately addresses the objectives of winter fishery management, it contributed to another management problem in 1982. In 1982, a combination of a lower catch limit and unusually high catch rates resulted in the troll chinook salmon fishery being closed July 28. From the time it reopened on August 8 until the end of the summer season on September 20, chinook salmon hooked incidentally while fishing for other salmon, primarily coho, had to be released. On the basis of reported observations by many troll fishermen, large numbers of chinook salmon were hooked and released with a significant--but unknown--mortality of the released fish.

A reoccurrence of this problem could be prevented in most years by utilizing a different catch counting period, namely July 1 through June 30.

Under this system, chinook salmon for all fisheries except the troll fishery would be tabulated on a calendar year basis as before. The troll fishery catch would be compiled from July 1 through June 30 of the following year.

The primary benefit of using this counting period is that it would generally allow the troll fishery to be open to all species fishing through most of the

coho season from approximately July 1 through September 20 less any closures required for coho management specific closures. This would eliminate the need for chinook only closures and the undesirable hook and release mortalities. Furthermore, past chinook salmon catch rates during the July 1 through September 20 period indicate that adequate catch would normally remain for the winter fishery given current catch limit levels.

Any chinook salmon catch remaining in the established catch limit after the coho season and the winter fishery could be taken sometime during the early part of the summer season from May 15 to June 30 of the following year. This final adjustment would then take place during an almost exclusive chinook salmon fishery. (For example, given a catch limit of 255,500 and recent average catch patterns, a fishing period of approximately 25 days would be expected from May 15 through June 8.)

Management flexibility would be retained under the new counting period to: (1) allow for positioning allowable fishing periods in the May 15 to June 30 period to benefit specific stocks as required, and (b) to implement various all species time-area closures during the period July 1 through September 20 in major chinook producing areas to decrease the chinook catch rate for the purpose of delaying more of the catch into the early summer season.

Adoption of the July 1 to June 30 counting period would not impact management of the 1983 fishery since the fishery would still be managed to achieve the 1983 harvest guideline during the October 1, 1982 to September 20, 1983 period. Simultaneously, the accounting of the new OY year would begin on July 1, 1983 and end on June 30, 1984.

The Team believes that adoption of the July 1 - June 30 accounting period has potential merit in the fact that it: (1) virtually eliminates the probability of chinook-only closures, as occurred in 1982, unless harvest guidelines are restricted to the point that the entire amount can be taken in less than the July 1 to September 20 period, and (2) it allows more complete evaluation of the all gear chinook salmon catches, escapements, etc., prior to fulfillment of the harvest ceiling.

Although the Team believes the concept may have substantial merit, the full implications of the new accounting year have not yet been fully analyzed. Concern was expressed by some team members that the new accounting year might: (1) orient management philosophy towards the quota concept, and (2) have some undesirable biological impact on the chinook stocks due to deviating from the traditional harvest patterns with more chinook-directed effort being expended later in the summer.

The Team recommends tentative approval of the July 1 - June 30 accounting year pending full evaluation of its impacts prior to the January 1984, joint Council/Board meeting. The Team further recommends that the Council and Board reserve their final decision on implementing the change until the recommended evaluation is complete. Since the change will not impact 1983 management, the Council and Board would retain the flexibility to accept or reject the final implementation of the new accounting year pending the outcome of the evaluation.

#### Plan Development Team Season Options

At the January 1983 Joint Council/Board meeting, the Team presented three season options based on the 243,000 Southeast Alaska harvest guideline for 1983 contained in the proposed U.S./Canada Pacific salmon treaty. Due to the present uncertainty concerning the actual harvest guideline which the Council and Board will establish at this meeting, the Team does not offer any new season options at this time. The Team is, however, prepared to illustrate potential season options for the various harvest guidelines that the Council and Board might consider. Those options would be designed primarily to minimize the likelihood of the necessity for coho-only seasons such as occurred in 1982.

#### Single Species Fisheries (coho-only)

The Team recommends that the occurrence of single species fisheries closures (such as the July 28 chinook closure in 1982) should be avoided if possible and used only as a last resort to manage chinook catches within the harvest ceiling. If a chinook-only closure becomes necessary, however, the Team

believes that the hook and release mortality to chinook salmon should be quantified and defined as a harvest impact. Thus, the estimated mortality of legal-sized chinook salmon could be incorporated into the harvest guideline according to established criteria. Although the Team supports the concept of measuring and accounting for the total harvest impact of management practices, it is not yet ready to recommend a specific formula by which the accounting would be accomplished. The Team believes that adequate monitoring of fishermen's catches is absolutely essential if a chinook-only closure is to occur. Such monitoring would allow managers to more accurately assess changes in fishing practices due to the single species closure on chinook salmon catch rates. Furthermore, other management options, such as selective area closures and gear restrictions such as barbless or duranickel hooks should be considered as potential methodologies to minimize the hook and release mortalities to chinook salmon.

The PDT recommends that in the event of a chinook-only closure the Council and fishermen's associations sponsor workshops to educate fishermen about the need and procedures to minimize chinook hook and release mortalities.

# THE WILD King Salmon

## PERIL AND PROMISE

The wild king salmon, the magnificent symbol of the Pacific Northwest, has reached a dire moment of historical reckoning. An unbroken sequence of 20th century exploitation and habitat destruction suggests that the creature is hurtling toward extinction, and biologists fear that major wild stocks are at the point of "non-viability" if substantial new conservation measures are not undertaken immediately. On the other hand, agreements currently under negotiation could enable the creature to flourish once again, even in close proximity to its nemesis, man. In very real terms, 1983 looms as a pivotal year for the species.

Wild king salmon stocks are depressed from the Columbia River to Alaska, in some cases severely, according to the North Pacific Fishery Management Council Salmon Plan Development Team. The team's recent survey of wild king salmon stocks shows that 1982 "escapement" (the number of fish that manage to avoid fishermen and dam turbines and migrate upstream to spawn) fell 30 percent below the optimum in Southeast Alaska; from 100 percent to 233 percent below the optimum in British Columbia; up to 173 percent below the optimum along the Washington coast; and from 38 percent to 222 percent below the optimum in the Columbia River. In fact, some of the stocks that spawn in the Columbia—the greatest of the king salmon rivers but a vestige of what it was—have already been considered for designation as endangered species.

The process of obliteration begun by earlier generations—ruthless and unregulated exploitation followed by wholesale habitat destruction during the era of the great hydroelectric projects on the Columbia—has very near-



Trollers: practitioners of a cherished lifestyle but collectively a conservation problem.

ly been completed by the woefully unsuccessful fisheries management of the past decade.

"We've really butchered the king salmon resource over the past 10 years," admits NPFMC Chairman Clem Tillion of Alaska, a controversial manager who voices a readiness to impose effective conservation restrictions on the salmon fleet even at the expense of his own career if that is what it takes to restore the king salmon stocks.

What has passed for coastwide management recently has been a spate of finger pointing and name calling among the lower 48 United States, British Columbia and Alaska. The fisheries managers, user groups and political factions from the various management jurisdictions along the coast have been busy hurling accusations at each other as an excuse for not undertaking conservation measures themselves, and grabbing fish while the stocks continue to decline.

In fact, some recent management policies are reputed to have incorporated deliberate overfishing as a means of wrenching concessions from other jurisdictions in the principal dispute that blocks cooperative, coastwide management—the inability of the United States and Canada to negotiate a salmon interception treaty after 13 years of trying.


And yet, there is tremendous promise embodied in measures aimed at mitigating the habitat catastrophe represented by the Columbia hydroelectric dams, on the one hand and at resolving the international disagreement over which country permits its fishermen to intercept too many migratory salmon from the other's rivers, on the other.

Ironically, 1982 was a big year for king salmon from California to Alaska. Fishermen and biologists alike were surprised by a natural bonanza in the form of far more fish than they expected to see. The commercial and sport fishermen in most management jurisdictions had big seasons, at least by recent standards, while the trollers in Southeast Alaska, who were managed on the basis of a quota rather than a season, watched bitterly as fish swam past their vessels only to confront the Canadian troll and net fleets, whose government had given them freer rein.

Of course, while the 1982 abundance was a gratifying surprise in terms of recent experience and the preseason projections, it was minor in historical terms. The coastwide king salmon production by commercial fleets in 1982, about 2.5 million fish, was just half a million more than the Columbia produced by itself in 1883.

And, despite the relative wealth of king salmon observed during 1982, the NPFMC planning team judged escapement adequate in only one





A troller sets his gear in Southeast Alaska, one of the areas where the controversy over chinook management will be played out.

management system, the coast of Oregon. Elsewhere, team biologists concluded that had there been no fishing interception whatsoever, major escapement goals would have been unrealized. As it was, the fishing toll was heavy, and the inadequate escapement means, in the words of Rich Lincoln of the Washington Department of Fisheries, that we are "living off our capital" at the rate of something like 1 million king salmon per year.

And yet, the mini-bonanza of 1982 has precipitated a clamor among user groups who allege that current management is too restrictive. The allegation is not surprising in view of the fact that uncoordinated policies mean that a fisherman who relinquished a fish in 1982 might have been doing no more than enriching one of his counterparts across a jurisdictional border, rather than assuaging a conservation need.

If history repeats itself in 1983, management will remain contradictory and inadequate. Each jurisdiction

will justify its shortcomings with the argument that since others are doing an even worse job, it can't be expected to drive its own fishermen out of business, and the stocks will continue to suffer. Thankfully, there is hope that historical realities are changing.

The fact that 1982 was the relatively "big year" for king salmon that occurs once or twice a decade indicates that despite the degradations we have heaped upon salmon habitats, the natural realm remains vital in the Northwest. The successes achieved in various locations along the coast in the rehabilitation of the lesser pink, sockeye and chum salmon species is proof that sound management brings results. The human shepherds of the king salmon stocks have the tools to nurse the species back to health. What remains a question is whether they have the will.

#### THE COLUMBIA

It is unfortunate but true that while the U.S. government has promised

elaborate measures to mitigate damage to the wild salmon runs of the Columbia every time it has proposed an environmentally threatening new dam, it has invariably reneged. As evidence, one need only consider the depressing statistic that between 1920 and 1980, the annual in-river commercial catch of salmon and steelhead declined from 36.3 million to 6.8 million pounds.

The government has sought to mollify the fishing industry and the public by replacing the natural runs with hatchery fish, a program of questionable wisdom and marginal success that may yet precipitate the extinction of the genetically superior wild fish, and has certainly contributed to the depletion of all the river's wild runs.

Despite the tremendous disruption inflicted upon the river system, however, it has somehow remained a significant contributor of king salmon to ocean fisheries from Southeast Alaska to Oregon; and a series of recent legislative and judicial decisions



Traditional old troll vessels at rest.

suggests that the balance of priorities along the Columbia may finally be swinging back toward fish.

Most encouraging, the Northwest Power Planning and Conservation Act of 1980 has granted fish a status equal to power generation, flood control, irrigation and navigation in terms of how the river is managed. While it is certainly too soon to take this commitment at face value in view of the historical record, the Northwest Power Planning Council established by the act has just taken a significant first step. It has adopted a program designed to protect the fish and wildlife resources of the Columbia basin to the extent that they are affected by hydroelectric projects, and to spend in the vicinity of \$700 million on capital construction and \$160 million annually in the effort.

Bert Larkins, Northwest regional director of the National Marine Fisheries Service, calls the council plan the "light at the end of the tunnel." While he admits that the electric utilities "are not enamored" by a plan that would boost the cost of generating electricity (an estimated \$2 per month for the average ratepayer), it is the inescapable law of the land assuming it survives any court challenges that may be forthcoming. "Of course," he says, "we hope there won't be any court challenges and we can implement it immediately."

Another legislative measure, the federal Salmon and Steelhead Conservation and Enhancement Act of 1980, promises more money for enhancement of the salmon stocks in

Washington and along the Columbia. And, the federal judicial decision known as Boldt II that further defines the fishing rights of treaty Indians in Washington gives the tribes the right not only to go fishing, but to have something to fish for on their traditional fishing grounds. While subsequent clarification by the courts has rendered the decision less than the Indian "veto power" over salmon-threatening land-use decisions that opponents once feared, it still suggests that land-use planning in Washington will have to consider fish from now on.

Taken together, the legislative and judicial actions promise to greatly improve the in-river conditions for salmon along the Columbia. However, each of these remedies for resource distress has a catch, an explicit or implicit requirement that the other major problem confronting king salmon—overfishing on the ocean—be resolved before anyone goes to work on habitats.

It is a problem that recurs up and down the coast: enhancement opportunities are unrealized because of the fact that with the current, contradictory state of ocean fishing management, creating better conditions for migratory king salmon in your river doesn't mean you're ever going to get any fish back.

In the wake of the creation of the big hatchery program on the Columbia, for example, Canada permitted its troll fleet to mushroom in size. The Canadians were able to boost their production on what were essentially "free" fish generated by the American

hatcheries, even if the natural stocks in British Columbia suffered in the process. In fairness to the Canadians, they look at American seine fishermen at Point Roberts, Washington, who intercept sockeye salmon bound for the Fraser River mouth near Vancouver, as just as big a problem. Whatever the final answer to the interception question, however, the existence of the big Canadian troll fleet working on migratory king salmon stocks, and the threat that enhancement work will be nullified by what occurs on the ocean, remain principal obstacles to restoring the king salmon resource.

## MANAGEMENT MIASMA

Straightening out the management contradictions promises to be at least as intractable a problem as convincing the electric utilities to share a little Columbia River water with fish. Salmon fleets from California to Alaska are "overcapitalized," in the jargon of the fishing business. There are far more fishing vessels than necessary to catch the harvestable surpluses that occur in some salmon runs, many the result of favorable tax policies and government-guaranteed financing.

The governments that were simultaneously sanctioning habitat destruction and encouraging boat construction, were also devising limited entry schemes meant to reduce participation in the salmon fisheries. The result was often exactly the opposite, as everyone entitled to a permit, and many who weren't, applied for and generally received them as hedges against the future. In Alaska, for example, while participants estimate that there were perhaps 300 active power trollers prior to limited entry, there are more than 900 now.

And, once the limited entry system was closed and the number of permits capped, the permits underwent speculative appreciation in value that helped boost the cost of entry into the salmon business to the point that no one who had \$30,000 invested in an Alaska permit, and probably six figures more invested in a boat, could afford not to fish as long and hard as was physically (and legally) possible.

