


MEMORANDUM

TO: Council and AP Members

FROM: Chris Oliver   
Executive Director

DATE: December 1, 2005

SUBJECT: Gulf of Alaska Groundfish Rationalization

ESTIMATED TIME 6 HOURS (all C-5 items)
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ACTION REQUIRED

- (b) Review other data and information and revise alternatives/options as appropriate

BACKGROUND

At its April 2003 meeting, the Council adopted a motion preliminarily defining alternatives for the rationalization of the Gulf of Alaska groundfish fisheries. Because the Councils' alternatives contained multiple decision points, staff would have had difficulty completing an adequate regulatory analysis that explains the interaction of the choice of each option with every other option in each alternative. Consequently, since the April 2003 meeting, the Council has undertaken the process of refining the alternatives by identifying specific options for inclusion in each alternative, eliminating other options from further consideration.

At this meeting, staff has provided three sets of analyses intended to assist the Council in the process of further refining the alternatives. The first document (**Item C-5(b)(1)**) includes a general description of the various alternatives under consideration and a preliminary analysis of the general structures of the alternatives. The analysis is intended to provide the Council with a preliminary perspective on the overall effects of each alternative. The analyses should provide a more complete context in which to make decisions concerning options that more fully define the alternatives. The paper also includes a brief discussion of provisions affecting entry opportunities under the alternatives, requested by the Council to assist it in developing the alternatives. The paper is the same as that paper presented to the Council at its October meeting, with some minor revisions based primarily on SSC comments.

The second paper (**Item C-5(b)(2)**) provides quantitative analyses of catch data and allocation options that the Council is considering under the various alternatives. These data are intended to assist the Council in selecting specific allocation options. This paper is the same as the paper presented to the Council at its October meeting. Since that meeting, staff has continued to refine the data, and some revisions of these data for the Western and Central Gulf Pacific cod catch will be forthcoming.

The third paper (**Item C-5(b)(3)**) is an annotated copy of the Council's motion on Alternative 2 and Alternative 3. Annotations are intended to provide preliminary analyses of provisions that the Council could consider taking action on. The Council also could use these analyses to develop specific information requests that would assist it in its deliberations concerning outstanding options. This paper is the same as the paper presented to the Council at its October meeting.

Depending on the actions taken by the Council at this meeting, staff intends to continue to develop quantitative and qualitative analyses of options that the Council can use to further refine the alternatives at future meetings.

**DECEMBER 2005**  
**Gulf of Alaska Rationalization**  
**Overview of Alternatives and Preliminary Analysis**

At its April 2003 meeting, the Council adopted a motion preliminarily defining alternatives for the rationalization of the Gulf of Alaska groundfish fisheries. The Council motion defining the alternatives contains several options for consideration that could be used to define the alternatives. Since the April 2003 meeting, the Council has undertaken the process of refining the alternatives for analysis by selecting options for inclusion in the alternatives. This process of specifically defining alternatives by selecting options is necessary to enable staff to prepare adequate regulatory analyses of the alternatives. Adequate regulatory analyses must fully analyze all alternatives, comparing and contrasting their impacts. To accomplish that end, the analysis must make clear the implications of each option available to the Council within an alternative, including the interaction of the choice of each option with every other option that the Council might also choose for other provisions. To aid staff, the Council is undertaking the process of simplifying the alternatives by identifying specific options for inclusion in each alternative, eliminating other options from further consideration.

At this meeting, staff has provided two sets of analyses intended to assist the Council in the process of further refining the alternatives. This document is the first of the two. It includes a general description of the various alternatives under consideration and a preliminary analysis of the general structures of the alternatives. The analysis is intended to provide the Council with a preliminary perspective on the overall effects of each alternative. The analyses should provide a more complete context in which to make decisions concerning options that more fully define the alternatives. This paper also includes a brief discussion of provisions affecting entry opportunities under the alternatives, requested by the Council to assist it in developing the alternatives.

The second paper that staff will provide to complement this paper is a mostly quantitative analysis of options that the Council is considering including in the various alternatives that should assist the Council in selecting specific options. The second paper will be included in a later mailing to the Council.

In selecting options to refine the alternatives to advance for analysis, the Council should also assess the range of alternatives that are created. Each alternative should meet the Council's purpose and need statement, should be feasible, and should be distinguishable from each other alternative. The Council should therefore consider using its selection of options to distinguish the alternatives from each other, but only to the extent that maintains the integrity of each alternative under the problem statement. Since the alternatives as defined to date are distinct, the Council may select the same option for each of the alternatives, if that option best satisfies the objectives of the purpose and need statement.

This paper begins with the problem statement, intended to refresh the Council concerning its purpose for developing the Gulf rationalization program. The paper follows with a brief description of the alternatives, based on the summary tables developed by the Council. The paper goes on to briefly analyze the impacts of each of the alternatives with respect to several factors, including efficiency in fishing, efficiency in processing, overall production efficiency, entry to fishing, and entry to processing, small fishing entities, and small processing entities. The analysis also makes reference to undecided options that could affect the impacts and provides a brief qualitative assessment of those options. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of provisions that affect entry opportunities under the alternatives, which the Council requested at an earlier meeting.

## Problem Statement

To guide the identification of a rationalization program for the Gulf of Alaska groundfish fisheries, the Council has developed the following purpose and need statement:

The Council is proposing a new management regime that rationalizes groundfish fisheries in the Gulf of Alaska west of 140 degrees longitude and rockfish bycatch east of 140 degrees longitude. A rationalization program includes policies and management measures that may increase the economic efficiency of GOA groundfish fisheries by providing economic incentives to reduce excessive capital investment. These management measures would apply to those species, or groups of species identified by the Council as benefitting from additional economic incentives that may be provided by rationalization. This rationalization program would not modify the hook-and-line sablefish fishery currently prosecuted under the IFQ Program, except for management of associated groundfish bycatch.

The purpose of the proposed action is to create a management program that improves conservation, reduces bycatch, and provides greater economic stability for harvesters, processors, and communities. A rationalization program could allow harvesters and processors to manage their operations in a more economically efficient manner. Rationalization of GOA fisheries should eliminate the derby-style race for fish by allocating privileges and providing economic incentives to consolidate operations and improve operational efficiencies of remaining operators. Because rationalization programs can have significant impacts on fishing dependent communities, this program should address community impacts and seek to provide economic stability or create economic opportunity in fishery dependent communities.

Rationalizing GOA fisheries may improve stock conservation by creating incentives to eliminate wasteful fishing practices, improve management practices, and provide mechanisms to control and reduce bycatch and gear conflicts. Rationalization programs may also reduce the incentive to fish during unsafe conditions.

Management of GOA groundfish has grown increasingly complicated due to impositions of measures to protect Steller sea lions, increased participation by fishermen displaced from other fisheries such as Alaska salmon fisheries and the requirements to reduce bycatch and address Essential Fish Habitat requirements under the Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA). These changes in the fisheries are frustrating management of the resource, raising attendant conservation concerns. These events are also having significant, and at times, severe adverse social and economic impacts on harvesters, processors, crew, and communities dependent on GOA fisheries. Some of the attendant problems include:

1. reduced economic viability of the harvesters, processors, and GOA communities
2. high bycatch,
3. decreased safety,
4. reduced product value and utilization,
5. jeopardy to community stability and their historic reliance on groundfish fishing and processing,
6. limited ability of the fishery harvesters and processors to respond to changes in the ecosystem
7. limited ability to adapt to MSA requirements to minimize bycatch and protect habitat,
8. limited ability to adapt to changes to other applicable law (i.e., Endangered Species Act).

All of these factors have made achieving the goals of the National Standards in the MSA difficult and encourage reevaluation of the status quo management of the GOA groundfish fisheries. The management tools in the current GOA groundfish FMP do not provide managers with the ability to improve the economic efficiency of the fishery and effectively solve the excess harvesting capacity and resource allocation problems in the GOA groundfish fisheries. The Council has determined that some form of rationalization program is warranted.

## The Alternatives

To meet these purposes and needs, the Council motion has outlined sets of alternatives for three different sectors; catcher processors, trawl catcher vessels, and fixed gear catcher vessels. The alternatives applicable to each of these sectors are generally identified in separate tables, which follow together with a

brief description of each alternative. The elements and options contained in the Council motion fully specify the various alternatives.

### ***Catcher processor alternatives***

The three catcher processor alternatives are outlined in Table 1.

Table 1. Modified Gulf of Alaska groundfish rationalization alternatives – catcher processors

<u>Alternative 1</u> Status quo	<u>Alternative 2</u> Co-op/IFQ	<u>Alternative 3</u> Co-op/limited access
No Action	Harvester IFQ-cooperative	Sector Allocations
	Shares allocated to individuals by gear type	Harvest histories allocated to individuals in cooperatives and annual harvest allocations to cooperatives
	All Catcher Processors	Sectors: CP Trawl, CP Longline, CP Pot
	Cooperative	Cooperative
	CP Provisions	CP Provisions
	No Processor Provisions	No Processor Provisions
	those that do not join cooperatives fish IFQs with option for PSC reduction	those that do not join co-ops fish open access with option for PSC reduction

**Alternative 1** is the **status quo**, under which the LLP would be maintained. **Alternative 2** would create a **cooperative/IFQ** program under which share holders would be permitted to form cooperatives. Although limits on transfers of shares between gear types could be applied, cooperatives could be formed among holders of shares for different gear. Share holders that choose not to join cooperatives would receive their allocations as individual quota with a possible reduction in their PSC allocations. Under **Alternative 3** is a **co-op/limited access** program, under which sector allocations would be made to three different catcher processor sectors; the trawl sector, the longline sector, and the pot sector. The program would be history based, with holders of qualified history eligible to join a cooperative within that sector. A cooperative would receive an annual harvest allocations based on the history of its members. Holders of qualified histories that chose not to join a cooperative would be permitted to fish in a limited access fishery that will receive an allocation based on the qualified histories of sector members that chose not to join a cooperative. The PSC allocation to the limited access fishery could be reduced.

### ***Trawl catcher vessel alternatives***

Table 2 outlines the Council’s five alternatives for the trawl catcher vessel sector.



Table 2. Modified Gulf of Alaska groundfish rationalization alternatives – trawl catcher vessels

<u>Alternative 1</u> Status quo	<u>Alternative 2A</u> Co-op/IFQ with processor limited entry	<u>Alternative 2B</u> Co-op/IFQ with processor linkages	<u>Alternative 2C</u> Co-op/IFQ with harvest shares to processors	<u>Alternative 3</u> Co-op/limited access with processor linkages
No Action	Harvester IFQ cooperative with license limitation for processors	Harvester IFQ cooperative with license limitation for processors and processor linkage	Harvester IFQ cooperative with processor allocation	Sector allocations with processor linkage
	Shares allocated to individuals	Shares allocated to individuals	Shares allocated to individuals	Harvest histories allocated to individuals in cooperatives and annual harvest allocations to cooperatives
	Trawl CV	Trawl CV	Trawl CV	Trawl CV
	Cooperative	Cooperative	Cooperative	Cooperative
	license limitation for processors with X% delivery obligation	license limitation for processors with specific processor linkages with X% delivery obligation and share reduction penalty to move between cooperatives	allocation of 10, 20, or 30% of harvest shares to qualified processors	specific processor linkages
those that do not join co-ops fish IFQs subject to closed class delivery requirement with option for PSC reduction	those that do not join co-ops fish IFQs subject to processor linkage delivery requirement with option for PSC reduction	those that do not join co-ops fish IFQs	those that do not join co-ops fish open access with option for PSC reductions	

**Alternative 1** is the **status quo**, which would continue the LLP. **Alternative 2A** would create a **co-op/IFQ with processor limited entry** program that requires a portion of each harvester's allocation to be delivered to a processor holding a limited entry license. Processor licensing would be based on historic processing. Share holders would be permitted to form cooperatives to manage their members' allocations. Share holders that choose not to join a cooperative would continue to receive their allocations as individual quota with a possible reduction in their PSC allocations. **Alternative 2B** would create a **co-op/IFQ with processor linkages** program. Under this alternative, processors would receive limited entry licenses. The program would take an additional step by creating a system of harvester/processor linkages, under which a share holder would be required to deliver a specific percentage of landings to the linked processor. Linkages would be based on the share holder's landings history. A share holder could change the processor to which its shares are linked, but would be subject to a share reduction penalty when making that change. Share holders would be permitted to form cooperatives to manage their allocations. Share holders that chose not to join a cooperative would receive individual allocations (which would be subject to the processor linkage), but may be subject to a reduction in their PSC allocations. **Alternative 2C** would also create a **co-op/IFQ with allocations of harvest shares to processors**. Under this alternative, a portion of the harvest share pool (between 10 and 30 percent) would be allocated to processors based on their processing history. Share holders would be permitted to form cooperatives, with non-cooperative members receiving individual allocations. **Alternative 3** is a **co-op/limited access program with processor linkages**. The alternative creates history-based cooperative program, under which cooperatives would receive annual harvest share allocations based on the qualified histories of their members. Cooperatives would be required to be associated with a processor, but the details of that relationship would be determined by negotiations among the cooperative members and the processor. Initially, each holder of qualified history would be eligible to join a cooperative associated with the

processor to which it delivered the most pounds during a specific time period. Holders of qualified history that choose not to join a cooperative would be permitted to fish in a limited access fishery that would receive an annual allocation based on the histories of non-members of cooperatives. The allocation of PSC to the limited access fishery could be reduced.

### ***Fixed gear catcher vessel alternatives***

Table 3 outlines the Council’s alternatives for the fixed gear catcher vessel sector. The Council has specified 6 alternatives that would apply to all or a portion of the fixed gear sector. In general, these alternatives follow a structure similar to applicable to the trawl catcher vessel sector, with the exception of an alternative that would create an IFQ program for “low producing” fixed gear vessels.

Table 3. Modified Gulf of Alaska groundfish rationalization alternatives – fixed gear catcher vessels

<u>Alternative 1</u> Status quo	<u>Alternative 2 Low</u> Co-op/IFQ	<u>Alternative 2A High</u> Co-op/IFQ with processor limited entry	<u>Alternative 2B High</u> Co-op/IFQ with processor linkages	<u>Alternative 2C</u> Co-op/IFQ with harvest shares to processors	<u>Alternative 3</u> Co-op/limited access with processor linkages
No Action	Harvester IFQ	Harvester IFQ cooperative with license limitation for processors	Harvester IFQ cooperative with license limitation for processors and processor linkage	Harvester IFQ cooperative with processor allocation	Sector allocations with processor linkage
	Shares allocated to individuals	Shares allocated to individuals	Shares allocated to individuals	Shares allocated to individuals	Harvest histories allocated to individuals in cooperatives and annual harvest allocations to cooperatives
	low producing fixed gear CV	high producing fixed gear CV	high producing fixed gear CV	fixed gear CV	Longline CV, Pot CV
	Cooperative	Cooperative	Cooperative	Cooperative	Cooperative
	no processor delivery obligation	license limitation for processors with X% delivery obligation	license limitation for processors with specific processor linkages with X% delivery obligation and share reduction penalty to move between cooperatives	allocation of 10, 20, or 30% of harvest shares to qualified processors	specific processor linkages
	those that do not join co-ops fish IFQs	those that do not join co-ops fish IFQs subject to closed class delivery requirement with option for PSC reduction	those that do not join co-ops fish IFQs subject to processor linkage delivery requirement with option for PSC reduction	those that do not join co-ops fish IFQs	those that do not join co-ops fish open access with option for PSC reduction

**Alternative 1** is the **status quo**, which would continue the LLP. **Alternative 2 Low** would create an **co-op/IFQ** program that would apply to only the “low producing” fixed gear sector, participants that receive allocations either below the average or below the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile of fixed gear allocations. Participants would be permitted to form cooperatives to coordinate harvest activities. **Alternative 2A High** would a **co-op/IFQ with processor limited entry** program similar to Alternative 2A for the trawl catcher vessel sector. This alternative would allocate harvest shares that could be fished as IFQs or in a cooperative with a processor limited license program that requires a portion of each harvester’s allocation to be delivered to a licensed processor. Processor licensing would be based on historic processing. Share holders would be permitted to form cooperatives to manage their members’ allocations. Share holders that choose not to join cooperatives would continue to receive their allocations as individual quota with a possible reduction in their PSC allocations. **Alternative 2B High** would create a **co-op/IFQ with processor linkages** program similar to Alternative 2B for trawl catch vessels. This alternative would also create a harvester share program with a system of processor limited licenses. Harvester/processor linkages would be established, under which a share holder would be required to deliver a specific percentage of landings to the linked processor. Linkages would be based on the share holder’s landings history. A share holder could change the processor to which its shares are linked, but would be subject to a share reduction penalty when making that change. Share holders would be permitted to form cooperatives to manage their allocations. Share holders that chose not to join a cooperative would receive individual allocations (which would be subject to the processor linkage), but may be subject to a reduction in their PSC allocations. **Alternative 2C** would create a **co-op/IFQ with allocations of harvest shares to processors** program similar to Alternative 2C for trawl catcher vessels. This program would also create a harvester IFQ program with a portion of the harvest share pool (between 10 and 30 percent) allocated to eligible processors based on their processing history. Share holders would be permitted to form cooperatives, with non-cooperative members receiving individual allocations. **Alternative 3** would create a **co-op/limited access program with processor linkages** program similar to Alternative 3 for trawl catcher vessels. This alternative is a history-based cooperative program, under which cooperatives would receive annual harvest share allocations based on the qualified histories of their members. Cooperatives would be required to be associated with a processor, but the details of that relationship would be determined by negotiations among the cooperative members and the processor.<sup>1</sup> Initially, each holder of qualified history would be eligible to join a cooperative associated with the processor to which it delivered the most pounds during a specific time period. Holders of qualified history that choose not to join a cooperative would be permitted to fish in a limited access fishery that would receive an annual allocation based on the histories of non-members of cooperatives. The allocation of PSC to the limited access fishery could be reduced.

## **Preliminary analysis of the alternatives**

Following is a preliminary analysis of each of the alternatives. The analysis of each alternative begins with a brief summary of the defining characteristics of the alternative. Following that brief summary are more in depth analyses of the alternative with respect to different factors (e.g., efficiency, entry). To simplify the analysis, the effects of common fixed gear catcher vessel and trawl catcher vessel alternatives are combined. Prior to the detailed analysis, the issues of authority to adopt the alternatives and some antitrust considerations are addressed.

### ***Scope of Magnuson Stevens Act authority***

The Magnuson Stevens Act authorizes the regulation of fishing and authorizes the allocation of fishing privileges. Several of the catcher vessel alternatives included for analysis may go beyond the authority of

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<sup>1</sup> This alternative contains an option that would remove the cooperative/processor association requirement from “low producing” fixed gear vessels.

the Council and Secretary of Commerce under the Magnuson Stevens Act because they regulate onshore processing. The only catcher vessel alternatives that are clearly authorized under the Act are the cooperative/IFQ alternative (Alternative 2 Low – for low producing fixed gear vessels) and cooperative/IFQ with harvest share allocations to processors (Alternative 2C). Each of the other alternatives contained in Section 2 of the Council motion (Alternatives 2A and 2B) involves limitations on landing and processing of catch. These alternatives would require Congressional authorization to be implemented. While Alternative 3 does not directly limit the catcher vessel landings or processing, the requirement that a harvester join a cooperative in association with a specific processor to join the rationalized fishery could be argued to be akin to an allocation of processing privileges. This alternative may require Congressional approval to be implemented.

### **Antitrust Considerations**

Under all of the alternatives, harvesters would be permitted to join a cooperative that would coordinate the harvest of the allocations of its members. The general activity of these cooperatives is the harvest of fish, so for clarity these cooperatives are often referred to and should be thought of as “harvest cooperatives”. The creation of a harvest cooperative necessarily raises the question of whether the cooperative would or should qualify for the antitrust exemption of the Fishermen’s Collective Marketing Act. Under the terms of all of the alternatives, processor affiliated vessels (i.e., vessels owned or controlled by a processor) are qualified for harvest cooperative membership. Allowing or requiring harvest cooperative membership by these entities likely disqualifies that cooperative from the antitrust exemption of the FCMA, limiting the activities that the cooperative can engage in. As a result, a harvest cooperative clearly cannot engage in negotiations of the price or terms of delivery of catch to a processor. Both sections of the motion (section 2 and section 3) currently provide that processor affiliates cannot participate in price negotiations. The motions, however, could be clarified further concerning the limited role intended of these cooperatives. In a prior action (the rockfish pilot program), the Council similarly clarified the nature of cooperatives by including the following two provisions:

***The cooperatives formed under this program are harvest associations that are intended only to conduct and coordinate harvest activities of their members and are not FCMA cooperatives. Processor affiliated vessels will be permitted to join harvest cooperatives.***

***Co-op membership agreements will specify that processor affiliated harvesters cannot participate in price setting negotiations except as permitted by general antitrust law.***

These provisions could be included in 2.4.3.1 and 3.4.1 to clarify the nature of the cooperatives that would be created under the different alternatives.

### **Catcher Processor Cooperative/IFQ**

#### **Catcher Processor Alternative 2**

Under this alternative, each eligible catcher processor would be allocated harvest shares that could be brought to a cooperative and fished under the cooperative agreement or that could be fished as IFQs. While the alternative appears to provide no member of the sector with leverage over others, since each person would have the choice of either joining a cooperative or fishing an individual allocation, program options that govern cooperative formation and options that reduce the allocation to non-members of cooperatives could provide some participants with bargaining leverage over others. Rules that limit or penalize trading of secondary species and PSC shares could limit the ability of a person to harvest their allocations of other species (2.2.4.v. and 2.2.5.3).

### **Catcher Processor Efficiency**

This section of the analysis examines effects of the alternatives on catcher processor efficiency. Since catcher processors process their catch, any estimate of catcher processor efficiency is generally an estimate of overall production efficiency of the sector. In the simplest terms, production efficiency as considered here is the difference between production revenues and production costs. Production efficiency is a measure of the effectiveness of a producer in using inputs to produce one or more outputs, focusing on the relationship between the cost, quantity, and quality of outputs produced and the cost, quantity, and quality of the various inputs (e.g., fuel, vessels, and labor) used for that production.

Under the catcher processor cooperative/IFQ alternative, all participants in the catcher processor sector should realize improvements in efficiency, since persons who choose not to enter cooperatives would be permitted to fish individual allocations. The degree of efficiency improvement may vary across participants, as the different levels of processing occur across fisheries, gears, and vessels. Much of this variation is likely to arise from fishery and gear characteristics. Some difference, however, could arise from operational differences, including the regulatory requirements and relatively high costs for retrofitting processing plants to produce more processed products. Efficiency differences across vessels should be eliminated over time as activity in the fishery gravitates to the most efficient vessels.

Several provisions governing transfers could affect efficiency and the distribution of negotiating leverage under this alternative. If adopted, the reduction of halibut PSC allocations to individuals that choose not to join cooperatives (2.2.5.3.1) could create substantial incentives for cooperative membership. Given the relatively relaxed rule for cooperative formation (i.e., 4 distinct entities under 2.4.2.2) most participants should be capable of negotiating a cooperative arrangement without making substantial concessions in negotiations. Establishing non-separability of halibut PSC QS and primary species QS would also reduce efficiency by disallowing permanent transfers to establish usage consistency in the distribution of primary allocations and halibut PSC needed to support primary species harvests (2.2.5.4). Options for reduction of halibut PSC on transfer are also likely to reduce efficiency by reducing total harvests if halibut is constraining (2.2.5.3.1).

### **Entry to the Fishery**

Entry to the catcher processor sector is likely to be limited under all of the alternatives. The severable harvest shares allocated under the cooperative/IFQ alternative should create a more fluid market for entry than the existing LLP management, under which entry requires the purchase of a license. The ability to effectively enter the sector, however, will be limited in any case because of the large capital cost necessary to enter a catcher processor in the fisheries. The provisions for transfers of catcher processor shares to catcher vessels together with the limitation on transfers to catcher processors from the inshore sector will reduce entry opportunities in the catcher processor sector over time (2.2.3.3.2).<sup>2</sup> Overall, the potential for a person to gradually purchase shares and transition into all aspects of participation (i.e., holding shares and vessel ownership) will likely be very limited.

### **Small Entities**

In general, small entities are likely to receive smaller allocations under the history-based system of allocations under this alternative. The allocations under this alternative would be equitable, to the extent that qualifying years are reflective of historic participation and to the extent that history-based allocations are perceived as fair.

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<sup>2</sup> The overall effect of this provision on entry depends on whether the catcher vessel sector can be entered more readily than the catcher processor sector. The provision, however, clearly will reduce entry opportunities to the catcher processor sector.

