

FISHERY AGENCY . AGENDA #23<sup>a</sup>  
February 1978  
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY  
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

2-1,1-chome, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, Japan

February 15, 1978

Mr. Robert W. Schoning  
Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator, NOAA  
National Marine Fisheries Service  
Department of Commerce  
Washington D.C., 20235  
U.S.A.

Dear Mr. Schoning,


Subject: Japanese tanner crab fishing operation during  
the months of March and April

Please find enclosed the request of the Japanese tanner crab fishing industry with respect to your recent decision on the fishing ground to be assigned to it. In view of the pressing time before the Council's next meeting scheduled on February 23 and 24, I have taken the liberty of having the copy of this letter mailed directly to Mr. Lokken, Chairman of the North Pacific Fishery Management Council. I am heartened to be advised in Vancouver that, thanks to good offices of you and Mr. Lokken, steps have already been taken for the Council to review this request at the Council's next meeting.

The request of the industry seems to me to be quite modest, and I sincerely hope that the Council and your Department would be able to give a favourable consideration to their request.

You will understand that the position of my Government on the status of the tanner crab stocks and the proposed regulations on our fishery remains unchanged from that as expressed in our previous correspondences to your Department.

Yours sincerely,

  
Kunio Yonezawa  
Councillor, Fishery Agency

c.c. Mr. Harold E. Lokken  
Mr. Jim H. Branson



Subject: Japanese tanner crab fishing  
operation during the months of  
March and April

The area where the Japanese crab fleet wishes to operate during the months of March and April when fishing north of  $58^{\circ}\text{N}$  is not feasible, is waters west of  $171^{\circ}\text{W}$  and north of  $56^{\circ}\text{N}$ . Japanese fleet will be prepared to return to the sea all bairdi, as soon as they are caught while operating in this area.

The reasons for this proposal are as follows:

a) Ice conditions

The attached charts depict the southern boundaries of ice coverage during the months of March and April in recent years, as observed from the Essa Satellite. As the charts demonstrate, the area north of  $58^{\circ}\text{N}$  is completely covered by ice and hence inaccessible for fishing fleet for an average of about 50 days during this two month period. Sudden and unexpected outflow of ice would also make extremely difficult and dangerous the operation in the vicinity of ice edge.

b) Reason to ask for the opening of the area eastwards to  $171^{\circ}\text{W}$

The attached charts also indicate the location of the continental shelf. It is evident that the area south of  $58^{\circ}\text{N}$  and west of  $174^{\circ}\text{W}$  is removed too

far


far from the edge of the continental shelf to be of any value to crab fishing. In addition, there has not been and will not be any gear conflict between Japanese and U.S. fishermen in the area west of 171°W and north of 56°N.

- c) The period of March and April is essential for the operation of the Japanese fleet

Reasons are threefold.

- 1) Due to unfavourable climatic and fishing conditions in autumn, it is essential for the fleet to start fishing as soon as the weather and ice conditions permit it in spring.
- 2) Since the Japanese fishing is confined for the rest of the season to the waters north of 58°N which are unfamiliar to the fleet and much less productive as compared with the area to the south, it is all the more essential for it to start fishing in March.
- 3) The industry has made sizable investments in gear and labour for the preparation of fishing, so that any delay in fishing would be costly to the industry.


1965 M ① 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990



流水打況 3/10 ~ 3/10 Period

流氷状況


Period: 3/11 ~ 3/15



Southern boundaries of ice coverage

流冰状況

Period: 3/16 ~ 3/20



Year


- '73 —●—●—●—●—
- '74 - - - - -
- '75 ————
- '76 - - - - -
- '77 —▲—▲—▲—▲—

200M isobath

Southern boundaries of ice coverage

流水状況

Period: 3/21 ~ 3/25




Year	Symbol
'73	.....
'74	- - - - -
'75	—————
'76	- · - · -
'77	—▲—▲—▲

Southern boundaries of ice coverage

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流氷状況


Period: 3/25 ~ 3/31






流水状况

Period: 4/1 ~ 4/5




流水状況

Period: 4/6 ~ 4/10




流水状況

Period: 4/11 ~ 4/15



流水状況

Period: 4/16 ~ 4/20



Southern boundaries of ice coverage


Stream Isobaths

Year  
'43  
'46  
'47  
'49


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流水状況

Period: 4/21 ~ 4/25




Southern boundaries of ice coverage



流水状況

Period: 4/26 ~ 4/30



(Translation)

SOURCE: Suisan Keizai Shimbun, Lead Article  
Wednesday, February 1, 1978

FINAL USG DECISION NEARS ON TANNER CRAB FISHING REGULATIONS

TANNER CRAB - REMOVING JAPAN OUT OF MAJOR GROUND

LOGLINERS - LIFTING AREA RESTRICTION

The North Pacific Regional Fishery Council (NPRFC) drew the final conclusion on January 26 on foreign fishing regulations for tanner crab fishing in the Eastern Bering Sea and longlining in the Gulf of Alaska, both of which were pending since December last year when the USG had announced the foreign fishing regulations for Japan under a management plan for 1978 within the U.S. 200-mile conservation zone. An official cable reaching JFA on January 30 indicates that NPRFC, while deciding to lift the current regulations imposing on Japanese longliners operating in the Gulf of Alaska, has decided to shut out Japanese tanner crab vessels in the Eastern Bering Sea from a good fishing ground south of 58°N and to confine them to the north of 58°N as was its original plan despite of appeals made over and over again by GOJ and the Japanese industry and of a U.S. Commerce Department's proposal made to NPRFC to reconsider its draft regulations. It is

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for certain that this NPRFC decision will become the final  
USG decision without modifications. This decision will  
no~~z~~ doubt give a fatal blow to the Japanese tanner crab  
fishing industry which is on the cross-road now as to the  
possibility of sending two fleets this coming March.

While having increased a Japanese quota for tanner crab  
from 12,500 mt in 1977 to 15,000 mt in 1978, NPRFC has decided  
to shut out Japan from the major ground in between 56°N and 58°N  
which has been developed sorely by Japan, and to confine her  
to the north of 58°N and east of 173°W, in an eventual attempt  
to prevent Japan from fishing C. bairdi of high commercial value.

Previously, NPRFC presented this recommendation in  
October and December of last year, and GOJ and the Japanese  
industry had requested the U.S. side's reconsideration on  
about ten occasions by sending missions or through negotiations.  
Besides, such a conclusion as "the stock of tanner crab, both  
C. bairdi and C. opilio, is better than the previous year" was  
adopted by INPEC's Biological Sub-Committee met in the last fall.

Facing with these requests and the fact, the Commerce  
Department returned the recommendation to NPRFC for  
"reconsideration of the tanner crab issue." This gave us  
a bright prospect at this stage as "it would be difficult  
to create such an area limit as to ~~xxxxxx~~ <sup>cause</sup> foreign fisheries  
for C. bairdi to zero." However, the NPRFC decision has  
completely wiped out the Japanese expectation.

This decision is to impose unnecessary restrictions on foreign fisheries under the excuse of conservation of the stock and to aim at monopolizing the tanner crab market by U.S. fishermen. In fact, U.S. fishermen have been permitted to fish over MSY in a certain areas such as Kodiak and the Southern Peninsula, and yet Japanese fishing vessels are to be shut out from the ground south of 58°N in the Bering Sea despite of the scientific evidence indicating that the stock of tanner crab in this area is abundant and that there will be no danger of decline in the stock even if fishing effort is increased over the present level. Accordingly, JFA is dissatisfied with this decision.

Japan has so far taken more than 90 percent of the catch in the area south of 58°N. It will be difficult for Japan to operate two motherships in the northern area of less productivity. Moreover, the feasibility of the commercial catch is also feared since the decision will enable Japan to catch C. opilio of less commercial value alone with no access to large C. bairdi.

On the other hand, OY of sablefish in the Gulf of Alaska has been set at 13,000 mt excluding incidence by trawl fishery. With regard to the area, the decision has allowed foreign longliners directed to Pacific cod to operate in waters shallower than 500 meters deep in the Gulf of Alaska west of 157°W which was supposed to be closed to foreign longliners

under the last October-December recommendation of NPRFC.  
Furthermore, incidence of sablefish has also been allowed  
to these longliners in the area.

Y.N.

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# STATE OF ALASKA

Agenda #23  
February 1978  
JAY S. HAMMOND, Governor

## DEPARTMENT OF FISH & GAME DIVISION OF COMMERCIAL FISHERIES

P. O. BOX 686 — KODIAK 99615

February 7, 1978

Jim H. Branson  
Executive Director  
North Pacific Fishery Management Council  
P. O. Box 3136 DT  
Anchorage, Alaska 99510

Dear Jim:

Thank you for your letter concerning the king crab report to the Council. The team members were happy to hear that their presentations were appreciated.

In regard to a written presentation of our report, most team members had their talks orientated with certain slides and without the slides would not be as informative and in some cases not understandable. I am enclosing a copy of my talk for distribution to the Council members as requested by the Chairman.

Sincerely,



Martin F. Eaton  
Regional Shellfish Biologist  
Westward Region

enclosure

cc: Collinsworth



# STATEWIDE PRESENTATION OF THE KING CRAB RESOURCE IN ALASKA

By Martin F. Eaton  
Alaska Department of Fish and Game  
Regional Shellfish Biologist

The writing team members, composed of ADF&G and NMFS biologists, wish to thank the Council for the opportunity to make oral presentations on the status of stocks and the present management regime in each area. The information presented should assist you in understanding the king crab management plan during the review process.

## I Introduction

I would like to begin the presentation with a statewide overview of the king crab resource and all its major components. After my presentation our staff will give a short summary of the resource and its management by area.

## II Species Distribution and Management Units within the State (Slide)

King crab inhabit Alaska's continental shelf from Southeastern Alaska west through the Aleutians, to Norton Sound in the Bering Sea. In general, king crab are caught on the Continental Shelf in depths of less than 100 fathoms. The major fisheries occur in Cook Inlet, Kodiak, Aleutian Islands and the Eastern Bering Sea. The commercial fishery target species is red king crab, (Paralithodes camtschatica) which occurs abundantly in commercial concentrations in all management units. Blue king crab (Paralithodes platypus) are found and fished in the Eastern Bering Sea near the Pribilof and St. Matthew Islands, Prince William Sound and Southeast Alaska. Brown king crab, (Lithodes aequispina) are taken in Southeastern Alaska and in the Western Aleutians. In general, the average age king crab enter into the commercial fishery is seven to eight years and the average life expectancy is ten years.

Alaska king crab stocks are managed in specific administrative units called statistical areas (management areas), which may further be divided into districts composed of discrete stocks. Presently, nine statistical areas are defined which are managed independently of each other.

## II Historical Development

### (a) Domestic fishery

King crab fishing began in 1920 with sporadic catches until the mid 1930's. During the 1930's catcher processor vessels were harvesting king crab in the Bering Sea and shore based plants were being constructed in Central Alaska to process king crab caught in the area. By 1965-1966 the king crab resource had been exploited to the point that most areas of the State were relying solely on annual recruitment to support the fishery. The demise of a multi-age class fishery and subsequent low recruitment during this period accounted for significant decreases in production which continued until 1970 when a low catch of 51.7 million pounds was landed. During the 1970's the Department initiated the concept of multi-age class management in an attempt to rebuild king crab stocks to their former levels. Since the initiation of a quota system and multi-age class management, the condition and yield from stocks has improved, although the extremely low stock levels experienced in the early 1970's appears to be a factor in current low recruitment levels in some management units. Preliminary figures for the 1977 king crab harvest indicate that approximately 100 million pounds will be landed.