The result has been the emergence of more fishermen working harder to catch fewer fish, and complaining mightily that because government encouraged them to mortgage their futures to salmon, government ought

## STATUS & CONSERVATION NEEDS OF CHINOOK

Stock Unit	Escapement Goal	Present Escapement	Needed Escapement Increase		Major Ocean Fisheries Management Opportunities (not prioritized)
			Numbers	%	
Southeast Alaska (Total)	64,200	49,200	15,000	30	
Yakutat					
N. Southeast					SE Alaska, NBC
S. Southeast					
<b>British Columbia</b>					
North Coast	90,000	30,000	60,000	200	NBC, SE. Alaska
Central Coast	70,000	21,000	49,000	233	NBC, SE. Alaska
Georgia St.	60,000	30,000	30,000	100	Georgia Strait
West Coast Vancouver Isl.	30,000	14,000	16,000	114	NBC, CBC, SE. Alaska
Fraser	125,000	55,000	70,000	127	WCVI, NBC, SE. Alaska
Transboundary <sup>1</sup>	72,500	36,000	36,500	100	SE. Alaska
<b>Washington</b>					
Grays Harbor Fall	14,600	13,000	1,600	12	
Grays Harbor Spring	1,400	1,400	-	-	
Quillayute Summer	1,500	2,900	-	-	
Quillayute Fall	6,000	7,900	-	-	SE. Alaska, NBC
Hoh Spring-Summer	1,500	1,970	-	-	
Hoh Fall	2,400	3,400	-	-	
Queets Spr.-Su.	1,400	1,341	59	4	
Queets Fall	4,200	7,200	-	-	
Strait Juan de Fuca	2,650	1,500	1,150	77	
Nooksak Springs	500	500	-	-	
Skagit Springs	3,000	1,100	1,900	173	WCVI, NBC, SE. Alaska
Puyallup Su.-Fall	3,250	2,900	350	12	
<b>Columbia River</b>					
Upriver Springs	120,000	76,100	43,900	58	
Upriver Summer	85,000	26,400	58,600	222	NBC, SE. Alaska, WCVI
Upriver Fall	40,000	(29,000)	11,000	38	NBC, SE. Alaska, WCVI

NBC = Northern British Columbia

CBC = Central British Columbia

WCVI = West Coast Vancouver Island

SOURCE: NPFMC SALMON PLAN DEVELOPMENT TEAM

to give them more fish or buy them out. Since "buy back" (governmental acquisition of boats and permits) costs money, the politically activated response along the coast has all too often been condoning and even encouraging overfishing. It has been by far the easiest choice, especially if one state's or one country's fishermen could amortize their investments by catching someone else's fish; and interest groups in Oregon and Washington have long railed at what they allege is overfishing of the king salmon stocks that occurs in Alaska and British Columbia.

Unfortunately, the hapless king salmon that spawn in the great Northwest rivers, the choicest candidates for damming and diversion, are migrants who leave their natal streams and pass through numerous management jurisdictions *en route* to and from their ocean feeding grounds which lie primarily in northern British Columbia and Alaska. The fish are

ripe for exploitation by the commercial and sport fishermen in each region they pass during their migratory journeys, and are likely candidates for hook or net throughout the roughly three years they spend on the feeding grounds.

In the absence of coordinated, coastwide management, the fish haven't got a chance, and management is anything but coordinated. Each of the coastal U.S. states manages its fishermen to its own ends; the federal government has jumped into salmon management with both feet through its regional management councils that are frequently in conflict with the states; and the federal judiciary has displayed an increasing willingness to overrule the biologists and base salmon management on legal or constitutional principles that have nothing to do with the needs of fish. Users who can't get satisfaction at the state, federal or judicial levels turn to sympathetic politicians for

legislative relief, and the result is a welter of managerial confusion in which socioeconomic and political considerations overwhelm science. And that's just in one country.

In the middle sits British Columbia with the biggest ocean harvesting impact on migratory king salmon: a 1982 catch by troll, net and sport fishermen of more than 1.5 million fish compared to some 300,000 in Southeast Alaska, and estimated interceptions of 600,000 to 800,000 U.S. wild and hatchery fish. It also has its own set of management contradictions, and if anything a worse recent record of restraining its fishermen to meet the escapement goals crucial to the species.

In the United States, federal pressure has begun to force all the states to start confronting the conservation problem. For example, the commercial ocean harvest of king salmon in Washington has been cut to the bone as the result of the Boldt rul-

ings and the dwindling condition of the Columbia River runs, most of the ocean take of Washington fish occurs north of the state's border. In view of Washington's distress, the federal government has pressured Alaska into reducing its ocean harvest of king salmon over the past three years.

British Columbia has yet to impose similarly stringent cutbacks on its troll fleet, however, and the Alaskans wail that they have been forced to jeopardize their livelihoods by relinquishing fish that have simply wound up in Canadian holds instead of their own.

For their part, the Canadians point to the seiners waiting to intercept Fraser River fish in Washington and American observers speculate that the Canadian intransigence on king salmon is a bargaining lever they intend to wield until the Americans make concessions on Fraser sockeye.

Now, however, there is hope that a U.S.-Canada salmon interception treaty may finally become a reality. Since the process has been underway fruitlessly for more than a decade, excessive optimism would be laughable, but negotiators for the two countries

got further than ever before when they hammered out a draft agreement during sessions in Seattle and Vancouver in November and December.

The document establishes a joint commitment to salmon enhancement that calls for cuts in the Alaska and British Columbia ocean harvests of king salmon and combined efforts to rebuild the king salmon runs. It defines the principle of "equity" whereby each country would get primary benefit from fish it produces in its own streams. It establishes fishing "regimes" up and down the coast that are meant to provide frameworks for conducting various fisheries even if the numbers of fish each country deserves remain in doubt. And it sets up mechanisms for continued cooperation and negotiation when future disputes arise.

According to principal U.S. negotiator Lee Alverson, it is as if the two countries are bride and groom on their way to the altar. They know there are going to be problems throughout their lives, but they are about to make a commitment to working them out within the context of a sustained relationship.

To repeat, it is the closest the two countries have gotten to a treaty in more than a decade. Unfortunately, agreement between the two negotiators is a far cry from agreement between all the factions involved, and spokesmen for groups in both countries that stand to lose a share of their traditional harvests—at least until long-term management succeeds in creating more fish for everybody—have already denounced it.

In the final analysis, ratification in each country will entail an extended political battle. Hopefully, those who perceive the benefits to be gained through cooperation will prevail, because the wild king salmon are running out of time.


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
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OPTIONS FOR MANAGEMENT OF THE 1983  
CHINOOK SALMON FISHERY IN  
SOUTHEAST ALASKA

The Alaska Trollers Association has prepared the following alternatives for chinook salmon management in the commercial fishery off Southeast Alaska. The alternatives recognize the necessity for rebuilding native Alaskan chinook stocks. Option Number 1 contemplates an expanded season yet still addresses conservation concerns. Option Number 2 incorporates a reduced harvest guideline proposed by the Alaska Department of Fish and Game and originally implemented in the 1981 season. This reduction allows for a 15 year rebuilding program that is already in progress.


Alaska's unilateral conservation program has shown excellent returns since 1981. Either policy option below will continue this successful rehabilitation program while limiting interception of the troubled Canadian and Columbia River stocks. This in turn allows Canada, Washington, and Oregon to take their own conservation actions to rehabilitate their devastated natural runs. In the meantime, Alaska's largest commercial fleet will still be able to survive economically and most importantly, Alaska will be permitted to manage biologically rather than politically.

Option Number 1:

The Department of Fish and Game will manage the Southeast Alaskan chinook salmon fishery with a summer season occurring from April 15 through September 20. During this time period the following closures will be imposed to address conservation requirements in Alaska and regions outside the state: 1) April 15 to May 15 the season will remain closed to benefit Alaskan stocks, 2) The season will close 7 days in June to benefit stocks originating in the lower 48, 3) The season will close for 10 days in August to benefit stocks destined for Canadian streams.

Option Number 2:

The Department of Fish and Game will design a season based on historical catch data that in the average year would result in a commercial catch of approximately 285,000 to 288,000 chinook salmon. After the designed season with a set number of days commences, the fishery will proceed without interruption through its termination. In this manner fishermen will catch 285,000 to 288,000 salmon if 1983 proves to be an average year, but will benefit with higher catches if increased stock availability is observed, or correspondingly have lower catches if the run exhibits lower than average availability; thus, providing a built-in mechanism for protection of the run.



Alaska  
Trollers  
Association

This option would probably require a closure from April 15 to May 15 to benefit Alaskan systems, a closure in June to benefit systems in the lower 48, and a closure in August to benefit Canadian systems.

The catch of 285,000-288,000 chinooks represents a reduction from the 1971-1980 ten year average catch of 325,000. This reduction is pursuant to a management scheduled plan to rebuild Southeast Alaskan stocks without increasing efforts on stocks with origins outside the state. The plan, designed by the Alaska Department of Fish and Game, is already 2 years into its 15 year term with observed progress well ahead of schedule.

We believe both management options address sound conservation practices in the State of Alaska without major effort shifts to stocks originating outside the state. They allow areas outside Alaska experiencing depressed stock conditions to implement their own programs to rebuild runs as they deem appropriate.

## COLUMBIA RIVER INTERTRIBAL FISH COMMISSION

TESTIMONY PRESENTED TO NORTH PACIFIC FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL

THE ALASKA BOARD OF FISHERIES

MARCH 30, 1983

The Columbia River Intertribal Fish Commission represents the common fishery interests of the Yakima, Warm Springs, Umatilla, and Nez Perce Indian Tribes. These four tribes have federally recognized fishing rights and management authority on the Columbia River. These rights have been repeatedly affirmed by federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court.

We have, on a number of occasions, urged this Council and Board to recognize and respond to the serious conservation crisis facing many chinook stocks coastwide, and Columbia River stocks in particular. With few exceptions, the major U.S. harvester of these chinook stocks is the S.E. Alaska troll fishery. Since most of the chinook stocks coastwide that are in serious trouble are from areas which, unlike the Columbia River, have not experienced significant habitat alteration, it is recognized by most biologists that a major factor contributing to the conservation crisis is overharvest by ocean fisheries, and the S.E. Alaska troll fishery in particular.

Once again we urge you to implement meaningful reductions in the S.E. Alaska troll fishery to meet the conservation needs of chinook stocks coastwide, and Columbia River stocks in particular. The conservation crisis of these stocks continues unabated, and further delays can only mean even smaller runs in the future requiring even more painful remedies. This time there is a difference, however.

In the past, a major explanation for inaction has been the presence of the Canadian fishery to the south which could have benefited from the conservation actions taken by Alaska. Of course, a long term solution to the chinook problem must include coordinated action on the part of the U.S. and Canada. The Council and the Board have repeatedly stated in the past their willingness to make the necessary reductions if the Canadians would join in the effort. The Canadians have now clearly stated their desire and intention to participate with Alaska in just such a rebuilding of the chinook resource. On December 28, 1982 U.S. negotiator Dr. Dayton Alverson submitted to the State Department a proposed treaty between the U.S. and Canada regarding management of salmon stocks migrating between the two countries. A fundamental portion of this treaty is the chinook conservation annex. This annex provides the basis for coastwide rebuilding of chinook stocks and a sharing of the conservation burden between the United States and Canada. Since the bulk of the harvest of depressed chinook stocks takes place in S.E. Alaska and northern British Columbia, the chinook harvest reductions called for in the treaty also occur in these areas. In 1983 the treaty calls for a S.E. Alaskan harvest ceiling of 263,000 chinook, 243,000 of which are to occur in the commercial fishery, and a ceiling on the B.C. chinook harvest, excepting the West Coast Vancouver Island fishery, of 868,000 fish. It further states that harvest ceilings in future years will be designed to rebuild chinook stocks in a two-cycle or ten-year period, and will be determined by a joint U.S./Canada technical committee on the basis of their evaluation of the effect of the previous year's harvest. The 1983 reductions call for a 21.2% reduction in the Alaskan chinook harvest relative to the previous ten-year average, and a 21.7% reduction in the Canadian catch. While it has been an active pastime of fishermen and managers in the last few months to compare the proposed 1983 reductions to practically any other single year, combination of



years, or time period for at least the last fifty years, depending on the particular view point of the observer, it is clear that the chinook annex represents an equitable sharing of the conservation burden, and provides the essential frame work for rebuilding of the chinook resource. Certainly the treaty is far from perfect; we, for instance, would have preferred an accelerated rebuilding schedule and more stringent cuts in 1983. However, the present treaty represents the best compromise of many competing interests that we are likely to achieve for many years to come.

In fact, the proposed treaty has received considerable and widespread support from U.S. interests. The governors of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho have all extended their endorsements, as have the fishery management agencies of these states. The Pacific Fishery Management Council recently voted unanimously to support the treaty. The Oregon legislature is now considering a resolution of support for the treaty. Treaty Indian governments and fishery management agencies have also been universal in their support. The Columbia River Intertribal Fish Commission has unequivocally endorsed the treaty. We have attached copies of these endorsements to the written version of our comments. The treaty has also received active support at the Congressional level. Senator Bob Packwood, chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, has written to us expressing his support for the treaty, and stated his intent to do everything possible to insure passage of the treaty. Senator Mark Hatfield, chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee has also expressed his complete support for the treaty. Copies of these endorsements have been attached to our testimony, and I would like to read them into the record at this time.

It is important to realize that more is at stake here than the short term benefit to chinook, if that was now enough.

Columbia River chinook are recognized as a fundamental component of the S.E. Alaskan fishery. It has often been pointed out at these meetings that the decline in Columbia River chinook can not be solely blamed on overharvest by ocean fisheries. Clearly, inriver problems, especially those introduced by the development of the Columbia River hydroelectric system, have also been instrumental in this decline. Past efforts to correct and mitigate the losses have been inadequate, misguided, and ineffective. However, we now have before us an unprecedented opportunity to address the problem.