## **Catcher Processor Sector Allocation with Cooperatives/Limited Entry**

### **Catcher Processor Alternative 3**

Under this alternative, each eligible catcher processor would be permitted to either enter a cooperative that would fish an exclusive allocation based on its members' histories or fish in a competitive, limited access fishery that would receive an allocation based on the history of all catcher processors that choose not to join a cooperative. As under the previous catcher processor alternative, the ability of persons to assert leverage over others will largely depend on the rules governing cooperative formation and the management of and allocations to the limited access fishery. If the allocation to the limited access fishery is reduced, cooperative members may be able to assert substantial leverage over non-members that would be disadvantaged in the limited access fishery. Similarly, if the limited access is managed very conservatively (i.e., with full harvest of an allocation closing all fisheries or low maximum retainable allowances for species incidentally caught) the limited access could be far less profitable than fishing in a cooperative, providing cooperative members with substantial leverage over the non-members that might wish to join.

### **Catcher Processor Efficiency**

Under this alternative, the catcher processor sector is likely to realize some gains in production efficiency capturing greater rents from the fishery. The primary efficiency gains of catcher processors will result from expenditure reductions as participants are likely to be able to reduce expenditures on inputs to some degree (possibly scaling down crews slightly) and increasing outputs slightly (with less loss due to diminished quality) by fishing in the rationalized cooperatives. In some cases, the choice of outputs is likely to be limited by equipment and regulatory costs of vessel upgrades. Efficiencies should also rise because of the cooperative structure of the alternative, which could reduce transaction costs of consolidating catch on fewer vessels and facilitate the full harvest of allocations. The extent of aggregation will depend both in the choices of participants in the fisheries and the excessive share caps (3.4.3 and 3.4.4).

The extent of any gain will depend, in part, on cooperative membership levels in the fleet. The extent of cooperative membership, however, is difficult to predict and will depend on cooperative formation requirements (3.3.7). Rules that require a majority of the fleet for cooperative formation could provide some sector members with substantial negotiating leverage over others. These rules could drive more participants to the limited access fishery than more lax rules for cooperative formation, such as a requirement of four distinct entities.

While most catcher processors are likely to join cooperatives to realize efficiency benefits of a rationalized fishery, some participants could remain in the limited access fishery, if they perceive a better opportunity in that fishery. The opportunity in the limited access will depend on whether PSC allocations to the fishery are reduced (3.6) and the management of secondary species in that fishery. If PSC is reduced and/or catch of valuable secondary species is limited by a low MRA (which may be necessary to prevent overharvest) participants are likely to perceive greater opportunities in cooperatives.

Participants in this sector will also have the option of transferring their annual allocations to the shore-based sector (3.4.7). Some historic participants could elect to transfer their allocations to the catcher vessel sector, if they perceive an added benefit from the transfer. Whether better returns can be realized in the shore-based fishery cannot be predicted and depends on both the difference in harvesting and processing costs and the value of the outputs produced.

## **Entry to the Fishery**

As under the previous catcher processor alternative, entry to the catcher processor sector under this alternative is likely to be limited. At first glance, the severable harvest histories under the program alternative would create a more fluid market for entry than the existing LLP management, under which entry requires the purchase of a license. If cooperative formation is limited (or is subject to relatively strict requirements), opportunities for gradual entry by purchasing only a partial history may be limited. To participate in the limited access fishery, a person must hold an LLP and the complete history associated with a license at the implementation of the program (3.6). Entrants that do not purchase both the LLP and all history associated with the LLP would not be permitted in the limited access fishery. As a result, if the opportunity to enter the limited access fishery is important in negotiations with a cooperative (which is likely the case under relatively restrictive cooperative formation rules) entrants will need to purchase a license and all history associated with that license to be reasonably well positioned for negotiations.

Entry under this alternative could also be limited because cooperatives provide an easy avenue for history transfers, which would lead to consolidation among existing participants instead of entry. The ability to effectively enter will also be limited because of the large capital cost of a vessel. Provisions allowing transfer of history from catcher processors to catcher vessels, but preventing transfers to the catcher processor sector in the long run will reduce the available market of catcher processor history for entry to the sector. The potential for a person to gradually purchase history and transition into vessel ownership in the catcher processor sector is likely to be very limited.

## **Small Entities**

In general, small entities are likely to receive smaller allocations under the history-based system of allocations under this alternative. The fairness of allocations depends on the extent to which history-based allocations are perceived as fair and the extent to which the qualifying years are reflective of historic participation. Small entities could also be disadvantaged under this alternative, if cooperative formation rules allow formation of a single cooperative with the formation requiring a threshold percentage of the sector's history (3.3.7, Option 2). This provision would give participants that receive large allocations disproportionate control in the cooperative formation process.

## **Catcher Vessel Cooperative/IFQ**

### ***Fixed Gear Catcher Vessel Alternative Low 2***

Under this alternative, each eligible catcher vessel would receive a harvest share allocation that could be fished in a cooperative or as an IFQ. This option applies only to low producing fixed gear vessels (participants with less than either the median allocation or the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile) and would provide no specific processor protections. All processors would be permitted to compete for landings from these participants.

## **Ex Vessel Pricing**

A critical factor in the assessment of the effects of the alternatives on efficiency of the catcher vessels and shore-based processors is the ex vessel price of groundfish, which determines the distribution of product revenues between those two sectors. Landings are the primary source of revenues for harvesters and the principal input cost to processors. Because of the importance of ex vessel prices in determining the efficiencies of the different shore-side sectors, a section is devoted to the effects of the different alternatives on ex vessel pricing to focus attention on this important aspect of the alternatives.

Under this alternative, harvesters receive an IFQ that can be delivered to any processor. Slowing of the race for fish by exclusive allocations should effectively free processor capacity in the fisheries by

dispersing landings over time. In the absence of any direct processor protection, harvesters should be able to generate substantial competition for landings of their catch. As a result, harvesters should have a strong negotiating position relative to processors under this alternative.

At times when processors operating at maximum capacity with catch from other fisheries (e.g., during the pollock roe season), fewer processors will compete aggressively for landings from this fleet. During periods of less intense activity, processors are likely to compete aggressively for landings, so more landings should be expected during these periods of relatively low processing throughput.<sup>3</sup>

### **Catcher Vessel Efficiency**

Efficiency in the harvest sector under this alternative is likely to be increased over the status quo. In general, most rents in the fishery should be realized by harvesters. Most of the gain will come from the additional negotiating leverage that arises from the allocation of IFQs without processor protection.

To some extent, efficiency gains could be reduced by limits on leasing (2.2.2.3.5) and owner on board requirements (2.2.3.3.7), if those provisions are incorporated into this alternative. If rigidly applied to all allocations, owner-on-board requirements or limitations on leasing could greatly reduce efficiency, since a person could be precluded from all fisheries, if the allocation of one species is fully harvested. Applying owner-on-board requirements or leasing limitations on a portion of each allocation (as is proposed for owner on board requirements) may achieve the goals of the provision without reducing efficiency because participants will have some flexibility to transfer a portion of their allocations. Limiting the application of these requirements to participants that are not in cooperatives is unlikely to achieve any goal other than increase cooperative membership. Participants that do not wish to comply with the leasing limitations or owner-on-board requirements will join cooperatives to avoid the provisions. The Council should question whether the administrative cost of creating and implementing these requirements is worthwhile, if the requirements are waived for cooperative members.

Harvester efficiency (and rent capture) should be increased through the formation of cooperatives. Since the alternative contains no provisions that are intended to increase the incentives for cooperative membership (beyond the incentives inherent in the cooperative structure) and because participants in this sector are believed to be relatively independent, cooperatives may be less likely than for other sectors. Also, if cooperative monitoring and management is more costly (because of increased observer coverage or management costs) cooperative formation could be delayed. Over time, however, cooperative formation should become the norm, particularly if management costs are similar for cooperatives and individuals.

### **Processor Efficiency**

Processing efficiency is likely to be affected by a few different aspects of this alternative. First, as typically happens when a fishery is rationalized, fishing is slowed allowing processing efficiency to be improved by producing more output and higher quality output from the same quantity of fish. This quality improvement, however, may provide little direct benefit to processors, since processor competition for landings is likely to increase with the slowing of fishing and the rate of landings. This competition is likely to prevent processors from capturing more than a small portion of the rents from the fishery. In the long run, processors that remain in the fisheries would be expected to receive normal profits for their

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<sup>3</sup> Since the high producing portion of the fixed gear fleet is likely to be subject to processor protection under an alternative affecting that fleet, it is unlikely that this fleet will need to fish throughout the year to allow processors maintain a consistent supply of fish to fresh markets. Instead, this fleet is likely to fish when competition for landings is the greatest.



processing, but harvesters that receive IFQs can be expected to gain the rents from the fishery. Processor competition for landings (and product quality) will depend on the timing of harvests.

### **Overall Production Efficiency**

Overall efficiency should improve under this alternative, as the race for fish ends. As low producing vessels, improvements in quality of landings and cost reductions are likely to be less substantial than for larger producers that race more aggressively to increase their overall harvests. Minor improvements in the quality of landings and reductions in the costs of harvesting fish are possible. Efficiency in processing should also improve as catch is distributed over a longer season. Since this fleet harvests a relatively small portion of the overall catch, a portion of the improvement of quality will result from slowing of catch and landing rates of other fleets that deliver to the same processors. Overall improvement should occur as processors are able to focus on higher value markets, particularly fresh markets that can be maintained over a longer period of the year. Two competing factors could affect efficiency under this alternative. First, the absence of any processor association could improve efficiency by allowing more competition for landings, fostering the development of greater efficiencies through cost reducing and revenue improving production improvements. Second, the absence of any processor associations could cause occasional short run efficiency losses, if harvesters remain too independent of the processing sector and fail to coordinate landings to achieve efficiencies in processing. In the long run, this loss of efficiency should dissipate, as harvesters realize the benefits of higher ex vessel prices of coordinating landings.

### **Entry to the Harvest Sector**

Entry to the harvest sector under this alternative should be similar to entry under the halibut and sablefish IFQ program. In an IFQ program entry can occur through the purchase of relatively small share holdings. Qualifying only individuals (and not corporations) to acquire shares (2.2.3.3.1) should also lead to a more active market for shares. Purchasing shares under this alternative will be relatively uncomplicated as landings will not be associated with a specific processor. The absence of processor associations, however, could increase the price of shares. Share caps and similar limitations on holdings (such as a block program under 2.2.7) could reduce the price of shares and also could lead to a more active market, since consolidation would be limited. Owner on board requirements could also facilitate entry, as persons not willing to fish their shares would be forced to divest a portion of their holdings.

### **Entry to the Processing Sector**

Entry to the processing sector is unlimited under this alternative. As a consequence, entry can occur without a requirement to purchase a license. In addition, a processor may enter without paying a premium price to attract harvesters from an associated processor, as would be required under any of the alternatives with processor associations.

### **Small Harvesting Entities**

Most of the participants in the sector subject to this alternative are likely to be small harvesting entities. The alternative provides these entities with the greatest flexibility in harvesting their shares and selling their catch. These small entities are likely to receive the greatest benefit under this alternative. In general, these small entities are likely to receive smaller allocations under the history-based system of allocations under this alternative. The fairness of allocations depends on the extent to which history-based allocations are perceived as fair and the extent to which the qualifying years are reflective of historic participation.

### **Small Processing Entities**

Many of the small processing entities in the Gulf are thought to purchase most of their fish from this fleet. This alternative, however, provides no protection to these processing entities. Under the current management, most of the larger processors devote most of their efforts to attracting landings from the

larger fixed gear and trawl fleets. Once those fisheries are rationalized with processor protections, it is possible that the larger processors will devote greater effort to attracting landings from the low producing fixed gear participants to fill gaps in their processing activities. Attracting landings from this fleet could also help the larger processors develop a more consistent supply to higher value, fresh fish markets. This increased competition for landings could be detrimental to some small processors, if they are unable to compete with the larger processors with more diverse operations.

### ***Catcher Vessel Cooperative/IFQ with Limited Processor Entry***

#### ***Trawl Catcher Vessel Alternative 2A and Fixed Gear Catcher Vessel Alternative High 2A***

Under this alternative, eligible catcher vessels would be allocated harvest shares that could be fished in a cooperative or that could be fished as an individual allocation. A specific portion of each allocation would be required to be delivered to a licensed processor. As under the parallel catcher processor alternative, options that govern cooperative formation and options that reduce the allocation to non-members of cooperatives could provide some catcher vessel participants with bargaining leverage over others. Rules that limit share trading by non-members of cooperatives could also affect bargaining leverage as binding allocations of one species may limit the ability of a person to harvest their allocations of other species. Processors might receive little protection from the limited license program, if a substantial pool of processors receives licenses. This alternative applies to trawl catcher vessels and fixed gear catcher vessels that qualify as high producers.

#### **Ex Vessel Pricing**

Although processor entry is limited under this alternative, harvesters should be able to generate competition for landings among the licensed processors. It is anticipated that most deliveries from the rationalized fisheries have been made to processors that will qualify for licenses. Since fishing and the rate of landings should be slowed under this alternative, processing capacity should be more available than during the current, more abbreviated seasons.<sup>4</sup> Catcher vessel participants are likely to be in a strong negotiating position relative to processors under this alternative, because of the extended season and the limited protection of the processing limited license system.

Although generally, harvesters can be expected to have a relatively strong bargaining position under this alternative, it is possible that processors could effectively reduce competition for landings by consolidating license holdings. If relatively few processors can (and are permitted to) hold multiple licenses, it is possible that those processors could reduce the market of processors, limiting competition for landings. If processors successfully consolidate licenses in this manner, it is possible that harvester negotiating strength could be reduced substantially. Whether this license consolidation will occur cannot be predicted with certainty, but should be expected given the incentive arising from potential gains.

#### **Catcher Vessel Efficiency**

Catcher vessel efficiency is likely to improve substantially under this alternative. Catcher vessels receiving exclusive allocations should refocus their efforts toward harvesting allocations with the greatest efficiency. To improve efficiency, participants can be expected to balance cost efficiencies (i.e., reduce use of inputs such as fuel) against quality improvements that bring greater prices for landings. Some participants are likely to remove vessels from the fisheries to reduce costs. In general, the ability to coordinate harvest activity and remove vessels from the fleet without loss of harvest share, together with a relative improvement in bargaining strength arising from the relatively weak processor protection of the

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<sup>4</sup> Most processors with substantial participation in Gulf of Alaska LLP fisheries currently have substantial down times between seasons that occupy most of their processing capacity.

limit on processor entry should result in substantial improvements in harvest sector efficiency.<sup>5</sup> Because cooperative formation rules are relatively liberal under this alternative (i.e., any four unique entities may form a cooperative), options that reduce IFQ allocations to persons that do not join cooperatives should not affect the distribution of benefits among harvesters. That distribution of benefits among harvesters should be a reflection of the initial allocations received under the program.

As noted under the previous alternative, efficiency gains could be reduced by limits on leasing (2.2.2.3.5) and owner-on-board requirements (2.2.3.3.7), if those provisions are incorporated into this alternative. These constraints on the use of shares (particularly in a multispecies system) could result in the shortage of shares of one species constraining the harvest of all other species. Without the ability to lease shares to or from another participant, a portion of an allocation could be stranded. Applying owner-on-board requirements or leasing limitations on a portion of each allocation (as is proposed for owner-on-board requirements) may achieve the goals of the provisions without reducing efficiency. Limiting the application of these provisions to participants that are not in cooperatives is unlikely to achieve any goal other than increasing cooperative membership.

### **Processor Efficiency**

Under this alternative, processing efficiency should be affected by several factors. Catcher vessel participants are likely to use cooperatives to coordinate landings leading to processing technical efficiency improvements as processors are better able to schedule crews to process landings and improve product quality and increase production of higher quality products. As under the previous alternative, short run efficiency losses could occur, if harvesters attempting to market their fish to the highest bidder prove to be unreliable sources of inputs.

Processors, however, may experience little improvement in their overall efficiency (profits) under this alternative because of their weak negotiating position in the market for landings. Although entry is limited under this alternative, the capacity of qualified processors likely exceeds that necessary to process landings in a slowed fishery with an extended season. Cooperation from catcher vessels may improve quality and value of processing outputs and help processors minimize costs of production, but catcher vessels should be in a relatively good negotiating position to receive most of the benefits of those improvements through ex vessel pricing. Notwithstanding the relatively strong position fishermen may have under this alternative, processors, in the long run, should obtain normal profits from their processing. Some less efficient processors, however, may be unable to realize normal profits, and may be expected to drop out of the fisheries.

In the long run, it is possible that processors could achieve a substantial gain in efficiency, if processor license holdings are not limited by a cap. In the absence of a cap, a few processors could purchase several licenses each, effectively limiting the market for landings. If realized, these gains could accrue to the few processors that are able to remain in the fishery. Although these processors will need to purchase licenses that they consolidate, it is likely that any departing processors are unlikely to be in a strong negotiating position with respect to licenses that they wish to divest.

In addition, some efficiencies may not be realized, if A shares (which required to be delivered to a licensed processor) are so large a portion of the overall harvest share allocation that entry of new processors is limited. Entry could be important to production developments that contribute to efficiency by reducing costs or increase revenues. If few B shares are allocated, little catch may be available for processors to enter the fishery to experiment with production developments.

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<sup>5</sup> If a few processors are able to acquire most of the licenses, it is possible that competition for landings could be reduced, which would result in a corresponding reduction in harvester efficiency.

## **Overall Production Efficiency**

Overall efficiency should be improved substantially under this alternative. Short run potential efficiencies may not be realized, if portions of the fleet are unwilling to coordinate landings with processors. Overtime, harvesters can be expected to coordinate landings to increase overall efficiency. If entry to processing is limited by the A share/B share ratio, some production improvements could be curtailed.

## **Entry to the Harvest Sector**

Entry to the harvest sector under this alternative should be similar to entry under the cooperative/IFQ alternative. The absence of specific processor associations and the limits on landings should provide a relatively wide market to any person wishing to enter the fisheries.

Limiting corporate ownership of shares to only recipients of an initial allocation (2.2.3.3.1) and restricting leasing and requiring owner-on-board could also lead to a more active market for shares. In developing the alternative, the Council should consider whether these leasing limits and owner-on-board requirements are appropriate for the different fleets that will be governed by this alternative. Applying these limits to a portion of the shares could facilitate entry without overly constraining operations of participants.

Purchasing shares under this alternative will be relatively uncomplicated as landings will not be associated with a specific processor. The absence of processor associations, however, could increase the price of shares. Share caps and similar limitations on holdings (such as a block program under 2.2.7 that could apply to some fixed gear shares) could reduce the price of shares and also could lead to a more active market, since consolidation would be limited. Owner on board requirements (2.2.3.3.7) and leasing limitations (2.2.3.3.5) could also facilitate entry, as persons not willing to fish their shares would be forced to divest a portion of their holdings. These provisions, however, are unlikely to have any effect on entry, unless they are applied to cooperative members.

## **Entry to the Processing Sector**

Entry to the processing sector is constrained by a limited license program. Under the options, the portion of each allocation that would be B shares (i.e., free to be delivered to any processor, including processors without licenses) will need to be identified. These unrestricted B shares are likely to be important to facilitating processor entry, because they would allow a potential entrant to experiment prior to making a potentially substantial investment in a license. The availability of licenses in the market cannot be predicted and likely will depend on both the circumstances of participants and whether the Council includes a limitation on the number of licenses a processor can hold. If processors are permitted to hold several licenses, it is possible that existing processors could effectively limit competition and entry by purchasing any available licenses. If B shares are a high portion of the allocation and licenses are readily available in the market, it is possible that entry could be relatively free.

## **Small Harvesting Entities**

Many of the participants in the sector subject to this alternative are likely to be small harvesting entities by RFA standards. Allocations will be history based, so to the extent that the selected qualifying years are reflective of historic participation and that history based allocations are equitable, small operations will not be discriminated against in the initial allocation. Although the alternative requires a portion of each allocation to be landed with licensed processors, harvesters are likely to have a substantial market for the sale of their catch at the outset. As a result, these entities are likely to receive great benefits from the program in the early years. Over time returns to harvesters could decline, if processors are not limited in the number of licenses that they can hold. In the absence of limitations on license holdings, processors could consolidate license holdings effectively constraining the market for landings of A shares. Whether this license consolidation is likely cannot be predicted.

### **Small Processing Entities**

Some of the small processing entities in the Gulf are thought to purchase fish from this fleet. This alternative, however, provides limited protection to processing entities. The limit on processing entry under this alternative provides no specific protection to any processor and will likely license processor with capacity to process substantially more fish than will be harvested.

As noted in the previous alternative, larger processors could be better positioned to compete for landings from all vessels once fisheries are rationalized the rate of landings and processing slows. Increased competition for landings could be detrimental to some small processors that currently pay premium prices, if they are unable to compete with the larger processors with more diverse operations.

### **Catcher Vessel Cooperative/IFQ with Processor Linkages**

#### ***Trawl Catcher Vessel Alternative 2B and Fixed Gear Catcher Vessel Alternative High 2B***

This alternative would also allocate harvest shares to eligible catcher vessels that could be fished in cooperatives or individually. A specific portion of each harvest share allocation would be required to be landed with the processor to which the catcher vessel delivered the most groundfish during the processor qualifying period. The harvest share/processor association could be severed or changed, subject to a share reduction penalty. As under the other cooperative/IFQ alternatives, bargaining leverage among catcher vessel participants will be affected by the choice of options that govern cooperative formation. Options that reduce the allocation to non-members of cooperatives could provide some catcher vessel participants with bargaining leverage over others. Rules that limit share trading by non-members of cooperatives could also affect bargaining leverage as binding allocations of one species may limit the ability of a person to harvest their allocations of other species. The protection granted to processors will depend on the percent of each allocation that must be landed with the associated processor and the size and duration of the share reduction penalty for movement among processors.

### **Ex Vessel Pricing**

The negotiating position of catcher vessels under this alternative will depend on the options included in the alternative by the Council. Two specific sets of options together will have the greatest impact on the distribution of negotiating leverage between the sectors. First, the percentage of each allocation that is required to be delivered to the associated processor will affect the extent to which an associated processor will be assured of landings during the tenure of the association (2.3.1.1.1). Harvesters can be expected to have a relatively strong bargaining position in the negotiations of landings of unrestricted B share catch.<sup>6</sup> Generally, A shares that are required to be delivered to an associated processor will be subject to a reduced level of competition, for which processors will pay a relatively lower ex vessel price. While other processors may choose to compete to sever the association, these competing processors will need to pay a premium over the price offered by the associated processor to sever the association.<sup>7</sup> The magnitude of the premium depends on the terms of the share reduction penalty imposed for severing the association; these penalty provisions are the second set of options that will determine the distribution of rents (2.3.1.1.3). The current options would allow a reduction of between 10 and 20 percent for a period of 1 to 4 years. Generally, larger share reductions for longer periods will increase the negotiating strength of

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<sup>6</sup> Rules limiting the leasing of shares and requiring the share owner to be on board the vessel harvesting the shares could reduce the usefulness of B shares to harvesters as a negotiating tool, if the B share allocation is a small portion of the total share allocation. For example, if a share holder is required to be on the vessel harvesting the shares and B shares are a small portion of the total allocation, it could be impractical for the share holder to make deliveries to multiple processors.

<sup>7</sup> In most cases, the premium would be in the form of a higher ex vessel price. In some cases, however, a harvester may be motivated to break an association with a processor, in part, by terms of delivery that lower harvest costs. In either case, higher profits for the harvester would result.

processors with share associations, by increasing the premium that would need to be paid to overcome the share reduction penalty.

The negotiating leverage arising from the association, however, should change at the time an association is severed. As long as a harvester maintains the association with a processor, the associated processor will pay a relatively low ex vessel price paid for landings of associated harvest shares. Once the association is severed, the share reduction is redistributed to the fleet that remains with the processor that the share holder left. If the penalty is entirely A shares, the processor would have strong negotiating leverage for landings of those penalty shares, since the harvesters receiving the reallocation will be required to land the shares with the processor during the term of the share reduction. If the penalty includes B shares, the harvesters receiving those shares during the term of the penalty should have a relatively strong position in the negotiation for landings of those B shares. The associated processor will be in a relatively weak position to negotiate for landings of these redistribution of these B shares, since their holders may deliver them to any processor. Since harvesters are likely to receive the benefits of the redistributed B shares, including B shares in the penalty could create an incentive for harvesters associated with a processor to drive other harvesters away from that processor for the short term reallocation. The ability of harvesters to force others away from a processor could be limited, if harvesters have reasonable opportunities to harvest their allocations independent of others associated with the same processor (i.e., if IFQ allocations are not reduced and cooperative formation rules are liberal).