### (b) Foreign fishery

Japanese fishermen began fishing for king crab in the Eastern Bering Sea in 1930 and continued until 1939 at which time fishing ceased due to World War II. Japan re-entered the Eastern Bering Sea

king crab fishery in 1953 and continued fishing until 1974 when under executive agreements, conditions were negotiated which established catch quotas. Under these agreements Japan declined to fish king crab from 1974 to 1976.

Soviet fishermen began fishing the Bering Sea in 1959 and continued until 1971 at which time their fishing activities ceased. A decline in catch and bilateral agreements were responsible for their withdrawal from the king crab fishery.

(c) Domestic catch

The catch of king crab since 1960 has varied from a low of 23.3 million pounds in 1960, to 152.0 million pounds in 1965. Since 1974 the catch has remained near 100 million pounds although the percentage each statistical area has provided has been quite variable for eg., Kodiak provided 24% of the statewide catch in 1974 but provided only 17% in 1976. In 1974 the Bering Sea provided 48% of the total Alaskan king crab catch, while in 1976 the contribution rose to 67%.

#### IV Historical Development of Management and Regulations

The king crab resource was managed by FWS-BCF, from its inception, until 1959 when the State Organizational Act of 1959 provided for Alaska Statutes, Title 16, Alaska Fish and Game Resources. Article I established the Department of Fish and Game whose principal executive officer is the Commissioner.

The Commercial Fisheries Division was established to manage all commercially harvested fish species in Alaska.

##### The Fisheries Regulatory Process

The Alaskan system has a seven member Board of Fisheries, composed of fishermen and non-fishermen appointed by the Governor, which considers both public and staff regulatory proposals. Proposals are implemented into regulations based on biological, social and economic reasons.

Advisory committees located in most Alaskan communities are composed of people interested in the fish and game resources of their locality. They serve as local clearing houses and sources of proposals for Board consideration.

Alaska's commercial fisheries are managed by regulations which can be initiated by three different processes. First, regulations can be adopted by the Board of Fisheries on a yearly basis. Second, emergency regulations can be generated by the Board of Fisheries for immediate preservation of public peace, health, safety and general welfare. The last and most expedient form of regulation is the emergency order which provides immediate response to fishery management problems.

#### Regulations and Purpose

Regulatory measures employed to currently manage the king crab resource are as follows:

1. Fishing Seasons
2. Type and Quantity of Gear
3. Sex Limitation
4. Size Limit
5. Area Restrictions
6. Harvest Levels

The regulations I just mentioned have been developed and evolved from the fisheries inception in 1930, by Fish and Wildlife biologists, ADF&G biologists, the Board of Fisheries, and individuals and groups of the fishing and processing community.

I will briefly describe the regulations and rationale for their use, that are currently in effect.

Fishing Season: Biological fishing seasons vary through the



nine management units because of environmental differences, but generally occur between August and March. Season closures are based on biological data covering the most sensitive periods during the crabs life cycle (mating and molting). Some adjustments within the biological season framework are made by the Board of Fisheries in consideration of preferences by the fishing community in the scheduling of seasons.

Type and Quantity of Gear: Legal gear for king crab is defined in the current State regulations as pots and ring nets. Gear selectivity is desirable when fishing occurs on portions of the population which by law are illegal to harvest sublegal males and females. Pot gear has evolved through the years by fishermen as the most effective and efficient selective gear type for king crab fishing.

Quantity of Gear: The number of king crab pots allowed to be fished by each vessel varies from area to area. Gear restriction regulations have been promulgated by the Board of Fisheries for economic reasons.

Sex Limitation: The current regulations permit harvest of males only. This regulation was one of the first imposed on the fishery. The rationale for this regulation is that it maximizes reproductive potential. The industry has conducted some experiments with females, but because of small size and low recovery rates there has been little further interest.

Size Limits: The legal size of male king crab has been determined by growth per molt and maturation studies. The legal size is set to provide male king crab at least one opportunity to mate before being recruited into the fishery. Size limits vary from area to area based on growth per molt and size at maturity studies in each area and are manipulated during fishing seasons to maximize the harvest of abundant

age classes.

Area Registration: The nine statistical areas encompass the registration areas which are either exclusive or nonexclusive. Exclusive area registration regulations have been adopted by the Board of Fisheries to protect fishing areas from the influx of large numbers of vessels into the fishery during the fishing season. Fishermen have to register in a particular area prior to season openings. Area registration permits fleet movement from area to area, but not during the season. Exclusive registration has had a positive economic impact on smaller crab vessels.

Nonexclusive registration areas are open to all vessels registered in exclusive registration areas, except Cook Inlet. Nonexclusive areas have been in the past, areas of low effort level as the Bering Sea and Western Aleutians.

Harvest Levels: Guideline harvest levels are established by regulation prior to the season based on population studies or historic harvest. Annual population assessment cruises are conducted prior to the season opening and this data together with commercial fishery data are used to manage the fishery. In-season monitoring of the catch, effort and fishing mortality provide the backup as to the appropriateness of the pre-season harvest levels and need if any for adjustment.

Management Objectives: King crab management strategy since 1970 has attempted to rebuild and stabilize king crab stocks at productive levels through regulating harvests and reducing dependency on annual recruitment. In order to accomplish this an intensive population assessment program was undertaken. The fishery is presently allowed to harvest portions of each legal age class, thus assuring a carry over stock for next year's harvest. A dependency on a recruit fishery

in the past allowed for a decrease in production as small recruit classes entered the fishery. A very important part of the multi-age class management is the ability to accurately predict a year in advance the range of harvest the fishermen and processors can expect. Under the current management scheme certain harvestable portions of the stock are with-held each year to supplement the next year's catch. In low recruitment years eg., Kodiak 1976 and 1977 these with-held crab comprised 67 percent of a 17.9 million pound harvest or 12 million pounds. In 1977, preliminary analysis indicates a higher percentage approaching 80% of a 13.5 million pound harvest.

#### V The 1976-1977 King Crab Season

A total catch of 104 million pounds was landed in the 1976-1977 season. A total of 446 vessels participated in the fishery and their total gross income was 67 million dollars. King crab is the most important species in Alaska. In 1976 ex-vessel value of king crab accounted for 70 percent of all shellfish, and 28 percent of all fish in Alaska. The Bering Sea accounted for 65 percent of total ex-vessel value followed by Kodiak 19 percent, and Dutch Harbor 11 percent.

#### The 1977-1978 Fishery

The preliminary catch figures for 1977-78 list the statewide catch at 90,283,964 pounds through November. The average price paid to fishermen this year was approximately \$1.00 per pound, which will make the king crab fishery worth in excess of 90 million dollars to the fishermen.

#### General Status of Stocks

Preliminary analysis indicates the 1978-1979 catch should be comparable in most areas to the 1977-78 harvest of 100 million pounds.

#### Summary

In conclusion, the king crab fishery management rationale and

Regulations have been developed over many years and have been tested in actual fishery management situations. Current regulations and management rationale seems to be working in achieving desired objectives of (1) maintaining stocks at productive levels, (2) insuring maximum reproductive potential, (3) maximizing harvest through management of smallest sub-stocks practicable, and (4) minimizing fluctuations in harvest due to dependency on annual recruitment.

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Feb 19 78

# North Pacific Fishery Management Council

Harold E. Lokken, Chairman  
Jim H. Branson, Executive Director

Mailing Address: P.O. Box 3136DT  
Anchorage, Alaska 99510

Suite 32, 333 West 4th Avenue  
Post Office Mall Building




Telephone: (907) 274-4563  
FTS 265-5435

## MEMORANDUM

DATE: February 9, 1978

TO: Council Members, Scientific and Statistical Committee  
and Advisory Panel Members

FROM: Jim H. Branson, Executive Director 

SUBJECT: Council Mailing

We are on schedule with the revision of the FMP's. The errata sheet for the Gulf of Alaska Groundfish Plan was mailed February 3rd and we should finish researching the Council record on Tanner Crab and the OY decision north of 58 degrees North Latitude today. We hope to have that material compiled and the appropriate section of the plan redrafted early next week.

The Troll Salmon Plan is going to take considerably more rewriting and even with the Plan Development Team and the Council Staff working on it we will be hardput to have a redrafted plan finished in time for the February Council meeting. We will do our best, however.

We have received a resignation from Paul Guy from the Advisory Panel. Paul is resigning because of family and job commitments.

Of the 15 attachments to this mailing, Number 7, the policy statement on joint ventures from NOAA, is probably the most important.

The only other item that appears to require Council action is Number 2, a Gulf of Mexico Management Council Resolution on Estuarine Habitats, suggesting possible adoption of a similar resolution by the North Pacific Council.

The Alaska Board of Fisheries has requested time on the February Agenda to discuss the joint implementation of management plans and the development of management measures and regulations. It is time to work out some of the details on Council/Board interaction in regulation changes, licensing, enforcement and the other myriad details involved in a joint management scheme.

The following is a list of the attachments:

1. Paper by Vidar Weststad and E.E. Anderson "Relationship of Japanese Herring Harvests in the Eastern Bering Sea to Japanese Market Conditions"
2. Memo dated 1/26/78 to Council Executive Directors from Wayne E. Swingle of Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council conveying the GMFMC Estuarine Resolution.
3. Letter of 1/30/78 to Richard Frank, NOAA, from Jim Branson regarding NPFMC actions on the three FMP's being reviewed by the Secretary.
4. Memo dated 1/26/78 from David H. Wallace, NOAA, regarding status of applications/permits issued for 1978.
5. NPFMC Annual Report for 1977.
6. ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS article dated 2/3/78 titled "New Guidelines Give Edge to U.S. Fishermen-" by Jeanne Abbott. (Joint Ventures)
7. Policy Statement on Joint Ventures written by NOAA.
8. Letter of 1/31/78 to Harold Lokken from James P. Walsh, NOAA in appreciation for time at January 1978 Council meeting to express their views on Tanner Crab Plan.
9. Letter dated 1/27/78 to Spencer Appolonia, NEFMC, from David H. Wallace, approval of request for Council members to travel to Canada on routine basis for coordination and development of management plans and U.S./Canadian bilaterals.
10. Letter dated 2/2/78 from Lokken to Branson regarding letter of 1/31/78 from Takuji Kato, Japanese Tanner Crab Industry to Secretary of Commerce Kreps (copy attached).
11. Clipping from Southeast Alaska Empire, award to A.W. "Bud" Boddy, Advisory Panel member of NPFMC.
12. Letter dated 1/31/78 to Richard Frank from Harold Lokken regarding 'Economic and Allied Data Needs'.
13. Newsletter: Nautilus Vol. 4, #1, January 1978 (Marine Fish Management)
14. Summary of Actions, dated 1/27/78, by NOAA/NMFS on recommendations from the Marine Fisheries Advisory Committee at its meeting 10/4-6/78, Washington, D.C.
15. Minutes of January 26-27, 1978 NPFMC meeting.