On December 5, 1980 the U.S. Congress passed Public Law 96-501, the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, generally referred to as the Northwest Power Act. This legislation was intended to provide the Bonneville Power Administration with the authority to market power from the entire Columbia River hydroelectric system. Included, however, was the provision that measures be undertaken to "correct, mitigate, and enhance" the salmon and steelhead resource of the Columbia River as it has been affected by hydroelectric development. Pursuant to this, the Northwest Power Planning Council, created by the Act, has prepared a Fish and Wildlife Plan which includes measures to increase adult and juvenile survival and to provide additional mitigation for upriver losses. You should all have a copy of this plan before you, and I invite you to study its ambitious provisions. However, the Power Planning Council has recognized that hydroelectric development is by no means the only problem which plagues the Columbia River chinook resource. Overharvest, primarily by ocean fisheries, is recognized as another key factor. The Plan provides many of the measures necessary for correction of inriver problems, but at the same time demands reductions in ocean fishing.

I quote from section 503 of the plan on page 5-3:

"The Council recognizes that an excessive mixed-stock ocean and river fishery could reduce the effectiveness of program measures designed to restore naturally spawning salmon stocks, and believes that the fisheries management entities should ensure adequate levels of escapement (returning adults) to strengthen and improve the upriver stocks of the Columbia River Basin. Therefore, the Council has developed measures that provide for consultation and coordination with these entities, as well as measures that require adequate ocean harvest regulations to be imposed before the Council will approve funding of certain mitigation and enhancement efforts." (emphasis added).

The Power Planning Council has stated that it regards the completion of a U.S./Canada salmon treaty to be fundamental to the successful completion of its program and has endorsed the present draft treaty. We have attached a copy of a letter of endorsement from Dan Evans, chairman of the Power Planning Council to Governor Scheffield. Mr. Evans has told us that he will also write a letter of endorsement to the Council in the near future.

It is apparent that support for the present treaty is practically universal. The State of Alaska is evidently the lone holdout. Although we have yet to see any official statement on the treaty, press reports indicate that considerable and heated opposition to the treaty exists in Alaska. Although opposition from user groups is to be expected, the opposition from this Council and Board, as well as the Alaskan government is not so easily fathomed in light of the laudatory statements of the past regarding your willingness to participate in a joint rebuilding program with Canada.

It should be perfectly clear to all reviewers of the treaty that the conservation needs of the resource are completely independent of the treaty, and must be addressed in one form or another. While the cooperation of Canada is important, and obviously desirable, the conservation of United States chinook stocks is an obligation of U.S. management agencies as stated in legislation such as the FCMA. Without the cooperation of Canada, far more severe measures will be required of Alaska to meet the needs of the resource. We calculate that in 1983, an Alaskan chinook harvest ceiling of 143,000 would be needed to meet the conservation requirements of Columbia River bright chinook, absent international cooperation. Of this harvest ceiling 122,000 would be allocated to troll and net commercial fisheries. Directed chinook fisheries would have to be eliminated, and the all species season could not open before July 17. These measures would only meet the conservation needs for Columbia River bright fall chinook, while supplying the inriver commercial fishery with only 5,500 fish, approximately the same as the record low 1982 catch. The needs of upriver summer chinook would not be met.

Thus the choices available to the government of Alaska and this Council and Board are clear: First, you can join with all other U.S. management agencies and governmental bodies to work with Canada to rebuild the chinook resource. This would require in 1983 a chinook harvest ceiling of 263,000, and a commercial harvest ceiling of 243,000. The alternative, if Alaska chooses not to join in a cooperative effort, is for Alaska to bear the entire conservation burden. This would require in 1983 a chinook harvest ceiling of 143,000. The Columbia River Intertribal Fish Commission is committed to the restoration of natural spawning chinook stocks, especially those originating in the upper Columbia River. We call upon you to join with us in a cooperative effort, with the government of Canada, to realize the goals of the U.S./Canada salmon treaty. This treaty represents a fair and reasonable accommodation of all our interests. The costs of forsaking this treaty are incalculable. We urge you not to take that risk.

ATTACHMENT  
POSITION OF THE COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-TRIBAL  
FISH COMMISSION REGARDING THE PROPOSED TREATY BETWEEN THE  
UNITED STATES AND CANADA

The Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission consistently has stated its view that it is critically important to reduce harvest rates on naturally spawning chinook stocks coastwide, and that the proposed treaty between the governments of the United States and Canada is fundamental to achieving that objective. Furthermore, ratification of the proposed treaty will be a critical determinant of the success of currently planned enhancement activities. For example, the Northwest Power Planning Council recently issued its final Fish and Wildlife Program, pursuant to section 4(h) of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act. That program contemplates a wide-ranging, comprehensive effort to protect, mitigate and enhance the anadromous fish resources of the Columbia River basin. Similarly, the states of Oregon, Washington and the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission are engaged in the development of a comprehensive enhancement plan for the Columbia River system, in accord with section 102 of the Salmon and Steelhead Conservation and Enhancement Act of 1980. The enhancement of upriver chinook stocks will be an integral part of both those programs. The success of both programs, and other efforts being undertaken throughout the Pacific Northwest, hinges upon ratification of the proposed treaty between the governments of Canada and the United States.

For all of these reasons, the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission and its member tribes have endorsed the proposed treaty between the United States and Canada concerning Pacific salmon stocks. We are convinced that the proposed treaty, in its current form, fairly accommodates the divergent interests of both countries. We are further convinced that in the absence of this treaty our joint efforts to protect and restore naturally spawning chinook salmon stocks will be seriously frustrated. Thus, the Commission strongly urges that the proposed treaty be submitted to the United States Senate. The Commission and its member tribes look forward to working with the executive and legislative branches of the national government and with state fishery management agencies to assure that the treaty is ratified by the Senate, and that the treaty's implementing legislation faithfully comports with all aspects of the proposed treaty.



# Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission

## news release

MAR 15 1983

### ATTACHMENT

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: March 14, 1983

CONTACT: Bill Frank Jr., Chairman, (206) 352-8030  
Elsie Dennis, Information Services Manager, (206) 352-8030  
EVENINGS: (206) 952-5066

1983/02 TRIBES CONSIDER ENDORSEMENT OF U.S.-CANADA TREATY

The 20 Tribes of the Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission (NWIFC) support the basic principles of the treaty drafted on the management of Pacific salmon stocks between the U.S. and Canada. The Tribes are reserving their full support pending assurance that their own treaty fishing rights "will not be diminished or impaired in any way."

At a Fri., March 11 meeting of the Puget Sound and Washington coastal Tribes, Bill Frank Jr., NWIFC Chairman, said that the Tribes are still considering whether they can fully endorse the treaty.

"I want to emphasize that the Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission and our member Tribes believe that a treaty between the two countries is in everyone's best interest," said Frank.

Among the positive points of the draft, the Tribes recognize, are that it promotes the development and implementation of needed comprehensive conservation programs to protect natural stocks of salmon, and that it limits interception of each country's stocks.

"The Tribes have devoted considerable time in monitoring the draft treaty language developed during the negotiations between the two countries. They realize that a treaty is needed for coordinated fisheries management with Canada. We do need a treaty; the fish need a treaty," Frank stated.

In further analysis of the draft treaty, Tribal and Commission representatives will be meeting with Federal officials to clarify its impact on U.S. Indian treaties, salmon catch limits, and other aspects of fisheries management.

The following is the motion unanimously adopted by the Case Area Tribes of U.S. v. Washington:

The Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission and our member Tribes recognize that a treaty between the United States and Canada is an essential element in the effective management of our common fisheries resource. We support the basic principles of this treaty. However, we reserve full support of the draft treaty pending assurance from the Federal Government that existing Indian treaty rights as currently affirmed by the Federal courts are not diminished or impaired in any way. This support is specifically conditioned upon the full participation of Tribal governments in the ratification processes of the Federal Executive and Legislative branches, and in the implementation of the treaty as carried out by both governments.

ATTACHMENT

BOB PACKWOOD, OREG. CHAIRMAN  
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.  
JOHN C. DANFORTH, MISS.  
NANCY LONDON KASSEBAUM, KANS.  
LARRY PRESSLER, S. DAK.  
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TED STEVENS, ALASKA  
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WENDELL H. FORD, KY.  
DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR., MICH.  
J. JAMES EXON, NEBR.  
HOWELL HEFLIN, ALA.  
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, N.J.  
WILLIAM M. DIFENDERFER, CHIEF COUNSEL  
RALPH B. EVERETT, MINORITY CHIEF COUNSEL

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE,  
AND TRANSPORTATION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 15, 1983

RECEIVED

MAR 21 1983

Mr. S. Timothy Wapato  
Executive Director  
Columbia River Inter-Tribal  
Fish Commission  
2705 East Burnside Street  
Portland, Oregon 97214

COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-  
TRIBAL FISH COMMISSION  
PORTLAND, OREGON

Dear Mr. Wapato:

Thanks for contacting me in support of the United States-  
Canada salmon treaty.

I am glad to know that we are in agreement on this issue.  
The salmon stocks of the Columbia River have been depressed by  
a number of factors during the last several decades. Not the  
least of these is the interception of salmon by Canadian and  
Alaskan fishermen during the time the fish spend in the ocean.

The treaty would help to significantly reduce intercep-  
tions and insure that more fish return upriver to spawn. This,  
combined with other restoration measures such as hatchery work  
and habitat improvement, will be a big step toward the goal of  
restoring natural runs on the Columbia to levels approaching  
their traditional size.

As you know, opposition has been expressed from several  
areas. This was to be expected, but it should not deter us  
from working for ratification of the agreement. This is my  
goal and I'll do everything possible toward that end.

Again, thanks for taking the time to write. Please  
keep in touch.

Cordially,



BOB PACKWOOD

BP: dpj

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C.

March 25, 1983

Mr. Tim Wapato  
Inter-Tribal Fish Commission  
2705 E. Burnside Street  
Portland, Oregon 97214

Dear Mr. Wapato:

Thank you for your recent letter concerning the proposed Pacific Salmon Treaty between the United States and Canada.


As you know, I have supported efforts in the Senate to mitigate losses of salmon stocks that have resulted from interception by Canadian and Alaskan fishermen. For the last two decades, salmon stocks have been declining for a variety of reasons, including, among other things, the loss of upriver habitat and native stocks. Interception has compounded that problem.

I am hopeful that the U.S./Canadian treaty will help to restore both upriver salmon stocks, as well as reduce interception of salmon by Canadian and Alaskan fishermen. As you know, opposition has been expressed over this treaty for a variety of reasons. However, please be assured that I will support the treaty and work to effectuate final passage in the Senate.

Thank you again for sharing your thoughts and comments with me on this important matter. I hope you will continue to do so in the future.

Kind regards.

Sincerely,



Mark O. Hatfield  
United States Senator

MOH/twm



ATTACHMENT

# NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL

SUITE 200 • 700 S.W. TAYLOR STREET  
PORTLAND, OREGON 97205 • (503) 222-5161

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James Collins  
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Montana  
Gerald Mueller  
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Robert (Bob) Sarvik  
Vice-Chairman  
Idaho  
W. Larry Mills  
Idaho  
Roy Hemmingway  
Oregon  
Alfred A. Hampson  
Oregon

January 26, 1983

William D. Sheffield  
Governor of Alaska  
State Capitol  
Juneau, Alaska 99811

Honorable William D. Sheffield:

It is our understanding that you are currently undertaking a review of the proposed U.S./Canada fisheries agreement to determine whether the proposed agreement is in the overall interest of the State of Alaska. We appreciate the significant interest of the state of Alaska in this agreement and believe that you have taken a very responsible position by conducting this review of the proposed agreement within a specific time.

As you may be aware, the Northwest Power Planning Council adopted a comprehensive Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program on November 15, 1982, copies of which I am enclosing. This program is aimed at rebuilding many of the upriver naturally spawning stocks, especially chinook stocks in the Columbia River Basin. The program provides flows for downstream migrants which will cost the region's ratepayers approximately \$160 million a year in terms of lost firm energy load carrying capability. Also, the total costs for research, capital, operation and maintenance of all the program measures could result in a total of approximately \$700 million over the next 20 years, most of which is aimed at the rebuilding of anadromous fish stocks. Bonneville Power Administration alone is planning a budget of almost \$50 million for the next two fiscal years.


This significant investment in Columbia River fish stocks is conditioned, however, to a large degree on whether the harvest management entities impose adequate controls on the mixed-stock ocean fishery (see Section 500). The Council has established a Fish and Wildlife Committee (see Section 1100) to oversee the implementation of the program, to examine whether adequate harvest controls are being imposed and to recommend future funding of particular program measures contingent upon adequate controls being imposed.

The Council believes that this U.S./Canada agreement, if ratified, would move substantially in the direction of assuring greater numbers of returning adults to the Columbia River. Therefore, we strongly urge you

to support the eventual signing and ratification of this agreement. Clearly, the Council will face many future decisions about the likelihood of inriver investments resulting in an increase in the number of returning adults. The Council will not undertake such investments if positive results are unlikely.

Again, we are pleased that you are conducting this review. If we can be of any further assistance in explaining or providing additional information about the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, please contact Curt Marshall, Fish and Wildlife Program Manager. Also, I and other members of the Fish and Wildlife Committee would be happy to meet with you to discuss this matter further.

Sincerely,



Daniel J. Evans  
Chairman

Attachments

cc: Elmer Rasmussen

DJE/jp



D-1

STATE OF ALASKA  
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR  
JUNEAU

March 23, 1983

Alaska Board of Fisheries  
North Pacific Fisheries  
Management Council

Gentlemen:

In January of this year I requested that you delay regulatory action or make recommendations regarding the proposed United States/Canada Salmon Interception Treaty until my Administration had completed a review of the document. I appointed a Task Force to evaluate the draft treaty and recommend a course of action to me which would ensure that Alaskan fishery industry interests are equitably treated. As you are aware, based on their report to me, I publicly stated that I could not support the draft as written.

I realize that you must now promulgate regulations for the 1983 season. If there was an agreed upon treaty it would serve as the framework for the management system; unfortunately we do not have such agreement. Nearly everyone we have talked to does agree however that a treaty between the two countries is needed. There also seems to be little doubt that some urgency exists to continue the negotiation process, and certainly to ensure the gains which have been made to date are not lost by unwise actions taken during the 1983 season.

I encourage you to carefully consider regulations required to conserve the stocks and promote rational management between the two countries, either as part of a continuing treaty negotiating process or as an interim measure. I also encourage you to not take a specific stand on the desirability of the current draft, but rather to encourage all parties to proceed with as much speed as possible to see if an agreement can be reached.