If the Council elects to impose penalties after the first move (i.e., a system of perpetual linkages), the price that a processor is willing to pay to induce a harvester to leave an associated processor could be increased, since the new processor will receive the benefit of a linkage that limits competition for delivery restricted shares. In addition, the Council could decide to apply the penalty at half the initial level to all movements after the first movement. Applying the penalty to only the first move would show the Council's intent to value only the historic harvester/processor relationships that exist prior to implementation of the program. If the Council elected to adopt a single penalty program, over time it could be expected that all processor protections severed as harvesters pay the penalties needed to sever the linkages. Once linkages are severed, the program would have no processor element. An ongoing processor association might be favored by participants that see those associations as stabilizing the distribution of landings with processors.

Another factor that could affect ex vessel price negotiations under this alternative is the transferability of processor associations. If processors are permitted to transfer share associations, it is possible that processing could consolidate by acquisition of licenses and associations. While this, in and of itself, is not likely to affect rent distributions, if the number of processing licenses that a person can hold is not limited, competition could be limited by consolidation of licenses. These two provisions together (transferable associations without license caps) could contribute to consolidation that limits competition for landings weakening the negotiating strength of harvesters.

In determining the penalty terms, the Council could decide whether the penalty will be applied in a single year or over the course of more than one year. Extended terms for penalties are likely to increase the bargaining strength of the associated processor relative to the harvester and to discourage movement between processors by increasing the cost of movement. Discounting suggests that extending a penalty over several years, however, is likely to be less costly to a harvester than imposing a penalty of the same quantity of fish over a shorter period of time (i.e., 2 percent per year for 4 years is less costly than 8 percent in a single year, if the TAC and product markets remain constant). Extending the penalty to reduce its magnitude in a single year could also avoid disruption to a harvester's operations that could occur from imposing a larger penalty in a single year. Long term penalties, however, could discourage movement and competition. On the other hand, penalties of relatively long terms could contribute to

stronger relationships between harvesters and processors. If a penalty is imposed over several years, the processor with which a new linkage is established could establish a relationship for the term of the penalty (or beyond) to cover the harvester's costs of penalty.

### **Catcher Vessel Efficiency**

Under this alternative, harvest costs should decrease with slowing of the race for fish. In addition, catcher vessels should contribute to an increase in product quality and improved product recovery as better care is taken of harvests to increase returns from the fishery. The processor associations under this alternative likely create a substantial incentive for harvesters and processors to cooperate in production during the term of the association to improve product value and overall returns from catch. Whether overall catcher vessel efficiency (profits) improves, however, will depend on ex vessel prices. The portion of each allocation that is delivery restricted A shares (2.3.1.1.1) and the penalty for severing that association will determine the extent of leverage (2.3.1.1.3). Harvesters can be expected to receive rents from the unrestricted B shares. Generally, A shares that are required to be delivered to an associated processor will be subject to a reduced level of competition, for which processors will receive a portion of the rents. The rent distribution from the association can be expected to change at the time an association is severed. As long as a harvester maintains the association with a processor, the associated processor will receive the rents from the relatively low ex vessel price paid for landings of associated harvest shares. Once the association is severed, however, the share reduction is redistributed to the fleet that remains with the processor that the share holder left. If the penalty is entirely A shares, the processor should receive all rents from landings of those shares, since the harvesters receiving the reallocation will be required to land the shares with the processor during the term of the share reduction. If the penalty includes B shares, the harvesters receiving those shares during the term of the penalty should receive the rents from those B shares. The redistribution of these B shares also provides little benefit to the associated processor. Since harvesters are likely to receive the benefits of the redistributed B shares, including B shares in the penalty could create an incentive for harvesters associated with a processor to drive other harvesters away from that processor for the short term reallocation. The ability of harvesters to force others away from a processor could be limited, if harvesters have reasonable opportunities to harvest their allocations independent of others associated with the same processor (i.e., if IFQ allocations are not reduced and cooperative formation rules are liberal).

Options to prohibit permanent trades of PSC (2.2.5.3.1) could reduce efficiency, if the provision limits the ability of participants to harvest their allocations or drive up transactions costs by requiring participants to trade shares on an annual basis. Provisions that reduce PSC allocations to non-members of cooperatives (2.2.5.4) could affect the distribution of benefits among harvesters, if some harvesters lose negotiating leverage in the cooperative formation process. The relatively liberal rules for cooperative formation (i.e., 4 distinct entities) should mitigate this potential, but it is possible that some harvesters holding shares associated with a processor with few associations could have little choice of cooperatives to join.

If included in the alternative, efficiency gains could be reduced by limits on leasing (2.2.2.3.5) and owner on board requirements (2.2.3.3.7). Applying those limitations on a portion of each allocation (as is proposed for owner on board requirements) may achieve the goals of the provision without reducing efficiency. As currently proposed, limiting the application of these requirements to participants that are not in cooperatives is unlikely to achieve any goal other than increasing cooperative membership.

### **Processor Efficiency**

As noted above, production under this alternative should be refocused toward increasing product quality and production of higher valued outputs. The extent to which processors realize benefits from these improvements will depend on the distribution of rents, as determined by the provisions defining harvest share/processor associations. Catch from A shares will be subject to less competition, so the larger the A

share portion of the allocation, the larger the portion of landings that associated processors will have reduced competition for. The negotiating strength of (and rents to) associated processors will be determined by the share penalty, with the negotiating position of (and rents to) the associated processor increasing with the magnitude and duration of the share reduction. The level of penalty should be set to balance the interests of processors that have established histories in the fisheries against the interests of harvesters in having a broader market in which to sell their harvests and potential losses of efficiency, if competition is muted.

In considering the penalty, the Council should consider that the penalty represents a temporary loss of revenues to a harvester, which could be used to defer long term fixed costs, such as vessel loans, in addition to variable costs, which are reduced by not having to harvest the shares subject to penalty. This temporary loss of revenues should be balanced against the long term loss of revenues to a processor that occurs, if a processor loses the association. While the loss to a processor from the severed association is greater, it should be kept in mind that the loss to a processor would only occur if the processor were unwilling to pay a price for landings that will retain the harvester association. And, the ex vessel price that an associated processor will need to pay to retain the association will be less than a competitive market price because of the penalty. So, the penalty has the effect of determining the extent of rents that can be captured by an associated processor by paying a reduced price for landings.

### **Overall Production Efficiency**

Overall production efficiency should be improved through production improvements that typically arise through the slowing of the race for fish. Both A shares and B shares have competing, inherent properties that could affect efficiency. For A shares, the linkage should contribute to efficiency by contributing to the coordination of landings. This coordination should exceed the coordination of B share landings, at least at outset. A competing effect, however, arises because of the penalty that must be paid to change associations, since the penalty could deter efficiency improving movements among processors. For B shares, the lack of restrictions should allow harvesters to deliver their landings to the processor willing to pay the greatest price. The relative freedom to choose delivery time and location, however, could reduce coordination of landings with some efficiency loss. Over time (and in general), B share landings should stabilize as catcher vessels realize price benefits from coordinated landings.

This structure also could reduce production developments (and long run efficiency), if the B share pool does not accommodate processor entry to the fishery, as entry opportunities facilitate product experimentation. If harvesters see B shares primarily as a mechanism for encouraging their linked processor to pay higher price for A share landings, processor entry to the fishery could be compromised, despite a B share pool that would seem to be adequate to facilitate entry.

### **Entry to the Harvest Sector**

A few competing factors are likely to affect entry to the harvest sector under this alternative. First, since the program is an IFQ program with fully divisible allocations, persons should be able to enter the fisheries relatively easily by making several purchases of small numbers of shares over time.

Entry, however, could be complicated by the processor associations. A harvester that purchases small numbers of shares may not be able to purchase shares with associations to more than one processor. So, a person that wishes to enter by small share purchases will be required to purchase from a segment of the market associated with a single processor. The landing requirement of the associations under this alternative could complicate entry for persons that are unable to purchase shares that are less than a full delivery from a vessel.



Limiting corporate ownership of shares to only recipients of an initial allocation (2.2.3.3.1) and restricting leasing and requiring owner on board could also lead to a more active market for shares. In developing the alternative, the Council should consider whether these provisions are appropriate for the fleets governed by this alternative. In addition, provisions that limit leasing and require owner-on-board could make compliance with the landing requirements more difficult for entering harvesters that are unable to acquire shares associated with a single processor.

### **Entry to the Processing Sector**

Processor entry will also be constrained under this alternative. The extent of the constraint depends on choices of several options under consideration in the program. In most cases, decisions that facilitate entry also reduce the protection granted to existing processors. For example, small scale entry could be facilitated by a relatively large portion of the harvest share allocation being B shares. Yet, the larger the portion of the share allocation made up of B shares, the lower the protection to existing processors. Another option that is likely to affect entry opportunities is whether (and the extent of) share reduction penalties after the first movement among processors will also affect the ability of processors to enter the fisheries. If penalty share reductions apply only to the first move, the number of shares unconstrained by processor landing requirements will increase over time. Similarly, if penalties are reduced after the first move, the cost of larger scale entry should drop over time as fewer shares will be subject to the full, first move penalty.

License availability will also determine the extent to which entering processors can use pricing to entice harvesters to change associations. As under the previous alternative, if processors are not limited in the number of licenses that they can hold, it is possible that a few processors could acquire most of the licenses in the fisheries to limit competition.

### **Small Harvesting Entities**

Most of the participants in the harvest sector under this alternative are thought to be small harvesting entities by RFA standards. Small entities are likely to receive relatively smaller allocations, under the history-based system of allocations. Those allocations will be fair to the extent that history-based allocations and the qualifying years are viewed as fair. The processor associations and landing requirements under this alternative are more restrictive than the processor protections under the limited license alternative and should reduce revenues to all harvesters (including those that are small entities). Small entities, particularly those with small allocations, may have little opportunity for marketing their catch with processors other than their associated processor. Pooling of B shares in a cooperative, however, may create some opportunity for person's with small allocations to increase their returns from those landings.

### **Small Processing Entities**

Small processing entities could receive less protection under this alternative because of the winner-take-all nature of the processor associations. Under this alternative, each harvester will associate with the single processor to which it delivered the most groundfish during the processor qualifying years. This single association could leave some processors with substantially less protection with others. Large processors that participate in the largest (by volume) fisheries should realize the benefits of most of the associations, with small processors with limited capacity being left out of the associations.

## **Catcher Vessel Cooperative/IFQ with Harvest Share Allocations to Processors**

### **Trawl Catcher Vessel Alternative 2C and Fixed Gear Catcher Vessel Alternative 2C**

This alternative would also allocate harvest shares to eligible catcher vessels that could be fished in cooperatives or individually. A specific portion of the harvest share pool would be allocated to eligible processors. A processor could either harvest its allocation (if it is able to document a vessel) or contract catcher vessels to harvest their allocations. In addition, a portion of the pool of harvest shares would be available for acquisition by processors.

### **Ex Vessel Pricing**

Negotiating strength in ex vessel pricing will depend on whether the underlying shares are held by a harvester or processor. For shares held by a harvester, the harvester should have relatively strong negotiating leverage. Since the fishery will be slowed and landings will be dispersed over a longer period of time, processing capacity should be more available than under the current race for fish. This freeing of processing capacity should increase competition among processors for landings from processing shares, improving the position of harvesters in negotiations.

On the other hand, processors should have the upper hand in negotiations for landings from the shares that they hold. Negotiations for these landings are likely to be effectively leases of the shares that require the harvester to deliver the landings to the processor holding the underlying shares. Harvesters are likely to be compensated for their fishing expenses (with normal profits) with processors receiving any rents from the catch. In some instances, processors could use the leases of these shares to entice deliveries from harvesters. In any case, the negotiating leverage and the distribution of benefits from the catch is likely to remain unchanged, with the harvester receiving the rents from shares it holds and the processor receiving the rents from the shares that it holds.

### **Catcher Vessel Efficiency**

As under the other rationalization alternatives, a general trend toward reduction of harvest costs and improvement of quality of landings and production of higher valued products should occur under this alternative. At the outset, harvesters may be less inclined to coordinate landings with processors, instead choosing to bargain for deliveries with processors. Over time, harvesters should coordinate landings, which should be rewarded with higher ex vessel prices. In general, harvesters should realize the rents from the allocations to harvesters under the program.

Catcher vessel efficiency under this alternative could be affected by several different factors. The percentage of shares allocated to the processing sector is the greatest determinant of the distribution of benefits between the harvesting and processing sectors. The allocation of shares to processors will affect the overall return to harvesters by reducing their allocations of harvest shares. Competition for each harvester's allocation, however, will be unlimited by processor landing requirements. Through this competition, harvesters should capture all of the rents on landings from shares received in the initial allocation. Some harvesters could realize some returns from allocations to processors, if they are able to contract for the harvest of those processor allocations. Generally, the return from these harvests will be normal profits with the rents from the allocation being received by the processor holding the shares.

Options to prohibit permanent trades of PSC (2.2.5.3.1) could reduce efficiency, if the provision limits the ability of participants to harvest their allocations or drive up transactions costs by requiring participants to trade shares on an annual basis. Provisions that reduce PSC allocations to non-members of cooperatives (2.2.5.4) could affect the distribution of benefits among harvesters, if some harvesters lose negotiating

leverage in the cooperative formation process. The relatively liberal rules for cooperative formation (i.e., 4 distinct entities) should mitigate this potential.

Limits on leasing (2.2.2.3.5) and owner-on-board requirements (2.2.3.3.7) could reduce efficiency gains. Applying those limitations on a portion of each allocation (as is proposed for owner on board requirements) may achieve the goals of the provision without reducing efficiency. As currently proposed, limiting the application of these requirements to participants that are not in cooperatives is unlikely to achieve any goal other than increasing cooperative membership. If these elements are included, provision should be made to ensure that processors that do not operate vessels have the ability to have their shares harvested (i.e., 2.3.2, paragraph 5 should control).

### **Processor Efficiency**

Processor efficiency will also be affected by several aspects of this alternative. First, processors will receive an allocation of harvest shares from which the processors should receive all rents, regardless of whether the processor harvests those shares on its own vessels or contracts with others for their harvest. The magnitude of this allocation will determine the distribution of benefits between the sectors (2.3.2., paragraph 6). Processors will need to compete for landings from allocations to harvesters, with each processor receiving normal profits, but not rents, for the deliveries that it processes. Some risk that harvesters may not coordinate landings with processors, would cost some processors. In the long run, coordinated landings should benefit harvesters with higher rents and reduce possible costs to processors that are able to benefit from scheduling. Some loss of stability in processing could arise without processor landing requirements, but processors that are concerned about stability could use their allocations to entice harvesters both to deliver their own allocations to the processor and to coordinate landings.

### **Overall Production Efficiency**

Under this alternative, overall production efficiency should be improved substantially. The absence of processor associations will allow harvesters to choose to deliver to the most efficient processors (typically the processor that is able to pay most). Processors can use their allocations to fill time gaps in production and to bargain for additional coordination of deliveries from harvesters. The result should be substantial gains in overall production efficiency, as participants give greater attention to product quality and cost reductions in making production decisions.

### **Entry to the Harvest Sector**

Entry to the harvest sector should be similar to entry under the IFQ alternative for low producing fixed gear vessels. Entry should be simplified since entry can be accomplished through gradually purchasing small numbers of shares, since shares are fully divisible. Since shares are not associated with a single processor, entrants can purchase shares from a broader market, without complicating the harvest and delivery of shares. The absence of processor associations, however, could increase the price of shares. Although allocations to processors could reduce shares in the market (or drive up the price for shares available to processors) a market for shares available to harvesters only should ensure a relatively large market of shares for harvest sector entrants. Share caps and similar limitations on holdings (such as a block program under 2.2.7 that could apply to some fixed gear shares) could reduce the price of shares and also could lead to a more active market, since consolidation would be limited.

Limiting corporate ownership of shares to only recipients of an initial allocation (2.2.3.3.1) and restricting leasing and requiring owner-on-board could also lead to a more active market for shares.<sup>8</sup> Limitations on

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<sup>8</sup> It is assumed that the provisions would not apply to the pool of shares that could be purchased by processors. Eligibility to purchase shares from the pool available should be specified.

leasing and owner on board requirements, however, may have little effect, if cooperative members are exempt from these provisions.

### **Entry to the Processing Sector**

Entry to the processing sector should be simplified under this alternative since a processor can enter by simply competing for landings with price. Unlike other alternatives with license or linkage provisions, a processor that wishes to enter will not need to pay for a license or pay a premium to sever associations to attract any substantial amount of landings. A processor that wishes to develop large scale operations could also do so by a combination of purchasing shares from the pool available to processors or purchasing landings on an annual basis.

### **Small Harvesting Entities**

Small entities generally are treated similar to the IFQ alternative for fixed gear vessels, but with reduction of shares for allocations to processors. If history based allocations and inclusion of processors in the initial allocation are viewed as fair, this alternative could be viewed as fair to small harvest entities.

### **Small Processing Entities**

This alternative likely provides allocations to processors in direct proportion to their qualified processing history. Assuming eligibility criteria do not exclude small processors, small processors will receive protection in proportion to their historic processing. Small processors will have the option of harvesting their allocations directly or contracting their harvest with independent harvesters. Small processors may be able to attract additional landings by having independent harvesters catch their allocations.

## ***Catcher Vessel Sector Allocations with Cooperatives with Processor Associations/ Limited Access***

### ***Trawl Catcher Vessel Alternative 3 and Fixed Gear Alternative 3***

This alternative creates history-based cooperative program, under which cooperatives would receive annual harvest share allocations based on the qualified histories of their members. Cooperatives would be required to be associated with a processor, but the details of that relationship (including the terms for severing the relationship) would be determined by negotiations among the cooperative members and the processor. Initially, each holder of qualified history would be eligible to join a cooperative associated with the processor to which it delivered the most pounds during a specific time period. Holders of qualified history that choose not to join a cooperative would be permitted to fish in a limited access fishery that would receive an annual allocation based on the histories of non-members of cooperatives. The allocation of PSC to the limited access fishery could be reduced. Once in a cooperative a participant would have the choice of remaining in the cooperative subject to the negotiated terms or severing the relationship in accordance with the terms for exit that also must be included in the initial agreement with the processor. It is contemplated that a harvester would compensate a processor (either by leaving shares with the processor permanently or for a period of years) on severing a relationship.

### **Antitrust Considerations**

Under this alternative, for each primary species group that a harvester receives an allocation that harvester will be required to join a cooperative in association with a processor. The general activity of these cooperatives is the harvest of fish allocated to the cooperative, so for clarity these cooperatives are often referred to and should be thought of as "harvest cooperatives" in this analysis. The creation of a harvest cooperative necessarily raises the question of whether the cooperative would or should qualify for the antitrust exemption of the Fishermen's Collective Marketing Act. This section considers the activities of harvest cooperatives and the implications of limitations on antitrust on those activities.

Under the terms of the alternative, processor affiliated catcher vessels (i.e., vessels owned or controlled by a processor) are qualified for harvest cooperative membership. Allowing or requiring harvest cooperative membership by these entities disqualifies that cooperative from the antitrust exemption of the FCMA, limiting the activities that the cooperative can engage in. As a result, a harvest cooperative clearly cannot engage in any negotiations of the price or terms of delivery of catch to a processor. Since the contracts between harvesters and associated processors are intended to govern the terms of their relationship (including delivery obligations and the transfer of shares on severing the relationship), the negotiation of the terms of that agreement are not an appropriate role for a harvest cooperative. Harvesters without processor affiliations could enter a separate FCMA cooperative for negotiation of those terms, but that FCMA cooperative need not have (and in some cases may be prohibited from having) the same membership as the harvest cooperative.<sup>9</sup>

In considering the effect of the alternative, it should be noted that the provision requiring a harvest cooperative to accept membership of any eligible participants subject to the same terms and conditions as govern all other harvest cooperative members cannot effectively guarantee any harvester price or terms of delivery or exit agreement terms because the harvest cooperative agreement cannot contain those provisions, since the cooperative need not be an FCMA cooperative.

To carry forward the intention of the current motion consistent with this understanding of the role of cooperatives the Council could revise section 3.3.11 and 3.4.1 of the current motion as follows:

### **3.3.11 Initial Cooperative Requirements**

The following provision is required for the initial co-op:

Catcher vessel co-ops may be formed by eligible harvesters (the co-op) subject to the terms and conditions of a co-op membership agreement. In order to receive an allocation of GH under this program, **an eligible harvester co-ops** must enter into a duly executed contractual agreement (Contract) with the processor identified in Section 3.3.5.

Contracts established under this section shall specify the terms and conditions for transferring GQ or GH from the cooperative, including mechanisms whereby a member exiting the co-op (or transferring GH from the co-op) compensates the remaining co-op members and/or the associated processor for exiting the co-op (or transferring GH from the co-op). Compensation can take on any form agreed to by the ~~members~~ **eligible harvester** and the associated processor, including permanent transfer of some or all GH generated by the existing participant to the remaining co-op members and/or the associated processor.

Following the initial co-op period, new GH can be generated by eligible harvesters that have never been co-op members only by **entering into a Contract with the processor identified in Section 3.3.5** and joining a co-op in association with ~~the eligible~~ **that processor pursuant to the terms of an agreement** that meets the requirements for an initial co-op.

Any shareholder under this program is intended to comply with all existing laws concerning the documentation of vessels and entry of vessels to U.S. fisheries in fishing those shares. Shareholders unable to enter a vessel into U.S. fisheries may lease share holdings or use holdings through cooperative membership to the extent permitted by the program, but not in contravention of current law pertaining to entry of vessels in U.S. fisheries.

### **3.4.1 General Cooperative Requirements**

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<sup>9</sup> As currently written, 3.3.11 requires a contract between a harvest cooperative and its associate processor that includes the terms under which a harvester may exit the cooperative and association. To be consistent with current antitrust law, this provision should be modified so that each "cooperative member" is required to enter a contract with the processor defining the terms under which the cooperative member may exit the cooperative and the processor association.

The following provisions apply to all cooperatives:

1. The harvesters that enter into a co-op membership agreement shall be the members of the co-op. The processor will be an associate of the cooperative but will not be a cooperative member.
2. Except for CP cooperative, a pre-season Contract between an eligible, willing harvesters in association with a processor is a pre-requisite to **cooperative membership** and a cooperative receiving an allocation of GQ based on the history of that harvester. For an initial co-op, the Contract must meet the provisions in 3.3.11. After meeting the requirements of Section 3.3.11 and following any periods established pursuant to 3.3.12, a holder of GH may join a cooperative in association with any processor pursuant to a Contract that meets the provisions of this section.
3. The co-op membership agreement and the Contract will be filed with the RAM Division. The **Contract cooperative agreement** must contain a fishing plan for the harvest of all co-op fish.
4. Co-op members shall internally allocate and manage the co-op's allocation per the **Contract cooperative agreement**.
5. Subject to any harvesting caps that may be adopted, GH or GQ may be transferred and consolidated within the co-op to the extent permitted under the **cooperative agreement Contract**.
6. The **cooperative agreement Contract** must have a monitoring program. Monitoring and enforcement requirements would be at the co-op level. Co-op members are jointly and severally responsible for co-op vessels harvesting in the aggregate no more than their co-op's allocation of primary species, secondary species and halibut PSC mortality, as may be adjusted by inter-cooperative transfers.
7. Co-ops may adopt and enforce fishing practice codes of conduct as part of their membership agreement. Co-ops may penalize or expel members who fail to comply with their membership agreement.
8. **The cooperatives formed under this program are harvest associations that are intended only to conduct and coordinate harvest activities of their members and are not FCMA cooperatives. Processor affiliated vessels will be permitted to join harvest cooperatives. Co-op membership agreements will specify that processor affiliated vessels cannot participate in negotiations concerning price setting, code of conduct, mechanisms for expelling members, or exit agreements, except as permitted by general antitrust law.**
9. Co-op membership agreements shall allow for the entry of other eligible harvesters into the co-op under the same terms and conditions as agreed to by the original **cooperative agreement**. Harvesters that have never been a member of a cooperative must enter an agreement that meets all requirements for an initial co-op, as specified under Section 3.3.11.