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# North Pacific Fishery Management Council

Harold E. Lokken, Chairman  
Jim H. Branson, Executive Director

Mailing Address: P.O. Box 3136DT  
Anchorage, Alaska 99510

Suite 32, 333 West 4th Avenue  
Post Office Mall Building



Telephone: (907) 274-4563  
FTS 265-5435

February 10, 1978

Mr. David H. Wallace  
Acting Assistant Administrator for Fisheries  
NOAA, National Marine Fisheries Service  
3300 Whitehaven Street, Page Bldg. 2  
Washington, D.C. 20235

Dear Dave,

I have reviewed the latest collection of permit applications and am able to recommend approval for the following:

JA-78-0432	KAIYO NO. 8	crab and snails
JA-78-0810	SUE 11	snails
JA-78-0812	KOYO 3	crab
JA-78-0815	KYOWA 7	crab and snails
JA-78-0817	EIKYU	crab
JA-78-0819	HOKUTO 33	crab
JA-78-0820	EIWA 28	snails and crab
JA-78-0824	AZUMA 32	crab
JA-78-0856	TAKASHIRO 31	crab and snails
JA-78-0859	MEIHO 7	snails
JA-78-0860	MARUNAKA 68	snails
JA-78-0862	HOYO 63	snails
JA-78-0871	AZUMA 11	snails
JA-78-0872	HAKKAI 11	snails
JA-78-0873	HIGO	snails
JA-78-0874	KOHOKU 7	snails
JA-78-0875	KOTOYOSHI 21	snails
JA-78-0876	MITO 52	snails
JA-78-0877	RYOUN 2	snails

The other five applications received at the same time will have to wait on Council action at their next meeting, February 23-24, since they fall outside the parameters developed for Council staff review. The two Korean ships

KS-78-0042	SOO GONG 51	STRL	5,500 Gross Tons
KA-78-0079	BOOK NEUNG	Factory	8,600 Gross Tons

have applied for permits for processing and support activity in the Gulf of Alaska to conduct a joint venture purchasing raw fish from American vessels.

One Japanese crab boat the

JA-78-0821      MATSUEI 72

has a violation record, an infraction of the contiguous fishery zone off Southeastern Alaska on August 22, 1969.

The Japanese longliner

JA-78-0822      EIKYU 26      LL

which is applying for a permit to fish crab and also to fish with a longline for blackcod and numerous other species in the Bering Sea and Aleutians and for herring with a gillnet, is an unusual enough mix of gear types and target species to require consideration by the Council.

The longliner/pot boat

JA-78-0851      TAISAN 1

has applied for a permit for crab and snails in the Bering Sea and also for a permit to conduct support activity in the Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea and Aleutians. The combination of a fishing vessel conducting support activities, particularly in areas where their fishing permit would not cover, presents an unusual enough situation to require review by the Council.

Sincerely,



Jim H. Branson  
Executive Director



THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION

APPLICATION FOR VESSEL PERMITS TO FISH WITHIN THE  
FISHERY CONSERVATION ZONE OF THE UNITED STATES

No. \_\_\_\_\_

In accordance with the provisions of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, the Government of Republic of Korea hereby submits this application for permits for vessels under its jurisdiction to fish within the Fishery Conservation Zone of the United States, or beyond that zone for anadromous species or Continental Shelf fishery resources subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, during the year 1978.

Fishing Vessel Identification Forms will be submitted in support of this application. The fishery plans, species, and catch contemplated for vessels of the Korean flag are as follows:

Fishery Plans	Target Species	Total Tonnage Requested For Each Species (MT)
G O A	Processing & Transporting	

Submitted: January 23 1978  
Date

[Signature]  
Signature of Authorized Official  
Fishery Attache, Embassy of the  
Republic of Korea, Washington, D.C.  
Title

FISHING VESSEL IDENTIFICATION FORM (FOREIGN)

No. KS-78-0042

1. Name of Vessel Soo Gong No. 51 Visual Identifier (Call Sign) 6NEJ
3. Type of Vessel Stern Trawler (Factory Ship) Length 101.80 M
5. Gross Tonnage 5,510.74G/T 6. Net Tonnage 2,762 N/T 7. Speed (knots) 15.0 KTS  
Maximum
8. Owner's Name and Address Korea Marine Industry Development Corporation  
#55-4, Seodomun-Dong, Chung-Ku, Seoul, Korea
9. Types of Processing Equipment Fish Meal Plant, Minced Meat Plant,  
Fish Oil Plant, Filleter, Flash Freezer.

10. Fisheries for Which Permit is Requested:

Fishery Plans	Target Species	Gear To Be Used	ACTIVITY		
			Catching	Processing	Other Support
G O A				X	X (Transport)

11. Are Fishing Activities Requested in Support of Vessels of a Different Flag:

- No  Yes (If yes, attach supplemental sheet showing flag of other vessels, fishery, species, quantities, dates, locations and specific activities requested.)

FISHING VESSEL IDENTIFICATION FORM (FOREIGN)

No. KD-78-0079

1. Name of Vessel Book Neung Visual Identifier (Call Sign) BF 36130  
 2. Type of Vessel Factory Ship (Processing) 4. Length 130.00 M  
 3. Gross Tonnage 8,600.81G/T 5. Net Tonnage 5,983.65N/T 7. Maximum Speed (knots) 14 KTS  
 8. Owner's Name and Address Korea Marine Industry Development Corporation  
#55-4, Seodomun-Dong, Chung-Ku, Seoul, Korea  
 9. Types of Processing Equipment Filleter. Fish Meal Plant

10. Fisheries for Which Permit is Requested:

Fishery Plans	Target Species	Gear To Be Used	ACTIVITY		
			Catching	Processing	Other Support
G O A				X	X (Transport)

11. Are Fishing Activities Requested in Support of Vessels of a Different Flag:

- No  Yes (If yes, attach supplemental sheet showing flag of other vessels, fishery, species, quantities, dates, locations and specific activities requested.)

Material for Question No. 11:

Specific Activities requested: Purchase of raw fish from U.S. vessels for processing and shipment to Korea.

Flag of other vessels: U.S.

Fishery: GOA - Bottomfish fishery.

Species: Primary Pollock and incidental species including POP, Pacific cod, flounders, rockfish and other species.

Quantity: Project Target is 130,000 MT. Realizing that TALFF has been distributed there is only approximately 72,800 MT of fish available for U.S. fishermen, 36,400 MT is requested for each vessel.

Locations: Various locations within the U.S. Fishery Conservation Zone in the Gulf of Alaska.

Dates: April 1 - December 31, 1978 which will depend upon culmination of arrangements with U.S. fishermen.

#23 f. 2

February 9, 1978

Mr. Lee J. Weddig  
Executive Vice President  
National Fisheries Institute, Inc.  
1730 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. Weddig:

I want to thank you for your very thorough and thoughtful letter of December 22nd to the Secretary of Commerce in support of the North Pacific Council's Tanner Crab Fishery Management Plan. Although we have had many letters in support of the plan to the Secretary, your reasoned arguments articulate the problem better than any I have seen.

The Council staff is currently in the process of researching the Council record of deliberations on Tanner crab as the plan developed over the past 14 months. Once that is done we intend to redraft the section dealing with optimum yield north of 58° latitude and the surplus available for foreign catch. Hopefully this process will dispel the doubts currently held by the Department of Commerce and the plan will be speedily approved. We can only hope that the delay will not have a detrimental effect on either the U.S. or foreign crab fisheries in the Bering sea.

Thank you again for your support.

Sincerely,

Jim H. Branson  
Executive Director

cc: Council (50) with Attachments

COPY



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration  
 National Marine Fisheries Service  
 Washington, D.C. 20235

F31/DL

FEB 6 1978

Mr. Lee J. Weddig  
 Executive Vice President  
 National Fisheries Institute, Inc.  
 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
 Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. Weddig:

Secretary Kreps has asked me to respond to your informative letter of December 22, 1977, in which you urge the immediate approval of the fishery management plan (FMP) for Tanner crab harvested off Alaska which was prepared by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council.

The Tanner crab FMP allows foreign fishing only north of a line at 58° latitude, and sets forth a maximum sustained yield of 102,000 metric tons for this fishery. It then proposes a total allowable level of foreign fishing (TALFF) of 15,000 metric tons with an optimum yield (OY) in the corresponding area of 16,360 to 17,268 metric tons. The primary justification for this TALFF is a Council desire to ensure that no drastic reduction in the price of Tanner crab will occur. However, the record contains inadequate evidence to indicate that a higher OY would depress the price and thus adversely affect the U.S. domestic industry. We believe that a TALFF of only 15,000 metric tons is not supported by the evidence presented in the FMP. We have subsequently advised the Council that we could not approve the FMP in its present form and have requested it to produce appropriate modifications.

We recognize the difficulty of producing information on the economics of this fishery and intend to work with the Council to develop a record which will provide a basis for a proper OY consistent with the standards of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act. We are thus working to avoid any ultimate conflict in views and are hopeful that formal disapproval of the FMP will not be required.

We appreciate receiving your comments and views on this important FMP. In making our decision with respect to the Tanner crab FMP, we considered your views on the matter, and the potential impacts to all user groups.

Sincerely,

*David H. Wallace*  
 David H. Wallace  
 Acting Assistant Administrator  
 for Fisheries



NPFMC

cc: A, CC, POL/ORSPC, ExecSec(2), F, 1 (2), F31(2), GCF,  
 NPFMC, Fx31

F31:NMFS:EPASTULA:634-7328:1/24/78:bv  
 Revised::DLEEDY:634-7454:2/1/78:ndl




## NATIONAL FISHERIES INSTITUTE, INC.

1730 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W. ■ WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 ■ (202) 785-0500

December 22, 1977

The Honorable Juanita M. Kreps  
Secretary of Commerce  
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
Room 5851  
Main Commerce Building  
14th & Constitution Ave., N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20230



Dear Madam Secretary:

I am urging immediate approval of the Alaskan Crab Management Plan, which has been submitted by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council.

The plan should be approved on its merits as well as to assist in establishing the integrity of the Regional Council Management function.

There is need for immediate action. Tanner crab harvest by United States fishermen begins in earnest after the Holidays. While Japanese motherships typically do not arrive on the grounds until April and so an immediate decision is not needed for the foreign fleet, present uncertainty has negative impact on the industry in the United States. This is so because Japanese buyers are reported to be hedging on commitments for product in anticipation of a larger quota being allocated to the Japanese fleet. Consequently, the U.S. processor, beginning in January, will be required to invest in labor, packaging, and inventory in a state of uncertainty as to how much product will be provided to the Japanese market by the Japanese fleet.

Regarding the Plan itself, it seems the only issues can be whether the foreign catch should be restricted to 15,000 tons of *C. opilio*, and to the area north of 58 degrees latitude. Discussions with various NOAA and NMFS officials indicate concern over limiting Japanese catch to 15,000 tons when the biological capabilities of the resource are much greater. They point out a lack of economic data to show the impact of a larger allocation to Japan.

I agree that hard data is lacking. Also missing is a proven tested economic model which could predict impact of various variables. Whether a reliable model of this type can be developed is open to question. There have been numerous unsuccessful attempts. The market for any given seafood product category, such as tanner crab, is affected by many conditions beyond the supply of crab in Japan, the U.S., and elsewhere.

As examples, consider:

- . The effect of substitution of one kind of shellfish for another. Right now, shrimp inventories are at record levels. Prices have dropped. How many restaurant operators will switch from crab appetizers and entrees to shrimp?
- . Continued low prices for beef. Another season of relatively low red meat prices will accentuate competition for entrees.
- . The expected resurgence of blue crab production. Last year, this item was in short supply. We expect better production in 1978. This will compete for the crab meat market in the United States.
- . The effect of President Carter's tax "reform" measures, if adopted, which would restrict restaurant and club meals.