I have enclosed a copy of a letter I have sent to the State Department requesting assistance in further discussions with Canada. I think a treaty to promote conservation and equitable harvest sharing is an absolute necessity, but there is some work yet to be done in achieving this.

I ask you to bear with me in our continuing efforts to finalize an equitable agreement. I realize that your task is complicated by the lack of such a framework and the

March 28, 1983

uncertainty as to what regulatory measures other jurisdictions may adopt in 1983 under the current situation. Nevertheless I believe you will see the necessity that we continue with a program to promote conservation of the stocks and prevent uncontrolled interception increases. Only in this way can we leave the way open to a long range solution to this complex problem. We must certainly encourage our Canadian neighbors to exercise similar constraint.

Thank you for your continuing efforts to promote a healthy Alaskan fishery industry.

Sincerely,



Bill Sheffield  
Governor

Enclosure



STATE OF ALASKA  
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR  
JUNEAU

March 28, 1983

The Honorable George Schultz  
Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As a culmination of some twenty years of complex negotiations between the United States (U.S.) and Canada, the Chief U.S. Negotiator, Dr. Dayton Alverson, presented the United States' government, the public, and my Administration a draft of a proposed salmon interception treaty in January of this year. My Administration had not had the opportunity to participate in this negotiating process, although other Alaska agency people and fishermen had done so. I asked the negotiator for a 60 day period to review the draft to assure myself that it was in the best interests of the Alaskan fishing industry before deciding whether to put our full support behind it. I also asked the Alaska Board of Fisheries and the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council to delay action on either their approval or disapproval of the treaty or implementation of regulations to enact it until I completed my review.

I appointed a task force of individuals knowledgeable in fisheries, but who had not been direct participants in the treaty negotiation process, to evaluate the draft treaty and recommend to me what, if any, problem areas existed from Alaska's standpoint. This task force studied the treaty in detail, sifted through the massive amount of correspondence received by them and my office on this topic, and reviewed or participated in teleconferences and hearings by the Legislature, as well as talking to various gear group representatives in person. It is pertinent to note that not a single fisherman, fishermen's organization, or industry representative endorsed the treaty in its current form. Additionally, agency people who had been participants in the negotiation agreed that problems existed in the draft that needed to be corrected.

There seems to be little doubt in most people's minds that a treaty to manage the harvest of salmon taken in one country and bound for the other country's spawning streams is an absolute necessity to both conserve the stocks and promote

their future enhancement. Without a treaty, uncontrolled interceptions, disruption of domestic fisheries, and major conservation problems can result. It is also unlikely that any country or state is going to undertake substantial enhancement or run rehabilitation, which is now a technically feasible reality, without agreements that protect that investment. The problem has been to achieve an agreement that is perceived to be evenhanded and equitable in its distribution of benefits and restrictions to the various users in both countries. This is an extremely complex problem and given the number of stocks involved, the poor data and the number of different user groups and jurisdictions involved, it is unlikely any agreement is going to be received with total satisfaction by all. It is, however, evident from the response received on this current draft and reflected in the task force's recommendations to me, that the present treaty language has some very serious problems from Alaska's standpoint. This conclusion led me to release a previous statement that I was unable to support the draft treaty as currently written.

Some urgency exists to continue the negotiation process, and certainly to ensure the gains which have been made to date are not lost by unwise actions taken during the 1983 season. The North Pacific Fishery Management Council and the Alaska Board of Fisheries will be meeting shortly in Anchorage to consider regulations for the 1983 season, and I will encourage them to carefully consider regulations required to consider the stocks and promote rational management between the two countries, either as part of a continuing treaty negotiation process or as an interim measure. I will also encourage them to not take a specific stand on the desirability of the current draft, but rather to encourage that all parties proceed with as much speed as possible to see if an agreement can be reached.

I recently have entered into discussions with the Governors of Washington and Oregon to see if there is some common ground along which we can proceed to make treaty revisions acceptable to Alaska, and develop a United States' approach to further talks with the Canadians. Policy level staff from my Administration have met with policy level staff of these other two states to continue these discussions. I am pleased to report that all groups seem to have a common goal, although we do not have total agreement on the particulars or how to proceed. Other groups than those I have contacted were also represented in the original negotiating delegation. Nevertheless, perhaps the next step is to find how amenable the Canadian government is to continuing these discussions with an informal small group to determine just what flexibility exists in modifying the current draft.

March 28, 1983

I am requesting your assistance in pursuing this course of action. Members of my staff and I stand ready to meet with Canadian government officials to explore our areas of concern at any time.

The primary areas of concern relayed to me by my task force which need further discussion to achieve an agreement that is fair and equitable to Alaskans include:

1. Chinook harvest limits in 1983 and subsequent years.
2. Lack of a specific limit on some Canadian chinook salmon fisheries.
3. The need to examine Canadian chinook salmon fishing regulations, which are not now available, and ensure that they are comparable to measures enacted in Alaska.
4. The level of Canadian fisheries in the transboundary rivers, particularly for Stikine coho and sockeye salmon, and the limits for these fisheries in 1983, 1984, and future years.
5. The need to assure Alaskan fisheries will be able to harvest production from our own enhancement and natural salmon production, despite agreed limits in certain fisheries.
6. Clarification of provisions for the Yukon River to assure timely but separate negotiations from the current treaty process.
7. Provisions for treaty reratification.

The task force identified many areas where errors existed in the draft treaty language and where there was misunderstanding or confusion as to the meaning of certain articles or annexes, many of which could presumably be corrected by further discussion. I have enclosed, as a confidential negotiating support document, further details on each of these issues.

It is my sincere hope that the current draft can be modified so it becomes acceptable to Alaskans in the very near future. It would be desirable if an amended and supportable document could proceed through the ratification process as

The Honorable George Schultz

-4- -

March 28, 1983

soon as possible to serve as a model for 1983 fishing regulations and to secure the conservation and enhancement benefits to our fisheries that are envisioned in the treaty agreement.

Sincerely,



Bill Sheffield  
Governor

Enclosure

cc: Theodore G. Kronmiller  
Deputy Assistant Secretary for  
Oceans and Fisheries Affairs



COLUMBIA RIVER INTERTRIBAL FISH COMMISSION

Bright Fall Chinook

Priest Rapids Hatchery Age/Sex Composition

Year	Age	% Total	Males	% Age	% Sex	Females	% Age	% Sex	Total Number
1990	2's	53.91	2564	100.00	79.06	0	.00	.00	2564
	3's	9.69	351	75.14	10.82	110	23.56	7.27	461
	4's	9.21	153	34.93	4.72	285	65.07	19.84	438
	5's	27.19	175	13.53	5.40	1118	86.47	73.89	1293
	Total		3243			1513			4756
	Age	% Total	Males	% Age	% Sex	Females	% Age	% Sex	Total Number
1991	2's	39.02	1523	100.00	51.96	0	.00	.00	1523
	3's	19.96	731	93.84	24.94	48	6.16	4.94	779
	4's	34.72	577	42.58	19.69	778	57.42	30.04	1355
	5's	6.30	100	40.65	3.41	146	59.35	15.02	246
	Total		2931			972			3903
	Age	% Total	Males	% Age	% Sex	Females	% Age	% Sex	Total Number
1992	2's	55.28	4130	100.00	65.15	0	.00	.00	4130
	3's	32.43	1923	79.36	30.54	500	20.54	44.17	2423
	4's	8.21	204	36.54	3.55	309	53.46	34.36	513
	5's	4.08	62	20.35	1.98	243	79.57	21.47	305
	Total		6309			1152			7471

Age/sex comp. data from WBF: 03/21/93

Canadian Embassy



Ambassade du Canada

A I D E - M E M O I R E

Canadian and U.S. negotiators initialled a draft Pacific Salmon Treaty in February, 1983. In presenting it to the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States, they expressed the view that it represented "a fair and balanced accord which will permit both Parties to overcome severe conservation problems and provide opportunities to increase production through enhancement."

The Canadian authorities have noted the press release issued by the Governor of Alaska on February 21 indicating that he was not prepared to endorse the draft Treaty and that he was calling for further negotiations. Such views are not limited to the United States. Important elements of the Canadian fishing industry have indicated their opposition to the draft Treaty.

It is now up to the Canadian and U.S. Governments to decide whether to proceed with the draft Treaty, on the basis of their own perceptions of the balance of advantages and disadvantages it may offer. In any event, however, so far as the Government of Canada is concerned, the status quo cannot be maintained. The Canadian authorities believe that it will be

difficult to continue the progress that has been made in the regulation of intercepting fisheries on an informal basis over the past two years, in anticipation of the conclusion of the Treaty. The following points, in particular, should be noted:

- (1) Although the Canadian authorities would still seek to develop cooperative arrangements to rebuild depressed chinook stocks, it would be unreasonable to expect them to take the necessary measures in the sport and commercial fisheries without corresponding action in Alaska. Chinook conservation is a matter of serious concern to both sides, as evidenced by U.S. Senate Resolution 455 of October 1, 1982.
- (2) Canadian hatcheries on the west coast of Vancouver Island are contributing increasing numbers of chinook salmon to Alaskan fisheries, with reduced benefits to Canadian fishermen; Canada would be obliged to consider converting these hatcheries to the production of coho salmon.
- (3) The situation on the transboundary rivers, notably the Yukon, Stikine and Taku, would be especially

difficult. The Canadian authorities, while remaining responsive to conservation needs, would have no choice but to have a vigorous fishing presence on these rivers.

- (4) With respect to Fraser River sockeye and pink runs, it may be expected that Canada would increase its catches outside the Convention Area, particularly for pink salmon in 1983.
- (5) Finally, with regard to the Fraser River, Canada shares with the USA the desire to ensure transition arrangements that take into account the achievements of the present Salmon Commission. Considering the very weak sockeye run expected in 1984, Canada would wish the Salmon Commission to continue to regulate the fisheries in the Convention Area during that year. The Canadian authorities, however, cannot see the continuation of present arrangements beyond the 1984 season, outside the wider framework of cooperation envisaged in the present draft Treaty.

Washington, D.C.

March 7, 1983

JAN 11 1983

Fisheries Research Institute  
School of Fisheries  
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ACTION	ROUTE TO	INITIAL
	Dir.	
	Asst. Dir.	
	Adm. Off.	4
	Ext. Off.	
	Lab.	
	Stocking	
	Spec. Inv.	
	Training	
	Public Aff.	
	Rec. Mgmt.	
	Other	

DETERMINATION OF STOCK ORIGINS OF CHINOOK SALMON  
INCIDENTALLY CAUGHT IN FOREIGN TRAWLS  
IN THE ALASKA FCZ

by

Katherine W. Myers and Donald E. Rogers

Quarterly Report, October - December 1982  
Contract No. 81-5  
North Pacific Fisheries Management Council

Approved

Submitted January 7, 1983

*Robert S. Bengner*  
Director

## INTRODUCTION

Research accomplished during the previous fiscal year (October 1, 1981 - September 30, 1982) demonstrated the feasibility of using freshwater-marine growth patterns on the scales of selected major Asian and North American chinook salmon stocks to classify scale samples collected by U.S. observers on foreign trawlers to region or river of origin (Myers and Rogers 1982). The primary objective of this project during the current fiscal year is to classify "area-significant" ( $n \geq 25$  fish when samples are stratified by month and National Marine Fisheries Service statistical areas) samples of chinook caught by foreign groundfish fisheries operating in the Alaska Fishery Conservation Zone in 1978, 1979, and 1981 to probable region or river of origin. In addition, recommendations on the feasibility of using scale pattern analysis to determine origins of chinook salmon caught in the S.E. Alaskan troll fishery will be provided.

To accomplish these objectives, work during the present quarter included: 1) the measurement of freshwater-marine growth patterns on the scales of chinook of unknown origin caught by foreign trawl fisheries in 1978, 1979, and 1981, 2) the determination of brood year standards needed for a complete scale pattern analysis of area-significant samples of freshwater age 1. trawl-caught chinook, 3) the continued collection of inshore scale samples, catch, and escapement data from North American fisheries resource agencies, and 4) the ageing of inshore scale samples of selected major coastal stocks that returned to their rivers of origin in 1979-1982.

## METHODS AND RESULTS

Measurement of trawl-caught chinook scale samples

Approximately 2,200 scales of chinook caught in the 1978-81 foreign trawl fisheries in the Alaska FCZ were measured during this quarter (Table 1). Measurements were made to the outer edge of each circulus in the freshwater and first ocean year for three defined zones: 1) center of focus through last circulus in the freshwater annulus, 2) first circulus in freshwater plus growth zone (if present) through last freshwater circulus, and 3) first circulus in the first ocean zone through last circulus in the first ocean annulus.

Determination of Brood Year Standards

The scale patterns of trawl-caught chinook of unknown origin will be classified using inshore (known origin) scale samples from fish of the same brood year. Because the maturity of chinook in samples collected by U.S. observers is unknown, the brood year standards will include all possible age classes that the fish might have returned as had they lived to maturity. Using this technique, a complete scale pattern analysis of area-significant samples of freshwater age 1. chinook caught in 1978, 1979, and 1981 will require ten brood year standards for each region or river of origin (Table 2). At the present time, we plan to construct standards for five regions (Asia, western Alaska, central Alaska, southeast Alaska-British Columbia, and Washington-Oregon-California) and three "rivers" (Yukon, Kuskokwim, and Bristol Bay [Nushagak and Togiak]). We anticipate that the construction of some

Table 1. Brood year, National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) statistical area, catch date, age class, and sample size of trawl-caught chinook scales measured from October 1 through December 31, 1982.