### Ex Vessel Pricing

This alternative does not impose the specific terms of the harvester/processor relationship on participants (i.e., delivery obligations and penalties), instead leaving those to negotiation. The absence of defined terms to the harvester/processor association under this alternative makes it difficult to predict the effects of the alternative. Certain aspects of the structure, however, should affect the relative negotiating position and leverage of participants. Each harvester will choose to fish in one of three environments (or subject to one of three sets of rules). At the start of the program, a harvester will balance the opportunity in the limited access fishery against the opportunity in a cooperative with a processor association. After the initial cooperative formation period has ended,<sup>10</sup> the harvester will balance these first two modes of

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<sup>10</sup> A harvester cannot comply with an exit agreement to leave a cooperative until after the initial cooperative formation period has ended. This period is intended to allow participants the experience of working together in the new management prior to making decisions to leave a cooperative.

fishing against the opportunity to comply with the exit agreement and participating in any other cooperative without the requirement of a second exit agreement. The different opportunities presented by these three choices are likely to depend in part on the participants' relative circumstances, as those circumstances will affect their negotiating positions. As a result, the effects of the alternative are likely to differ across participants.<sup>11</sup> In addition, fishing under this alternative could evolve as participants elect to move from one management environment to the next.

Since this alternative allows a harvester to either fish in a cooperative or a limited access fishery, it is possible that some participants may not choose to enter the rationalized fishery, at least at the outset. In the limited access fishery, the distribution of negotiating leverage between harvesters and processors is likely to be similar to the current distribution. Harvesters are likely to have limited negotiating leverage since most harvests will take place over relatively short seasons. This limited time period will likely reduce competition among processors for landings from the limited access fishery. If few harvesters elect to participate in the limited access fishery (or as more participants move to the rationalized fishery) and processors schedule landings from the rationalized fishery to free processing lines to accommodate fish from the limited access, it is possible that some processors may compete more aggressively for limited access fishery landings.

Negotiating leverage between the parties in the rationalized fishery is likely to differ substantially from the limited access fishery. Any negotiations are likely to be complicated since several terms must be agreed, including ex vessel prices and exit agreement terms. Several factors will influence the distribution of negotiating leverage and the terms of any potential harvester/processor agreement. Since the limited access is the only option for a harvester that chooses not to enter an agreement with its associated processor, the limited access opportunity will have a great effect on the negotiating strength of the harvester. A processor may be able to demand greater concessions in negotiations with a harvester, if the limited access presents a poor opportunity. The limited access opportunity will depend on circumstances in the fishery and is likely to change over time. The number and catching power of sector participants entering that fishery and the size of the allocations of limited access participants are likely to have the greatest influence on the opportunity in the limited access fishery. If several participants with small allocations of history and substantial catching power elect to participate in the limited access, a participant with substantial history may have little opportunity in the limited access fishery. In some instances, it is possible that the limited access fishery may not open (providing no opportunity), if the number of persons choosing to enter that fishery is large relative to the allocation to the fishery.<sup>12</sup> If the Council elects to reduce the PSC allocation to the limited access fishery, the negotiating position of harvesters would decline commensurately with that reduction (3.6). Delaying the onset of the reduction would decrease the extent to which harvesters lose negotiating strength through the share reduction. Prior to satisfying an exit agreement, each year a harvester will compare the opportunity presented by the limited access against the opportunity presented by cooperative membership.

A harvester's opportunity in a cooperative in large part depends on the history that the harvester would bring to the cooperative. The other factor that will generally determine the cooperative opportunity is the

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<sup>11</sup> Although it may appear that the different catcher vessel participants associated with a processor will be subject to the same terms, the

<sup>12</sup> A few effects that are not initially apparent or intuitive could arise because of the effect of the limited access on negotiating strength. If the fishery follows a predictable trend, with participants moving strictly from the limited access to the cooperative, then the opportunity in the limited access will decrease over time. In some instances, this could create an incentive for a processor to hold out in negotiations, rather than conceding to terms, knowing that negotiating leverage may improve in the following year. A second effect is that from the harvester's perspective the limited access opportunity depends on the ability to succeed in that fishery. This may create an incentive for a harvester to maintain or even increase harvest capacity, in the short run, to increase negotiating leverage.

terms of the processor association. The negotiation of those terms will involve some interplay of the two most critical aspects of the relationship, the terms of delivery of any landings and the exit agreement (or terms for severing the relationship) contrasted with the opportunity in the limited access fishery.<sup>13</sup> The interaction of these two negotiated terms (delivery terms and the exit agreement) makes the effects of the alternative very difficult to predict. The harvester will have strong price negotiating leverage (and should gain all rents) from any portion of its history that is free to be delivered to other processors and any history that it will retain after exiting, but neither of those amounts can be determined because they are subject to negotiation. It is possible that some harvesters may elect to enter a cooperative, regardless of relatively punitive terms for exiting, if a processor offers relatively good terms for deliveries knowing that the limited access opportunity exists. On the other hand, some harvesters may refuse to enter a cooperative without terms for exit that they are likely to accept, for fear that they will be unable to come to terms in a future renegotiation of terms of delivery. To a great extent, the terms that a harvester will be willing to agree to (and the opportunity in a cooperative) will depend on relative negotiating leverage of the harvester and processor.<sup>14</sup>

The relative overall financial positions of the specific harvesters and the processor involved in any negotiation will likely determine negotiating strength, as much as the alternative structure itself. A harvester (or group harvesters<sup>15</sup>) or processor has substantial interests elsewhere that it can rely on for income and little debt may be able to hold out in negotiations much longer than a smaller participant with fewer sources of income. Likewise, participants from either sector that have more stable and diverse financial situations are in a relatively strong position in comparison to participants that are less financially stable and have fewer interests in other fisheries. The result is that the negotiating leverage (and distribution of benefits) under this alternative could differ substantially across participants. This ability to hold out could be very important to a processor, if that processor perceives that the limited access opportunity for fishermen will worsen as others join cooperatives over time. This effect will certainly arise, if the Council elects to impose a reduction in PSC allocated to the limited access fishery that starts after a period of years (3.6). On the other hand, it is possible that if only a small group of harvesters remain in the limited access, those harvesters could effectively develop a cooperative without processor association, limiting competition for catch, thereby preventing their associated processors from gaining any advantage in negotiations. Typically, such a cooperative will only develop, if a relatively small number of similarly situated harvesters are present in the limited access. As long as some of the limited access participants perceive a potential benefit from racing for fish, agreement among limited access participants is unlikely.

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<sup>13</sup> Once in a cooperative, a harvester will have the choice of remaining in the cooperative, exiting under the terms of the exit agreement, or reentering the limited access fishery. Although the terms of the exit agreement are important to the harvester, the ability to reenter the limited access fishery provides a second choice for a harvester that is unable to come to terms with the processor when renegotiating the terms of delivery of catch. As noted earlier, the limited access opportunity is not predictable and may worsen over time. Exit of the cooperative by complying with the exit agreement is only allowed after the "initial formation period".

<sup>14</sup> Several other factors, which cannot be predicted, could also affect efficiency under this alternative. For example, since a harvester may have different associations for different species, if terms of the two agreements limit the harvester's use of its secondary species and PSC, it is possible that the harvester may not be able to harvest all of its primary species from one group (e.g., flatfish) without compensating a processor, even if it had PSC remaining from another species group (e.g., Pacific cod). As should be apparent, the unlimited scope of the harvester/processor agreement create unlimited uncertainty concerning the potential impacts of this alternative.

<sup>15</sup> Some harvesters may choose to negotiate collectively with a processor. Collective negotiations could strengthen a harvester's position by denying the processor a larger portion of its associated history. On the other hand, if a processor has reached agreement with a substantial portion of its associated fleet, the position of those holding out may be weakened substantially, since the processor will already have a portion of its historic landing committed by the fleet it has settled with.



The cooperative formation requirements could also affect negotiating leverage and the distribution of benefits between a harvester and its associated processor (3.3.7). Under the more stringent formation thresholds (i.e., formation requires the holders of 75 percent of the shares eligible for the cooperative), holders of 25 percent of the eligible shares could prevent cooperative formation and assert substantial negotiating leverage, if the processor is dependent on that particular fishery. Less stringent rules (such as a rule requiring four distinct entities) would likely remove some of this leverage for processors with many associated harvesters. The ability of harvesters to assert leverage will be limited to some extent by the separation of the primary species into 4 groups for purposes of determining processor associations (i.e., pollock, Pacific cod, rockfish, and flatfish).

The ability of a harvester to sever a relationship with its associated processor under the exit agreement could lead this alternative to evolve over time. Since exit from an initial cooperative and compliance with the exit agreement is a one-time action, it is possible that in the long run, the fishery under this alternative will be similar to a harvester only IFQ program with processors holding a portion of the harvest history pool.<sup>16</sup> The negotiating leverage (and distribution of benefits) between the participants at this stage is likely to be determined by the distribution of history under the exit agreements, with each holder of history have a strong position in ex vessel price negotiations (and gaining all rents from that history).

In conclusion, the effects of this alternative on ex vessel pricing are very uncertain and likely vary across participants with circumstance. At each stage, a harvester will weigh the available opportunities against one another, choosing the one that appears to offer the best returns. Given the breadth of possible decisions and negotiable terms, the effects of the alternative on ex vessel pricing are indeterminate.

### **Catcher Vessel Efficiency**

Catcher vessel efficiency under this alternative is difficult to predict and likely to change over time, as harvesters move among the different management structures. Participants that remain in the limited access are likely to have greater harvest costs, since they will continue to race for catch to maintain their share of the allocation of the limited access allocation. Quality of landings is likely to suffer and a relatively high rate of landings could prevent the production of high quality or more processed outputs. Processor competition for landings could be limited by the time constraint of a brief limited access season, particularly if some processors choose not to compete for limited access landings because of conflicts with landings from their associated cooperatives. Notwithstanding this loss of overall efficiency, it is possible that some participants may elect to fish in the limited access fishery, if they cannot reach an acceptable agreement (concerning deliveries and exit from the cooperative) with their associated processor.

In the rationalized fishery, fishing practices are likely to contribute to improved quality of landings and the production of higher valued products. Fishing costs should be reduced, as fishermen no longer will need to race for catch, instead focusing on cost efficiency in their operations. Whether harvesters are likely to receive higher ex vessel prices and improve efficiency, however, depends on the negotiation of those prices. The negotiation between a harvester and its associated processor will address both delivery terms and the exit agreement for severing the association. Whether catcher vessel efficiency improves will depend on the resolution of all of these negotiated terms. Given the number of uncertain facets of the negotiation and the potential different circumstances of the parties to the negotiation, it cannot be determined whether catch vessel efficiency improvements will be realized by participants in the rationalized fishery.

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<sup>16</sup> Although individual limits on share holdings apply, no limit on overall processor holdings of harvest history is contained in the alternative. An overall limit on processor holdings of harvest shares could be difficult to develop since it could limit the ability of a harvester to transfer history to a processor under a reasonable exit agreement once the cap is reached through other processors holding relatively large amounts history.

Harvesters that choose to exercise their right to exit under an exit agreement will likely have full control of any shares that they retain on severing the processor association. A harvester can be expected to receive all rents from any history held after exiting the initial cooperative.<sup>17</sup> A harvester, however could be worse off after complying with an exit agreement, if a substantial portion of its share holdings left to the processor under the agreement. Whether the harvester's efficiency improves after leaving an initial cooperative under an exit agreement will depend on the terms of the exit agreement, which cannot be predicted.

An additional factor that could affect efficiency under the alternative is an option that would limit the separability of secondary species and PSC history from primary species history (3.3.3.3). The inability to separate these shares permanently could require participants to engage in annual transactions at some additional cost. Since these transactions are likely to involve different primary species groups, trading within a cooperative is unlikely to be useful for addressing this concern.

In conclusion, the effects of this alternative on catcher vessel efficiency are very difficult to predict because critical aspects of the harvester/processor relationship are left to negotiation. Whether a harvester that receives an allocation of history would improve efficiency under this alternative in comparison to the status quo likely depends on the specific circumstances of the harvester and its associated processor.

### **Processor Efficiency**

As with harvester efficiency, processor efficiency under this alternative is difficult to predict and could change over time as the fishery evolves from limited access to cooperatives with associated processors to cooperatives after payment of exit agreement terms. A few generalizations, however, can be made.

Clearly, some processors will be disadvantaged by the winner-take-all nature of the processor associations under this alternative. In the initial cooperative formation period, processors with substantial landings, but few associations are likely to have to compete for landings from the limited access and for landings of cooperatives that are not committed to the associated processor. After the initial cooperative formation period, these processors will also be able to compete for cooperative associations of harvesters that have left their initial cooperative after satisfying the terms of the exit agreement. In any case, these processors are unlikely to gain any rents from these landings. If these processors are able to be competitive over time, they should realize normal profits in the long run.

Efficiency of processors that gain associations because of historic landings is uncertain for reasons similar to the uncertainty surrounding catcher vessel efficiency. At the outset, it is possible that some processors could suffer a loss of efficiency, if associated harvesters elect to remain in the limited access fishery to leverage their position in negotiations. Revenues from landings from the limited access are likely to be less than from the rationalized fishery, if quality or product values decline as a result of participants racing to quickly harvest and process the catch from the fishery.

As noted in the discussion of catcher vessel efficiency, the distribution of benefits between harvesters and processors in the cooperative fishery depends in large part on the relative negotiating strength of the different participants and is likely to vary across the fishery. The delivery terms and the exit agreement will largely dictate the distribution of benefits. In a negotiation, a processor would balance its possible opportunities in not reaching an agreement with an associated harvester (leaving that harvester to fish in

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<sup>17</sup> It is possible that a harvester may enter secondary contracts with a processor after severing an initial association to support its loss of revenues from an exit agreement. A harvester entering such an agreement would give up some rents to the second processor in exchange for the processors assistance

the limited access) and coming to terms with the harvester on deliveries and an exit agreement. The terms of agreements between processors and their associated harvesters are likely to vary across participants with the relative negotiating strength of the participants. Larger more diverse entities that are more financially stable are likely to be in a relatively stronger negotiating position than entities that rely on the Gulf of Alaska fisheries for the large majority of their revenues or that carry substantial debts. A reduction in the allocation of PSC to the limited access fishery could also substantially strengthen the negotiating leverage of processors with harvester associations by reducing the value of that opportunity for harvesters.

A few additional dynamics should affect the negotiating strength of processors that have many associated harvesters as cooperatives are initially formed. In general, as a processor increases the portion of its fleet that it has come to terms with, the stronger its position when negotiating with harvesters that have held out in negotiations.<sup>18</sup> Processors with affiliated vessels should be in a relatively stronger position than those without affiliated vessels because of the certainty of landings from those vessels. Once cooperatives are formed, processors will either receive landings in accordance with the terms of the agreements with harvesters. The distribution of rents from these landings will vary with the terms of the agreement. As noted above, the terms governing deliveries are likely to change over time. On renegotiation, if the fishing opportunity in the limited access has changed, the negotiating positions of the harvester and processor may also change. If the limited access fishery provides a poor opportunity when terms are being renegotiated, a harvester may be compelled to either accept less agreeable terms in the negotiation or comply with the exit agreement to sever the association.

As harvesters comply with exit strategies and sever initial associations, the position of processors in the fishery will also change. Processors that retain a substantial associated fleet (that have not severed the initial association) will retain the initial fleet landings from their agreements with cooperative members and may compete for landings from (and cooperative associations with) harvesters that have left their original cooperative and are free to enter any cooperative. A few factors could influence this competition. Processors that have lost harvester initial associations will likely have history holdings of their own that they can use to develop a cooperative and to attract harvesters that have severed initial processor associations. Vertically integrated processors may also benefit from history that they received in the initial allocation or that they have acquired through transfer. Processors that have maintained substantial initial associations should also benefit from the stability of the landings from those associations. In general, however, a processor should expect to receive only normal profits from landings of harvesters that are free to move among cooperatives after complying with an exit agreement. During transitions (such as the first year that many harvesters comply with exit agreements are first free to move among cooperatives) competition for landings among processors is likely to be the greatest, so processors may not receive normal profits from these landings. A processor can expect to receive rents from any history that it has acquired through exit agreements. If, over time, most harvesters choose to exit their initial cooperatives, this alternative functionally becomes an IFQ program with allocations to processors. Harvesters would receive the rents from their history holdings, while processors would receive the rents from their history holdings. The distribution of history between the sectors, however, cannot be determined and depends on the relative negotiating strength of the participants that are paired by the rule for determining associations.

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<sup>18</sup> This relative strengthening of position will arise both within a fishery and across fisheries. In other words, a processor that reaches an agreement with a portion of its pollock fleet should be in a relatively stronger position with respect to the remainder of its pollock fleet and its flatfish fleet.

### **Overall Production Efficiency**

In the long run, overall production efficiency should improve substantially under this alternative. The transition to a rationalized fishery, however, could take some time, if harvesters are reluctant to join cooperatives at the outset. In addition, the extent of landings coordination in the rationalized fishery is difficult to predict and may change over time. At the outset, participants in the rationalized fishery will likely be bound by delivery obligations that contribute to landings coordination. As harvesters change cooperatives by meeting the exit agreements obligations, it is possible that some coordination of landings could be lost. In the long run, however, harvesters are likely to realize benefits from coordinating landings to serve markets and to aid processors in achieving technical efficiencies in their operations.

All else aside, overall production efficiency should be substantially lower in the limited access fishery than in cooperatives. Overall production efficiency therefore depends on the choices of harvesters and their responses to incentives arising under the relationship required by the alternative. Those choices depend on the relative opportunities presented by the different forms of management (i.e., the cooperative opportunity relative to the limited access opportunity). Harvesters that perceive a better opportunity in the limited access fishery are unlikely to elect to join a cooperative. Reduced PSC allocations to the limited access could reduce the opportunity in the limited access substantially. Management decisions could also affect the limited access opportunity. For example, if MRAs for valuable species need to be reduced to prevent overharvest, it is likely harvesters will see little opportunity in the limited access. If many participants with small history allocations perceive the limited access as an opportunity to improve harvests amounts, participants with large allocations may see little opportunity in the limited access. While these provisions may lead more harvesters to enter the rationalized fishery, improving overall production efficiency, they also have distributive effects.

### **Entry to the Harvest Sector**

Entry opportunities in the harvest sector are difficult to predict and are likely to change over time. At the outset, little opportunity for entry will exist as harvesters choose to fish in the limited access fishery or negotiate cooperative agreements and the delivery obligations that are likely in the cooperatives. During the initial cooperative formation period, licenses and histories are not severable and history cannot be sold outside of a cooperative, so entry will require purchase of a license. Although history held by cooperative members is separable and can be severed from a license after the initial cooperative formation period, the market for history may not expand quickly for a few reasons. First, an LLP cannot be used in the limited access fishery unless it is accompanied by all history originally associated with the license. Harvesters may be reluctant to trade history separately from a license that see the limited access option as important to their negotiations with a processor. Second, since fishing in the rationalized fishery only occurs in processor associated cooperatives, cooperatives are likely to provide a convenient market for trading history. The ability for new entrants to find available history in the market could be limited, as result of the market arising within the cooperative structure. A third factor that is likely to limit entry, particularly early in the program is the processor association. The processor association could affect the history market in several ways. Any transfer by a license holder that is still subject to a processor association could foreclose (or at least complicate) reentry to the limited access fishery for that license holder, since a entrants that purchase history subject to the initial processor association will either need to accept the existing processor association or compensate the processor under the terms of the exit agreement to sever an association. Once a new entrant accepts a processor association, the association could effectively limit the market available to the entrant to history associated with that processor or history for which exit agreement terms were met. Otherwise, the entrant could be required to deliver to multiple processors, which is may not be feasible for a person trying to enter by purchasing small amounts of history over time. In the long run, it is possible that associations may be severed by harvesters meeting the exit agreement terms. This could result in a better market for history for new entrants, but since all fishing of this will take place in cooperatives it is possible that the market will be difficult for new entrants.

Another factor that could complicate entry to the harvest sector under this alternative is the potential for processors to hold a substantial portion of the harvest allocation. Although each processor is limited in their holdings of harvest history,<sup>19</sup> exit agreements are intended to provide processors with a portion of the harvest allocation. In addition, all processors that have associated harvesters at the outset will be permitted to acquire harvest shares by transfer. Allowing processors to purchase a portion of the harvest share pool, as well as acquire shares through exit agreements could limit the available market to persons wishing to enter on a small scale. As with most other aspects of this alternative, the effect of processor holdings on entry is difficult to predict. Processors that own their own vessels are likely to use those vessels to harvest their allocations in most instances. It is possible that processor held history could be an avenue of entry for a harvester that owns or has purchased a vessel and has limited resources or holds a small amount of history. In some instances, it is possible that an entrant in this position could contract to harvest the processor's shares. A processor, however, might be better served by using their history to attract landings from harvesters with larger portfolios of history rather than a new entrant. Drawing persons with large holdings into an associated cooperative is likely to be more important than attracting new entrants that have little to offer beyond their vessel's catching power.

### **Entry to the Processing Sector**

Entry opportunities for processors are very difficult to predict under this alternative. A few different methods of entering the processing sector could be used. At the outset, a processor could enter by competing for landings in the limited access fishery. Entry in this manner could be tenuous, particularly as harvesters transition to the rationalized fishery decreasing the limited access pool. Small scale entry may also be possible during the rationalized fishery, by entering processors attracting landings from cooperatives that are associated with other processors. At the outset entrants may be greatly disadvantaged by the processor associations that are intended to protect the interests of existing processors. Since the delivery obligations of cooperative members are subject to negotiation, the extent to which allocations will be available for new entrants cannot be predicted. For allocations that are not committed, the associated processors should be much better positioned to negotiate for landings because of the existing relationship and the pattern of deliveries for the committed allocation.

When a substantial portion of the harvest sector has exercised its exit agreements, it is possible the entry may be simplified for processors that wish to compete for cooperative associations and harvester. Existing processors, however, should maintain a great advantage over entering processors. Existing processors are likely to benefit from either the initial cooperative associations or from the shares receive through exit agreements as the associations are severed. Entering processors may be able to purchase shares, if they meet the qualifications for the acquisition of shares (3.4.2.1).

### **Small Harvesting Entities**

As with other aspects of this alternative, the effects on small harvesting entities are difficult to predict. A few general inferences, however, can be drawn. Small harvesters are more likely to be less diversified and carry greater debt than larger harvesting entities. As a result, small harvesters may be less able to hold out in negotiations of terms of delivery and exit from a processor association. If the PSC allocation to the limited access fishery is reduced that reduction could further erode the negotiating position of small harvesters with respect to their associated processors. Also, for a period of time it is possible that the processor associations in this alternative could lead to a segmented market for history (i.e., a market for history associated with each processor) limiting the ability of a small harvester to grow.

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<sup>19</sup> The limitation on processor holdings of harvest history is contained in 3.4.5. This provision is assumed to limit entity holding a federal processing permit.

### **Small Processing Entities**

The specific effects of the alternative on small processors is also difficult to predict and will depend on the circumstances of the processor. Processors with few associations will be greatly disadvantaged under this alternative. Quantitative estimates of associations will be necessary to assess the extent of harvest associations of small processors. While small processors generally can be expected to have less associated history, it is possible that small processors will receive some associations.

Negotiations for landings (with associated harvesters, from the limited access, and from harvesters that have severed their initial association) are likely to be subject to the same influences described in the section on processor efficiency. In general, greater overall stability will increase negotiating leverage. Since small processors are likely to have limited operations, it is likely that any stability will be derived from operations in Gulf fisheries and possible associated harvesters under this program. Small processors with greater debt loads and fewer associations can be expected to be in a relatively weaker negotiating position.

### **Preliminary Analysis of Entry Opportunities**

At its December 2004 meeting, the Council's requested staff to provide a discussion of the Magnuson Stevens Act requirement for entry to fisheries and the entry opportunities under the program elements that the Council has included in its alternatives. The preceding discussion includes a general discussion of entry opportunities under the alternative structures developed by the Council. This section includes discussion of specific provisions that the Council could include in its final alternatives and the potential objectives and impacts of those options. In all cases, the impacts of the options will depend on the alternative in which the options are included and the interaction of the options with other provisions of the alternative.

### **Magnuson Steven Act Entry Requirements**

Under the Magnuson Stevens Act, in submitting a new individual fishing quota program a Council must ensure that the program:

provides for a fair and equitable initial allocation of individual fishing quotas, prevents any person from acquiring an excessive share of the individual fishing quotas issued, and **considers the allocation of a portion of the annual harvest in the fishery for entry-level fishermen, small vessel owners, and crew members who do not hold or qualify for individual fishing quotas.** Section 303(d)(5)(C) (emphasis added).

The requirement of this provision is that the Council consider a set aside intended to accommodate entry level fishermen, small vessel owners, and crewmembers that do not hold or qualify for shares under the share-based program. The provision, however, does not state the method by which this allocation should be made or fished. At least two approaches could be used that are likely to achieve different results.