These and other factors are imprecise and difficult to assess. Nonetheless, they will affect the market for tanner crab.

More specifically, and to the point, please consider that the Management Plan estimates an increase in domestic production of tanner crab of 23,000-42,000 metric tons. The Japanese allocation provides for an increase in production of an estimated 5,000 metric tons (15,000 m.t. over estimated 1977 catch of 10,000 m.t.). The maximum increase could be 47,000 m.t.---90 percent more than 1977 production. The testimony of Abby Gorham, University of Alaska, indicated the Japanese supply from all sources is down 10,000 m.t. From this, she implies that the Japanese market could absorb the increase in Japanese catch as well as increased imports from the U.S., without damaging price levels. To me, it appears that the increased production anticipated by the U.S. and the Japanese places market stability in great jeopardy without increasing the Japanese quota beyond 15,000 m.t. Indeed, I question the wisdom of allowing



any increase in Japanese catch over last year's production. Add to this the present fact that cold storage holdings of tanner crab are more than double that of a year ago.

One phenomenon of seafood marketing is the disproportionate impact of extremely small imbalances in supply and demand. Veteran observers and participants point out that as little as a five percent shortage can cause rapid, excessive price escalation. Likewise, overproduction in the same ratio has the effect of a glut, causing prices to tumble. The current situation in the shrimp market is a good example.

For most commodities, market surplus means a decline in price paid to the producer. For crab, however, a minimum producer price is negotiated at the beginning of the season. The processor will have to pay at least the minimum for all raw crab. Should the market reach saturation, prices for finished product will drop, as well as the value of inventories. The processor typically would halt or slow down purchase of additional raw product in such a situation, putting fishermen and plant employees out of work.

Some of the uncertainty is removed in the crab market when Japanese importers enter into purchase agreements at the beginning of the season. Already the buyers can anticipate increased production by the Japanese fleet of 5,000 m.t. They know of the increased production of crab in the Sea of Japan. They undoubtedly are seeking product from elsewhere in the world. All of this creates uncertainty. I don't believe this uncertainty should be accentuated by allowing additional foreign catch quota.

Finally, I believe we should look carefully at the FCMA:

- . The Findings call for a national program for the development of underutilized fisheries.
- . The Purposes include encouraging the development of those fisheries underutilized by United States fishermen; these same Purposes say management plans should "take into account the social and economic needs of the States".
- . The Policy says the management program should be "responsive to the needs of interested and affected States and citizens".

- . The term "optimum" with respect to the yield from a fishery means the amount of fish which will provide the greatest overall benefit to the nation.

The current activity of various Administration officials, scurrying to and from Tokyo with the publicized, not-too-subtle mission of increasing Japanese imports, leads me to the conclusion that increased sale of crab to Japan would be of benefit to our nation. (A suggested task for one of these negotiators, by the way, would be to seek removal of the 10 percent Japanese import duty on crab.)

Your office has embarked on a \$500,000 program to investigate overseas market opportunities for U.S. seafood products. Obviously, it is felt that more seafood exports will provide jobs and contribute to our trade account.

If we are serious about fisheries development, and more importantly, international trade, we will utilize situations which offer potential benefit without a great deal of abrupt change and public investment. The proposed management plan does this. The plan does not cut back foreign catch - it actually allows greater catch than in previous years. The private sector is willing to develop this underutilized fishery - there is no request for government development funds, loans, etc. I believe the plan is in accord with the broad provisions of the FCMA and respectfully request its immediate approval to allow the season to begin on a note of some certainty.

Sincerely,

NATIONAL FISHERIES INSTITUTE

*Lee J. Weddig*  
Lee J. Weddig  
Executive Vice President

LJW/flw



#238 3,  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration  
National Marine Fisheries Service  
Washington, D.C. 20235

Fx3/RSW

Date : FEB 6 1978


To : Chairmen, Regional Fishery Management Councils  
Regional Directors, NMFS

*Bob*  
From : Robert W. Schoning, Acting Deputy  
Assistant Administrator for Fisheries

Subject: Deferred Funding for Research Vessel Construction

The OMB has released \$3,750K in deferred FY77 Extended Jurisdiction funds for the construction of a 120' NOAA fishery research vessel. These funds are the remainder of \$7,500K appropriated in the FY77 supplemental appropriation for construction of two vessels. As you will remember, half of the appropriated amount was reprogrammed to help support FY77 Regional Council operations, provide additional support for States and Territories to participate in extended jurisdiction activities, and to enlarge the foreign vessel observer program.

Requests for Proposals to construct the ship have been sent to 41 shipyards nationwide. The responses will be evaluated during the month of April 1978, with a contract award around May 1. Completion is scheduled for July 1, 1979, after which we expect the ship to work out of Seattle - mostly in support of Resource Assessment (MARMAP) activities conducted by the Northwest and Alaska Fisheries Center.



#23h

4.

EDITORIAL

MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full.)

January 23, 1978

What Will Come after Japan-US-Canada Fishery Consultations

The Japan-US-Canada tripartite consultations on salmon and salmon-trout fishing in the Northern Pacific ended on the 22nd. The three countries have not been able to reach over-all agreement, but they have made large-scale concessions as to their assertions. They plan to hold consultations again in Vancouver on February 7 and 8. Unexpectedly large-scale and quick changes were made, going as far as to withdraw the proposed abrogation of the Japan-US-Canada Fishery Treaty, rising above a confrontation coloring seen between Japan and the US at the beginning. It has come about that a new step has been marked toward the Japan-Soviet fishery negotiations to be conducted from February 15.

Accompanying the enforcement of the 200-Nautical-Mile Act, the US has taken the principle that the mother-river countries have the right to control such anadromous fish as salmon and salmon trout, and it also has taken the stand that the US has the right to control salmon and salmon-trout of US origin, even outside its 200-nautical-mile zones. With this as the basis, the US submitted a plan for moving the present check line on 175 degrees west longitude by 15 degrees to the west. Our country strongly offered resistance to this, on the grounds that in sea areas to the west of the check line, salmon and salmon-trout of Japanese and Soviet origins also migrate, not only salmon and salmon-trout of US origin, and that therefore, the check line cannot be moved for salmon and salmon-trout of US origin alone. This is because if our country accepts America's proposal, our country will provide the Soviet Union with similar grounds, and also because this will deal a crushing blow to the salmon and salmon-trout fishing of our country in the northern seas.

It is viewed that the US has withdrawn its plan for establishing a new check line and proposed a more flexible plan as to restrictions, based on its judgment that the amount of salmon and salmon-trout of US origin caught by our country is extremely small, that is, only 300 tons, and that if the US is to force its assertions upon our country more strongly, it will cause unnecessary confusion. At any rate, it can be said that since the biggest task is the protection of resources, the US has chosen the way of securing results in international co-operation, rather than throwing the situation into confusion, to no avail.

It seems that the present crisis has been avoided for our country's salmon and salmon-trout fishing, but the contents of the proposed restrictions are severe. First of all, probably we can point out restrictions on the fishing season and the number of fishing boats for chinook salmon in the north from 55 degrees north latitude. Nothing has been boiled down yet concretely. However, the US, which harbors the strong sense of distrust as to Japanese fishing boats' catching young fish, will probably press Japan, by proposing a policy line close to a virtual ban on the fish catch.

Also, in the sea areas from 55 degrees to 45 degrees north latitude, Japanese fishing boats catch red salmon of Alaska and Canadian origins. For this reason, the shortening of the operation period is being strongly called for, including the operation period in America's 200-nautical-mile zones. Furthermore, pressure is coming to be applied extremely strongly, such as that it is requested to conduct a survey on the migration of salmon and salmon-trout of US and Canadian origins in waters to the north of 46 degrees north latitude, too, and that Japanese fishing boats should not be permitted to engage in operations during the survey period for two to three years.

It can be said that at the heels of one trouble, another trouble has appeared. What attracts our attention as a result of the consultations held this time, is that the "rights of the mother-river countries" in the draft for unified negotiations at the Conference on the Law of the Sea have been strictly upheld. The only point upon which our country can rely upon as to the draft is a provision, to the effect, "By considering the actual results of operations carried out by the traditional fishing countries, co-operation should be extended so as to hold down economic confusion to the minimum degree." In the midst of the upsurge in resources nationalism, pressure against off-shore fishing is becoming unprecedentedly strong.

The problem is probably the negotiations to be conducted between Japan and the Soviet Union in the future. The Soviet Union has strongly formulated the right of control by the mother-river countries, by dint of the Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree Concerning Coastal Fishing. It is also predicted that there will arise the situation where the Soviet Union will press for a ban on salmon and salmon-trout fishing outside its 200-nautical-mile zones. The strengthening of restrictions may be a "destiny" in the 200-nautical-mile age. We feel uneasy as to how far our country will be able to confront the Soviet Union, with its being a traditional fishery country and its actual operation results alone as the prop. Nevertheless, our country cannot but push them.

Our country and the Soviet Union are two big fishery countries. They take pride in their high-level marine culture and processing techniques, which excel other countries. Availing themselves of these techniques, they should make all-out efforts for the artificial incubation and cultivation of salmon and salmon-trout. In waters off the coast of our country, artificial incubation and cultivation are being carried out on a large scale, but it cannot be said that efforts to that extent are sufficient. When our country shows to the world the fact that it is making utmost efforts for the conservation of resources, its efforts, then, will be recognized as "actual results," for the first time.

As a matter of course, our country should introduce its high-level techniques to the US and the Soviet Union, not merely making efforts within its own country, and it should extend co-operation for the conservation of resources. In this connection, we cannot but say that it is unfortunate for Japan and the Soviet Union that an artificial incubation project, planned to be carried out in Sakhalin through co-operation between the two countries, has made no headway at all. We would like to stress that it is necessary for Japan, above all, to carry out co-operation projects, one after another, in order to live in the 200-nautical-mile age.

Japan-US-Canada Fishery Negotiations Expected to Reach Final Conclusion Early in February; US Showing Flexible Posture; Consultations to Be Held Again in Canada on Remaining Problems

The tripartite fishery consultations, which had been started among Japan, the US and Canada for the establishment of a new system for control of northern Pacific salmon fisheries in the age of 200-nautical-mile waters, came to a close on the 22nd, after the one-day extension of the scheduled session. Partly because of the limited length of the session, the consultations failed to produce a final conclusion. This round of consultations, however, made far greater progress toward agreement among the three nations than the previous two rounds, and prospects have been established for the establishment of a virtual agreement on the remaining problems, such as the limitation of the area for control and the determination of the fishing season, at the consultations to be held again in Vancouver, Canada, on February 7 and 8. Director General MATSUURA of the Ocean Fisheries Department of the Fisheries Agency, who was Japan's Chief Delegate to the consultations, held a news conference from 10:00 a.m. on the 23rd, and announced as follows: "Several problems have been left unsolved in this round of consultations. All of the participating nations, however, have offered considerable concessions. Consultations will be held again in Vancouver, Canada, on February 7 and 8. I think that it is no longer likely to occur that the present Treaty will be abrogated."

The following is the gist of the statements made by Director General MATSUURA:

1. In this round of consultations, all the participating nations held discussions in depth among them, showing their readiness to offer concessions. They could not, however, produce a final conclusion, because of the lack of time. In the end, they agreed to hold consultations again in Vancouver on February 7 and 8, and wound up the consultations at 2:30 p.m. on the 22nd.