Brood Year	NMFS Area*	Catch Date		Age Class	Sample Size
		Month	Year		
1973	Bering 2	Feb	1979	1.4	39
1974	Bering 2	Nov	1978	1.2	42
	Bering 2	Jan	1979	1.3	51
	Bering 2	Feb	1979	1.3	251
	Bering 2	Mar	1979	1.3	47
	Bering 2	Apr	1979	1.3	55
1975	Bering 1	Sep	1979	1.2	40
	Bering 1	Oct	1979	1.2	104
	Bering 2	Jan	1979	1.2	97
	Bering 2	Feb	1979	1.2	803
	Bering 2	Mar	1979	1.2	81
	Bering 2	Apr	1979	1.2	123
	Bering 2	May	1979	1.2	45
	Bering 2	Nov	1979	1.2	60
	Bering 2	Dec	1979	1.2	43
	Shumagin	Sep	1979	1.2	28
1976	Bering 2	Nov	1979	1.1	27
	Bering 1	Mar	1981	1.3	29
1977	Bering 1	May	1981	1.2	25
	Bering 1	Oct	1981	1.2	40
	Bering 1	Nov	1981	1.2	149
1978	Bering 1	Nov	1981	1.1	43
Total Sample Size					2,222

\* Bering 1 = Bering Sea east of 170°W  
 Bering 2 = Bering Sea north of 55°N between 180° and 170°W  
 Shumagin = Gulf of Alaska between 170°W and 159°W within the  
 200 mile fishery Conservation Zone



Table 2. Brood year standards needed for scale pattern analysis of freshwater age 1. trawl-caught chinook (1978, 1979, 1981).

Brood Year Standard	Age classes included in brood year standard		Trawl-caught chinook that brood year standard will classify	
	Age Class	Return Year	Age Class	Capture Date
1973	1.4	1979	1.4	02/79
	1.5	1980		
1974	1.3	1979	1.2	11/78
	1.4	1980	1.3	01/79-04/79
	1.5	1981		
1975A	1.2	1979	1.2	01/79-05/79
	1.3	1980		
	1.4	1981		
	1.5	1982		
1975B	1.3	1980	1.2	09/79-12/79
	1.4	1981		
	1.5	1982		
1975C	1.4	1981	1.4	01/81
	1.5	1982		
1976A	1.2	1980	1.1	11/79
	1.3	1981		
	1.4	1982		
1976B	1.3	1981	1.3	01/81-04/81
	1.4	1982		
1977A	1.2	1981	1.2	01/81-04/81
1977B	1.3	1982	1.2	10/81-12/81
1978	1.2	1982	1.1	10/81-11/81

of the ten brood year standards listed in Table 2 will not be possible for all eight regions and rivers due to a lack of scale samples for particular age classes, regions, rivers, and years.

#### Collection of Inshore Scale Samples, Catch, and Escapement Data

Inshore scale samples of chinook collected from fisheries resource agencies during the present quarter are shown in Table 3. Collection efforts were concentrated on obtaining 1982 samples from all regions as well as increasing our sample sizes of chinook scales from central and southeast Alaska. The 1982 samples are particularly important for the construction of brood year standards used to classify chinook caught in the 1981 trawl fishery (Table 2). To date, we have not yet received any of the requested 1981 or 1982 scales from Asia, or any of the requested 1982 scales from Bristol Bay, Cook Inlet, British Columbia, and most rivers in Washington and Oregon.

In addition to the scale samples, we continued to collect catch and escapement data for major stocks of North American chinook. These data will be used in conjunction with age composition data to determine the number of scales of each age class and stock to be included in the brood year standards.

#### Ageing of Inshore Scale Samples

Freshwater and ocean ages of approximately 25,000 chinook salmon returning to North American rivers from the Sacramento in California to the Yukon in Alaska in 1979-1982 were determined by Fisheries Research

Table 3. Inshore chinook scale samples collected from fisheries resource agencies, October-December 1982.

Region	Location	Year(s)	Resource Agency
Western Alaska	Yukon R.		Alaska Dept. Fish & Game
	Emmonak	1982	(Comm. Fish. Div.)
	Big Eddy	1982	"
	St. Mary's	1982	"
	Kuskokwim R.		
	Bethel	1982	"
	Kwegooyuk	1982	"
	Aniak Sonar	1982	"
	Kanektok R.		
	Quinhagak	1982	"
Central Alaska	Goodnews R.		
	Goodnews Bay	1982	"
	Cook Inlet		Alaska Dept. Fish & Game
	Deep Creek	1975-81	(Sport Fish. Div.)
	Anchor R.	1975-81	"
Prince William Sound	Ninilchik R.	1975-81	"
	Kenai R.	1975-81	"
	Copper R.	1982	Alaska Dept. Fish & Game
			(Comm. Fish. Div.)
Southeast Alaska	Taku R.		Alaska Dept. Fish & Game
	Nakina	1975-81	(Sport Fish. Div.)
	Alsek R.	1975-79	"
	Stikine R.	1975-77	"
	Little Tahltan	1976-1979	"
	Andrews Cr.	1976-1977	"
	Dry Bay (Alsek R.)	1982	Alaska Dept. Fish & Game
			(Comm. Fish. Div.)
	Nahlin R.	1982	"
	Sashin Cr.	1982	"
	Stikine R.	1982	"
	Little Tahltan	1982	"
	Keta R.	1982	"
	Andrews Cr.	1982	"
	Tahltan R.	1982	"
Cripple Cr.	1982	"	
Carrol R.	1982	"	
Ketchikan Cr.	1982	"	
Asia	Kamchatka	1965-1969	National Marine Fisheries Service

Table 3 (cont.'d)

Region	Location	Year(s)	Resource Agency
California- Oregon-Wash- ington	Columbia R.		
	Woody Island	1982	Oregon Dept. Fish & Wildl.
	Comm. Fish.	1982	"
	Coyote	1982	Washington Dept. of Fish.
	Rogue R.	1982	Oregon Dept. Fish & Wildl.
	Klamath R.	1982	U.S. Fish & Wildl. Serv.
	Sacramento R.	1982	"

Institute scale analysts during this quarter. In addition to providing information on the number of usable scales available for our analyses, age composition data will be used to determine the number of scales of each age class and stock to be included in the brood year standards. Freshwater age compositions may also be used to determine Alaskan or non-Alaskan origin of trawl-caught chinook.

#### REFERENCES CITED

Myers, K. W., and D. E. Rogers. 1982. Determination of stock origins of chinook salmon incidentally caught in foreign trawls in the Alaska FCZ. Annual Report, Oct. 1, 1981 - Sept. 30, 1982, Contract No. 81-5, North Pacific Fishery Management Council, 64 pp. Univ. Washington, Fish. Res. Inst., FRI-UW-8215, Seattle, WA 98195.

SOUTHEAST ALASKA AREA

5 AAC 46.050. WATERS CLOSED TO SPORT FISHING.

(c) In fresh water:

(6) the Chilkat River is closed to coho salmon fishing from August 1 through September 30.

Justification: New section necessary to provide for subsistence priority and conform to the existing state and federal laws.

Proposed by: N.A. Morris (195)

119

5 AAC 46.050. WATERS CLOSED TO SPORT FISHING. - Close Mitchell Bay near Angoon to sport fishing for coho salmon until subsistence needs have been satisfied.

The proposed regulation reads as follows:

5 AAC 46.050. WATERS CLOSED TO SPORT FISHING.

(c) In salt water:

(6) Mitchell Bay-Kootznahoo Inlet is closed to fishing for coho salmon until subsistence priorities are satisfied.

Justification: Close sport fishing until subsistence priorities are met, in compliance with authority under existing state and federal laws.

Proposed by: David Morris (205)

SOUTHEAST-YAKUTAT  
SALMON

120

\* 5 AAC 33.365.(b)(8)(9) and (10)(New Subsection). SOUTHEASTERN ALASKA-YAKUTAT CHINOOK AND COHO SALMON TROLL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PLAN. (Regulation page 156). Change or eliminate the chinook salmon guideline harvest level.

The proposed regulation reads as follows:

5 AAC 33.365. SOUTHEASTERN ALASKA-YAKUTAT CHINOOK AND COHO SALMON TROLL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PLAN.

Option 1:

(b)(8) to limit the total commercial king salmon harvest by all gear types in the Southeastern and Yakutat areas to a guideline harvest range of 292,000 to 312,000 [243,000 to 288,000] fish (plus the estimated annual Alaska hatchery production of harvestable king salmon);

SOUTHEAST-YAKUTAT

Option 2:

(b)(8) to limit the total commercial king salmon harvest by all gear types in Southeastern and Yakutat areas to a minimum guideline harvest level of 320,000 [RANGE OF 243,000 TO 288,000] fish (plus the estimated annual Alaska hatchery production of harvestable king salmon);

Option 3

(b)(8) to limit the [TOTAL] commercial king salmon harvest by troll [ALL] gear [TYPES] in the Southeastern and Yakutat areas to a guideline harvest level [RANGE] of 300,000 [243,000 TO 288,000] fish; [(PLUS THE ESTIMATED ANNUAL ALASKA HATCHERY PRODUCTION OF HARVESTABLE KING SALMON)]

Option 4

(b)(8) repealed / /83;

Option 5

(b)(8) to limit the total commercial king salmon harvest by all gear types in the Southeastern and Yakutat areas according to stock availability during season with flexibility to conserve resource and optimize catch [TO A GUIDELINE HARVEST RANGE OF 243,000 TO 288,000 FISH (PLUS THE ESTIMATED ANNUAL ALASKA HATCHERY PRODUCTION OF HARVESTABLE KING SALMON)];

Option 6

(b)(8) repealed / /83;

~~(b)(9)~~ repealed / /83;

(b)(10) a directed troll fishery for chinook salmon shall occur throughout the season provided in 5 AAC 33.310.(b)

Justification:

Option 1: To restore an equitable balance between the major harvesters of chinook salmon on the Pacific coast. This harvest figure represents the historic average for troll gear over the last 40 years. The 30-day closure in April-May and the 10-day closure later in the season provide adequate protection for Southeastern and transient stocks. On a coast-wide basis, the restrictive quotas of 1981 and 1982 discriminate against Alaskan fishermen in favor of Canadian and Southside interests.

Proposed by: Gary Slaven (105)

Option 2: (1) The catch of 320,000 represents an average of the catch the ten years prior to implementing the optimum yield system. (2) A catch figure of 320,000 will provide a more viable troll fishery while further stock assessments are made, and the State of Alaska takes an active role in protecting Alaskan interests with regard to foreign interception, high Canadian catches, and the problems of the Columbia River.

Proposed by: Elfin Cove Advisory Committee (109)  
Angoon Advisory Committee (208)

SOUTHEAST  
SALMON

Option 3: Net fisheries are targeting on king and coho salmon more every year. This year's 15¢ humpies in Southeast were not a seine fishery target fish. The king salmon (target fish) was the largest take on the record by seine fishermen.

Proposed by: Maurice Ingman (191)

Option 4: (1) Fishermen cannot selectively troll for coho, when the fish are feeding they will bite almost any lure; (2) the troll quota does nothing to protect the chinook stocks that are harvested in May, June, and July; (3) the troll quota forces heavier effort on weak stocks and relatively lighter effort on years when chinook are abundant; (4) coastwide chinook catches are regulated according to relative abundance but Alaska regulates for guideline harvest goal so in years of high abundance of chinook salmon, Alaska troller's catches are reduced and and other fisheries' catches increase.

Proposed by: Barton Sollars, Sr. (16 and 315)

Option 5: Southeast Alaska trollers feel the present system failed because of its lack of flexibility to adapt to stronger resource than anticipated with subsequent economic losses to trollers. Trollers request a different more flexible management system details of which the industry, fisheries board, advisory committees, and North Pacific Fisheries Management Council should work out before next season.

Proposed by: Sitka Advisory Committee (312)

Option 6: This proposal would establish a specific salmon season, replacing the present harvest guideline. The guideline harvest range and quota are not appropriate mechanisms for management of chinook salmon stocks. The fluctuative nature of this fishery demands a more flexible management strategy that allows a more even level of fishing effort on varying stock sizes. In 1982, we saw a total chinook closure in Alaska when we were experiencing a higher abundance than at any time in recent history; this occurred in spite of dismal forecasts. The outcome was a reallocation of benefits to southern fishermen in Canada and the "lower 48." An established season will provide increased catches during years of high abundance and correspondingly decrease catches during years of low abundance. Mechanisms for additional safeguards can be built in by pre-established season limitations, such as the thirty-day closure from April 15 to May 15.

Proposed by: Alaska Trollers Association (137)

(121)

5 AAC 33.310.(b)(12)(D) and (13)(New Subsection). FISHING SEASONS AND WEEKLY FISHING PERIODS. (Regulation pages 138-139). Close the Icy-Chatham Strait migration corridor to troll fishing from May 15 to May 31 and eliminate the 8-day on and 6-day off fishing periods during June.

The proposed regulation reads as follows:

5 AAC 33.310. FISHING SEASONS AND WEEKLY FISHING PERIODS.

(b) Salmon may be taken by hand and power troll gear from October 1 through April 14 (winter season) and from May 15 through September 20 (summer season) except as provided in 5 AAC 33.350 and as follows:



SOUTHEAST  
SALMON

Justification: With the advent of limited entry on the hand troll fishery, the 8 and 6 is no longer necessary as there will be lesser number of vessels. Additionally, the 10 day closure is already available to the Department, as is emergency order authority for season or area adjustments.

Proposed by: Petition from Alaska Native Brotherhood, Grand Camp (248-258)

(123)

5 AAC 33.310.(b)(10)(A)(New Subsection). FISHING SEASONS AND WEEKLY FISHING PERIODS. (Regulation page 138). Allow trolling in section 11-B during gillnet openings.

The proposed regulation reads as follows:

5 AAC 33.310. FISHING SEASONS AND WEEKLY FISHING PERIODS.

(b)(10) in district 11, salmon may be taken [ONLY] in sections 11-C and 11-D [AND] only from October 1 through April 14 and from June 15 through September 20;

(A) in section 11-B, salmon may be taken only from the third Monday in June through September 20 and the weekly fishing periods for trolling are the same as for gillnetting

Justification: This would help to alleviate concentrations of gear in areas of districts 12, 14 and 15. A similar system has worked successfully in district 8.

Proposed by: Christopher Pace (74)

(124)

\* 5 AAC 33.365. (b)(3). SOUTHEASTERN ALASKA-YAKUTAT CHINOOK AND COHO SALMON TROLL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PLAN. (Regulation page 155). Establish a set midseason coho salmon troll fishery closure.

The proposed regulation reads as follows:

5 AAC 33.365. SOUTHEASTERN ALASKA-YAKUTAT CHINOOK AND COHO SALMON TROLL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PLAN.