First, the allocation could be made to an "entry-level" or "small vessel" limited access fishery. To participate in this fishery a person would need to own or lease a vessel and possibly meet other criteria, such as limits on quota holdings or vessel length. This type of an allocation is likely to support a small scale fishery that that operates independently from the primary share-based program. Depending on the specific limits on participation (such as gear and vessel limits) and the number of applicants, the fishery could result in a race for fish or the fishery could operate efficiently. While this type of an allocation may serve certain interests, including community interests, this fishery is unlikely to result in either entry to the main quota program or any assistance to crewmembers that fish on vessels in the main program.

A second approach would be to make annual or longer term allocations of shares available to crewmembers or persons wishing to enter the fishery or fish off small vessels. These allocations would be fished under the rules of the main quota program and would be used to provide crew or entrants with allocations to leverage their position in the fishery. Applying this second approach would require that the Council develop criteria for the allocation of these shares. Since these share allocations would provide crew or entrants with a direct allocation in the main quota program, the allocations could be used simultaneously with shares purchased in the main program and could assist the person in making the gradual transition to becoming a full fledged participant in the main quota program. Alternatively, crewmembers could use the allocation in negotiating crew shares with their employer.

The Magnuson Stevens Act also provides for the creation of loan programs for small vessel participants or entrants with the following provision:

A Council may submit...a program which reserves up to 25 percent of any fees collected from a fishery...to issue obligations that aid in financing the –

- (i) purchase of individual fishing quotas in that fishery by fishermen who fish from small vessels; and
- (ii) first-time purchase of individual fishing quotas in that fishery by entry level fishermen. Section 303(d)(4)(A).

Loan program under this provision can be used by potential entrants to overcome difficulty in securing financing for shares purchases.

The Magnuson Stevens Act also requires that the Council consider the recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences report on IFQ programs, "Sharing the Fish," in submitting an IFQ program to the Secretary of Commerce. Section 303(d)(5). That report expresses concern that IFQ programs could limit entry opportunities. Entry, however, may be inconsistent with the objectives of an IFQ program that is intended to facilitate some consolidation and efficiency gains. The report recommends that measures intended to facilitate entry avoid expanding the quota share pool. Allowing transferability of shares, creating ownership qualifications, limits on excessive shares, and purchasing mechanisms (such as zero revenue auctions<sup>20</sup> or loan programs) can be included in programs to facilitate entry. The report also suggests that taxes on quota rents could be used to keep share prices down to facilitate entry.

### ***Provisions Affecting Entry Opportunities***

The Council alternatives contain several provisions that affect opportunities in the fisheries. These provisions create entry opportunities through either providing for an entry-level limited access fishery or through providing persons with the opportunity to purchase shares in the fishery, entering the share-based or main quota program. This section presents those provisions and provides a brief discussion of the potential implications of and issues addressed by each provision.

**Allocation to the jig fishery (2.2.1 and 3.1)** – Under this provision a portion of the TAC would be allocated to a jig fishery, which would be prosecuted as an open access fishery. The allocation to the

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<sup>20</sup> Under a zero revenue auction, all recipients of an initial allocation are required to put up shares for auction a number of years after program implementation. Auctions can be phased over time so that auctions occur over a period of years with a portion of each share endowment auctioned each year. The share recipient is permitted to participate in the auctions. Revenues from each auction are redistributed to the recipients of the initial allocations. The objective of this system is to convey the benefits of the allocation to the initial recipients, but create a fluid market for shares arises to permit entry and ensure that the most efficient fishermen hold and fish the shares.

fishery could be permitted to expand to as much as twice the historic harvests. This provision would allow for entry to a small scale fishery, but not provide for entry into the share-based fishery.

**State water fishery (2.2.2.3 and 3.3.1)** – Allocation of a portion of the TAC to a State managed fishery is likely to affect entry opportunities, but the implications depend on the management program developed by the State. The specific management of State water cannot be predicted and may serve objectives different from those of the Council.

**Low producer fixed gear sector (2.2.3.2.1 and 3.3.1.1)** – These provisions would identify a “low producing fixed gear” sector, which could be exempt from provisions intended to protect processors (i.e., creating a harvester only IFQ program for the sector). This exemption could affect entry opportunities in share-based fishery several ways. Most of these effects depend on the specific options incorporated into the alternative. If shares issued are fully transferable IFQ with few constraints on use and transfer, this alternative could increase the price of shares (because rents would be incorporated into share prices). If limitations on transfers and share accumulation are included, entry could be aided by the development of this sector.

**Transfers to individuals only (2.2.3.3.1)** – This provision would allow only individuals to acquire shares. Limiting corporate ownership of shares could have a minor effect on share accumulation, which could facilitate entry to the share-based fishery.

**Allocations to and purchases by community entities (2.2.3.3.1 and community provisions)** – Community share holdings will affect entry in a few ways. Persons residing in eligible communities that fish these shares will benefit from these community entity holdings, which could facilitate their entry to the fisheries by supplementing their own holdings. These allocations and holdings, however, reduce the percentage of the TAC held by individuals and available for purchase by individuals that wish to enter. Depending on the management and distribution of these allocations, these shares could create some uncertainty for users of shares (who may not be certain of receiving shares to fish in future years). In some cases, the use of these shares could be biased toward some participants and away from others even within a community.

**Excessive share caps (2.2.3.3.6, 3.4.3, and 3.4.4) and limits on vertical integration (2.2.3.3.4, 3.4.5, and 3.4.6)** – Limits on excessive shares and holdings of harvest shares by processing entities can help facilitate entry to the share-based fishery by limiting consolidation. In the short run, the effects of these provisions depends on the levels of the caps relative to existing participation levels.

**Limits on leasing (2.2.3.3.5) and owner on board requirements (2.2.3.3.7)** – Limits on leasing and owner on board requirements could increase the supply of shares in the market in the long run, increasing entry opportunities in the share-based fisheries. Exemption of recipients of an initial allocation, however, could substantially delay the effect of this provision. In addition, exemption of cooperative members is likely to result in these provisions stimulating cooperative membership, rather than limiting leasing or encouraging share owner participation in the fishery. The cooperative exemption is likely to mean that this provision has little effect on the quantity of shares available to potential entrants.

**Block program (2.2.7)** – The block program that could be applied to small initial allocations (or blocks) would limit the ability of persons to acquire shares when holding blocks. This provision should ensure that small amounts of quota are on the market for entrants. Depending on the threshold block size, the provision should allow for entrants to acquire small share holdings after which they may transition to the less restricted general share market.



**Skipper and crew shares (2.2.8)** – Allocations to and creation of a separate class of shares available only to active skippers and crew would create a pool of shares that should trade at a lower price and be more actively traded than those in the general market. These shares should facilitate entry by those eligible to acquire the shares.

**Cooperatives (2.4 and 3.3)** – Creation of cooperative generally create a mechanism for the exchange of shares among existing participants. Although cooperatives may serve several efficiency purposes, cooperatives are likely to be a favored means for the exchange of shares, limiting the development of markets available to persons wishing to enter the fishery.

**Harvester/processor associations (Alternatives 2C and 3)** – Alternatives that directly associate harvest shares (or history) with a particular processor have the potential to segregate the market for shares (or history), which could complicate entry. Potential entrants are likely to have relatively small share holdings that would be governed by these associations. It may not be practicable for an entrant to acquire shares associated with more than one processor in a fishery because of landings limitations.

### ***Summary on Entry Opportunities***

In assessing entry opportunities, it is important to understand that different levels of entry will be supported by different provisions. Providing an open access jig fishery may provide some opportunity to persons wishing to enter that small scale sector, but is not likely to provide these entrants with an opportunity to enter the share-based fishery. Entry opportunities in the share-based fishery arise from elements that directly affect the participants in those sectors (such as limits on consolidation and eligibility requirements for share acquisition). In addition, entry opportunities for one sector (e.g., the low producer fixed gear catcher vessel sector) could have no effect on entry to another sector (e.g., the trawl catcher vessel sector). The relative independence of entry opportunities across sectors means that an evaluation of entry opportunities must consider both each sector independently and overall entry opportunities across all sectors.

## **Gulf of Alaska Rationalization Preliminary Catch Data and Estimated Allocations**

**Prepared by Council Staff and Northern Economics, Inc.  
October 2005**

At its April 2003 meeting, the Council adopted a motion preliminarily defining alternatives for the rationalization of the Gulf of Alaska groundfish fisheries. Since that meeting, the Council has undertaken the process of refining the alternatives for analysis. This paper first provides a preliminary summary of catch data. These data may be used to select species that would be allocated based on catch history for each gear and vessel type, assess options that would set aside a portion of the TAC for State management, and to determine eligibility to receive an initial allocation. The second part of this paper provides preliminary estimates of allocations under the different alternatives. These data could be used by the Council to assess the qualifying year options for allocations to sectors and individuals.

### **Summary of Primary Species Catch History**

The information provided by this discussion paper is intended to aid the Council in determining appropriate provisions concerning three aspects of the current elements and options:

Sections 2.2.3.1 and 3.2.3 of the Council motion define “primary species” by gear, which would be allocated to sectors and eligible persons based on the historic catch of the species.<sup>1</sup> Under the rationalization alternatives, these allocations are intended to define the main target fisheries for the different gear-types in the Gulf of Alaska. Table 1 shows the primary species by gear-type, as defined in the motion.

Sections 2.2.2.3 and 3.3.1.1 of the Council motion provide for the set aside (or allocation) of a portion of the TAC for harvest in State managed fisheries. Options would base these allocations to State managed fisheries on historic catch inside 3nm.

Sections 2.2.2.2 and 3.3.1 of the Council motion define eligibility for participation in the rationalization program. Options could limit eligibility to persons that hold either a permanent license or permanent or interim license under the Limited License Program (LLP).

The tables in this section show participation and catch data for primary species by gear in the Gulf of Alaska aggregated for the years 1995 through 2003, as well as annual catch and participation data for Pacific cod and pollock. The tables are intended to provide background information concerning the three sets of options described above. First, the tables provide background information to the Council that could be use for considering the appropriateness of making allocations of the various primary species to the different gear types as currently proposed in the alternatives. If a gear-type has little catch history for one of its primary species, the allocation to the gear may be insufficient to support directed fishing. If the Council wishes to provide for a directed fishery in these circumstances, some other method of determining an allocation may be appropriate. Second, the tables provide baseline information concerning the distribution of catch between State and Federal waters. This information is intended to aid the Council in its consideration of the option for setting aside a portion of the various TACs for management by the State of Alaska in State waters. Third, the tables provide background information concerning the catch of vessels by license should also prove useful in dealing with the issue of catches by unlicensed vessels and vessels with interim licenses.

The source data for catcher processor (CP) catch are the Weekly Processor Reports. The source data for catcher vessel (CV) catch are ADF&G Fish tickets.

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<sup>1</sup> Other species would be allocated as “secondary species” based on average catch rates for the gear-type, rather than based on individual catch history.

The tables are sorted by management area from west to east—Western Gulf (WG) tables are followed by Central Gulf (CG) tables, with tables for West Yakutat (WY) last. Two tables show catch data for each management area—the first shows total catch and number of vessels, while the second provides catch percentages over all non-confidential catches by all gear and vessel types for that species and management area. The primary species for each gear, as designated by the Council motion, are shown in each table. Pacific cod is designated as a primary species for all four gears; for jig and pot gear Pacific cod is the only designated primary species. In addition to Pacific cod, five other species are primary species for hook and line (HAL) gear, three rockfish species and two flatfish species. There are nine primary species designated for the trawl fisheries. In the catch and participation tables shown below, species are listed, from top to bottom, according to the number of different gears for which they are primary species. Thus the table lists Pacific cod first, followed by the three rockfish species and two flatfish species designated as primary for the hook and line boats, followed by species that are primary only for trawl gear—the three remaining flatfish species, and finally pollock.

**Table 1. Proposed Primary Species Allocations by Gear in the Gulf Rationalization Motion**

Jig	Hook and Line	Pot	Trawl	
Pacific Cod	Pacific Cod Northern Rockfish Pelagic Rockfish Pacific Ocean Perch Arrowtooth Deepwater Flatfish	Pacific Cod	Pacific Cod Northern Rockfish Pelagic Rockfish Pacific Ocean Perch Arrowtooth	Deepwater Flatfish Flathead Sole Rex Sole Shallow-water Flatfish Pollock

The tables also break out catches in the EEZ and in the parallel fisheries inside 3 miles. For Pacific cod there are additional rows for the State-water fisheries. There is also a row in the West Yakutat table showing catches in the State-managed Prince William Sound pollock fishery.

All of the tables have sets of columns corresponding to the types of licenses on which the vessel operated. Catches of permanent and interim license holders were combined due to confidentiality restrictions, but counts of permanent and interim licensed vessels are shown separately. Catches of catcher processors and catcher vessels are also shown in separate columns.

In some cases data cannot be released because fewer than four vessels contributed catches. These entries are shaded black.

All of the tables provide summary columns showing the aggregated catches of licensed and unlicensed vessels combined (i.e., All CPs, All CVs, and All vessels). Numbers provided in these columns reflect only those catches that are not confidential. In other words, in instances in which unlicensed catch is confidential these columns show total non-confidential catch (rather than total catch). Over all three areas, total catch that is considered confidential (and is therefore not accounted for in the table) is approximately 6,000 tons or 0.4 percent of the 1.5 million tons caught in the Gulf in these fisheries during the 9-year period.

Table 2 shows the catch and participation in Western Gulf fisheries by license, vessel, and gear for the years 1995-2003. More than 470,000 MT of primary species by all gears in the WG was caught between 1995-2003, 92 percent of which was either Pacific cod or pollock. Approximately 0.09 percent of the total catch cannot be reported to due confidentiality restrictions. Annual tables for Pacific Cod and Pollock can be seen in Appendix A. More details on participation by jurisdiction are found in Appendix B.

**Table 2. Catch and Participation in Western Gulf by Species, License, Vessel, and Gear, 1995-2003**

Gear	Fishery	CPs with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			CVs with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			Vessels with No License CP				All CPs		All CVs		All Vessels	
		Catch (MT)	Perma- nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	Catch (MT)	Perma- nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	Catch (MT)	CP (No.)	CV Catch (MT)	CV (No.)	CP (MT)	CP (No.)	CV (MT)	CV (No.)	Total (MT)	Total (No.)
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Pacific Cod Fisheries</b>																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	18.0	7	-	-	-	23.6	17	-	-	41.7	24	41.7	24
	Parallel	-	-	-	224.1	24	-	-	-	738.2	74	-	-	962.3	98	962.3	98
	State	-	-	-	828.5	34	1	-	-	3,787.3	112	-	-	4,615.8	147	4,615.8	147
HAL	EEZ	34,108.6	21	6	2,119.1	10	4	4,064.1	12	460.4	13	38,172.7	39	2,579.5	27	40,752.3	66
	Parallel	-	-	-	113.8	11	2	-	-	96.8	13	-	-	210.6	26	210.6	26
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	2,500.8	4	2	9,417.0	63	3	813.5	5	4,237.6	50	3,314.4	11	13,654.6	116	16,969.0	127
	Parallel	-	-	-	20,644.3	96	3	-	-	4,759.3	79	-	-	25,403.6	178	25,403.6	178
	State	-	-	-	26,837.9	70	2	-	-	2,797.1	27	-	-	29,635.0	99	29,635.0	99
TRW	EEZ	3,943.4	22	2	80,095.4	133	4	442.3	13	442.1	19	4,385.7	37	80,537.6	156	84,923.3	193
	Parallel	-	-	-	17,478.6	84	4	-	-	246.6	13	-	-	17,725.2	101	17,725.2	101
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
All	All	40,552.9	44	9	157,776.8	234	12	5,320.0	30	17,589.1	276	45,872.8	83	175,365.9	522	221,238.7	605
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Northern Rockfish Fisheries</b>																	
HAL	EEZ	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	2,216.9	18	-	0.8	19	-	-	2	-	1	2,216.9	20	0.8	20	2,217.7	40
	Parallel	-	-	-	0.0	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	8	0.0	8
All	All	2,216.9	19	-	0.8	31	1	-	5	-	10	2,216.9	34	0.8	88	2,217.7	122
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Pelagic Rockfish Fisheries</b>																	
HAL	EEZ	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	4
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	840.0	17	-	0.1	13	1	-	2	-	-	840.0	19	0.1	14	840.1	33
	Parallel	-	-	-	0.1	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	4	0.1	4
All	All	840.0	18	1	0.2	28	1	-	4	-	-	840.0	23	0.2	29	840.2	52
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Pacific Ocean Perch Fisheries</b>																	
HAL	EEZ	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	2
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	11,288.3	16	-	49.6	34	1	-	3	-	3	11,288.3	19	49.6	38	11,337.9	57
	Parallel	-	-	-	0.1	11	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	13	0.1	13
All	All	11,288.3	17	-	49.7	59	2	-	3	-	7	11,288.3	20	49.7	68	11,338.0	88
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Arrowtooth Fisheries</b>																	
HAL	EEZ	44.4	8	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	44.4	10	-	-	44.4	10
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	12,776.7	21	-	269.4	47	1	-	3	-	2	12,776.7	24	269.4	50	13,046.1	74
	Parallel	-	-	-	14.3	27	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	14.3	28	14.3	28
All	All	12,821.1	29	-	283.7	75	3	-	5	-	10	12,821.1	34	283.7	88	13,104.8	122
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Deepwater Flatfish Fisheries</b>																	
HAL	EEZ	57.9	13	-	-	2	-	26.3	4	-	2	84.1	17	-	4	84.1	21
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	3	-	3	3
TRW	EEZ	8.1	10	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	8.1	10	-	1	8.1	11
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
All	All	65.9	23	-	-	17	1	26.3	4	-	4	92.2	27	-	22	92.2	49
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Flathead Sole Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	2,280.6	15	1	59.0	64	2	259.6	4	0.4	4	2,540.3	20	59.4	70	2,599.7	90
	Parallel	-	-	-	14.9	33	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	14.9	35	14.9	35
All	All	2,280.6	15	1	73.9	83	3	259.6	4	0.4	10	2,540.3	20	74.3	96	2,614.6	116
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Rex Sole Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	4,350.8	21	1	2.6	34	1	410.9	8	-	3	4,761.7	30	2.6	38	4,764.3	68
	Parallel	-	-	-	0.6	11	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.6	12	0.6	12
All	All	4,350.8	21	1	3.2	64	1	410.9	8	-	7	4,761.7	30	3.2	72	4,764.9	102
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Shallow-Water Flatfish Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	867.5	19	-	75.5	35	1	-	2	-	3	867.5	21	75.5	39	942.9	60
	Parallel	-	-	-	23.0	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23.0	13	23.0	13
All	All	867.5	19	-	98.5	61	2	-	2	-	4	867.5	21	98.5	67	965.9	88
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Sub-Area 610 Pollock Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	531.3	18	-	91,690.7	115	4	293.8	5	4,145.6	17	825.2	23	95,836.3	136	96,661.5	159
	Parallel	-	-	-	116,320.4	87	3	-	-	1,027.2	9	-	-	117,347.5	99	117,347.5	99
All	All	531.3	18	-	208,011.1	126	4	293.8	5	5,172.8	23	825.2	23	213,183.9	153	214,009.0	176

Note: Shaded cells represent catch totals that cannot be released due to confidentiality restrictions. Catch totals in summary columns exclude catches from confidential cells.

Table 3 shows WG catches by species, but as a percentage of the total catch of that species in the area. While the totals used to calculate the percentage exclude confidential catches, the amount excluded (0.09 percent of the total) is so small that the percentages shown are largely unaffected. Annual tables for Pacific Cod and Pollock can be seen in Appendix A. More details on participation by jurisdiction are found in Appendix B.

**Table 3. Catch Percentage by License, Vessel, Gear and Species in the Western Gulf, 1995-2003**

Gear	Fishery	Vessels with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			Vessels with No License			All Vessels		
		CP	CV	All Vessels	CP	CV	All Vessels	CP	CV	All Vessels
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Pacific Cod Fisheries</b>										
JIG	EEZ	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0
	Parallel	-	0.1	0.1	-	0.3	0.3	-	0.4	0.4
	State	-	0.4	0.4	-	1.7	1.7	-	2.1	2.1
HAL	EEZ	15.4	1.0	16.4	1.8	0.2	2.0	17.3	1.2	18.4
	Parallel	-	0.1	0.1	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.1	0.1
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	1.1	4.3	5.4	0.4	1.9	2.3	1.5	6.2	7.7
	Parallel	-	9.3	9.3	-	2.2	2.2	-	11.5	11.5
	State	-	12.1	12.1	-	1.3	1.3	-	13.4	13.4
TRW	EEZ	1.8	36.2	38.0	0.2	0.2	0.4	2.0	36.4	38.4
	Parallel	-	7.9	7.9	-	0.1	0.1	-	8.0	8.0
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
All	All	18.3	71.3	89.6	2.4	8.0	10.4	20.7	79.3	100.0
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Northern Rockfish Fisheries</b>										
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	100.0	0.0	100.0	-	-	-	100.0	0.0	100.0
	Parallel	-	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.0
All	All	100.0	0.0	100.0	-	-	-	100.0	0.0	100.0
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Pelagic Rockfish Fisheries</b>										
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	100.0	0.0	100.0	-	-	-	100.0	0.0	100.0
	Parallel	-	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.0
All	All	100.0	0.0	100.0	-	-	-	100.0	0.0	100.0
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Pacific Ocean Perch Fisheries</b>										
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	99.6	0.4	100.0	-	-	-	99.6	0.4	100.0
	Parallel	-	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.0
All	All	99.6	0.4	100.0	-	-	-	99.6	0.4	100.0
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Arrowtooth Fisheries</b>										
HAL	EEZ	0.3	-	0.3	-	-	-	0.3	-	0.3
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	97.5	2.1	99.6	-	-	-	97.5	2.1	99.6
	Parallel	-	0.1	0.1	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.1
All	All	97.8	2.2	100.0	-	-	-	97.8	2.2	100.0
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Deepwater Flatfish Fisheries</b>										
HAL	EEZ	62.8	-	62.8	28.5	-	28.5	91.3	-	91.3
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	8.7	-	8.7	-	-	-	8.7	-	8.7
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
All	All	71.5	-	71.5	28.5	-	28.5	100.0	-	100.0
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Flathead Sole Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	87.2	2.3	89.5	9.9	0.0	9.9	97.2	2.3	99.4
	Parallel	-	0.6	0.6	-	-	-	-	0.6	0.6
All	All	87.2	2.8	90.1	9.9	0.0	9.9	97.2	2.8	100.0
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Rex Sole Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	91.3	0.1	91.4	8.6	-	8.6	99.9	0.1	100.0
	Parallel	-	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.0
All	All	91.3	0.1	91.4	8.6	-	8.6	99.9	0.1	100.0
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Shallow-Water Flatfish Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	89.8	7.8	97.6	-	-	-	89.8	7.8	97.6
	Parallel	-	2.4	2.4	-	-	-	-	2.4	2.4
All	All	89.8	10.2	100.0	-	-	-	89.8	10.2	100.0
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Sub-Area 610 Pollock Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	0.2	42.8	43.1	0.1	1.9	2.1	0.4	44.8	45.2
	Parallel	-	54.4	54.4	-	0.5	0.5	-	54.8	54.8
All	All	0.2	97.2	97.4	0.1	2.4	2.6	0.4	99.6	100.0

Note: Shaded cells represent catch totals that cannot be released due to confidentiality restrictions. Calculation of percentages excludes all confidential numbers.

Table 4 shows the catch and participation in Central Gulf fisheries by license, vessel, and gear for the years 1995-2003. More than 966,000 MT of primary species by all gears was caught in the CG between 1995-2003, 78 percent of which was either Pacific cod or pollock. Approximately 0.5 percent of the total catch cannot be reported to due confidentiality restrictions. Annual tables for Pacific Cod and Pollock can be seen in Appendix A. More details on participation by jurisdiction are found in Appendix B.