2. Looking back on the whole process of the consultations which lasted from the 17th through the 22nd, I must point out that the US Delegate at the beginning proposed to establish restrictions covering the whole area of migration of North American salmon. Japan opposed such severe restrictions. The US then came out with a plan to phase out Japanese salmon fisheries in a period of three to five years. We refuted this plan, saying that it is quite impossible for Japan to promise to give up salmon fisheries in five years hence. The US retracted this plan, too, and later revealed a far more flexible plan to control salmon fisheries.

3. This control plan contains the following proposals:  
(i) Shortening of the fishing season and other restrictive measures should be strengthened in the sea north of the 55th Parallel North Latitude, because the king salmon fry of North American stock in this sea area advance westward beyond the established line (175 Degrees West Longitude) and mix with silver salmon there, to be caught by Japanese fishing ships; (ii) Measures for the conservation of the salmon resources of North American stock should be strengthened in the sea between the 46th and 55th Parallels North Latitude, because the red salmon of Bristol origin in this sea area are migrating to the sea west of the same line, which sea overlaps the 200-nautical-mile fishery zone of the US; (iii) In the sea south of the 46th Parallel North Latitude, research should be conducted for two or more years on whether salmon of North American stock are migrating to and from this sea area, and Japanese fishing operations should be banned during the period of research.

This plan involves several problems which must be studied further, such as the control line and the fishing season. As a result, a final conclusion could not be produced on this plan, while the participating nations showed their readiness to offer considerable concessions. So it was decided to hold consultations again in Vancouver on February 7 and 8. Unlike the Soviet Union, the US does not maintain the policy of barring Japanese fishing ships totally from its 200-nautical-mile zone. Although the US is by no means lenient toward Japan, I think that the consultations will come to a settlement, if we step up talks hereafter. The present Treaty is scheduled to expire on February 9. The US, however, has retracted its notice of abrogation, and we expect that the occurrence of a treaty-less state will be prevented.

HF

# Japan's Fish Catch in 1976 Down 0.9 Per Cent to 10,455,000 Tons

Japanese fishermen hauled a total of 10,455,000 tons of fish in waters throughout the world in 1976, retaining its traditional place as the world's top fishing country, the Fishery Agency reported Wednesday.

Japan's fish catch, down 90,000 tons or 0.9 per cent from

1975, accounted for a one-seventh share of the world's total hauls of 73,467,000 tons during the year, the agency said.

The Soviet Union came second with the haul of 10,134,000 tons.

Since the United States, the

Soviet Union and a number of other nations, including Japan itself, have since set up 200-mile fishery zones off their coasts, the Japanese fisheries industry obviously has seen its best year, agency officials said.

The coastal off-shore fisheries in Japanese waters were the most productive, yielding 5,682,000 tons, up 179,000 tons or 3.2 per cent over the previous year.

Much of the increase was attributed to a good haul of sardines which came to 1,390,000 tons, up from 860,000 tons the previous year.

In waters around the four Soviet-held islands, east of Hokkaido, Japanese fishermen landed 275,000 tons, down from 300,000 tons.

Off-shore fisheries from distant waters now included in foreign 200-mile zones produced an estimated 3,506,000 tons, down 238,000 tons or 6.4 per cent.

The decrease was paced largely by declining hauls of Alaska pollack in U.S. and Soviet waters and a sharp drop in catches of various species of mackerel in waters off China and South Korea.

Japan's fishing in New Zealand waters, on the contrary, doubled to 166,000 tons from 80,000 tons.

In open waters, waters uncontrolled by any countries, Japanese hauls, mostly bonito and tuna, totaled 417,000 tons.

In 1977, Japanese fisheries should have taken a steep fall due to foreign restrictions in newly established fishery zones, dislodging Japan from its No. 1 position, the officials said.

## Hitachi to Get Gov't Go-Ahead For Computer Export to China

Hitachi, Ltd. will soon obtain the Government's go-ahead for its export to China of three large-scale computers, which has been suspended due to objection by the United States, informed sources said here Wednesday.

The sources said that an official of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and a Hitachi expert would leave for Washington within the next few days to seek U.S. understanding for the sensitive deal.

The talks are expected to clear the way for the shipment of the computers within March, the sources said.

The ¥2,538 million contract won by Hitachi in August 1976 calls for the delivery of one M170 and two M160II computers.

China wants to have them installed at the Central Meteorological Bureau in Peking.

The United States, an important member of the COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Export Control), has objected, saying that the memory capacity of the computers is so large that they might be converted into military use.

The Paris-based COCOM — Japan is one of its 15 member countries — screens the shipment of strategic items to the Communist bloc.

In the previous round of talks between Japan and the United States last year, Washington made it clear that it would drop its objection if two conditions were accepted by China.

These called for reducing the memory capacity, and placing

the computers under safeguards so that they might not be used for military purposes.

The sources said an agreement that could satisfy these conditions had been reached at recent negotiations between Hitachi and Chinese officials.

Under the accord, the capacity of the central processing devices of the computers would not be changed but the memory capacity of their auxiliary devices would be reduced.

A Hitachi official would be stationed in Peking for three years after the installation of the computers to prevent their possible conversion to military use.

## European Money Markets

### Dollar Opens Higher

LONDON (UPI) — The dollar opened higher on the European foreign exchange markets Wednesday and gold also gained in value.

In London, the pound opened at \$1.948 down from \$1.9500 Tuesday night. U.S. Treasury Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal's comment that he expected a narrower U.S. trade deficit by the end of the year probably helped the dollar along, dealers said.

In Frankfurt, the dollar rose to 2.1122 marks from 2.1067, but the price was still below Tuesday morning's levels. The dollar rate in Zurich was 1.9832 Swiss francs up from 1.9760.

## R.P. Garment Rising: Invest

MANILA (Kyodo-Reuters) — Board of Investment Governor Conrado Sanchez Thursday forecast considerable growth for the Philippines garment





#23i

5.

(dl)

(907) 586-7298

16460

09 FEB 1978

From: Commander, Seventeenth Coast Guard District  
To: Commandant (G-L)

Subj: FWPCA Violation Involving RTM ZARACHYE (UR)

1. The enclosed case file is forwarded for your review and action or advice as appropriate.
2. On 25 May 1976, the RTM ZARACHYE (UR) was observed by Coast Guard personnel in position 52°-17N, 175°-58E, 5.5 miles southeast of Buldir Island, discharging oil into the waters of the Contiguous Zone.
3. Repeated attempts have been made to serve notice of the violation for penalty assessment purposes on Alaska Maritime Agencies, Inc. and Mr. Lester Clark of Graham and James, agent and attorney respectively for SOVRYBFLOT, the owner/operator of subject vessel, without any success. That action was taken upon advice from COMDT(G-WEP-3/73) letter dated 15 September 1976 which forwarded a copy of a letter from the State Department advising that Mr. ENROTH of Alaska Maritime Agencies, Seattle, Washington should be contacted initially as the agent responsible for securing legal representation for subject vessel.
4. It is apparent from the enclosed correspondence and from numerous telephone conversations this office has had with Messrs. ENROTH, and CLARK on this matter, that the Soviet Embassy has not bothered to inform its agents of their designation as such for this matter. Alternatively, we may again be the subject (or victim) of more stalling by the Soviets as we experienced until only recently in the SAMARGA pollution case involving another SOVRYBFLOT vessel.
5. It is requested that the appropriate Headquarters Office review subject case file from the standpoint of coordination with the Department of State inasmuch as local efforts to secure response from a proper party have proven fruitless. Further action from the State Department appears warranted at this time owing to the aggravating nature of the facts surrounding this case, particularly regarding attempts by the Soviets to avoid the taking of evidence of the oil slick and the evasive maneuvers by other Soviet vessels in the area to prevent boarding of subject vessel or to dissipate the oil slick.
6. Because of the difficulties encountered in this and the aforementioned case involving the SAMARGA, I also recommend that action be taken to consider the Coast Guard's position regarding the relationship of these matters to that of financial responsibility of the Soviets for pur-

DEC 4  
FEB 14 1978

COPY

09 FEB 1978

Subj: FWPCA Violation Involving RTM ZARACHYE (UR)

poses of foreign fishing permit recommendations under the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 1801, particularly the action required by the Coast Guard in reviewing those permits under Section 1824 thereof. The repeated failure of the Soviet SOVRYBFLOT to acknowledge and respond to its responsibilities for violation of United States Pollution Laws in United States waters is certainly indicative of an attitude intended to be considered in the review process of 16 U.S.C. 1824. Certainly, concern for the environment by a Regional Council and the history of repeated disregard by Soviet vessels for that environment evidenced by their willful violation of pollution laws and failure to acknowledge financial responsibility for their acts should be taken into consideration by a Regional Council as well as the Department of State and the U.S. Coast Guard in making a final determination regarding permit approval under Section 1824.

7. It is requested that we be advised of what action is to be taken regarding resolution of this matter.

P. A. YOST  
ACTING

Encl: (1) RTM ZARACHYE (UR) Case File

Copy to:

CCGD17(m) (w/o encl)

CCGD17(oil) (w/o encl)

COMDT (G-000-4) (w/o encl)


COMDT (G-WEP-3) (w/o encl)

North pacific Regional Fisheries Management Council (w/o encl)

COF

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF  
**COMMERCE**  
**NEWS**

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20230



NOAA 78-15

RELEASE: Friday  
February 10, 1978

Foreign Nations Pay More Than \$10  
Million to Fish in 200-Mile Zone

Foreign nations to date have paid \$10 million to the United States in fees to fish within 200 nautical miles of the U.S. coast during 1978, according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's National Marine Fisheries Service.

About 800 foreign vessels are expected to fish in the 200-mile zone, and total revenues are anticipated to amount to \$10.1 million from the poundage fees, based on the dockside value of the fish taken, and \$0.9 million from the vessel permit fees. When observers are placed aboard foreign fishing vessels, observer costs will be collected and the total will increase.

The Commerce Department agency reported that the largest total fee--\$5,960,653--has been paid by Japan, permitting that nation to catch 1,157,635 metric tons of fish with up to 450 vessels within the U.S. 200-mile zone.

Second largest fee--\$3,549,978--was paid by the Soviet Union, allocated 493,928 metric tons with up to 200 vessels.

The Japanese allocation is primarily for pollock, and the Soviet allocation primarily for pollock and hake, two species that are not sought by U.S. fishermen.

Other nations that have paid fees, the amount of catch allocated, and number of vessels already issued permits to fish, are: South Korea, \$370,497, 92,598 metric tons, 18 vessels; Spain, \$266,347, 18,156 mt, 30 vessels; Italy, \$78,978, 4,125 mt, 15 vessels.

-more-



Permits soon will be issued to Bulgaria, which has paid \$16,513, 1,504 mt, 3 vessels; to Mexico, \$155,070, 10,528 mt, 14 vessels; and to Taiwan, \$26,094, 5,822 mt, 8 vessels.

Applications approved but not ready for permit issuance are from Poland, \$162,262, 22,622 mt, 22 vessels; and Cuba, \$112,183, 9,715 mt, 17 vessels.

France and the Federal Republic of Germany (West) are expected to apply later in the year for permits to fish.

#

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#23 k

# North Pacific Fishery Management Council

changed  
to agenda  
#5

Harold E. Lokken, Chairman  
Jim H. Branson, Executive Director

Suite 32, 333 West 4th Avenue  
Post Office Mall Building



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Feb. 1, 1978

FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN  
AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT  
FOR THE  
GULF OF ALASKA GROUND FISH FISHERY  
DURING 1978

REVISED PAGES ONLY

NORTH PACIFIC FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL

P.O. Box 3136 DT  
Anchorage, Alaska 99510

Shelf." Enforcement power under the bilateral agreements was allotted to the flag country.