(b)(3) during the month of August [EARLY PORTION OF THE COMMERCIAL COHO FISHING SEASON] the department [SHALL EVALUATE THE SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE COHO SALMON RUN AND] shall close the Southeastern and Yakutat Area's salmon troll fishery for approximately 10 days; the board recognizes that even on years of high coho salmon abundance a closure of the troll fishery is still needed to ensure adequate movement of coho to the inside fishing districts [UNLESS THE DEPARTMENT DETERMINES THAT THE COHO SALMON RUN IS LARGER THAN THE LAST 10-YEAR AVERAGE AND THAT ACCEPTABLE NUMBERS OF COHO SALMON ARE MOVING INTO THE INSHORE SALMON FISHING AREAS];

Justification: The increasing fishing power of the troll fishery in recent years and the movement of troll fishing effort to the coastal and outer coastal fishing areas makes it necessary that even in years of high coho salmon abundance a closure of the troll fishery is needed to obtain adequate movement of coho salmon in the inside areas to ensure that Board allocation objectives and spawning escapement goals are obtained.

Proposed by: Staff

SOUTHEAST-YAKUTAT  
SALMON

\* 125  
5 AAC 33.365.(b)(3) and (5). SOUTHEASTERN ALASKA-YAKUTAT CHINOOK AND COHO SALMON TROLL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PLAN. (Regulation page 155 and 156). Eliminate in-season closures on coho salmon.

The proposed regulation reads as follows:

5 AAC 33.365. SOUTHEASTERN ALASKA-YAKUTAT CHINOOK AND COHO SALMON TROLL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PLAN.(b)

Option 1

(3) repealed / /83;

(5) repealed / /83;

Option 2

(3) during the early portion of the commercial coho fishing season the department shall evaluate the size and distribution of the coho salmon run and shall close the Southeastern and Yakutat Areas' salmon troll fishery for approximately 10 days, unless the department determines that the coho salmon run is larger than the last 10 year average and that the occurrence of coho salmon in the inshore salmon fishing areas is above the ten-year average catch in catch-per-boat-day of fishing in those areas where fishing has continued in a manner that allows for comparison; [AND THAT ACCEPTABLE NUMBERS OF COHO SALMON ARE MOVING INTO THE INSHORE SALMON FISHING AREAS;]

Justifications:

Option 1: Salmon will not move into inside waters until they are ready to move in. Salmon could be physically carried to inside waters and would just swim back to the ocean if conditions weren't right for them to be inside. Trade the end of July or August closure for the last 10 days in September. Close all fishing commercial and sport till October 1st. Then the fish will be in and able to get to their spawning streams.

Proposed by: Maurice Ingman (192)

Option 2: The Board of Directors of the Alaska Trollers Association recognizes that in certain years a ten-day coho closure may be required to prevent conservation problems with our natural coho stocks. However, as written, the present regulation seeks to alleviate this potential problem by requiring "acceptable" numbers inshore. This allows for a purely subjective management decision without adequate guidelines. A given manager's actions could prove detrimental to the runs, given his personal interpretation of the term "acceptable." The proposed amendment would establish a predetermined standard that would adequately protect both the salmon stocks and the economic viability of the fishery from potential arbitrary management decisions.

Proposed by: Alaska Trollers Association (138)

SOUTHEAST-YAKUTAT  
SALMON

\* 126

5 AAC 33.365.(b)(7). SOUTHEASTERN ALASKA-YAKUTAT CHINOOK AND COHO SALMON TROLL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PLAN. (Regulation page 156). Eliminates the Board's objective of returning inside district coho salmon troll catches to pre-1978 levels by 1984.

The proposed regulation reads as follows:

5 AAC 33.365. SOUTHEASTERN ALASKA-YAKUTAT CHINOOK AND COHO SALMON TROLL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PLAN.

(b)(7) repealed / /83;

Justification: This regulation presently seeks the return of inside district coho salmon troll catches to pre-1978 levels by 1984. The myriad of inshore management regulations occurring since 1978 precludes the attainment of this goal without serious dislocation of presently existing fisheries.

Proposed by: Alaska Trollers Association (142)

SOUTHEASTERN-YAKUTAT  
SUBSISTENCE

127

5 AAC 02.125(3). SUBSISTENCE TANNER CRAB FISHERY. (Regulation page 51). Set a size and sex limit for tanner crab.

The proposed regulation reads as follows:

5 AAC 02.125. SUBSISTENCE TANNER CRAB FISHERY.

(3) Only male tanner crab 5½ inches or greater in width of shell may be taken or possessed.

Justification: Due to the increase and continued potential increase of the use of this resource, it is felt that size and sex restrictions must be imposed.

Proposed by: Upper Lynn Canal Advisory Committee (121)

128

5 AAC 02.1xx. SUBSISTENCE RESTRICTIONS. (New Section) (Regulation page 50). Allow residents to take crab.

The proposed regulation reads as follows:

5 AAC 02.1xx. SUBSISTENCE RESTRICTIONS. Crab may be taken in waters north of the latitude of Point Sherman only by residents of that area.

Justification: The increase of non-resident alien user groups appears to be causing abuse of this resource due to road access and lack of enforcement.

Proposed by: Upper Lynn Canal Advisory Committee (120)

STATEWIDE  
SUBSISTENCE

177

5 AAC 01.010.(1) METHODS, MEANS AND GENERAL RESTRICTIONS. (Regulation page 9) Allow the taking of rainbow trout and steelhead.

The proposed regulation reads as follows:

5 AAC 01.010. METHODS, MEANS AND GENERAL RESTRICTIONS.

(1) Repealed / /83. [THE TAKING OF RAINBOW TROUT AND STEELHEAD IS PROHIBITED.]

Justification: Increase efficiency in methods and means of subsistence fishing.

Proposed by: Charles Fitch (197)

178

5 AAC 01.XXX. FISHING SEASONS. Set a uniform statewide year around season for halibut.

The proposed regulation reads as follows:

5 AAC 01.XXX. FISHING SEASONS. Halibut may be taken at any time [ONLY FROM MARCH 1 THROUGH OCTOBER 31].

Justification: Halibut is the only fish available on a year-round basis for personal consumption. The take would not be substantial, but would allow persons to have fresh fish. This too would be on a permit basis.

Proposed by: Alaska Native Brotherhood (89)

Editor's Note: The Board of Fisheries requested that the original proposal be modified to include the option for a year around season in all areas of the state. The Board has also recommended that the International Pacific Halibut Commission set a year around subsistence halibut season for all areas of the state during its February 1983 meeting.

STATEWIDE  
SALMON

\*

179

5 AAC 39.270 (i). TROLL SPECIFICATIONS AND OPERATION. (Regulation page 175). Allow troll gear statewide.

The proposed regulation reads as follows:

5 AAC 39.270. TROLL SPECIFICATIONS AND OPERATION.

(i) Troll gear may be used to take salmon in all areas of the state.

Justification: 1. Troll caught fish are a quality product having a greater dollar value. 2. The troll fishery uses a large and extensive network of support and supply businesses. 3. The Alaska troll permits are issued as statewide permits. 4. Gives the fishing industry an option of diversifying in the event of poor cycle years thus alleviating heavy pressure on specific stocks. 5. Areas of maximum utilization of the resource could still be protected by area/time closures as is done in southeast.

STATEWIDE  
SALMON

Many Alaskans living westward would utilize power troll permits to augment their present fishing incomes.

The percentage of Alaskans (as compared to non-residents) owning and fishing Alaska troll permits would probably increase.

Improve locale economics of westward communities. The reopening of the westward waters to statewide power trolling would:

(a) increase the income and profits of the following local groups:

- (1) the local fishermen;
- (2) the processing plants and their employers; and
- (3) the various support businesses and their employees.

(b) increase economic incentive for processors to invest in westward Alaskan plants.

Proposed by: Richard Lundahl (174,175)

\*

180

5 AAC 39.270.(i) (New Subsection). TROLL SPECIFICATIONS AND OPERATION. (Regulation page 175). Allow the use of troll gear in all state waters.

The proposed regulation reads as follows:

5 AAC 39.270. TROLL SPECIFICATIONS AND OPERATION.

(i) Troll gear may be used in all waters of the State.

Justification: Open salmon troll fishing north and west of Cape Suckling by using only the migration of existing hand and power troll permits. The permit holders would apply for a northern area or southern area permit that would require them to fish that area for the entire season. Establish a separate OY for that area north of Cape Suckling. This action would spread out the existing fishing fleet and take the pressure off of the OY. It would also allow the northern people to enter in the troll fisheries without putting undue hardship on the northern salmon stocks.

Proposed by: Ken Procter and Bill Stokes (309)

STATEWIDE  
SUBSISTENCE

181

5 AAC 010(g). METHODS, MEANS AND GENERAL RESTRICTIONS. (Regulation page 47). Eliminate the opportunity for possession of undersize crab.

The proposed regulation reads as follows:

5 AAC 02.010. METHODS, MEANS AND GENERAL RESTRICTIONS.

(d) no crab may be mutilated or otherwise disfigured in any manner which prevents determining the minimum size set forth in this paragraph until processed or otherwise prepared for consumption.

Justification: The present regulation allows for the possession of crab legs without retaining the carapace intact. Fish and Wildlife

APR 12 1983

After a couple of decades of meetings and negotiations a draft United States-Canada Treaty on salmon has been recommended to the governments and is currently under review by our State Department for submission to the U.S. Senate. In the Treaty the United States and Canada agree to prevent overfishing, to provide for optimum production and to provide for each party to receive benefits equivalent to the production of salmon originating in its waters. In attaining these goals both parties will consider reducing interceptions, avoid undue disruption of existing fisheries, and take into account annual variations of the abundance of the stocks.

Almost all that are concerned agree that there is little future for salmon without a working relationship between the United States and Canada. Perhaps not as many will agree with my estimate that we cannot maintain the present levels of the runs with the current system.

At the present time if we look coastwide there is division within the salmon industry on support for the Treaty. Some groups are in favor, some have not taken a stand, and an important faction of the industry is opposed.

This is not the place and I am not the one to detail the various concerns that cause one group or another to take a stand in support or in opposition to the present draft Treaty, although I think it can be fairly stated that those opposed believe that the Treaty is not of sufficient advantage to our side and we should renew negotiations. I cannot agree with my friends that believe the draft Treaty does not meet their expectations. Fishermen are optimists by nature and I'm sure they feel something better is possible and perhaps even probable. I do think that someone should look at what are the possible outcomes if we have no treaty because in a search for a better treaty, we stand some risk of no agreement.

If you work for a salary and the kids need new shoes and one or more are going to college, you may have a good idea of your needs and why you want to go to the boss and say: "If I don't get a raise I quit". Under those circumstances you should have a good idea of how to handle either alternative.

The same situation exists with the Treaty and if this one is not satisfactory, we need to consider what might be the result of no agreement.

While I don't propose to speculate on what might be the result of new negotiation, I do believe the results of no agreement are not difficult to forecast and those results are bad for both nations.

There are presently plans for enhancement that should provide coastwide over 3 million additional chinooks to the catch over present levels. Since much of the return will be in Canada, from Puget Sound and the Columbia River and in Alaska from Canadian facilities, it seems obvious the opportunities will be set aside.

Increased enhancement on the Columbia River seems to face formidable opposition. Given the present budget climate with talks about setting aside our present hatchery facilities, it would seem impossible to sell increased enhancement without a program for rational ocean management. Some 50 or 60 of the catch of some central British Columbia chinook stocks are made in Southeastern Alaska. Without a treaty practical Canadian politics would dictate a shift to coho production at Robertson Creek, Nitnat, Kitimat and other hatchery locations.

Without a treaty the tribal fishermen on the Columbia River will receive no benefits from coastwide management and since the courts have not decided if the catches by Washington residents, or U.S. citizens in Alaska count within the 50 percent treaty allocation, it is not difficult to predict further court actions.

The fishery plan under the draft Treaty provides 32% of the Fraser sockeye to U.S. fishermen 1983, and 29% in 1984. These percentages have not been realized in 3 of the 4 last years during a period of cooperation in management. Canadians have stated that they would not continue the present sockeye treaty after 1984 but it seems to be that they have more to lose by giving up the present arrangement. They keep us in hand in the convention waters and have free reign to cork us outside the convention area inside Vancouver Island in the troll fisheries, or a renewal of net fisheries on the west coast of Vancouver Island. This they can do under normal oceanographic conditions but they would be at even a greater advantage if sockeye entered north of Vancouver Island and down Johnstone Strait. The oceanographic conditions for such a movement are developing in the ocean this year.

The maintenance of present catches in the ocean troll fishery off Southeastern Alaska require increased escapement into Alaska Rivers and increased Canadian and Columbia River escapements. Even with a treaty the returns from the past four years of reduced escapement in Canada must be reckoned with. Alaska streams produce only a quarter or a third of the Alaskan catch and even if rebuilt to optimum levels cannot support the present catches without Canadian and Columbia River contributions. At optimum levels Alaskan chinook escapement will produce about 100,000 fish to the catch every year. While the Alaskan rivers are rebuilding at a rate above schedule, there is presently a coastwide conservation problem with chinook.

The Canadian Government is considering "a vigorous fishing presence" on the transboundary rivers, the Yukon, Stikine, and Taku specifically. Without a treaty the Alaskans at Noyes Island and Tree Point and the Canadians in their terminal fishery on the Naas and Skeena would contest for shares of sockeye, perhaps to the detriment of escapement and definitely to the advantage of chinook.

The increased Canadian pink salmon troll catch at Dixon Entrance took 3/4's of a million fish last year and 1/4 of a million in 1981. It could increase to over 2 million in even years with present run levels of Southeastern Alaska pinks.

Further out in the future, if coastwide rational management is not effected, is the increased threat of hydropower on the Taku, the Stikine, and Fraser Rivers. Our experience on the Columbia River proves that part of the cost of power is a loss of salmon.

One of the opponents of the Treaty has written that, "It is vitally important to achieve a treaty, and that even a poor treaty is better than the chaos which might ensue". The real question then is whether this is a poor treaty and that can be answered only if we have some comparison. A question which is most difficult to answer is, "What is the chance of negotiating a treaty that will receive endorsement by those that are not opposed if we try further negotiations?"

It seems to me that negotiating in an atmosphere of increased interception and a failure to solve our critical chinook conservation problems provide considerable risk.

I leave to others to estimate the chances of something better than the result of 13 years of formal negotiation. I am convinced that the present draft is better than the status quo, that the status quo cannot be maintained, and that chaos in management without a treaty is a risk that must be seriously considered by those that seek something better.