**Table 4. Catch and Participation in Central Gulf by Species, License, Vessel, and Gear, 1995-2003**

Gear	Fishery	CPs with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			CVs with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			Vessels with No License CP				All CPs		All CVs		All Vessels	
		Catch (MT)	Perma- nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	Catch (MT)	Perma- nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	Catch (MT)	CP (No.)	CV Catch (MT)	CV (No.)	CP (MT)	CP (No.)	CV (MT)	CV (No.)	Total (MT)	Total (No.)
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Pacific Cod Fisheries</b>																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	77.7	39	2	-	-	27.0	31	-	-	104.7	72	104.7	72
	Parallel	-	-	-	646.6	66	1	-	-	717.9	107	-	-	1,364.5	174	1,364.5	174
	State	-	-	-	2,399.2	107	1	-	-	4,091.3	220	-	-	6,490.4	328	6,490.4	328
HAL	EEZ	3,838.6	17	5	33,489.8	199	4	-	3	767.1	55	3,838.6	25	34,256.9	258	38,095.5	283
	Parallel	-	-	-	13,128.6	195	4	-	-	1,493.4	88	-	-	14,622.0	287	14,622.0	287
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	1,836.0	4	3	42,296.3	130	5	2,584.1	7	3,708.9	40	4,420.1	14	46,005.1	175	50,425.2	189
	Parallel	-	-	-	31,126.4	131	5	-	-	2,293.9	50	-	-	33,420.3	186	33,420.3	186
	State	-	-	-	23,973.5	122	5	-	-	3,763.3	66	-	-	27,736.8	193	27,736.8	193
TRW	EEZ	14,505.7	21	3	156,055.7	146	6	2,143.2	14	4,342.9	28	16,649.0	38	160,398.6	180	177,047.6	218
	Parallel	-	-	-	3,541.5	104	4	-	-	71.1	11	-	-	3,612.7	119	3,612.7	119
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
All	All	20,180.3	42	9	306,735.2	529	16	4,727.3	24	21,276.7	420	24,907.6	75	328,012.0	965	352,919.6	1,040
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Northern Rockfish Fisheries</b>																	
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2
	Parallel	-	-	-	0.1	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	5	0.1	5
TRW	EEZ	12,050.5	20	1	13,694.1	71	3	1,954.9	8	-	3	14,005.4	29	13,694.1	77	27,699.4	106
	Parallel	-	-	-	23.1	24	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	23.1	26	23.1	26
All	All	12,050.5	20	1	13,717.2	82	3	1,954.9	7	-	17	14,005.4	35	13,717.2	152	27,722.6	187
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Pelagic Rockfish Fisheries</b>																	
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	3.1	65	-	-	1	0.0	4	-	1	3.2	69	3.2	70
	Parallel	-	-	-	4.1	60	1	-	-	0.4	13	-	-	4.5	74	4.5	74
TRW	EEZ	10,627.2	20	2	8,811.2	71	3	1,443.1	8	-	3	12,070.3	30	8,811.2	77	20,881.5	107
	Parallel	-	-	-	28.6	34	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	28.6	36	28.6	36
All	All	10,627.2	20	2	8,847.0	167	5	1,443.1	9	0.5	22	12,070.3	31	8,847.5	194	20,917.8	225
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Pacific Ocean Perch Fisheries</b>																	
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	3
TRW	EEZ	24,457.9	21	2	26,383.8	72	3	2,943.4	9	-	2	27,401.2	32	26,383.8	77	53,785.1	109
	Parallel	-	-	-	45.5	26	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	45.5	27	45.5	27
All	All	24,457.9	21	2	26,429.3	94	3	2,943.4	9	-	6	27,401.2	32	26,429.3	103	53,830.6	135
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Arrowtooth Fisheries</b>																	
HAL	EEZ	18.9	7	-	18.0	11	1	-	2	-	1	18.9	9	18.0	13	36.9	22
	Parallel	-	-	-	15.2	13	1	-	-	0.7	4	-	-	15.9	18	15.9	18
TRW	EEZ	17,142.7	19	2	8,579.3	83	3	739.1	5	58.3	4	17,881.8	26	8,637.6	90	26,519.3	116
	Parallel	-	-	-	426.2	48	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	426.2	50	426.2	50
All	All	17,161.6	26	2	9,038.7	130	5	739.1	7	59.0	17	17,900.7	35	9,097.7	152	26,998.4	187
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Deepwater Flatfish Fisheries</b>																	
HAL	EEZ	-	2	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	2	-	5
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
TRW	EEZ	1,343.7	15	2	8,446.4	70	2	103.1	5	-	3	1,446.8	22	8,446.4	75	9,893.2	97
	Parallel	-	-	-	29.0	39	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	29.0	39	29.0	39
All	All	1,343.7	17	3	8,475.4	86	3	103.1	5	-	4	1,446.8	25	8,475.4	93	9,922.3	118
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Flathead Sole Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	3,156.8	17	2	6,400.8	110	4	23.9	5	39.4	10	3,180.7	24	6,440.3	124	9,621.0	148
	Parallel	-	-	-	581.7	85	4	-	-	5.4	4	-	-	587.1	93	587.1	93
All	All	3,156.8	17	2	6,982.5	120	4	23.9	5	44.9	17	3,180.7	24	7,027.4	141	10,208.1	165
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Rex Sole Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	20,854.9	21	2	1,835.2	92	3	2,047.3	10	13.9	7	22,902.1	33	1,849.2	102	24,751.3	135
	Parallel	-	-	-	28.4	61	2	-	-	-	3	-	-	28.4	66	28.4	66
All	All	20,854.9	21	2	1,863.6	110	3	2,047.3	10	13.9	10	22,902.1	33	1,877.5	123	24,779.7	156
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Shallow-Water Flatfish Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	1,381.9	15	2	34,769.7	87	3	13.7	5	364.5	9	1,395.6	22	35,134.2	99	36,529.8	121
	Parallel	-	-	-	3,511.2	59	1	-	-	6.5	4	-	-	3,517.7	64	3,517.7	64
All	All	1,381.9	15	2	38,280.9	94	3	13.7	5	371.0	12	1,395.6	22	38,651.9	109	40,047.5	131
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Sub-Area 620 and 621 Pollock Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	120.5	13	1	135,272.5	114	4	121.4	5	4,429.1	17	241.9	19	139,701.7	135	139,943.5	154
	Parallel	-	-	-	61,820.3	97	5	-	-	1,659.5	7	-	-	63,479.8	109	63,479.8	109
All	All	120.5	13	1	197,092.9	119	5	121.4	5	6,088.6	20	241.9	19	203,181.5	144	203,423.3	163
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Sub-Area 630 and 631 Pollock Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	392.0	13	1	153,041.1	101	3	-	1	3,424.9	13	392.0	15	156,466.0	117	156,858.0	132
	Parallel	-	-	-	38,205.4	74	3	-	-	216.8	4	-	-	38,422.2	81	38,422.2	81
All	All	392.0	13	1	191,246.5	102	3	-	1	3,641.6	14	392.0	15	194,888.2	119	195,280.2	134

Note: Shaded cells represent catch totals that cannot be released due to confidentiality restrictions. Catch totals in summary columns exclude catches from confidential cells.

Table 5 shows CG catches, but as a percentage of the total catch of that species in the area. While the totals used to calculate the percentage exclude confidential catches, the amount excluded (0.5 percent of the total) is so small that the percentages shown are largely unaffected. Annual tables for Pacific Cod and Pollock can be seen in Appendix A. More details on participation by jurisdiction are found in Appendix B.

**Table 5. Catch Percentage by License, Vessel, Gear and Species in the Central Gulf, 1995-2003**

Gear	Fishery	Vessels with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			Vessels with No License			All Vessels		
		CP	CV	All Vessels	CP	CV	All Vessels	CP	CV	All Vessels
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Pacific Cod Fisheries</b>										
JIG	EEZ	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0
	Parallel	-	0.2	0.2	-	0.2	0.2	-	0.4	0.4
	State	-	0.7	0.7	-	1.2	1.2	-	1.8	1.8
HAL	EEZ	1.1	9.5	10.6	-	0.2	0.2	1.1	9.7	10.8
	Parallel	-	3.7	3.7	-	0.4	0.4	-	4.1	4.1
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	0.5	12.0	12.5	0.7	1.1	1.8	1.3	13.0	14.3
	Parallel	-	8.8	8.8	-	0.6	0.6	-	9.5	9.5
	State	-	6.8	6.8	-	1.1	1.1	-	7.9	7.9
TRW	EEZ	4.1	44.2	48.3	0.6	1.2	1.8	4.7	45.4	50.2
	Parallel	-	1.0	1.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	1.0	1.0
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
All	All	5.7	86.9	92.6	1.3	6.0	7.4	7.1	92.9	100.0
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Northern Rockfish Fisheries</b>										
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.0
TRW	EEZ	43.5	49.4	92.9	7.1	-	7.1	50.5	49.4	99.9
	Parallel	-	0.1	0.1	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.1
All	All	43.5	49.5	92.9	7.1	-	7.1	50.5	49.5	100.0
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Pelagic Rockfish Fisheries</b>										
HAL	EEZ	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0
	Parallel	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0
TRW	EEZ	50.8	42.1	92.9	6.9	-	6.9	57.7	42.1	99.8
	Parallel	-	0.1	0.1	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.1
All	All	50.8	42.3	93.1	6.9	0.0	6.9	57.7	42.3	100.0
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Pacific Ocean Perch Fisheries</b>										
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	45.4	49.0	94.4	5.5	-	5.5	50.9	49.0	99.9
	Parallel	-	0.1	0.1	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.1
All	All	45.4	49.1	94.5	5.5	-	5.5	50.9	49.1	100.0
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Arrowtooth Fisheries</b>										
HAL	EEZ	0.1	0.1	0.1	-	-	-	0.1	0.1	0.1
	Parallel	-	0.1	0.1	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.1	0.1
TRW	EEZ	63.5	31.8	95.3	2.7	0.2	3.0	66.2	32.0	98.2
	Parallel	-	1.6	1.6	-	-	-	-	1.6	1.6
All	All	63.6	33.5	97.0	2.7	0.2	3.0	66.3	33.7	100.0
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Deepwater Flatfish Fisheries</b>										
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	13.5	85.1	98.7	1.0	-	1.0	14.6	85.1	99.7
	Parallel	-	0.3	0.3	-	-	-	-	0.3	0.3
All	All	13.5	85.4	99.0	1.0	-	1.0	14.6	85.4	100.0
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Flathead Sole Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	30.9	62.7	93.6	0.2	0.4	0.6	31.2	63.1	94.2
	Parallel	-	5.7	5.7	-	0.1	0.1	-	5.8	5.8
All	All	30.9	68.4	99.3	0.2	0.4	0.7	31.2	68.8	100.0
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Rex Sole Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	84.2	7.4	91.6	8.3	0.1	8.3	92.4	7.5	99.9
	Parallel	-	0.1	0.1	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.1
All	All	84.2	7.5	91.7	8.3	0.1	8.3	92.4	7.6	100.0
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Shallow-Water Flatfish Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	3.5	86.8	90.3	0.0	0.9	0.9	3.5	87.7	91.2
	Parallel	-	8.8	8.8	-	0.0	0.0	-	8.8	8.8
All	All	3.5	95.6	99.0	0.0	0.9	1.0	3.5	96.5	100.0
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Sub-Area 620 and 621 Pollock Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	0.1	66.5	66.6	0.1	2.2	2.2	0.1	68.7	68.8
	Parallel	-	30.4	30.4	-	0.8	0.8	-	31.2	31.2
All	All	0.1	96.9	96.9	0.1	3.0	3.1	0.1	99.9	100.0
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Sub-Area 630 and 631 Pollock Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	0.2	78.4	78.6	-	1.8	1.8	0.2	80.1	80.3
	Parallel	-	19.6	19.6	-	0.1	0.1	-	19.7	19.7
All	All	0.2	97.9	98.1	-	1.9	1.9	0.2	99.8	100.0

Note: Shaded cells represent catch totals that cannot be released due to confidentiality restrictions. Calculation of percentages excludes all confidential numbers.

Table 6 shows the catch and participation in West Yakutat fisheries for the years 1995-2003. Only 52,000 MT of primary species catches were made in West Yakutat during this period, 11 percent of which are confidential, and are not included in the table. Of the 46,000 MT shown, 78 percent are either Pacific cod or pollock. Note also that over 14,000 MT from the State-managed Prince William Sound Pollock fishery are shown. Annual tables for Pacific Cod and Pollock can be seen in Appendix A. More details on participation by jurisdiction are found in Appendix B.

**Table 6. Catch and Participation in West Yakutat Gulf by Species, License, Vessel, and Gear, 1995-2003**

Gear	Fishery	CPs with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			CVs with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			Vessels with No License				All CPs		All CVs		All Vessels	
		Catch (MT)	Perma- nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	Catch (MT)	Perma- nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	CP Catch (MT)	CP (No.)	CV Catch (MT)	CV (No.)	CP (MT)	CP (No.)	CV (MT)	CV (No.)	Total (MT)	Total (No.)
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Pacific Cod Fisheries</b>																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	66.6	20	-	-	66.6	23	66.6	23	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
HAL	EEZ	1.5	5	-	12.7	13	-	-	11.7	5	1.5	5	24.3	18	25.9	23	
	Parallel	-	-	-	486.7	32	-	-	588.6	60	-	-	1,075.3	92	1,075.3	92	
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
POT	EEZ	-	-	1	28.8	5	-	2	-	2	-	3	28.8	7	28.8	10	
	Parallel	-	-	-	672.0	11	-	-	1,334.8	11	-	-	2,006.7	22	2,006.7	22	
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
TRW	EEZ	20.7	7	-	363.3	25	1	3	-	1	20.7	10	363.3	27	384.0	37	
	Parallel	-	-	-	110.8	15	1	-	-	1	-	-	110.8	17	110.8	17	
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
All	All	22.3	12	1	1,674.2	83	1	5	2,001.6	86	22.3	18	3,675.8	170	3,698.0	188	
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Northern Rockfish Fisheries</b>																	
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
TRW	EEZ	-	1	-	31.4	10	-	1	-	-	-	2	31.4	10	31.4	12	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
All	All	-	1	-	31.4	11	-	3	-	2	-	14	31.4	38	31.4	52	
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Pelagic Rockfish Fisheries</b>																	
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	
	Parallel	-	-	-	0.2	8	-	-	2.3	12	-	-	2.5	20	2.5	20	
TRW	EEZ	3,824.5	10	-	102.7	19	1	3	-	1	3,824.5	13	102.7	21	3,927.2	34	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	
All	All	3,824.5	10	-	103.0	29	1	3	2.3	14	3,824.5	13	105.2	44	3,929.7	57	
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Pacific Ocean Perch Fisheries</b>																	
HAL	EEZ	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	5	-	5	
TRW	EEZ	7,088.5	11	-	231.0	31	2	3	-	1	7,088.5	14	231.0	34	7,319.5	48	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	
All	All	7,088.5	12	-	231.0	37	2	3	-	3	7,088.5	15	231.0	42	7,319.5	57	
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Arrowtooth Fisheries</b>																	
HAL	EEZ	2.2	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.2	4	-	-	2.2	4	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	
TRW	EEZ	158.4	7	-	74.0	11	-	3	-	-	158.4	10	74.0	11	232.5	21	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	
All	All	160.6	11	-	74.0	35	1	3	-	2	160.6	14	74.0	38	234.7	52	
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Deepwater Flatfish Fisheries</b>																	
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
TRW	EEZ	307.8	7	-	877.9	22	1	3	-	-	307.8	10	877.9	23	1,185.8	33	
	Parallel	-	-	-	1.8	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.8	4	1.8	4	
All	All	307.8	7	-	879.7	27	1	3	-	-	307.8	10	879.7	28	1,187.6	38	
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Flathead Sole Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	69.7	6	-	80.9	21	1	2	-	-	69.7	8	80.9	22	150.5	30	
	Parallel	-	-	-	11.2	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	11.2	4	11.2	4	
All	All	69.7	6	-	92.0	23	1	2	-	-	69.7	8	92.0	24	161.7	32	
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Rex Sole Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	315.7	5	-	178.2	20	1	3	-	-	315.7	8	178.2	21	493.9	29	
	Parallel	-	-	-	4.9	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.9	4	4.9	4	
All	All	315.7	5	-	183.1	23	1	3	-	-	315.7	8	183.1	24	498.8	32	
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Shallow-Water Flatfish Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	-	1	-	188.0	19	1	1	-	-	-	2	188.0	20	188.0	22	
	Parallel	-	-	-	7.3	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.3	5	7.3	5	
All	All	-	1	-	195.3	20	1	1	-	-	-	2	195.3	21	195.3	23	
<b>Catch and Vessel Counts in the Sub-Areas 640 and 649 Pollock Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	-	1	-	14,649.5	36	2	-	-	-	-	1	14,649.5	39	14,649.5	40	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	State	-	-	-	14,436.9	18	1	-	-	3	-	-	14,436.9	22	14,436.9	22	
All	All	-	1	-	29,086.4	43	2	-	-	4	-	1	29,086.4	49	29,086.4	50	

Note: Shaded cells represent catch totals that cannot be released due to confidentiality restrictions. Catch totals in summary columns exclude catches from confidential cells. Also note that catches in the Prince William Sound Pollock fishery are listed as a State-Water Fishery.



Table 7 shows WY catches, but as a percentage of the total catch of that species in the area. The totals used to calculate the percentage exclude confidential catches which as mentioned above constitute over 11 percent of the total. Therefore, in some cases, the amount excluded could result in percentages that are noticeably different than actual percentages. Annual tables for Pacific Cod and Pollock can be seen in Appendix A. More details on participation by jurisdiction are found in Appendix B.

**Table 7. Catch Percentage by License, Vessel, Gear and Species in the West Yakutat Gulf, 1995-2003**

Gear	Fishery	Vessels with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			Vessels with No License			All Vessels		
		CP	CV	All Vessels	CP	CV	All Vessels	CP	CV	All Vessels
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Pacific Cod Fisheries</b>										
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	1.8	1.8	-	1.8	1.8
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HAL	EEZ	0.0	0.3	0.4	-	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.7	0.7
	Parallel	-	13.2	13.2	-	15.9	15.9	-	29.1	29.1
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	0.8	0.8	-	-	-	-	0.8	0.8
	Parallel	-	18.2	18.2	-	36.1	36.1	-	54.3	54.3
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	0.6	9.8	10.4	-	-	-	0.6	9.8	10.4
	Parallel	-	3.0	3.0	-	-	-	-	3.0	3.0
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
All	All	0.6	45.3	45.9	-	54.1	54.1	0.6	99.4	100.0
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Northern Rockfish Fisheries</b>										
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	-	100.0	100.0	-	-	-	-	100.0	100.0
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
All	All	-	100.0	100.0	-	-	-	-	100.0	100.0
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Pelagic Rockfish Fisheries</b>										
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.1	0.1	-	0.1	0.1
TRW	EEZ	97.3	2.6	99.9	-	-	-	97.3	2.6	99.9
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
All	All	97.3	2.6	99.9	-	0.1	0.1	97.3	2.7	100.0
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Pacific Ocean Perch Fisheries</b>										
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	96.8	3.2	100.0	-	-	-	96.8	3.2	100.0
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
All	All	96.8	3.2	100.0	-	-	-	96.8	3.2	100.0
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Arrowtooth Fisheries</b>										
HAL	EEZ	0.9	-	0.9	-	-	-	0.9	-	0.9
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	67.5	31.5	99.1	-	-	-	67.5	31.5	99.1
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
All	All	68.5	31.5	100.0	-	-	-	68.5	31.5	100.0
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Deepwater Flatfish Fisheries</b>										
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	25.9	73.9	99.9	-	-	-	25.9	73.9	99.9
	Parallel	-	0.1	0.1	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.1
All	All	25.9	74.1	100.0	-	-	-	25.9	74.1	100.0
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Flathead Sole Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	43.1	50.0	93.1	-	-	-	43.1	50.0	93.1
	Parallel	-	6.9	6.9	-	-	-	-	6.9	6.9
All	All	43.1	56.9	100.0	-	-	-	43.1	56.9	100.0
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Rex Sole Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	63.3	35.7	99.0	-	-	-	63.3	35.7	99.0
	Parallel	-	1.0	1.0	-	-	-	-	1.0	1.0
All	All	63.3	36.7	100.0	-	-	-	63.3	36.7	100.0
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Shallow-Water Flatfish Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	-	96.3	96.3	-	-	-	-	96.3	96.3
	Parallel	-	3.7	3.7	-	-	-	-	3.7	3.7
All	All	-	100.0	100.0	-	-	-	-	100.0	100.0
<b>Percent of Catch by Vessel and License Type in the Sub-Area 640 and 649 Pollock Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	-	50.4	50.4	-	-	-	-	50.4	50.4
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	49.6	49.6	-	-	-	-	49.6	49.6
All	All	-	100.0	100.0	-	-	-	-	100.0	100.0

Note: Shaded cells represent catch totals that cannot be released due to confidentiality restrictions. Calculation of percentages excludes all confidential numbers.

## **Preliminary Estimations of Allocations**

This section provides initial estimates of allocations to the various harvesting sectors and individuals under Alternatives 2 and 3.

Table 8 below summarizes the different methods of computing allocations to harvest vessels under Alternative 2 and under Alternative 3 and outlines the primary assumptions concerning eligibility and qualified catch used in computing estimates. In general, Alternative 2 calculates allocations to LLP license holders based on individual catch histories, without distinct sector level allocations. Allocations under Alternative 3 are based on a two-stage process. In the first stage, a sector allocation is made based on the catch histories of all eligible individuals in a sector. In making sector allocations, drop year provisions are applied at the sector level. So, (if applicable) for each sector the year (or years) with the lowest total sector catch is dropped, regardless of individual catch histories within the sector. Each eligible individual in a sector would then receive a portion of the sector allocation based on the individual's qualified catch history. Individual allocations could be based on different qualifying years than the sector allocations. In addition, (if applicable) for each individual the year(s) of lowest individual catch is dropped. In all cases, drop year provisions are applied on a species-by-species basis. So, a sector or individual may drop different years for different species. The use of a two-stage process for allocations (as under Alternative 3) obscures some effects and could motivate individuals to support different qualifying years for the sector than for the individual allocations. For example, a person who entered a fishery in 1997 might advocate sector qualifying years that include 1995 and 1996 to increase the size of a sector allocation, the advocate more recent years to increase his share of the sector's allocation. Some observers could question the fairness of such a system for allocations. If the Council chooses to use of different years for sector and individual allocations choice should therefore be justified.

**Table 8. Comparison of Allocation Calculations between Alternative 2 and Alternative 3**

	<i>Alternative 2</i>	<i>Alternative 3</i>
Sector Definition	Sector is a specific gear (jig, hook and line, pot, or trawl) and vessel type (CV or CP)	
Allocation Basis	Calculate QS on an individual basis. No explicit sector allocation.	Two stage process, with allocation to a sector based on "sector qualifying years," with subsequent allocations to individuals in a sector based on the "individual qualifying years". Sector qualifying years may differ from individual qualifying years.
Sector qualifying years	NA	1995-2002 No Drop 1995-2002 Drop 1 1995-2001 No Drop 1995-2002 Drop 1 1998-2002 No Drop 1998-2002 Drop 1
Individual qualifying years	1995-2002 Drop 1 1995-2002 Drop 2 1995-2001 Drop 1 1998-2002 Drop 1 1998-2003 Drop 1	1995-2002 Drop 1 1995-2002 Drop 2 1995-2001 Drop 1 1998-2002 Drop 1 1998-2003 Drop 1
Qualified catch	Catch in the qualifying years after applying drop year provisions on a species-by-species basis	Catch in the qualifying years after applying drop year provisions on a species-by-species basis
Calculation of sector allocation of primary species (as percent)	NA	Qualified catch of eligible members of the sector divided by qualified catch of all eligible persons
Calculation formula for individual allocations of primary species (as percent of all allocations)	Qualified catch of eligible individual divided by all qualified catch of all eligible individuals	Qualified catch of eligible individual divided by all qualified catch of all eligible individuals in the sector times the sector's allocation
Eligibility assumption in this analysis	Catch made using permanent or interim LLP licenses plus catch made with vessels less than 26', which did not require an LLP for federal participation.	
Area assumption in this analysis	Only catch from outside 3 nm.	
Qualified catch assumption in this analysis	Catch of the vessel from which the LLP originated plus the catch of the vessel designated on LLP are assumed to arise from the LLP.	
Gear and sector historic allocation assumptions	Allocations based on catch history to the hook-and-line sector are made for Pacific cod and Western Gulf deepwater flatfish only. Pacific Ocean perch, northern rockfish, pelagic shelf rockfish, and arrowtooth flounder in all areas and deepwater flatfish in the Central Gulf and West Yakutat are excluded from the estimates of history-based allocations.	

Estimated allocations are shown for each gear for all species designated as primary in the Council motion except Pacific Ocean perch, northern rockfish, pelagic shelf rockfish, and arrowtooth flounder in all areas and deepwater flatfish in the Central Gulf and West Yakutat. Catch data show that catch history-based allocations to the hook-and-line sector of these species would likely be too small to support a directed fishery. If the Council wishes to make allocations of these species to the hook-and-line sector, a method of determining those allocations other than catch history could be considered.<sup>2</sup>

The general conclusions below can be drawn from a review of the tables. Review of the tables and figures may reveal several different conclusions concerning allocations and may also reveal exceptions to these conclusions.

- Dropping years generally increases allocations to participants with less consistent participation and decreases allocations to participants with consistent participation. Since different years may be dropped for different species, participants that consistently participate in Gulf fisheries, but move among fisheries from year-to-year may benefit from drop year provisions.