The management regime draws from many different sources concerning groundfish stocks for allowable catches and efforts. Seasons, allocations among user groups, restrictions as to times, gear, quantities, methods, etc., are detailed and explained with references both historic and current.

The management provisions adopted by the North Pacific Council are based on a policy of protecting and rebuilding the halibut resource in the Gulf of Alaska and within that parameter encouraging as rapid a growth as possible of the U.S. groundfish fishery. To further that goal; the Council makes the following recommendations:

1. Close the Gulf of Alaska east of 140° West longitude to all foreign longlining. Elsewhere prohibit foreign longlining landward of the 500 meter isobath, except that a directed Pacific cod longline fishery may be conducted landward of the 500 meter isobath west of 157 degrees West longitude, except during the halibut season as set by the International Pacific Halibut Commission. Reduce the optimum yield for sablefish to 13,000 metric tons for the entire Gulf to encourage rapid rebuilding of these stocks to MSY and increase the size of fish available. These measures are designed to encourage the U.S. longline fishery and protect halibut.
2. Recommend the initial foreign allocation of surplus stocks be computed by the following formula:  $OY - (20\% \text{ of } OY = DAH) = \text{initial foreign allocation}$ . The 20 percent of OY held as a reserve should be reallocated either to the foreign fisheries or to the domestic fishery in-season, following a reassessment of U.S. development.

Table 58--The derivation of Optimum Yield (OY) for Gulf of Alaska groundfish resources, 1,000's mt.

	Species	Shu- magin	Chir- ikof	Kodiak	Yakutat	Southeast	TOTAL <sup>6/</sup>
Exploitable biomass	Pollock	357-713	340-680	255-511	78-155	25-51	1055-2110
	Cod	40-79	17-33	64-128	18-36	5.9-12	145-288
	Flounders	220	69	277	154	52	772
	POP			-Unknown-			
	Rockfish			-Unknown-			
	Sablefish			-Unknown-			
	Atka mack. Squid						(110) <u>1/</u>
MSY	Pollock						169-338
	Cod						34.8-69.1
	Flounders						67
	POP						125-150
	Rockfish						7.6-10
	Sablefish						22-25
	Atka mack. Squid						(33) <u>1/</u> 2.0
EY (When stock incapable of producing MSY)	Pollock						N/A
	Cod						N/A
	Flounders						N/A
	POP						50
	Rockfish						N/A
	Sablefish						17.4-19.8
	Atka mack. Squid						N/A 2.0
ABC	Pollock <sup>2/</sup>	57.1	54.4	40.8	12.5	4.0	168.8
	Cod <sup>2/</sup>	9.6	4.1	15.3	4.3	1.5	34.8
	Flounders <sup>2/</sup>	20.8	5.7	23.9	12.5	4.1	67
	POP <sup>3/</sup>	5.3	5.3	10.4	16.0	13.0	50
	Rockfish <sup>3/</sup>	0.3	0.2	0.6	3.4	3.1	7.6
	Sablefish <sup>3/</sup>	2.8	1.9	3.2	4.7	4.9	17.4
	Atka mack. <sup>4/</sup>	4.4	3.6	15.8	1.0	0	24.8
	Squid <sup>5/</sup>	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	2.0
	Others	4.3	3.6	5.0	2.0	1.1	16.2
OY	Pollock	57.1	54.4	40.8	12.5	4.0	168.8
	Cod	9.6	4.1	15.3	4.3	1.5	34.8
	Flounders	10.4	2.8	11.9	6.3	2.1	33.5
	POP	2.7	2.7	5.2	8.0	6.5	25.0
	Rockfish	0.3	0.2	0.6	3.4	3.1	7.6
	Sablefish	2.1	1.4	2.4	3.5	3.7	13.0
	Atka mack.	4.4	3.6	15.8	1.0	0	24.8
	Squid	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	2.8
	Others	<u>4.3</u>	<u>3.6</u>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>16.2</u>
TOTAL	91.3	73.2	97.4	41.4	22.4	325.7	

1/ From unsubstantiated report of Soviet scientists.

2/ Apportioned on basis of trawl survey data.

3/ Apportioned on basis of 73-75 Japanese catch.

4/ Apportioned on basis of 73-75 Soviet catch.

5/ Apportioned equally to each area.

6/ Totals may not equal column figures due to rounding.

natural mortality rate of 0.2, except for rock sole (0.26), are: turbot 24,300 mt; rock sole 21,300 mt; flathead sole 8,600 mt; and, other flounders combined 12,400 mt. For the flounder group as a whole (excluding halibut) the MSY is estimated to be 67,000 mt.

#### 4.7.4.2 Equilibrium Yield (EY)

Although MSY's for some flounder species have been estimated, it is more appropriate at this stage to manage the flounder resources as a group rather than by individual species. With present knowledge, it is assumed that any flounder fishery in the Gulf of Alaska will simultaneously capture a number of species and stocks, each of which will be fished at a different rate. Until geographical and seasonal patterns and rates of fishing on these individual flounder stocks become better known, EY will be considered only for the flounders as a group. Since this group has been only lightly exploited, MSY is attainable.

#### 4.7.5 Pacific Halibut

##### 4.7.5.1 Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY)

Chapman, Myhre, and Southward (1962) estimated the MSY of Pacific Halibut at 19,400 mt (14,550 mt dressed weight) in IPHC Area 2 (Southeastern-Vancouver) and 21,800 mt (16,350 mt dressed weight) in IPHC Area 3 (Shumagin-Yakutat), or 41,200 mt for the entire northeastern Pacific Ocean.



Gulf of Alaska. The predominant sizes of fish available to trawls were greater than 30 cm, which are mature fish older than 3-4 years. On the basis of analyses of biological characteristics, Soviet scientists believe that 30 percent of the adult stock can safely be harvested. Accordingly (and tentatively), MSY for Atka mackerel in the Gulf of Alaska is set at 33,000 mt.

#### 4.7.8.2 Equilibrium Yield (EY)

Not applicable --MSY attainable

#### 4.7.9 Squid

##### 4.7.9.1 Maximum sustainable Yield (MSY)

Although no published documentation or current research findings dealing with squid abundance or potential are available, incidental catches by commercial fishing and research vessels, and the incidence of squid in the stomachs of fish and marine mammals indicate a large standing stock. MSY is intuitively believed to be greater than 2,000 mt.

##### 4.7.9.2 Equilibrium Yield (EY)

Not applicable -- MSY attainable

##### 4.7.10 Other Species - *MSY=16,200 mt*

*Very little is known about the distribution and abundance of the species of fish referred to as "other species." However, based on the best scientific evidence available derived from past*

*performances of foreign fishing vessels, the MSY for "other species" is estimated at 16,200 mt.*

#### 4.8 Estimate of Future Stock Conditions

With the exception of Pacific ocean perch, Pacific halibut, and sablefish all other groundfish species in the Gulf of Alaska are believed to be at levels of abundance equal to or greater than those that would produce MSY. The management regime described in Section 8.0 is designed to keep those healthy stocks somewhat above the level of abundance required for MSY, while providing sufficient relief to halibut, ocean perch and sablefish so that their stocks can begin rebuilding.

In addition, there is no evidence of natural phenomena that could be expected to cause either serious biological or socio-economic consequences, although the possibility of undetected year-class failures, declines in growth rate, or other adverse symptoms cannot be completely discounted. On the other hand, unforeseen enhancements of stock condition are equally unlikely.

In the context of the longer-term concern, there is reason (mostly circumstantial) to believe that the Gulf of Alaska ecosystem has changed significantly over the last decade -- Pacific ocean perch, which had been the dominant groundfish form, is no longer so, but pollock and Atka mackerel populations appear to have increased greatly in abundance and in dis-

on user groups, and, to some extent, the temporary loss to the users can be made up the following year).

Accordingly, ABC's for pollock, cod, flounders, squid, and rockfish (other than ocean perch), are considered equal to the low end of the MSY range (Table 58). The only estimate of MSY/EY for Atka mackerel is from a recent report of unsubstantiated Soviet research findings. Until those findings can be verified, ABC for that species should be no more than 75 percent of the reported EY (Table 58), again preferring the risk of short-term underexploitation to the risk of long-term effects of overharvest. This value (24,800mt) is near the 1975-76 average catch of 24,200 mt and will not result in a decrease in production.

Concerning sablefish, inasmuch as the most optimistic estimate of EY is 21 percent below MSY, ABC will be set below 17,400 mt (the low end of the EY range) to allow rebuilding to occur.

With regard to 'other species,' the concept of a phased reduction in the allowed catch of this category to force more accurate reporting of catch by species remains valid. As described in the Preliminary Fishery Management Plan for the Gulf of Alaska Trawl Fishery this will be accomplished by reducing the allowed catch of this category by 10 percent per year *after 1978*. ABC for 'other species' in 1978 is set equal to the 1977 total allowable catch of this category, or *16,200 mt* (Table 58), *with the expectation that a 10 percent annual reduction in the allowable catch will begin in 1979*.

A final ABC consideration is that little is known concerning specific stock units for the Gulf of Alaska groundfish populations. If any of

FLOUNDERS -- ABC for this species complex was determined to be about 67,000 mt, more than twice the highest catch of record. Several of the flounder species are known to have a geographic and bathymetric distributional pattern that is similar to that of halibut, leading to the concern that a gross increase in flounder production would, through a commensurate increase in incidental catch (and mortality) of halibut, negate other conservation measures designed to grant additional halibut protection. In very simple economic terms and assuming that prices remain stable, the MSY of flounders at \$0.10/pound ex-vessel has a total annual value of \$14.8 million; the MSY of halibut in the Gulf of Alaska at \$1.00 (round weight) ex-vessel, has a total annual value of some \$70 million. Considering the disparity in potential value and the fact that the domestic fishery for halibut is fully developed and facing a current crisis, while the flounder fishery has operated at a very low level with its full domestic potential not expected to develop until some time in the future, optimum yield for flounders is set at 50 percent of ABC -- 33,500 mt. This level will still allow an expansion of the flounder fishery during which its impact on halibut can be evaluated.

Sablefish -- Because this species is of special importance in the development of a domestic groundfish fishery in the Gulf of Alaska, OY has been set at a level that: (1) will allow rebuilding to MSY within a minimum time frame; (2) takes account of recent reports of U.S. fishermen of a scarcity of sablefish on the traditional fishing grounds of Southeast (in both inside and outside

waters; and (3) reflects concern over the Japanese catch per boat-day trend which has declined much more sharply than the catch per skate indicator and used to estimate EY. Accordingly, OY for this species in 1978 is 23,000 mt.

### 6.3 Optimum Yield (OY)

Optimum yield for the groundfish species and species groups of the Gulf of Alaska (except halibut) are shown in Tables 58, 62 and 64. Optimum yield for halibut in 1978 will be determined by the International Pacific Halibut Commission.

## 7.0 FOREIGN ALLOWABLE CATCH (FAC)

United States' fishermen will have reserved for their use during 1978 any amount of any species, up to the Optimum Yield, based on credible projections of catch as of September, 1977. The Optimum Yield (OY) of any species may not, for any reason, be exceeded by the all-nation fishery.