Donald E. Bevan  
Presented to the  
North Pacific Fishery Management  
Council  
March 17, 1983



1983 ALASKA SALMON TROLL  
MANAGEMENT SEASON POSITION  
With Considerations Concerning  
Management Options for the  
Canadian-Directed Chinook and Silver Salmon  
1983 Harvest Season

Joint Position by:

NORTHERN PACIFIC FISHERMANS FEDERATION

JUNEAU HANDROLLERS ASSOCIATION

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## PERSPECTIVE

The proposal which follows addresses three fundamental interests and the thread of relative importance is woven throughout;

- 1) The present and future health of the Pacific chinook and coho salmon stocks,
- 2) The economic health of the related fisheries, and
- 3) The international atmosphere essential to the agreeable management and rehabilitation of the aforementioned salmon stocks;

with these at the forefront, we may proceed.

Although this proposal deals with a relatively small part of the total salmon picture on the Pacific Coast, it is of ultimate and understandably singular concern when perceived by the particular fisheries involved. However, if palatability can be derived from the prescriptive in this plan the precedent of equitability could then be extended to the fisheries not mentioned here. In other words, perhaps a fishery-by-fishery avenue could be adequately incorporated which would help relieve the turmoil generated by the conceptual approaches employed in the long-lived and somewhat jaded Bi-lateral Treaty negotiations.

Common sense would dictate that a proposal which employs the transfer of welfare from one industry to another in order to persuade agreements is essentially bound to controversy. As the similarity between certain fisheries exists only in that the resource comes from the sea we can no sooner justify those concessions than we might expect a corn farmer to curtail his production so that a coal miner might prosper.

There is a bill before the United States House of Representatives which addresses this principle on a grand scale concerning the allowed level of foreign fishing within the United States Fisheries Conservation Management Zone, "...alter the wording of the Fishery Conservation Management act to provide that the Secretary of State can consider, in addition to a rigid set of criterion only other fishery matters as he deems appropriate in granting fishing privileges. Under the present wording of the law, the secretary may consider other, possibly not fishing related, matters as he deems appropriate."<sup>1</sup> If it is improper that fish are traded for military privileges, etc., it would follow that a less significant, however similar, impropriety exists when trading a sockeye salmon gillnetter for a chinook salmon troller, and so forth.

The following proposal will hopefully be regarded in its own light. It is also important that the 'right to stocks of origin' concept be properly regarded. This particular policy was intended essentially to address the fishing behavior of harvesters which provide no physical support for those fish stocks anadromous to the Pacific Coast. Without laboring the point, reasonable credit must be given for the importance of areas in which certain Pacific salmon feed and mature. It is respectfully suggested here that there is more to the farm than the barn; the pasture matters, too.

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<sup>1</sup> H.R. 1228, U.S. 98th Congress, February 1983.

Respectfully Submitted Suggestions for the  
Canadian-directed Chinook and Silver Salmon  
1983 Management Season

1. Disallow West Vancouver Island Exclusion.
2. Standardize chinook salmon size limit.
3. Impose a 30-day closure on all directed chinook salmon fisheries.
4. Require freezer boat reporting or updating of reports by August 1 of chinook and coho salmon catch totals.
5. Establish a harvest guideline of 1.52 million chinook salmon.
6. Standardize the harvest ratio between the Georgia Straits sport and commercial troll chinook salmon fisheries.
7. Manipulate the benefits of the mandatory June 1 through June 10 Southeast Alaska troll total closure so as to facilitate escapement.
8. Manipulate the possible benefits of the non-mandatory August 1 through August 10 Southeast Alaska troll total closure so as to facilitate escapement.
9. Manage the coho runs in season so as to provide for escapement using available data and management tools to their fullest extent.
10. Exercise the most sensitive discretion regarding allowed harvest of chinook salmon in the headwaters of transboundary rivers and that this chinook salmon harvest apply toward the harvest guideline.

## Ten Points - Supporting Discussions

1. Include West Vancouver Island in a numerically literal sense as was avoided in the language of the bi-lateral treaty proposal.<sup>2</sup>
  - a) It is maintained that "...mature chinook salmon migrate down the west coast of Vancouver Island at the peak of the troll season and are not exploited in this fishery."<sup>3</sup> However, it is also noted that the ocean troll fishery is the major exploiter of the West Coast Vancouver Island harvest of chinook and that in 1981 (a relatively acceptable sample year) 78,000 chinook were harvested adjacent to northern West Coast Vancouver Island and 319,000 were taken adjacent to southern West Coast Vancouver Island.<sup>4</sup> This would suggest that not only does significant exploitation occur but that perhaps the harvest occurs with increasing vigor as the fish transit southward.
  - b) It is maintained that the chinook stocks adjacent Vancouver Island are significantly hatchery stocks and should not be managed equally with natural stocks. It should be noted here that "...enhancement of one stock could result in a detrimental effect on other natural stocks as a result of the increased fishing effort for the enhanced stock."<sup>5</sup> That the apparent abundance of fish as a result of enhancement provides for harvesting the 'profit' is a sensitive assumption concerning management regimes as the depressed natural (mixed) stocks can be further and uncontrollably exploited. A final note of interest here is that "American fish accounts for...70-90% of the total chinook harvest off the west coast of Vancouver Island."<sup>6</sup>
  - c) Inclusion of West Coast Vancouver Island denies the possibility of the misreporting of catch districts so as to preserve the quota in the areas governed by a numerical limit. Inclusion would disallow the generation of ill faith and prevent the disruption of the accurate accumulation of data.
2. The chinook salmon size limit should be standardized in order to prevent the in-season increase in harvest tonnage while at the same time a numerical limit restricts the number of fish taken.
3. Impose a 30-day closure on all directed chinook fisheries.

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<sup>2</sup> Canada-U.S. Pacific Salmon Treaty Proposal, Annex IV, Ch. 3, Par. 4 (Document referred to henceforth as Bi-lateral Treaty).

<sup>3</sup> North-migrating Natural Chinook Salmon Stocks from Oregon to Southeast Alaska - Their Status Distribution in Fisheries, and Conservation Needs. Report prepared by the Salmon Plan Development Team of the North Pacific Fishery Management Council. November 3, 1982. Appendix 2, Pg 5. (Document referred to henceforth as the P.D.T. Jurisdictional Report).

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., Appendix I, Coastwide chinook catches since 1963.

<sup>5</sup> The Commission on Pacific Fisheries Policy, Final Report. Peter H. Pearse, Commissioner, Pg. 51. (Document referred to henceforth as the Pearse Report).

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., pg. 12

- a) The first chinook salmon harvest guideline was imposed in Southeast Alaska in 1980. Although a lid discouraged the overharvesting of transiting stocks, it did little to bring about a significant increase in domestic escapement. In 1981, along with a harvest guideline, a 30-day closure was instituted and domestic escapement increased radically. In 1982 the same plan was imposed and escapement continued to respond remarkably well.
- b) The 30-day closure is necessary to protect spawning stocks which might be overharvested as a result of the anticipation and increased effort created by the guideline. Fishermen will work harder during the time given if they are aware that an 'administrative' season exists in lieu of the traditional season periods.
- c) Move the 30-day closure to encompass a period which most favorably provides for chinook salmon escapement. If April 15 through May 14 is observed the north and central stocks would be affected. Perhaps a June closure would better accomplish the overall benefits considered in this point.
- d) The moratorium should include all directed chinook fisheries as the Georgia Straits sport catch in recent years has represented 25 to 30% of the harvest total.

4. Due to the numbers and efficiency of the Canadian freezer boat fleet, it is essential to document their catch in season so as to accommodate the requirements mandated by a harvest guideline.

- a) Require reporting of catch totals by no later than August 1.
- b) Facilitate such reporting by land line or radio-telephone to Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans (CDFO) if necessary.
- c) Provide such information relay systems necessary to accommodate the above.
- d) Establish a simple code system with the particulars assigned at the time of pre-season licensing so as to avoid fleet scrutiny if required.
- e) The above measures or a similar plan is necessary to document the in-season catches of "...one of the world's most efficient small boat fleets..."<sup>7</sup>
- f) Preliminary catch reports (blue slips) for the 1982 chinook harvest season were unavailable until February, 1983.
- g) Proceed at maximum speed to substantially upgrade in-season data gathering and processing capabilities in general.

5. Establish a harvest guideline of 1.52 million chinook.

- a) Historical perspective is essential to understand the degree of need and to properly assign responsibilities for certain conservation actions.
- b) Notwithstanding the precision of the annual harvest totals, the numbers available clearly support the trend in chinook catch increases and corresponding escapement decreases. (Fig. 1).
- c) 1.52 million chinook is the twenty-year average.
- d) The proposed bi-lateral treaty mandates a harvest limit of 868,000 chinook in the designated areas; however, leaves open West Coast Vancouver Island.<sup>8</sup> Given the present adequacy of data

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., Pg. 79

<sup>8</sup> Bi-lateral Treaty, Pg. 44.

accumulation and processing facilities, "...worrisome is the weakness of the data used to monitor catch and escapement. Without substantial improvements in these area, reversing the declines in some stocks and realizing the substantial potential from stock rehabilitation will be impossible." <sup>9</sup> Also, given the understandable requirement for fisheries to maintain clear guidelines within which to operate, and given the loophole in catch reporting mentioned in Par. 1(c), it is more than reasonable to expect at least a minimum average harvest to occur off West Coast Vancouver Island in 1983.

- e) The expected chinook harvest total as implied by the bi-lateral treaty is in the neighborhood of 1.35 million chinook.
- f) The slightly-raised harvest guideline suggested by this proposal would tend to soften the initial impact of a first-ever ceiling limitation and assist in the acceptability of the additional conservation and regulatory measures suggested in all paragraphs.
- g) The twenty-year average approach compromises the Alaskan salmon trollers' contention that proper consideration is not assigned the successes derived from the 1980-1982 harvest limits and other stringent regulations imposed upon them. <sup>10</sup>
- h) The Southeast Alaska annual catch over the past twenty years has remained sensibly stable.
- i) The CDFO would be required to impose appropriate in-season time and area closures so as to protect weak runs and to assist this proposal in the facilitation of transfer of depressed brood stocks to their respective spawning grounds.
- j) In 1984 a plan similar to this one should be conservatively imposed so as to address the effectiveness of the 1983 regime. Should the escapement response prove favorable and should fisheries not mentioned in this proposal engage in similar agreements the urgency for a bi-lateral treaty might be attenuated such that innovative negotiating techniques could be pursued.
- k) This proposal should be permitted to function in 1983 and the bi-lateral treaty should be further negotiated while the impact of present and imminent regulations on foreign fishing in the Gulf of Alaska becomes more fully understood and the missing data concerning the migratory behavior of Pacific salmon stocks are better in hand.
- l) The equivalent twenty-year average approach to the 1983 harvest guideline would permit the Alaska troll industry to survive at a bare maintenance level, thereby avoiding the economic dislocation which would certainly occur under the prescriptions of the bi-lateral treaty or some similarly-restrictive management plan.

6. Standardize the domestic ratio between the Georgia Straits sport and commercial troll chinook harvest.

- a) In the early 70's the troll fishery experienced sharp increases in production and has remained at high levels since.
- b) By the mid-70's the Georgia Straits sport fishery responded with

<sup>9</sup> Pearse Report, Pg. 17.

<sup>10</sup> Alaska Department of Fish and Game Projected Troll Catches of chinook in Southeast Alaska. Figures available upon request from ADF&G Commercial Fisheries Division.

	Actual	Projected
1980	300,000	Approximately the same
1981	248,000	350,000
1982	242,000	406,000

sharp increases in production and has remained at high levels since. (Fig. 2)

- c) The chinook net harvest has remained stable.
- d) An increase in the allocation to any given fishery universally creates pressure to increase the allocation in other fisheries targeting on the same stocks and an increase in the harvest total is often the unfortunate consequence.

7. No explanation.

8. No explanation.

9. The level of management of coho stocks should be commensurate with the degree of conservation effort imposed on the chinook salmon harvest, given the comparative characteristics of the species. The requirements suggested in paragraph 5(i) should be observed.

10. It would seem reasonable that the king of the Pacific salmon, having survived five to seven years at sea and having evaded a myriad of predators and fishing gear, and having run the rivers to a depth of a few feet, should be relinquished the final hurdle and permitted to satisfy its ultimate design unmolested.

- a) In recognition of the above, the Southeast Alaska-directed terminal chinook drift gillnet fishery was closed in the mid-70's, and no further fishing has occurred nor been sought. In this and in other areas, the Southeast Alaska gillnetter has exhibited noteworthy conservation conscientiousness.
- b) With similar understanding, the same fishery in the Fraser river was closed last year.
- c) Such sensitivity exhibited by each nation and future management regimes which address that sensitivity would promote a mood of good faith for the well-working of subsequent and expanded fishing agreements.



**Respectfully Submitted Suggestions  
and Supporting Discussions  
for the Alaska Chinook and Silver Salmon  
1983 Salmon Troll Harvest Management Season**

1. Maintain the April 15 through May 14 chinook troll fishery moratorium.
2. June 1 through June 10, total closure.
3. August 1 through August 10 total closure, should Alaska Department of Fish and Game deem it necessary to provide for domestic coho escapement.
4. Establish a Southeast Alaska chinook salmon troll harvest guideline of 290,000 fish, with 314,000 total commercial.
5. Return statewide certification to the salmon troll fishery.
6. Standardize chinook salmon size limit.
7. Manage the coho runs in season so as to facilitate escapement using available data and management tools to their fullest extent.

Seven Points - Supporting Discussions.