<sup>2</sup> In further developing the program, the Council should consider the need to accommodate incidental catches through either direct allocations of the primary species or through some other management measure.

- The number of eligible participants increases with the number of qualifying years.
- Allocations of Pacific cod in all management areas are higher for non-trawl gear (CV and CP combined) if 1998-2002 are used.
- Trawl allocations (CV and CP combined) of Pacific cod are highest in all management areas if 1995-2001 are used.
- Regardless of gear, if 1998-2002 is used, as opposed to other qualifying year options, CPs would get higher allocations of Pacific cod in all management areas, compared to CVs of the same gear.
- For Pacific cod, differences in the allocations to sectors between Alternative 2 and Alternative 3 (using the same qualifying years) are generally very small—in only 19 of the 63 comparable sector/area combinations did the absolute difference exceed 0.1 percent. Furthermore, in 3 sector/area combinations the allocation difference between Alternative 2 and Alternative 3 exceeded 0.5 percent—all of which occurred when 1998-2002 were used.

### **Alternative 2 Allocations**

This section summarizes the allocations under the various qualifying year options for Alternative 2. Under Alternative 2 allocations of quota shares (QS) are defined on a sector/area basis to individuals, based on the individual catch during the qualifying years. Sectors are defined on the basis of gears (Jig, Hook and Line (HAL), Pot, and Trawl (TRW)), and vessel type (CV or CP). For purposes of analysis, we include only EEZ catches (outside 3 nm) of holders of permanent and interim LLP licenses plus all EEZ catches of vessel less than 26' LOA, which are not required to carry LLP licenses in federal waters in the Gulf.

Allocations were calculated for all gears for Pacific cod for both CVs and CPs. Allocations were also calculated for the Western Gulf deepwater flatfish fishery for hook-and-line gear. Allocations for all other trawl primary species were estimated under the assumption that catch history based allocations for hook-and-line gear would not be made.

The following steps were used to calculate each sector's QS percentage under the various qualifying year options for Alternative 2.

Sum the catch of primary species in the EEZ by gear, area, and year for each license.

For each qualifying year option:

Calculate each license's QS for each primary species/sector/area combination.

For each license, select catch amounts for the species/sector/area for each qualifying year (including zeros for years of no catch).

Drop catch amount for year of lowest catch (drop zero, if any qualifying year has no catch)

Sum catch amounts for all remaining qualifying years. This catch amount is the license's QS for the sector and area under this option.

Calculate the Quota Share Pool (QSP) by summing all QS for the particular primary species in the area (across all sectors).

Calculate each license's sector-based QS percentage for each primary species by dividing the individual's QS for that area/sector/species by the QSP for the area/species.

Calculate each sector's QS percentage by:

Summing all QS for the sector of the primary species in the area (the sector's QS)

Divide the sector's QS by the QSP for the primary species in the area.

## **Pacific Cod Allocations by Sector**

This section summarizes the estimation of QS percentages for the Pacific cod fisheries under Alternative 2. The summary includes a set of three tables (one for each management area) that show estimated QS percentages by sector under the 5 different qualifying year options. Also included in the summary are four figures (2 for the WG and 2 for the CG) that show the range of allocations to individuals (grouped by fours to protect confidentiality) under two different qualifying year options.

Tables 9–11 show Pacific cod quota share percentages and the number of vessels by sector, under the various qualifying year options for Alternative 2. The tables contain rows for each sector—defined by gear (jig, hook & line, pot, trawl) and vessel type (CP or CV). The tables show the QS percentages and the number of eligible license holders in the sector under the qualifying year option.

In Table 9, which shows Alternative 2 allocations for Pacific cod in the Western Gulf, 25 hook-and-line CPs (HAL CP) would qualify under the 1995-2002 qualifying year option. If 2 years are dropped, HAL CPs would receive an estimated 23.69 percent of the QS, but if only 1 year were dropped they would get 24.29 percent. If more recent years are used, 1998-2002 for example, the number of qualifying HAL CPs drops to 19, but the allocations to vessels in the sector increase to 25.65 percent. Pot CVs and pot CPs also fare better if a more recent participation period is used. A different picture arises if looking at trawl CVs—they receive higher allocations if 1995-2002 is used, and lower allocations if 1998-2002 or 1998-2003 is used.

**Table 9. Western Gulf Pacific Cod Quota Share Percentages and Number of Vessels by Sector under Alternative 2 Qualifying Year Options**

Sector	1995-2002; Drop 2 Years		1995-2002; Drop 1 Year		1995-2001; Drop 1 Year		1998-2002; Drop 1 Year		1998-2003; Drop 1 Year	
	QS%	No.	QS%	No.	QS%	No.	QS%	No.	QS%	No.
Jig CV	0.01	6	0.01	6	22.55	2	0.02	6	0.02	7
Hook & Line CP	23.69	25	24.29	25	22.55	23	25.65	19	26.70	21
Hook & Line CV	1.12	12	1.07	12	0.75	9	1.05	8	1.95	9
Pot CP	2.09	6	2.00	6	1.77	5	3.47	6	3.12	6
Pot CV	5.40	58	5.17	58	4.39	54	7.27	49	10.28	56
Trawl CP	3.10	21	3.00	21	2.99	20	3.48	18	3.40	18
Trawl CV	64.59	128	64.45	128	67.55	127	59.05	92	54.53	96

Note: To protect confidentiality the shaded JIG CV QS percentage were added to the HAL CV QS percentage.

Table 10 shows Pacific cod QS percentage allocations to vessels by sector in the Central Gulf. When compared to the WG, differences across qualifying year options for the Central Gulf Pacific cod fishery are less noticeable. Allocations to Trawl CVs generally decline if more recent years are used, while allocations to Trawl CPs, hook and line CPs and pot CPs all increase.

**Table 10. Central Gulf Pacific Cod Quota Share Percentages and Number of Vessels by Sector under Alternative 2 Qualifying Year Options**

Sector	1995-2002; Drop 2 Years		1995-2002; Drop 1 Year		1995-2001; Drop 1 Year		1998-2002; Drop 1 Year		1998-2003; Drop 1 Year	
	QS%	No.	QS%	No.	QS%	No.	QS%	No.	QS%	No.
Jig CV	0.03	38	0.03	38	0.03	34	0.03	19	0.03	21
Hook & Line CP	1.18	20	1.14	20	0.64	16	1.44	15	2.08	17
Hook & Line CV	13.75	187	13.60	187	12.11	183	16.57	141	15.92	143
Pot CP	0.84	6	0.81	6	0.83	6	1.46	6	1.25	7
Pot CV	17.81	130	17.68	130	18.47	126	19.37	98	17.90	98
Trawl CP	5.82	21	5.71	21	5.97	21	7.63	14	7.49	17
Trawl CV	60.57	142	61.02	142	61.95	142	53.51	125	55.33	125

Participation in the West Yakutat Pacific cod fisheries (as seen in Table 11) is relatively limited compared to participation in the Western Gulf and Central Gulf. The various qualifying year options have a similar effect in Western Yakutat as in the Central Gulf—Trawl CV allocations decline when more recent years are used and

allocations to trawl CP and to fixed gear sectors increase. In particular, any allocation that uses 2002 would result in a doubling of the allocation to pot sectors, from approximately 7 percent to more than 14 percent.

**Table 11. West Yakutat Pacific Cod Quota Share Percentages and Number of Vessels by Sector under Alternative 2 Qualifying Year Options**

Sector	1995-2002; Drop 2 Years		1995-2002; Drop 1 Year		1995-2001; Drop 1 Year		1998-2002; Drop 1 Year		1998-2003; Drop 1 Year	
	QS%	No.	QS%	No.	QS%	No.	QS%	No.	QS%	No.
Jig CV	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hook & Line CP	0.33	5	0.33	5	0.36	5		2		2
Hook & Line CV	2.05	12	2.05	12	1.57	11	2.80	4	4.06	6
Pot CV & CP	14.64	6	14.64	6	6.83	5	18.93	4	18.68	4
Trawl CP	4.48	7	4.48	7	4.93	7	6.33	4	6.25	4
Trawl CV	78.50	26	78.50	26	86.31	26	71.94	14	71.01	14


Note: To protect confidentiality Pot CP data were added to the Pot CV data under all options, and shaded Hook & Line CPs QS percentages were added to Hook & Line CV QS percentages.

Figures 1–4 show the distribution of Pacific cod QS percentages by sector. The figures show a series of bars sorted first by sector, and then within sector by the size of the QS percentage to individual vessels—each bar represents the average QS percentage of at least 4 vessels (the first bar in each sector may include up to 7 vessels).

In Figure 1, the distribution of Western Gulf Pacific Cod QS is shown using 1995-2002 and dropping two years. For the HAL CP sector there are a total of 6 bars representing the 25 participants (see Table 9). The left-most of the HAL CP bars shows the average QS percentage of the lowest 5 eligible vessels, while each of the next 5 bars shows the average QS percentage of successively ranked groups of 4. Thus, the top 4 HAL CPs would receive an average allocation of 4.15 percent of the QS, while the lowest 5 HAL CPs would receive an average allocation of 0.03 percent of the QS. In several cases the bars representing average QS percentages of lower ranked vessels do not appear greater than zero—in Figure 1 this is the case with the lowest ranked group of HAL CVs, all JIG CVs, the lowest ranked group pot CVs, and the lowest 6 ranked groups of TRW CVs. In this particular figure, the average of a group needs to exceed 0.004 percent of the QS before it becomes visible.


Figure 2 is similar to Figure 1, except that the 1998-2002 period is used and only 1 year is dropped. As seen in the figure, this qualifying year option yields slightly higher QS percentages for the four largest participants (i.e., the largest grouping) in each sector. There are also fewer bars in each sector in Figure 2 indicating that fewer vessels would receive QS. A comparison of the two allocation options is found in Table 12, which lists the average QS allocation of the four largest allocations in each sector. It should be noted that the recipients of the four largest allocations may differ under the various qualifying year options.

**Figure 1. Distribution of Western Gulf Pacific Cod Quotas Share Using 1995-2002 Drop 2 Years**



Note: Each bar shows the average QS percentage for ranked groups of 4 vessels. The lowest ranked group in each sector may contain up to 7 vessels.

**Figure 2. Distribution of Western Gulf Pacific Cod Quotas Share Using 1998-2002 Drop 1 Year**



Note: Each bar shows the average QS percentage for ranked groups of 4 vessels. The lowest ranked group in each sector may contain up to 7 vessels.


**Table 12. Average of the Four Largest Pacific Cod Allocations in each sector in the Western Gulf for Selected Qualifying Year Options**

	HAL CV	HAL CP	JIG CP	POT CV	POT CP	TRW CV	TRW CP
	Average QS Percentage of Top Ranked Groups of Participants						
95-02 Drop 2	0.222	4.144	0.002	0.677	0.348	2.144	0.502
98-02 Drop 1	0.235	4.635	0.003	0.951	0.578	2.208	0.630

Note: Shaded cells indicate that entire sector has fewer than 8 participants and that therefore top-ranked group is the only group.


Figures 3 and 4 and Table 13 show the distribution Central Gulf Pacific cod QS allocations under two qualifying year options. As was the case with the Western Gulf, these two qualifying year options were chosen as illustrative. Each of the bars shown in the figures represents the average QS percentage of groups of four vessels sorted from low-to-high in terms of QS allocations. In general there are many fewer bars shown in Figure 4, than in Figure 3, indicating the effect of the wider distribution that results from a longer qualifying year period. Looking at the four largest allocations in each sector in the two figures (see also Table 13), it is clear that the four largest allocations are significantly larger under the option with the shorter qualifying period. It should be noted that the persons receiving the largest allocations are not necessarily the same under the two qualifying year options.

**Figure 3. Distribution of Central Gulf Pacific Cod Quotas Share Using 1995-2002 Drop 2 Years**



Note: Each bar shows the average QS percentage for ranked groups of 4 vessels. The lowest ranked group in each sector may contain up to 7 vessels.

**Figure 4. Distribution of Central Gulf Pacific Cod Quotas Share Using 1998-2002 Drop 1 Year**



Note: Each bar shows the average QS percentage for ranked groups of 4 vessels. The lowest ranked group in each sector may contain up to 7 vessels..



**Table 13. Average of the Four Largest Pacific Cod Allocations in each sector in the Central Gulf for Selected Qualifying Year Options**

	JIG CP	HAL CV	HAL CP	POT CV	POT CP	TRW CV	TRW CP
Average QS Percentage of Top Ranked Groups of Participants							
95-02 Drop 2	0.005	0.544	0.148	1.109	0.139	1.767	1.048
98-02 Drop 1	0.005	0.686	0.258	1.353	0.243	2.144	1.649

Note: Shaded cells indicate that entire sector has fewer than 8 participants and that therefore top-ranked group is the only group.

### Allocations of Deepwater Flatfish in the Western Gulf under Alternative 2

In this section, allocations of deepwater flatfish in the Western Gulf are described. Western Gulf deepwater flatfish appears to be the only significant hook-and-line fishery for a primary species other than Pacific cod. As shown in Table 14, over 90 percent of the fishery would be allocated to hook-and-line CVs and CPs if 1995-2002 or 1995-2001 options are chosen. The percentages drop to slightly less than 79 percent for hook-and-line vessels, if the either of the options that use 1998 as the earliest year.

**Table 14. Western Gulf Deepwater Flatfish Quota Share Percentages and Number of Vessels by Sector under Alternative 2 Qualifying Year Options**

Vessel Class	1995-2002; Drop 2 Years		1995-2002; Drop 1 Year		1995-2001; Drop 1 Year		1998-2002; Drop 1 Year		1998-2003; Drop 1 Year	
	QS%	No.	QS%	No.	QS%	No.	QS%	No.	QS%	No.
Hook & Line CV & CP		15	90.60	15	90.94	14	78.71	11	78.17	11
Trawl CV & CP		7	9.40	7	9.06	7	21.29	4	21.83	7

Note: CP and CV data were combined for each gear to protect confidentiality. Also note that because fewer than 4 vessels had more than 6 years of participation, the allocations by sector for 1995-2002 Drop 2 years cannot be reported.

### Allocations to the Trawl Sectors under Alternative 2

This section summarizes the allocations to trawl participants under the various Alternative 2 qualifying year options. The Council's options for Alternative 2 proposed history-based allocations of arrowtooth flounder, deepwater flatfish, Pacific Ocean perch, northern rockfish, and pelagic shelf rockfish for both trawl and hook-and-line gear. Initial analysis of catch data indicates that hook-and-line catches of these species, with the exception of deepwater flatfish in the Western Gulf, were minimal, and in no case amounted to more than 1 percent of the total catch of a species in a year. Therefore, for purposes of analysis, this paper does not include hook-and-line catches of the primary species, with the exception of Pacific cod and Western Gulf deepwater flatfish.

Also, since relatively few individuals have long records of participation in the Western Gulf, it is not possible to report both "drop year" options for allocations that use 1995-2002 as qualifying years. With the exception of participation in the Pacific cod fisheries fewer than 4 individual's catches would be dropped in the "drop 2 years" option compared to the "drop 1 year" option.

Allocations estimates to trawl vessels under the various qualifying year options in the Western Gulf are shown in Table 15. The table is divided into two sections—the top section showing allocation estimates to trawl catcher processors and the second section showing allocations to trawl catcher vessel participants. Within each section rows correspond to each trawl primary species. For each qualifying year option, the QS percentage allocated to individuals in the sector and the number of individuals that would receive the allocations are shown. In the Western Gulf, trawl catcher processors are the dominant sector for all species but pollock and Pacific cod. Trawl CPs would receive allocations for at least 98 percent for the three rockfish species, and for flathead sole and rex sole, if 1995-2002 were used. They would also receive 97 percent of the arrowtooth and 91 percent of the shallow water flatfish. Allocations of these species generally increase if 1995-2001 were used. If 1998-2002 or 1998-2003 are used, trawl CVs get considerably higher allocations of shallow water flatfish. Use of 1998 as the starting year also generates a considerable increase in the Trawl CP allocation of deepwater flatfish.

**Table 15. Western Gulf Trawl Sector Quota Share Percentages and Number of Participants by Species under Alternative 2 Qualifying Year Options**

	1995-2002; Drop 1 Year		1995-2001; Drop 1 Year		1998-2002; Drop 1 Year		1998-2003; Drop 1 Year	
	QS%	No.	QS%	No.	QS%	No.	QS%	No.
<b>Trawl Catcher Processors</b>								
Pacific Cod	3.00	21	2.99	20	3.48	18	3.40	18
Northern Rockfish	99.96	15	99.95	14	100.00	11	100.00	14
Pelagic Rockfish	99.98	14	99.96	13	100.00	12	100.00	13
Pop	99.56	14	99.68	14	99.68	13	99.66	14
Arrowtooth	97.16	18	99.51	18	97.40	16	98.13	17
Deep Flatfish	9.40	6	9.06	6	21.29	4	21.83	7
Flathead Sole	98.14	14	97.92	14	99.56	12	98.04	12
Rex Sole	99.93	20	99.96	20	99.94	17	99.95	17
Shallow Flatfish	91.58	16	93.40	16	83.36	13	85.54	14
610 Pollock	0.39	17	0.31	17	0.76	17	1.05	18
<b>Trawl Catcher Vessels</b>								
Pacific Cod	64.45	128	67.55	127	59.05	92	54.53	96
Northern Rockfish	0.04	19	0.05	19		1		1
Pelagic Rockfish	0.02	14	0.04	14		1		1
Pop	0.44	33	0.32	32	0.32	9	0.34	11
Arrowtooth	2.84	47	0.49	46	2.60	6	1.87	6
Deep Flatfish		1		1	-	-	-	-
Flathead Sole	1.86	63	2.08	62	0.44	17	1.96	19
Rex Sole	0.07	35	0.04	34	0.06	6	0.05	6
Shallow Flatfish	8.42	36	6.60	36	16.64	12	14.46	12
610 Pollock	99.61	115	99.69	113	99.24	94	98.95	96

Note: Hook and Line catches of species other than Pacific cod and deepwater flatfish were ignored. To protect confidentiality, black-shaded trawl CV cells were added to corresponding gray-shaded trawl CP cells.

Central Gulf trawl sector QS percentage estimates under the different Alternative 2 qualifying year options are shown in Table 16. In the Central Gulf, compared to the Western Gulf, trawl CVs are much more significant participants in both the rockfish and flatfish fisheries. Trawl CPs would be allocated over 90 percent of the rex sole, but a much lower percentage of the other species. With the exception of Pacific cod, arrowtooth flounder, rex sole, and pollock in 630, allocations to Trawl CPs decline with the use of more recent years (1998-2002 or 1998-2003), compared to options that use earlier years. Note also that eligible participant counts drop for both sectors with the use of the more recent allocation year options.

**Table 16. Central Gulf Trawl Sector Quota Share Percentages and Number of Participants by Species under Alternative 2 Qualifying Year Options**

	1995-2002; Drop 2 Years		1995-2002; Drop 1 Year		1995-2001; Drop 1 Year		1998-2002; Drop 1 Year		1998-2003; Drop 1 Year	
	QS%	No.	QS%	No.	QS%	No.	QS%	No.	QS%	No.
<b>Trawl Catcher Processors</b>										
Pacific Cod	5.82	21	5.71	21	5.97	21	7.63	14	7.49	17
Northern Rockfish	48.74	18	48.85	18	52.77	18	30.53	10	32.42	10
Pelagic Rockfish	56.81	18	56.84	18	58.35	18	46.22	11	45.13	13
Pop	50.85	19	50.75	19	52.97	19	48.76	12	46.14	14
Arrowtooth	61.74	18	61.81	18	56.69	18	76.67	12	79.69	16
Deep Flatfish	13.98	16	13.81	16	14.27	16	4.19	8	4.89	10
Flathead Sole	32.71	18	33.05	18	33.74	18	26.05	11	27.49	13
Rex Sole	90.74	21	91.16	21	90.68	21	93.51	13	94.16	16
Shallow Flatfish	4.17	16	4.09	16	4.50	16	2.01	9	1.87	11
620 Pollock	0.07	13	0.07	13	0.07	13	0.07	12	0.10	12
630 Pollock	0.18	13	0.17	13	0.15	12	0.23	12	0.34	12

**Table 16. continued**

	1995-2002; Drop 2 Years		1995-2002; Drop 1 Year		1995-2001; Drop 1 Year		1998-2002; Drop 1 Year		1998-2003; Drop 1 Year	
	QS%	No.	QS%	No.	QS%	No.	QS%	No.	QS%	No.
<b>Trawl Catcher Vessels</b>										
Pacific Cod	60.57	142	61.02	142	61.95	142	53.51	125	55.33	125
Northern Rockfish	51.26	66	51.15	66	47.23	66	69.47	57	67.58	59
Pelagic Rockfish	43.19	67	43.16	67	41.65	66	53.78	62	54.87	64
Pop	49.15	70	49.25	70	47.03	66	51.24	61	53.86	64
Arrowtooth	38.26	82	38.19	82	43.31	82	23.33	39	20.31	39
Deep Flatfish	86.02	67	86.19	67	85.73	67	95.81	55	95.11	56
Flathead Sole	67.29	109	66.95	109	66.26	109	73.95	75	72.51	75
Rex Sole	9.26	89	8.84	89	9.32	89	6.49	68	5.84	68
Shallow Flatfish	95.83	84	95.91	84	95.50	84	97.99	68	98.13	68
620 Pollock	99.93	112	99.93	112	99.93	112	99.93	95	99.90	96
630 Pollock	99.82	97	99.83	97	99.85	96	99.77	83	99.66	84

Note: Hook and Line catches of species other than Pacific cod were ignored.

Allocations to trawl sectors in West Yakutat are shown in Table 17. Because the numbers of participants in trawl fisheries in this management area is quite low, confidentiality is a significant problem particularly in more recent years. In addition, participation in West Yakutat fisheries has been infrequent at best—only 6 individuals had more than 3 years of participation for any species. Further only one individual had consistent enough participation to be directly affected by the “drop 1” year requirements, and then only in the case of pelagic rockfish and POP fisheries. The lack of consistent participation means that dropping years has very little impact on outcomes and directly affects only one individual. This lack of long-term participation also precludes the reporting of both “drop year” options associated with the 1995-2002 qualifying years. It should also be noted that participation by the Trawl CP sector dropped off in more recent years and cannot be reported separately from Trawl CVs under the 1998-2002 and 1998-2003 qualifying year options.


**Table 17. West Yakutat Trawl Sector Quota Share Percentages and Number of Participants by Species under Alternative 2 Qualifying Year Options**

	1995-2002; Drop 1 Year		1995-2001; Drop 1 Year		1998-2002; Drop 1 Year		1998-2003; Drop 1 Year	
	QS%	No.	QS%	No.	QS%	No.	QS%	No.
<b>Trawl Catcher Processors</b>								
Pacific Cod	4.48	7	4.93	7	6.33	4	6.25	4
Northern Rockfish		1		1	-	-	-	-
Pelagic Rockfish	96.82	10	96.30	10		3		3
POP	96.55	11	96.27	11		2		2
Arrowtooth	68.16	7	68.16	7		3		3
Deep Flatfish	25.96	7	25.96	7		3		3
Flathead Sole	46.29	6	46.29	6		2		2
Rex Sole	63.92	5	63.92	5		3		3
Shallow Flatfish		1		1	-	-	-	-
640 Pollock		1		1		1		1
<b>Trawl Catcher Vessels</b>								
Pacific Cod	78.50	26	86.31	26	71.94	14	71.01	14
Northern Rockfish	100.00	9	100.00	9	100.00	7	100.00	7
Pelagic Rockfish	3.18	20	3.70	20	100.00	14	100.00	14
Pop	3.45	31	3.73	26	100.00	26	100.00	28
Arrowtooth	31.84	10	31.84	10	100.00	5	100.00	5
Deep Flatfish	74.04	22	74.04	22	100.00	11	100.00	11
Flathead Sole	53.71	21	53.71	21	100.00	8	100.00	8
Rex Sole	36.08	20	36.08	20	100.00	7	100.00	7
Shallow Flatfish	100.00	19	100.00	18	100.00	10	100.00	10
640 Pollock	100.00	36	100.00	34	100.00	27	100.00	29


Note: Hook and Line catches of species other than Pacific cod and deepwater flatfish were ignored. To protect confidentiality, black-shaded trawl CP cells were added to corresponding gray-shaded trawl CV cells. Cells with vertical lines are also block because of confidentiality—in this case only 1 individual is directly affected by the requirement to drop 2 years of catch.