Optimum yields for each groundfish species or species group in the Gulf of Alaska are shown in Table 58; expected domestic annual harvest (DAH) projections are shown in Table 61. The Foreign Allowable Catch (FAC) will be determined and applied as described below.

Because: (1) growth of the domestic groundfish fishery cannot be accurately forecast; (2) constraints against growth of the domestic fishery up to the level of optimum yield are contrary to the intent of P.L. 94-265; (3) optimum yield should neither be exceeded nor should it go unrealized; and, (4) recognizing that domestic fishermen are often unrestricted in their activity during a season, it is, therefore, not unreasonable to make in-season amendments to measures applying to foreign fishermen, FAC will be set in a manner so as to allow in-season adjustments between foreign and domestic fisheries. Such adjustments will be dictated by domestic fishery performance and will be accomplished as follows:

The initial FAC of each species for 1978 will equal DAH subtracted from 80 percent of OY:  $FAC = (0.8 OY) - DAH$ . The remaining 20 percent of the OY will be apportioned to foreign or domestic fisheries, as the season progresses, on the basis of continuing appraisals of DAH. The

Gulf-wide schedule of OY/Reserve/DAH/FAC is given in Table 62. FAC and reserve has also been apportioned to individual statistical areas (Table 64).

*This accomodates, initially, a conservative appraisal of DAH (and less risk of loss of credibility) because up to 20 percent of the OY for each species could later be added to the U.S. "share."*

Table 62 -- Derivation of foreign allowable catch (FAC)<sup>1/</sup> for Gulf of Alaska groundfish in 1978 (1000's mt)

<u>Species</u>	<u>OY</u>	<u>Reserve</u>	<u>DAH</u>	<u>FAC<sup>1/</sup></u>
Pollock	168.8	33.8	14.2	120.8
Cod	34.8	7.0	15.5	12.3 <sup>2/</sup>
Flounders	33.5	7.0	7.2	19.3
Pacific ocean perch	25.0	5.0	1.1	18.9
Other Rockfishes	7.6	1.5	2.0	4.1
Sablefish	13.0	2.6	4.0	6.4
Atka mackerel	24.8	4.9	0	19.9
Squid	2.0	.4	0	1.6
Other species	<u>16.2</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>12.4</u>
Totals	325.7	65.5	44.5	215.7

<sup>1/</sup> Initial FAC; may be increased as reserve is apportioned during year.

<sup>2/</sup> The area landward of the 500 m isobath and west of 157 degrees West longitude is designated as a longline fishery for Pacific cod. The maximum allowable foreign catch (including the 20 percent reserve) for the area would be 6,233 mt.

Table 64 -- OY<sup>1</sup> / Reserve/DAH/FAC<sup>2</sup> / Schedule, By Area (1000's mt)

Species Shumagin Chirikof Kodiak Yakutat Southeast To

Species	OY	Reserve	DAH	FAC	OY	Reserve	DAH	FAC	OY	Reserve	DAH	FAC	OY	Reserve	DAH	FAC	OY	Reserve	DAH	FAC		
Pollock	57.1	11.4	4.8	40.9	54.4	10.9	8.1	29.3	12.5	2.5	0.8	2.9	168.8	33.7	14.2	120.8	34.8	1.5	0.3	0.7	15.5	12.3
Cod	9.6	4.1	1.5	38.9	15.3	4.3	1.1	8.9	4.3	1.5	0.8	2.9	34.8	6.9	3.7	19.3	34.8	1.5	0.3	0.7	15.5	12.3
Pacific ocean perch	2.7	0.5	0.1	2.1	2.7	0.5	1.0	4.0	8.0	1.6	0.4	4.9	25.0	6.5	1.3	18.9	25.0	6.5	1.3	0.3	1.1	1.1
Other rockfish	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.6	0.1	0.7	0.9	3.4	0.7	0.6	1.7	7.6	3.1	0.8	2.0	7.6	3.1	0.6	0.8	1.5	2.0
Sablefish	2.1	0.4	0.1	1.1	2.4	0.5	0.1	1.8	3.5	0.7	3.0	0.0	13.0	3.7	0.7	6.4	13.0	3.7	0.7	2.6	4.0	6.4
Atka mackerel	4.4	0.9	0.0	3.5	3.6	0.7	3.2	12.6	15.8	1.0	0.0	0.0	24.8	0.0	0.0	000.0	24.8	0.0	0.2	4.9	000.0	19.9
Squid	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.3	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.3	2.0	0.4	0.1	000.0	2.0	0.4	0.1	0.4	0.4	1.6
Other Species	4.3	0.9	0.0	0.3	3.6	0.7	1.0	3.3	5.0	2.0	0.4	0.8	16.2	1.1	0.2	12.4	16.2	1.1	0.4	4.5	0.5	12.4


<sup>1</sup>/ Based on percentages shown in Table 63.

<sup>2</sup>/ Initial FAC; may be larger as reserve is apportioned during year.

<sup>3</sup>/ Of this total, only (including the 20 percent reserve), 6,233 mt can be taken west of 157 degrees West longitude.

<sup>4</sup>/ Totals may not equal column figures due to rounding.





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Figure 15.--"Davidson Bank" winter closures, and area closed to foreign sablefish fishing described in Sections 8.3.2.1. (D).

(d) Three "Kodiak Halibut Areas," described in Appendix I and shown in Figure 17 -- five days before to five days after the opening of the domestic halibut setline fishery. *To allow halibut grounds to remain undisturbed prior to the opening of the halibut season and allow the initial halibut trip of the season to be made without interference from foreign trawlers; identical closures now in effect.* This provision will be unnecessary unless the 1978 halibut season opens later than May 26 because of (2) (b) above.

(3) The following areas shall be closed year-around to foreign setline fishing:

(a) That portion of the gulf of Alaska east of 140 degrees W longitude. *To prevent preemption of sablefish grounds and gear conflicts in the area where the U.S. sablefish fishery is expected to develop -- this closed area encompasses all of Southeast, where there is no sablefish FAC, and 30 percent of Yakutat, leaving the other portion open for attainment of the prescribed 1,787 mt FAC in that area.*

(b) The area east of 157 degrees West longitude and landward of the 500 m isobath. *To prevent take of juvenile sablefish which have not yet reached their "critical size" and are generally distributed in shallower*

(2) Longline

In the area landward of the 500 meter isobath and west of 157 degrees West longitude a directed fishery for Pacific cod may be conducted only by longline gear and is prohibited during the halibut season as established by IPHC.

(3) *Sablefish longline fishery*

*Directed fisheries for sablefish may be conducted only with longline (hook & line) or pot gear.*

#### 12.8.4 Disposition of Comments Received

Inasmuch as the "joint venture" issue is of national scope and is being considered by the Director, National Marine Fisheries Service, comments received on that subject are not addressed in this FMP/EIS.

Responses, in identical serial order, to all of the numbered comments shown in Section 12.8.3, above, are as follows:

Comment  
Number

Response

1. No change made--flounders off Alaska are generally relatively small (flathead sole, rock sole) or of lower value than those taken off Washington-California (starry flounder, turbot).  
Higher processing costs in Alaska would also result in lower ex-vessel price so that product could be competitively priced.
2. No change made--potential impact of flounder fishery on halibut already considered in setting OY.
3. Clarification made--proper formula is (90% of OY) - DAH.
4. No change made--Table 61 does not deal with reserve concept.  
Without reserve, FAC will be less than OY simply because of DAH (FAC = OY - DAH); with reserve, OY is, in effect, further reduced before DAH is subtracted (initial FAC = (.80 OY) - DAH).
5. Correction made.
6. No change made--a vessel fishing off Washington would need whatever permit Pacific Council FMP requires; if that vessel is Alaskan or lands in Alaska, State of Alaska landing laws might

- impacted by incidental catches. Pacific ocean perch stock is of such low abundance in relation to MSY that any increase in OY will severely retard an already long rebuilding process.
29. Change made--foreign longlining for cod landward of 500 m will be permitted west of 157 degrees West.
30. No change made--U.S. assessment of sablefish stocks, based primarily on Japanese fishery data, indicates that abundance is substantially below that required to produce MSY.
31. No change made--30% decline refers to catch rate, not catch.
32. No change made--Japanese fishery has been limited to deep water where only the larger fish were available; the contention that average size has decreased is from U.S. fishermen who operate over entire range of stock.
33. No change made--sanctuary question is academic considering that DAH is greater than OY in Southeast, DAH is a substantial portion of OY in Yakutat, and foreign fishing for sablefish is prohibited east of *140 degrees* West longitude.
35. Change made--reevaluation of sablefish stock condition led to reduction in OY to *13,000* mt.
34. Change made--foreign longlining for cod will be allowed west of 157 degrees West longitude.
36. Change made--although Option II-A was chosen, domestic trawl fishery will not be subject to winter restrictions unless, or until, area-specific incidental halibut catches are exceeded.
37. No change made--risk of potential conflicts between domestic users (trawlers vs. longliners) in 1978 not believed high.

38. Change made--option favoring halibut protection (ii-A) chosen.
39. See response #38.
40. No change made--management of halibut fishery in 1978 will remain with IPHC; see response #38.
41. Change made--no foreign longlining will be permitted east of 140 W.
42. No change made--no rationale has been presented to allow longlining but prohibit fishing pots.
43. No change made--management of inside waters remains with State of Alaska.
44. No change made--DAH is only 40 percent of OY.
45. See response 344.
46. No change made--off-bottom restriction applies only during winter when halibut incidence is high.
47. Change made--Option 1B2 chosen.
48. Change made--Option III C chosen.
49. Change made--Option II-A chosen.
50. Change made--although not identical to foreign restrictions.
51. Change made--flexible allocation option chosen.
52. See response #38.
53. change made--Option II-A chosen; several time-area closures and gear restrictions to reduce incidental halibut catch will be in force.
54. Change made--no foreign longlining permitted east of 140 W; no reason, however, to prohibit foreign trawling in that area inasmuch as DAH's of trawl species much smaller than OY's.

55. Change made--Option II-A chosen; winter trawl closure extended to May 31.
56. Change made--domestic and foreign fishery restrictions are different.
57. Change made--sablefish OY reduced to 13,000 mt.
58. Change made--no foreign longlining permitted east of 140 degrees West.
59. See response #58.
60. No change made--original statement is correct but FMP attempts to find satisfactory compromise.
61. Change made--statement added to Sec. 2.0 to explain difference in treatment; table headings corrected.
62. No change made--OY is 50% of EY to allow rebuilding; POP not of high priority to U.S. industry so OY chosen so as to allow some foreign fishing to continue.
65. No change made--potential effect on halibut already considered in setting OY for other groundfish species.
66. No change made--halibut-savings closures apply only in portions of the Gulf for limited time periods.
68. No change made--gear technology not yet capable of producing single-species catching devices; pelagic and off-bottom trawls are required during winter to reduce incidental halibut catch.
67. No change made--not clear as to which or what kind of standards comment refers to.
69. No change made--in general terms, FMP does treat foreign and domestic vessels in similar manner, but recognizes inherent differences in vessel capabilities.



STATE OF ALASKA  
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR  
JUNEAU

February 14, 1978

February 1978

1978  
#231

The Honorable John Negroponte  
Deputy Assistant Secretary for  
Oceans and Fisheries Affairs  
U. S. Department of State  
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Ambassador Negroponte:

On behalf of the State of Alaska, I wish to protest a developing Federal policy which is demonstrably at odds with the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (FCMA).