1. Maintain the spring moratorium.
  - a) By far the single most significant factor pertaining to Southeast Alaska's sharply increased escapements of chinook salmon in recent years is the spring closure.
  - b) The April 15-May 14 closure prevents the accelerated harvest of spawning stocks which might occur due to the intensified effort encouraged by the anticipation which a non-traditional season limitation causes.
  - c) Northern and Central British Columbia escapement is encouraged very significantly by the southeastern spring closure, yet North Coast and Central British Columbia escapements are nonetheless decreasing at a rate of 7% per year. Coincidentally, it is suggested that "Reductions will be required primarily in the Alaskan ocean troll fishery to meet a major portion of the (North Coast and Central B.C.) spawning requirement of chinooks."<sup>11</sup> On this, it can only be said that the ball is in the Canadian court.
2. Establish a June 1 through June 10 troll total closure.
  - a) This closure would be imposed exclusively to facilitate escapement to Canada and to the lower 48.
3. August 1 through August 10 troll total closure.
  - a) This closure should be imposed only if ADF&G deems it necessary to provide for escapement of domestic coho stocks.
  - b) If ADF&G deems it such, then it will be a total closure.
  - c) The above measure will be instituted so as to facilitate escapement to Canada and to the Lower 48.
  - d) The above measure will be instituted to avoid the chinook mortality problem caused by a single-species fishery.
4. Impose a 1983 Southeast Alaska chinook harvest guideline of 314,000 total commercial.
  - a) 314,000 is the twenty-year average.
  - b) Recall the arguments contained in Par., 5(a), 5(b), 5(g), 5(h), 5(i)(substitute ADF&G), 5(j), 5(k) and 5(l) of the Canadian management season suggestions. Special emphasis should be given Par. 5(k). Said paragraph tacitly suggests the benefits of joint effort on the part of Canada and the United States to make accountable the foreign fleets which harvest, on the high seas and within our respective coastal control zones, the salmon stocks anadromous to the Pacific coast.
  - c) The Alaskan salmon troll industry cannot withstand continued management regimes as rigid as those imposed in 1981 and 1982. This can be evidenced by the resultant decline in troll permit values. (Fig. 3)
  - d) Permit market values are solid indicators of the earning potential of any given fishery. The decrease in a permit value can result from a lack of availability of the resource, restricted access to the resource through stringent management regimes, or both. As the Southeast troll harvests in 1981 and 1982 were 35 to 40% lower

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<sup>11</sup> P.D.T. Jurisdictional Report. Appendix 2, Pg. 4

than the projected harvests, it cannot be concluded that a lack of resource availability is in any way responsible. Rather, it is due to restrictions imposed on the fishery to satisfy the requirements of the Washington Department of Fisheries model (see Background Discussion), domestic chinook escapement (spring moratorium), and the direct and indirect transfer of stocks to Canada. (Recall Pars. 1(c), 2(a), and 3(c) of this section as a few of the management regimes in recent years.)<sup>12</sup>

- e) The suggested Southeast Alaska troll harvest guideline of 290,000 chinook, 314,000 total commercial, is no more than adequate to support the troll industry in any suitable sense of viability.
- f) Considering the inertia in Canadian management actions regarding the rehabilitation of natural chinook stocks, and considering the level of accountability of the foreign fisheries, the harvest level of chinook for Southeast Alaska suggested in this proposal should appear completely acceptable; considering additionally that the Southeast Alaska troll industry is presently on the fiscal "block".
- g) The difference between the troll harvest guideline proposed by this paper and the harvest guideline proposed by the bi-lateral treaty represents .02% of the total chinook harvest in Washington, Canada, and Southeast Alaska in 1981. <sup>13</sup> It would seem ludicrous to virtually exterminate a traditional industry in order to cast that figure into the hat.
- h) The genuine documentation of the foreign effort on the Pacific salmon stocks could reduce the aforementioned .02% to virtual invisibility.

5. Return statewide jurisdiction to the salmon troll fishery.

- a) The August 1973 closure of all state waters to salmon trolling west of Cape Suckling was not a permanent closure.
- b) The genuine accountability of the foreign effort on the Pacific salmon stocks, particularly the high-seas mothership-directed salmon gillnet fishery, would favorably impact the availability of chinook salmon in westward Alaska to a far greater extent than the continued exclusion of a small fleet of perhaps 30-40 trollers. "The estimated Japanese mothership catch of North American chinook in 1980 was reported to be 380,000 fish while, in fact, evidence indicates that more than 734,000 North American chinook were intercepted, i.e. killed in this fishery.", and "...virtually all North American salmon intercepted in the mothership fishery are destined to return to western Alaska."<sup>14</sup>
- c) Due to the uniquenesses of the chinook stocks, a troll allocation in western Alaska should be considered separately from the harvest guideline established for Southeast Alaska.
- d) The re-opening of westward would benefit the economically hard-pressed Southeast troll fleet. The small number of trollers which might operate in western Alaska would represent a degree of

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid. Southeast Alaska troll fishery management history, Appendix A, Pgs. A1-B1.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. See Sectional Catch Data.

<sup>14</sup> NOAA Technical Memorandum. NMFS F/ARK-1 March 1982. Pgs 5 and 9.

relief in the effort in Southeast Alaska and the portion of the harvest guideline not taken by that reduced effort would accrue to the balance of the fishery in Southeast Alaska.

- e) The apparent assignment of responsibility and the subsequent exclusion of the small historical level of troll effort in western Alaska concerning the health of the chinook and coho salmon stocks is regarded with reasonable suspicion. However, considering the relative value of salmon fishing permits (Fig. 3), it may be concluded that at least a historical level of troll effort could be presently absorbed with a tolerable impact on the economics of the resident western Alaskan fisheries.
  - f) Limited entry was instituted two years after the westward closure and it is unlikely that the level of troll effort in those waters would increase beyond historical levels.
  - g) "Instead of being asked to reduce their fishing efforts, as were other gear types, trollers were eliminated from the fishery."<sup>15</sup>
  - h) "This elimination from the area west of Cape Suckling occurred although no tag recovery data exists which proves that troll-caught salmon in the westward area were responsible for the conservation problem."<sup>16</sup>
  - i) "While other gear types fishing in the westward area are back to normal fishing patterns, in some instances enjoying liberalized seasons because of the abundance of salmon, the troller has been denied historic fisheries by the NPFMC, and the Alaska Board of Fish."<sup>17</sup>
  - j) The repeated claim that "the salmon resources in western Alaska are being utilized to their fullest extent" is no longer adequate to reasonably address the aforementioned discussions presented in this paper.
6. Standardize the chinook size limit. Recall Par. 2, and supporting discussion of the Canadian management season suggestions.
7. Concerning the management of the coho stocks. Recall Par. 9, and supporting discussion of the Canadian management season suggestions.

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<sup>15</sup> The Salmon Troll Fishery West of Cape Suckling. Production records and affidavits for years 1950-79 for Halibut Producers Cooperative. (now Seafood Producers Cooperative.)

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

**1983 ALASKA SALMON TROLL  
MANAGEMENT SEASON PROPOSAL  
BACKGROUND DISCUSSION**

**Subject:**

**Southeast Alaskan Chinook**

**Optimum Yield or Quota**

Our responsibility to the socio-economic and biological well-being of the chinook fishery has led to intensive study and widespread concern by many involved in the chinook fishery. We have set out issues here that impact the industry, as well as the chinook stocks. These issues have had very little, if any, attention by management, now or at the time the Optimum Yield (OY) was developed by the NPFMC. The importance of the information relating to the socio-economic and biological well-being of the U. S. fishermen and coastwide chinook is paramount for the realization of the mandate of the MFCMA, as well as a comprehensive coastwide chinook management program.

Therefore, we deal with the numbers generated by the NPFMC and accepted by the treaty negotiators, strictly on a temporary basis (the 1983 season). The rationale behind the OY, which has since been referred to as a quota, is questionable in relationship to the data used to develop said quota. The question of whether or not the quota is truly a sound management tool should be addressed.

Here, we would like to present a compilation of the major points of concern we have with the present "quota scenario".

Development: As we go back to 1980, we find the NPFMC developing and implementing an optimum yield of 320,000 to 288,000 chinook salmon in Southeast Alaska. The tools used to develop this OY have yet to be substantiated. From what we understand, the years used were 1971 to 1977. Years 1978 and 1979 were excluded because the troll fleet had enjoyed good catches of chinooks (376,000 in 1978 and 338,000 in 1979). This would discredit the concept of an Optimum Yield if it has anything to do with the strength and abundance of the resource. Furthermore, as was proven in the November 1977 NPFMC hearings in Juneau, no one could substantiate numbers of chinook caught. The case being, numbers of chinook caught were not entered on fish tickets with any regularity until 1978; which leads us back to the question of the 1978 and 1979 exclusions from OY computation. The mandate of the MFCMA for Optimum Yield is, "the allowable catch in a fishery which will provide the greatest overall benefit to the nation, taking into account the maximum sustained yield (as yet unknown), as modified by food needs and recreational needs and by social, economic, or ecological factors".

Increment Reductions: The mandate, from the NPFMC, upon developing an OY, was to take steps to reduce the allowable harvest. During deliberations at Board of Fisheries-NPFMC joint hearings, the reference to the OY slipped to a "quota", which is basically easier to protect, given there are no guidelines set out by the MFCMA. The immediate call was for a 15% reduction in the troll "quota". The position of the NPFMC, that Alaskan trollers were harvesting enormous amounts of "Columbia up-river Brights", prevailed over all. Numbers were presented to enhance argument, from the Washington Department of Fisheries Computer Model. These figures are extremely questionable and cannot be substantiated by WDF personnel at this time.

Factors to present as argument to WDF claims are:

1. Poaching of 30,000 to 40,000 up-river chinook per year between Bonneville and McNary Dams. (NMFS enforcement, 1981)
2. Five major dams have been built on the Columbia River in the past 25 years downstream from up-river bright spawning grounds. (Seattle Times, Oct. 1981)
3. Major droughts in Washington in 1973 called for most water to be directed through turbines on the Columbia, causing an estimated 95% destruction of out-migrating young chinook. (Seattle Times, Oct. 1981)
4. The Yakima River has been designated for massive irrigation projects in Yakima Valley, which has caused an estimated 600,000 annual spawner loss to Columbia River natural chinook population (Oregonian, Dec. 1981)
5. The effect of the Hanford Atomic Works on the Priest Rapids spawning grounds could be three-fold.
  - a) The development of the Hanford area decreased or otherwise impacted the area of spawning grounds.
  - b) The warmer water, cycled from and to the Columbia through the reactors, may adversely affect survival of salmon fry.
  - c) Low level radioactive materials washed away from the Hanford Works could have significant impact on survival or reproductive capabilities of chinook salmon.
6. Canadian catch of Washington chinook, off southern Vancouver Island, is estimated at over 400,000 chinook a year.
7. 97% of salmon incidentally harvested by Russian, Polish and Japanese trawlers off Vancouver Island in 1980 were chinook salmon. (INPFC, 1980 proceedings)
8. Japanese and South Korean mothership and land-based gillnet fleets harvest millions of North-American-origin salmon annually. (INPFC 1980; NMFS, EIS Japanese High Seas Gillnet Fishery, 1977)
9. Tag recoveries of steelhead and salmon of Southeast Alaska, Washington, and Idaho origin have been recovered in the Bering Sea and around the Aleutian Chain by American trawlers. Japanese recovered-tag reports are also starting to show up on record. (INPFC 1980-81; ADF&G 1980)
10. Argument presented to NPFMC, by Washington Confederated Tribes, to reduce Alaskan troll catch, was reasonably accepted; the Canadian interception of Washington chinook was disregarded. This exclusion would totally discredit percentage of catch by all fisheries involved in chinook harvest coastwide. We are showing here the highly migratory nature of Columbia River chinook salmon and steelhead, and refute claims by management that Columbia River salmon migrate only to Southeast Alaskan troll grounds, feed, grow, and return to the Columbia River.

General arguments presented to question validity of the chinook quota system:

- 1) White chinook salmon are not found to any degree outside Southeast Alaska and British Columbia; and any catch statistics, in relation to Washington and Oregon, should reflect an equitable reduction in catch percentages of white chinook.
- 2) Residents of Washington and other states are active participants in the harvest of chinook salmon in Southeast Alaskan waters. Given the equal opportunity afforded American citizens, under the Constitution of the United States, to participate in the Alaskan chinook fishery, the management and harvest of Columbia River hatchery stocks should reflect in kind consideration; especially since federal dollars are involved.

Consider also the fact that chinook hatcheries on the Columbia River are flooded with returning spawners. (Longview News, June 1981) It is also a fact that tag contribution to Alaskan troll catch is primarily Washington-Oregon hatchery chinook, and not up-river bright stocks. (Tag contribution is also disproportionate because Alaska has no comparable tagging program.) The overabundance of hatchery chinook in the Lower Columbia River has presented a harvest management problem for Washington and Oregon. To allow those fish to be harvested along with the returning migratory route, would benefit all American fishermen and meet the mandate of the U.S. Constitution, as well as the MFCMA.

It would be appropriate, at this point, to refer to a statement made by the Chairman of the NPFMC. The place and time was at the joint Board of Fish and NPFMC hearings in January 1981. It was said that the implementation of the OY and subsequent reduction by 15% was to transfer Alaskan troll-caught chinook to the Canadian troll fishery. This, in hopes of negotiating a better agreement at U.S.-Canadian treaty talks, for Washington net fishermen. We do not agree with these trade-offs; nor believe this kind of action is in the best interest of good conservation and management of our chinook stocks.

As can be seen, there are major concerns about this 'quota' situation. In light of the U.S.-Canadian treaty, now continued negotiations, we feel it is imperative to present our suggested option, with this discussion, to all concerned.



We have shown, through our conservation efforts in Southeast Alaska, a substantial increase in chinook escapement. In fact, we are eight years into our 15-year ADF&G chinook rebuilding program, in just two years. (Primarily because of the April 15 to May 15 total troll closure in Southeast Alaska.) We do not agree with the present "quota" situation. We do agree our suggested option reflects our concern for the conservation of the resource, as well as a realistic management tool for all concerned in the 1983 season.

We thank you very much for your attention.



**FIGURES**

COMPARATIVE CANADA - S.E. ALASKA  
 CHINOOK SALMON HARVEST AND  
 ESCAPEMENT BEHAVIOR 1965 - 1982



- (1) PRELIMINARY FIGURES — DEVELOPED 1-25-83  
 (2) ALASKA DEPT. FISH AND GAME PROTECTION GIVEN  
 NO QUOTA AND NO TOTAL CLOSURES


(FIGURE 1)

CANADA

CHINOOK SALMON HARVEST DISTRIBUTION 1963 - 1982


FISH IN  
THOUSANDS

----- CANADA TROLL  
..... GEORGIA SPORT  
———— CANADA NET



(FIGURE 2)

ALASKA LIMITED ENTRY COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT DEC. 1982



SAMPLE COMMERCIAL SALMON PE MIT VALUES (FIGURE B)