Recently, the United States (through the Department of State) mandated to Japan an annual allocation of about one million metric tons of pollock, to be taken from the U.S. fishery conservation zone (FCZ). Japan prohibits the import of pollock and pollock products harvested by U.S. fishermen. Korea is another example of the same phenomenon.

In reviewing the FCMA, I cannot discern a convincing justification for the willingness of the State Department to allocate U.S. fisheries resources to nations which refuse to import U.S. fisheries products of the same type. After foreign nationals catch and process U.S. fish taken from the FCZ, they use the products (1) to satisfy their domestic needs, and (2) to control other markets, including the United States market. Thus, while being excluded from foreign marketing opportunities by import restrictions, U.S. producers are concurrently stifled at home by the dominance of foreign fisheries products, many of which originated in waters subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Therefore, notwithstanding enactment of the FCMA, foreign interests have essentially locked up these resources, preventing any development or expansion of the U.S. fishing industry.

This situation is extremely difficult to accept in view of the Congressional finding in Section 2(a)(7) of the FCMA that "[a] national program for the development of fisheries which are underutilized or not utilized by United States fishermen, including bottom fish off Alaska, is necessary to assure that our citizens benefit from the employment, food supply, and revenue which could be generated thereby." I would mention that virtually the same language (again expressly referencing Alaskan bottom fish) is included in Section 2(b) as one of the six basic purposes of the Act.

The Honorable John Negroponte

- 2 -

February 14, 1978

Concededly, Section 201(e) vests considerable discretion in the Secretary of State respecting the formulation of allocations to foreign nationals. Yet, in the exercise of this discretion, the Secretary cannot ignore a Congressional directive that development of the Alaskan bottom fish fishery and other U.S. fishing enterprises is a national priority. There is plenty of latitude in Section 201(3)(4) for the restriction of allocations based on the circumstances I have earlier described.

Therefore, I believe that I am representing the national interest as well as the welfare of Alaska in strongly urging that the State Department make no foreign allocation of a species of fish from the FCZ if the nation in question imposes substantial import restrictions on U.S. products involving that species. Only if such a policy is adopted will the intent of the FCMA be fully respected, and I would be pleased to provide the assistance of our State Government in achieving that result.

Sincerely,

Jay P. Hammond  
Governor



# ICICLE SEAFOODS, INC.

4215 - 21ST AVE. W. • SUITE 206  
LITTLE, WASHINGTON, 98199 (206) 282-0988

2/15/78

February 14, 1978

Senator Ted Stevens  
Senate Office Building  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Ted:

As you will recall, I have been pushing for increased import quota on Alaska fisheries products to the Japanese market. I believe we have had some success with herring as last years import quota was lifted from 12,000 metric ton to approximately 35,000 metric ton.

However, in spite of persistent efforts, we have had no success on pollock. I had hopes this year would be different but as you can see by the attached translation the Fisheries Agency has decided against allowing further imports.

Of course, it is obvious that they have other bad news for the fishing industry and since the major fishing companies made windfall profits from their Alaska caught pollock last year, the Fisheries Agency is politically pressed to not allow imports.

However, when we consider the balance of trade problems that we are now involved with, and the fact that we have a developing pollock fishery in Alaska, I believe it is imperative that the import embargo be lifted.

I heard today that the fishing fleet from northern Hokkaido that normally fishes in Russian waters has been reduced from 130 vessels to 27. Also, that they have been allocated a very unproductive area in which to fish and that fishing is very poor. Thus, prices for both pollock and pollock roe are at an all time high in northern Japan. Japan is now entering into new negotiations with the Russians on fishery matters and I suspect that the Russians will not be any more generous than they have in the past.

We are currently processing pollock in our Petersburg plant for the U. S. domestic market. However, this is rather labor intensive and the volume is, therefore, low.



CANNERY: P.O. BOX 1147, PETERSBURG, ALASKA 99833

• VIKING AND ICICLE BRAND SEAFOODS

to Sen. Ted Stevens from RMT  
February 14, 1978

Page 2

If we could be producing round frozen pollock for the Japanese market many of our Alaska plants could start producing with very little modification and it would be a great impetus to the development of our trawl fishery.

I had a good visit with Steve while in Tokyo and I appreciate your continued interest in fishery matters.

Very truly yours,

ICICLE SEAFOODS, INC.

Bob Thorstenson

BT/pbl

Enclosure

cc: Tom Thompson w/Enclosure  
Gene Ruthford w/Enclosure

cc: Chas. Meacham

*Anti-Chinese  
But:  
File is pulled  
article I  
mentioned.  
Jim J.*

(Translation)

SOURCE: Shin Suisan Shimbum, Lead Article.  
Monday, January 23, 1978

JFA DECIDES NOT TO INCREASE IMPORT QUOTA FOR POLLOCK

The Japan Fisheries Agency has decided not to increase an import quota for pollock "for the time being" on the ground that pollock surimi is in over supply now. JFA will give due consideration to this issue in the autumn of this year when inventories of pollock surimi are expected to decline and a plan for production of pollock surimi for 1979 will be firmed up. This decision was notified on January 13 to eleven fisheries organizations.

According to JFA, the current holdings of pollock surimi total 100,000 mt (65,000 mt in producer areas and 35,000 mt in distributor or end-user areas).

In 1976, supply totaling 496,000 mt (holdings at the beginning of 1976 totaled 43,000 mt plus production totaled 453,000 mt) exceeded the total consumption of 455,000 mt. As for 1978, holdings at producer areas alone now total 65,000 mt with production in 1978 targeted at 390,000 mt (170,000 mt at sea and 220,000 mt on shore), bringing the total supply to 494,000 mt or about the same as in 1976. In addition, there are holdings of 35,000 mt at distributor or end-user areas.

This indicates that supply in 1978 will be above the level of demand, and accordingly, it is not necessary to increase the import quota for pollock to make surimi.

JFA will soon allocate the same import quota for 65,000 mt of fresh pollock as in the past to Hokuyo Suisan Company to purchase directly from Soviet fishing vessels at sea, using the company's mothership, but will never allow requests from other companies for an increase in this quota. Hitherto, Taiyo Fishery Company and other trading firms have approached JFA with a hope of increasing the import quota for pollock. In addition, fisheries organizations were about to establish a Japan-Soviet Fisheries Trade Corporation (tentative name) on January 17 in order to deal with barter transactions of Japanese sardine and Soviet pollock. However, these attempts have now been turned down.

As to fishing quotas, Japan has ensured approximately 820,000 mt of pollock within the U.S. Zone and 340,000 mt within the Soviet Zone for 1978. From a long-range perspective, however, prospects for the quota especially within the Soviet Zone in 1979 are dark. Besides, the area closures within the Soviet Zone will make it difficult for Japan to consume the quota. Therefore, requests for an increase in the import quota will become strong in the long end and this issue will be taken up again by JFA in the autumn of this year.

Y.N.

# TELEGRAM

RCA ALASKA COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

PHONE: 526-6440

JUNEAU, ALASKA 99801

FEB 21 AM 12 56

IPMAFUA AHG

1-032257G052 02/21/78

ICS IPMIIHA IISS

IISS FM RCA 21 0348

PMS ANCHORAGE AK

WUB1350 JRN576 AIF196 LCB470

UAJX HL JPTF 092

TOKYO 92/85 21 1709 PAGE 1/50

LT

CHARLES MEACHAM OFFICE GOVERNOR

JUNEAU ALASKA

NEWSPAPER TRANSLATION FROM EMBASSY STATES IN PART QUOTE JFA WILL  
ALLOCATE SAME IMPORT QUOTA FOR 65000 MT FRESH POLLOCK AS IN PAST

TO

HOKUYO SUISAN TO PURCHASE DIRECTLY FROM SOVIET VESSELS AT SEA USING  
COMPANYS MOTHERSHIP BUT WILL NEVER ALLOW REQUESTS FROM OTHERS TO  
COL 65000

LCB470 CHARLES MEACHAM OFFICE PAGE 2/35

INCREASE THIS QUOTA UNQUOTE AIRMAILING TRANSLATION STOP CONTACTED  
YONEZAWA AT AGENCY WHOSE EXPLANATION FUNDAMENTALLY SAME AS CABLED  
YOU

WILL ALSO CONTACT DISTRIBUTION SECTION IN AGENCY AS RECOMMENDED  
BY

YONEZAWA FOR CLEARER PICTURE IF POSSIBLE

LOOKNORTH

NNN

0350 EST

IPMAFUA AHG

1978 FEB 17 AM 12 50

1-032929G048 02/17/78

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IISS FM ITT 17 0332

PMS ANCHORAGE AK

AVR075 VIA ITT JMB538 BTF585 LCB518

UAJX HL JPTF 142

TOKYO 142/134 17 1649 PAGE 1/50

LT

CHARLES MEACHAM OFFICE GOVERNOR  
JUNEAU ALASKA 9689

OBTAINED FOLLOWING AGRICULTURE AND FISHERY SECTION MITI POLLOCK

AND

BYPRODUCT IMPORTS FROM USA ALLOWED ONLY HOLDERS OF COD FAMILY IMPORT

ALLOCATIONS OR QUOTAS WHICH GRANTED FIRMS IMPORTING AMERICAN FISH

TOTALLING OVER DOLLARS50000 ANNUALLY STOP POSSIBLY BECAUSE TOTAL

ALLOCATION STRICTLY LIMITED AND POLLOCK COMPARATIVELY UNPROFITABLE

COL DOLLARS50000

LCB518 CHARLES MEACHAM OFFICE PAGE 2/50

NO POLLOCK IMPORTS RECORDED STOP ONLY STRAIGHT BOILED PROCESSED

POLLOCK MEAT WITHOUT FURTHER PROCESSING ALLOWED IN QUOTA THEREFORE

PRACTICALLY SPEAKING IMPOSSIBLE CONSIDER EXPORTING TO JAPAN UNDER

PRESENT CONDITIONS STOP IMPORTS FROM RUSSIA AND NORTH KOREA BANNED

WITH ONLY SMALL ALLOCATION FOR SOUTH KOREA STOP KOREAN EMBASSY

INFORMS UNTIL LAST YEAR

LCB518 CHARLES MEACHAM OFFICE PAGE 3/34

SOUTH KOREA BANNED IMPORTS ALL FISHERY PRODUCTS INCLUDING POLLOCK

BUT

BECAUSE DWINDLING DOMESTIC SUPPLIES KOREAN NEWSPAPERS REPORT

POSSIBILITY ALLOWING IMPORTS 1978 FOR REEXPORT PROCESSING AND DOMESTIC

USE STOP SENDING AQUACULTURE MOVIE NEXT WEEK


LOOKNORTH

COL 1978

NNN

0334 EST

IPMAFUA AHG



/23/78

TELEGRAM RECEIVED TODAY AT 9:50am by phone.

To: Jim Branson

#1885, Philadelphia, PA

Dear Mr. Branson:

Mrs. Paul's Kitchens, Inc. is supporting a petition to the Secretary of Commerce regarding Korean vessels' right to purchase pollock from Alaska fishermen. Mrs. Paul's feels this program will aid in holding down food costs to Americans, utilize fish caught in U.S. waters by Americans, provide employment to industry in both Alaska and employees of Mrs. Paul's and give Mrs. Paul's the capability to process to that the U.S. consumer is properly served.

Sincerely,

E.J.Piszek, Jr.  
Vice President

Mrs. Paul's Kitchen's Inc.