Figures 5 and 6 show distributions of pollock QS percentages by management areas and sector. The differences between the two figures are the qualifying year options used—Figure 5 uses the 1995-2002 drop 1 year option, while Figure 6 uses the 1998-2002 drop 1 year option. As in previous figures, the figures show a series of bars sorted first by sector, and then within sector by the size of the QS percentage to individuals—each bar represents the average QS percentage of at least 4 individuals (the first bar in each sector may include up to 7 vessels). For example, the right-most bar of each sector shows the average QS percentage of the four largest allocations, while the left-most bar shows the average of the smallest allocations in the sector. A careful comparison of the two figures reveals that with the 1998-2002 period, the four largest allocations are somewhat larger than under the 1995-2002 qualifying period. It should be noted that the recipients of the largest allocations could differ under the different qualifying year options.

**Figure 5. Distributions of Pollock Quotas Share by Area and Sector for 1995-2002 Drop 1 Year**



**Figure 6. Distributions of Pollock Quota Share by Area and Sector for 1998-2002 Drop 1 Year**



### **Alternative 3 Allocations**

This section summarizes the allocations under the various qualifying year options for Alternative 3. Under Alternative 3 allocations of Gulf History are defined first on an area basis to sectors, based on the catch history of eligible persons in the sector during the sector qualifying years. Each eligible individual in a sector would then receive allocations from the sector based on the catch history of the individual during the individual qualifying years.

As under Alternative 2, sectors are defined on the basis of gears (Jig, Hook and Line (HAL), Pot, and Trawl (TRW)), and vessel type (CV or CP). For purposes of analysis, we include only EEZ catches (outside 3 nm) of holders of permanent and interim LLP licenses plus all EEZ catches of vessel less than 26' LOA, which are not required to carry LLP licenses in federal waters in the Gulf. Allocations were calculated for all gears for Pacific cod for both CVs and CPs. Allocations were also calculated for the Western Gulf deepwater flatfish fishery for hook-and-line gear. Allocations for all other trawl primary species were estimated under the assumption that catch history based allocations for hook-and-line gear would not be made.

The following steps were used to calculate each sector's QS percentage under the various qualifying year options for Alternative 3.

Sum the catch of primary species in the EEZ by gear, area, and year for each license.

For a each sector qualifying year option:

Calculate each sector's allocation for each primary species/ area combination.

For each sector, sum all catch of all eligible license holders in the sector during each qualifying year (gives a sector catch total for each year).

Select catch amounts for the species/area for each qualifying year (including zeros for years of no catch).

Drop catch amount for year of lowest catch (drop zero, if any sector qualifying year has no catch)

Sum catch amounts for all remaining qualifying years. This catch amount is the sector's qualified history for the species/area under this option.

Calculate the sector allocation catch history pool by summing all sector catch history for the species in the area (across all sectors).

Calculate each sector's percentage of the qualified sector catch history by dividing the sector's qualified catch history for that area/species by the sector allocation catch history pool for the area/species.

For each eligible individual in a sector:

Sum the catch of primary species in the EEZ by gear, area, and year for each license in the sector.

For a each qualifying year option:

Calculate each license's catch history for each primary species/area combination.

For each license, select catch amounts for the species/area for each qualifying year (including zeros for years of no catch).

Drop catch amount for year of lowest catch (drop zero, if any qualifying year has no catch)

Sum catch amounts for all remaining qualifying years. This catch amount is the sector's total qualified catch history for this species/area.

Calculate the sector's eligible catch history pool by summing all catch history for the particular primary species in the area for the sectors.

Calculate each license's percent of the sector's allocation for each primary species by dividing the individual's qualified catch history for that area/species by the sector's total qualified catch history for the area/species.

Calculate each license's percentage of the total allocation of the species/area by multiplying the license's percentage of the sector's allocation by the sector's percentage of the total allocation for the area/species (using the selected sector allocation qualifying years).

Since the two stage process could use different qualifying years for sectors allocations and individual allocations the number of combinations that could be used for assessing individual allocations as a percentage of the total allocation of a species are overwhelming. The relative allocation of history within a sector, however, is identical under Alternative 2 and Alternative 3, for the same individual qualifying year option. So, the analysis of Alternative 3 allocations in this document only shows the distribution of sector allocations.

Tables 18–20 show the estimated Pacific cod allocations to sectors under the various qualifying year options for the Western Gulf, Central Gulf, and West Yakutat, respectively. Generally, allocations to catcher processors increase slightly, if the allocation is based only on catches from qualifying years from 1998 on.

**Table 18. Western Gulf Pacific Cod Sector Share Percentages and Number of Vessels under Alternative 3 Qualifying Year Options**

Vessel Class	1995-2002			1995-2001			1998-2002		
	No Drop Sector Percent	Drop 1 Year Sector Percent	Vessels (No.)	No Drop Sector Percent	Drop 1 Year Sector Percent	Vessels (No.)	No Drop Sector Percent	Drop 1 Year Sector Percent	Vessels No.
Jig CV	0.01	0.01	6			2	0.02	0.02	6
Hook & Line CP	24.76	23.93	25	23.30	22.32	23	26.11	24.94	19
Hook & Line CV	1.05	1.12	12	0.72	0.78	9	1.00	1.13	8
Pot CP	1.95	2.09	6	1.71	1.85	5	3.29	3.72	6
Pot CV	5.04	5.24	58	4.22	4.39	54	6.90	6.99	49
Trawl CP	2.95	2.98	21	2.90	2.94	20	3.45	3.58	18
Trawl CV	64.23	64.63	128	67.15	67.73	127	59.24	59.63	92

**Table 19. Central Gulf Pacific Cod Sector Share Percentages and Number of Vessels under Alternative 3 Qualifying Year Options**

Vessel Class	1995-2002			1995-2001			1998-2002		
	No Drop Sector Percent	Drop 1 Year Sector Percent	Vessels (No.)	No Drop Sector Percent	Drop 1 Year Sector Percent	Vessels (No.)	No Drop Sector Percent	Drop 1 Year Sector Percent	Vessels No.
Jig CV	0.03	0.03	38	0.03	0.03	34	0.02	0.03	19
Hook & Line CP	1.12	1.19	20	0.62	0.66	16	1.35	1.54	15
Hook & Line CV	13.49	13.35	187	11.98	11.76	183	16.40	15.51	141
Pot CP	0.79	0.84	6	0.80	0.87	6	1.37	1.56	6
Pot CV	17.59	17.90	130	18.35	18.75	126	18.78	19.78	98
Trawl CP	5.64	5.84	21	5.85	6.11	21	7.56	8.03	14
Trawl CV	61.35	60.84	142	62.37	61.82	142	54.53	53.56	125

**Table 20. West Yakutat Pacific Cod Sector Share Percentages and Number of Vessels under Alternative 3 Qualifying Year Options**

Vessel Class	1995-2002			1995-2001			1998-2002		
	No Drop Sector Percent	Drop 1 Year Sector Percent	Vessels (No.)	No Drop Sector Percent	Drop 1 Year Sector Percent	Vessels (No.)	No Drop Sector Percent	Drop 1 Year Sector Percent	Vessels No.
Jig CV	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hook & Line CP	0.33	0.33	5	0.36	0.36	5			2
Hook & Line CV	2.05	2.05	12	1.57	1.57	11	2.80	2.80	4
Pot CP & CV	14.64	14.64	6	6.83	6.84	5	18.93	18.93	4
Trawl CP	4.48	4.48	7	4.93	4.93	7	6.33	6.33	4
Trawl CV	78.50	78.50	26	86.31	86.29	26	71.94	71.94	14

Table 21 shows the estimated sector allocations of deepwater flatfish in the Western Gulf. The table shows that the allocation to hook-and-line sectors (CV and CP combined) decline, if the allocation is based on qualifying years from 1998 on.

**Table 21. Western Gulf Deepwater Flatfish Sector Share Percentages and Number of Vessels under Alternative 3 Qualifying Year Options**

Vessel Class	1995-2002			1995-2001			1998-2002		
	No Drop Sector Percent	Drop 1 Year Sector Percent	Vessels (No.)	No Drop Sector Percent	Drop 1 Year Sector Percent	Vessels (No.)	No Drop Sector Percent	Drop 1 Year Sector Percent	Vessels No.
HAL CP & CV	90.60	90.56	15	90.96	90.89	14	78.71	78.44	11
Trawl CP & CV	9.40	9.44	7	9.04	9.11	7	21.29	21.56	4

Tables 22–24 show the estimated allocations to trawl sectors for all primary species under the various Alternative 3 sector qualifying year options for the Western Gulf, Central Gulf, and West Yakutat, respectively. In addition to Pacific cod, the two trawl sectors would receive separate allocations of Pacific Ocean perch, northern rockfish, pelagic shelf rockfish, deepwater flatfish, flathead sole, rex sole, shallowwater flatfish, arrowtooth flounder, and pollock in each management area.

In the Western Gulf under all of the options, trawl CPs would receive in excess of 95 percent of the allocations of the three rockfish species, flathead sole, rex sole, and arrowtooth flounder. If options that include catches from 1995 on are selected catcher processors would receive in excess of 90 percent of the shallowwater flatfish. Allocations of shallowwater flatfish to trawl catcher processors, however, decline to approximately 85 percent if qualifying years from 1998 on are used (with a commensurate increase in the allocation to trawl CVs).

**Table 22. Western Gulf Trawl Sector Share Percentages and Number of Vessels by Species under Alternative 3 Qualifying Year Options**

Vessel Class	1995-2002			1995-2001			1998-2002		
	No Drop (Percent)	Drop 1 Year (Percent)	Vessels (No.)	No Drop (Percent)	Drop 1 Year (Percent)	Vessels (No.)	No Drop (Percent)	Drop 1 Year (Percent)	Vessels No.
<b>Trawl Catcher Processors</b>									
Pacific Cod	2.95	2.98	21	2.90	2.94	20	3.45	3.58	18
Northern Rockfish	99.96	99.96	15	99.96	99.95	14	100.00	100.00	11
Pelagic Rockfish	99.98	99.98	14	99.98	99.96	13	100.00	100.00	12
POP	99.57	99.53	14	99.53	99.68	14	99.68	99.64	13
Arrowtooth	97.16	97.15	18	97.15	99.51	18	97.43	97.28	16
Deep Flatfish	9.40	9.44	6	9.04	9.11	6	21.29	21.56	4
Flathead Sole	98.14	98.08	14	98.08	97.93	14	99.58	99.55	12
Rex Sole	99.93	99.93	20	99.93	99.96	20	99.94	99.94	17
Shallow Flatfish	91.62	91.41	16	91.41	93.43	16	83.94	83.13	13
610 Pollock	0.39	0.41	17	0.41	0.31	17	0.77	0.81	17
<b>Trawl Catcher Vessels</b>									
Pacific Cod	64.23	64.63	128	67.15	67.73	127	59.24	59.63	92
Northern Rockfish	0.04	0.04	19	0.04	0.05	19			1
Pelagic Rockfish	0.02	0.02	14	0.02	0.04	14			1
POP	0.43	0.47	33	0.47	0.32	32	0.32	0.36	9
Arrowtooth	2.84	2.85	47	2.85	0.49	46	2.57	2.72	6
Deep Flatfish			1			1	-	-	-
Flathead Sole	1.86	1.92	63	1.92	2.07	62	0.42	0.45	17
Rex Sole	0.07	0.07	35	0.07	0.04	34	0.06	0.06	6
Shallow Flatfish	8.38	8.59	36	8.59	6.57	36	16.06	16.87	12
610 Pollock	99.61	99.59	115	99.59	99.69	113	99.23	99.19	94

Note: Hook and Line catches of species other than Pacific cod and deepwater flatfish were ignored. To protect confidentiality, black-shaded trawl CV cells were added to corresponding gray-shaded trawl CP cells.

In the Central Gulf, trawl CVs are much more significant participants in both the rockfish and flatfish fisheries, than in the Western Gulf. Trawl CPs would be allocated over 90 percent of the rex sole, but a much lower percentage of the other species.

**Table 23. Central Gulf Trawl Sector Share Percentages and Number of Vessels by Species under Alternative 3 Qualifying Year Options**

Vessel Class	1995-2002			1995-2001			1998-2002		
	No Drop (Percent)	Drop 1 Year (Percent)	Vessels (No.)	No Drop (Percent)	Drop 1 Year (Percent)	Vessels (No.)	No Drop (Percent)	Drop 1 Year (Percent)	Vessels No.
<b>Trawl Catcher Processors</b>									
Pacific Cod	5.64	5.84	21	5.85	6.11	21	7.56	8.03	14
Northern Rockfish	48.98	48.72	18	48.72	52.94	18	30.34	30.73	10
Pelagic Rockfish	56.83	55.69	18	55.69	58.33	18	46.43	46.39	11
POP	50.86	49.75	19	49.75	53.10	19	49.71	48.62	12
Arrowtooth	61.82	62.43	18	62.43	56.64	18	77.18	78.23	12
Deep Flatfish	13.78	14.23	16	14.23	14.23	16	4.15	4.45	8
Flathead Sole	33.18	32.66	18	32.66	33.67	18	27.34	25.85	11
Rex Sole	91.26	91.08	21	91.08	90.75	21	94.03	94.13	13
Shallow Flatfish	4.07	4.18	16	4.18	4.46	16	2.06	2.07	9
620 Pollock	0.07	0.07	13	0.07	0.07	13	0.07	0.07	12
630 Pollock	0.17	0.18	13	0.18	0.14	12	0.23	0.20	12
<b>Trawl Catcher Vessels</b>									
Pacific Cod	61.35	60.84	142	62.37	61.82	142	54.53	53.56	125
Northern Rockfish	51.02	51.28	66	51.28	47.06	66	69.66	69.27	57
Pelagic Rockfish	43.17	44.31	67	44.31	41.67	66	53.57	53.61	62
POP	49.14	50.25	70	50.25	46.90	66	50.29	51.38	61
Arrowtooth	38.18	37.57	82	37.57	43.36	82	22.82	21.77	39
Deep Flatfish	86.22	85.77	67	85.77	85.77	67	95.85	95.55	55
Flathead Sole	66.82	67.34	109	67.34	66.33	109	72.66	74.15	75
Rex Sole	8.74	8.92	89	8.92	9.25	89	5.97	5.87	68
Shallow Flatfish	95.93	95.82	84	95.82	95.54	84	97.94	97.93	68
620 Pollock	99.93	99.93	112	99.93	99.93	112	99.93	99.93	95
630 Pollock	99.83	99.82	97	99.82	99.86	96	99.77	99.80	83

Note: Hook and Line catches of species other than Pacific cod and deepwater flatfish were ignored.

In West Yakutat the low number of participants in trawl fisheries causes confidentiality problems for revealing allocation information. It should also be noted that the number of trawl catcher processors declined in more recent years and that with the exception of Pacific cod, allocations cannot be reported separately from trawl CVs under the 1998-2002 qualifying year options.

**Table 24. West Yakutat Trawl Sector Share Percentages and Number of Vessels by Species under Alternative 3 Qualifying Year Options**

Vessel Class	1995-2002			1995-2001			1998-2002		
	No Drop (Percent)	Drop 1 Year (Percent)	Vessels (No.)	No Drop (Percent)	Drop 1 Year (Percent)	Vessels (No.)	No Drop (Percent)	Drop 1 Year (Percent)	Vessels No.
<b>Trawl Catcher Processors</b>									
Pacific Cod	4.48	4.48	7	4.93	4.93	7	6.33	6.33	4
Northern Rockfish			1			1			-
Pelagic Rockfish	96.87	96.72	10	96.72	96.37	10			3
POP	96.72	96.55	11	96.55	96.47	11			2
Arrowtooth	68.16	68.16	7	68.16	68.16	7			3
Deep Flatfish	25.96	25.96	7	25.96	25.96	7			3
Flathead Sole	46.29	46.29	6	46.29	46.29	6			2
Rex Sole	63.92	63.92	5	63.92	63.92	5			3
Shallow Flatfish			1			1			-
640 Pollock			1			1			1
<b>Trawl Catcher Vessels</b>									
Pacific Cod	78.50	78.50	26	86.31	86.29	26	71.94	71.94	14
Northern Rockfish	100.00	100.00	9	100.00	100.00	9	100.00	100.00	7
Pelagic Rockfish	3.13	3.28	20	3.83	3.55	20	100.00	100.00	14
POP	3.28	3.45	31	3.45	3.53	26	100.00	100.00	26
Arrowtooth	31.84	31.84	10	31.84	31.84	10	100.00	100.00	5
Deep Flatfish	74.04	74.04	22	74.04	74.04	22	100.00	100.00	11
Flathead Sole	53.71	53.71	21	53.71	53.71	21	100.00	100.00	8
Rex Sole	36.08	36.08	20	36.08	36.08	20	100.00	100.00	7
Shallow Flatfish	100.00	100.00	19	100.00	100.00	18	100.00	100.00	10
640 Pollock	100.00	100.00	36	100.00	100.00	34	100.00	100.00	27

Note: Hook and Line catches of species other than Pacific cod and deepwater flatfish were ignored. To protect confidentiality, black-shaded trawl CP cells were added to corresponding gray-shaded trawl CV cells.



## Appendix A. Annual Catch Tables for Pacific Cod and Pollock

The tables in this appendix show annual catch and participation for Pacific Cod and Pollock by management area. Annual tables for other species were not created because the limited participation would compromise data confidentiality. The tables are set up in the same way as tables in the main report, except that each section represents the fisheries that took place during one year. There are two sets of tables for each species in each sub-area—the first showing annual catch and participation and the second showing annual catch percentages. Note that because of their length, the Pacific cod tables had to be divided across 2 pages. The order of the tables in the appendix is the same as used in the main report—moving from west to east—Western Gulf, followed by Central Gulf and West Yakutat.

**Table A1. Annual Catch and Participation in Western Gulf Pacific Cod Fisheries by License, Vessel, and Gear, 1995-2003**

Gear	Fishery	CPs with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			CVs with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			Vessels with No License				All CPs		All CVs		All Vessels	
		Catch (MT)	Perma- nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	Catch (MT)	Perma- nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	CP Catch (MT)	CP (No.)	CV Catch (MT)	CV (No.)	CP (MT)	CP (No.)	CV (MT)	CV (No.)	Total (MT)	Total (No.)
<b>1995 Fisheries</b>																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	
	Parallel	-	-	-	42.7	9	-	-	-	2	-	-	42.7	11	42.7	11	
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
HAL	EEZ	4,417.4	9	2	-	-	457.2	4	-	1	4,874.6	15	-	1	4,874.6	16	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	4	-	4	
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
POT	EEZ	-	-	-	626.2	20	-	2	-	2	-	2	626.2	24	626.2	26	
	Parallel	-	-	-	1,811.5	47	-	-	104.5	7	-	1,916.0	54	1,916.0	54		
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
TRW	EEZ	570.2	7	-	10,674.2	95	4	41.7	4	3	611.9	11	10,674.2	102	11,286.1	113	
	Parallel	-	-	-	2,005.9	36	3	-	-	-	-	-	2,005.9	39	2,005.9	39	
All	All	4,987.6	16	2	15,160.6	144	6	498.9	10	104.5	15	5,486.4	28	15,265.1	165	20,751.5	193
<b>1996 Fisheries</b>																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	
	Parallel	-	-	-	23.8	4	-	-	21.0	8	-	-	44.8	12	44.8	12	
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
HAL	EEZ	3,820.8	9	3	544.6	4	-	1	-	1	3,820.8	13	544.6	5	4,365.3	18	
	Parallel	-	-	-	98.3	7	2	-	-	2	-	-	98.3	11	98.3	11	
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
POT	EEZ	-	-	-	360.1	9	-	-	867.0	8	-	-	1,227.0	17	1,227.0	17	
	Parallel	-	-	-	1,664.1	38	-	-	389.4	15	-	-	2,053.5	53	2,053.5	53	
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
TRW	EEZ	314.2	8	-	10,293.1	52	4	319.2	9	-	633.4	17	10,293.1	56	10,926.5	73	
	Parallel	-	-	-	3,624.7	41	2	-	-	1	-	-	3,624.7	44	3,624.7	44	
All	All	4,135.0	17	4	16,608.7	90	4	319.2	10	1,277.3	54	4,454.2	26	17,886.0	172	22,340.2	198
<b>1997 Fisheries</b>																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	3	-	3	
	Parallel	-	-	-	64.9	11	-	-	73.7	23	-	-	138.7	34	138.7	34	
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
HAL	EEZ	3,135.2	5	2	-	1	-	2	-	1	3,135.2	9	-	2	3,135.2	11	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	3	-	3	
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
POT	EEZ	-	-	-	181.1	6	-	-	680.1	10	-	-	861.2	16	861.2	16	
	Parallel	-	-	-	4,138.2	41	-	-	994.9	18	-	-	5,133.1	59	5,133.1	59	
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
TRW	EEZ	227.2	13	2	14,719.5	75	4	-	296.9	5	227.2	17	15,016.4	84	15,243.6	101	
	Parallel	-	-	-	3,410.7	41	3	-	105.6	4	-	-	3,516.3	48	3,516.3	48	
All	All	3,362.4	17	4	22,514.4	90	4	-	10	2,151.1	54	3,362.4	26	24,665.6	172	28,028.0	198
<b>1998 Fisheries</b>																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	2	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	2	
	State	-	-	-	48.9	8	-	-	150.6	17	-	-	199.5	25	199.5	25	
HAL	EEZ	2,959.0	5	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2,959.0	5	-	1	2,959.0	6	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	3	-	3	
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
POT	EEZ	-	-	-	518.6	13	-	-	589.0	13	-	-	1,107.6	26	1,107.6	26	
	Parallel	-	-	-	1,569.9	30	-	-	330.1	11	-	-	1,899.9	41	1,899.9	41	
	State	-	-	-	3,906.6	51	2	-	137.9	7	-	-	4,044.5	60	4,044.5	60	
TRW	EEZ	205.9	14	-	13,148.7	61	4	-	94.9	6	205.9	16	13,243.5	71	13,449.4	87	
	Parallel	-	-	-	1,642.5	47	2	-	-	3	-	-	1,642.5	52	1,642.5	52	
All	All	3,164.9	19	-	20,835.2	125	4	-	2	1,302.4	51	3,164.9	21	22,137.6	180	25,302.5	201

Note: Shaded cells represent catch totals that cannot be released due to confidentiality restrictions. Catch totals in summary columns exclude catches from confidential cells.

Table A1. (continued)

Gear	Fishery	CPs with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			CVs with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			Vessels with No License				All CPs		All CVs		All Vessels	
		Catch (MT)	Perma- nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	Catch (MT)	Perma- nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	CP Catch (MT)	CP (No.)	CV Catch (MT)	CV (No.)	CP (MT)	CP (No.)	CV (MT)	CV (No.)	Total (MT)	Total (No.)
<b>1999 Fisheries</b>																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	2	
	Parallel	-	-	-	42.4	5	-	-	306.4	19	-	-	348.9	24	348.9	24	
	State	-	-	-	-	2	-	5.1	4	-	-	5.1	6	5.1	6		
HAL	EEZ	4,455.1	12	3	-	-	492.1	5	-	1	4,947.1	20	-	3	4,947.1	23	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	3	-	3	
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
POT	EEZ	-	2	1	595.3	17	-	3	292.1	7	-	6	887.5	24	887.5	30	
	Parallel	-	-	-	1,475.8	32	-	-	283.2	12	-	-	1,759.0	44	1,759.0	44	
	State	-	-	-	4,722.6	50	2	-	283.8	7	-	-	5,006.4	59	5,006.4	59	
TRW	EEZ	617.6	11	-	12,241.0	63	4	2	-	2	617.6	13	12,241.0	69	12,858.6	82	
	Parallel	-	-	-	2,400.0	50	3	-	-	1	-	-	2,400.0	54	2,400.0	54	
All	All	5,072.6	24	4	21,477.2	100	6	492.1	10	1,170.6	49	5,564.7	38	22,647.8	155	28,212.5	193
<b>2000 Fisheries</b>																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	3	
	State	-	-	-	37.3	4	-	-	318.5	25	-	-	355.7	29	355.7	29	
HAL	EEZ	3,591.2	8	2	-	1	-	3	-	3	3,591.2	13	-	4	3,591.2	17	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	2	
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
POT	EEZ	-	-	1	1,666.5	21	1	1	579.9	19	-	2	2,246.4	41	2,246.4	43	
	Parallel	-	-	-	1,261.7	43	1	-	1,302.9	18	-	-	2,564.6	62	2,564.6	62	
	State	-	-	-	6,006.9	58	2	-	478.3	8	-	-	6,485.2	68	6,485.2	68	
TRW	EEZ	654.1	13	-	8,040.1	46	4	-	-	-	654.1	13	8,040.1	50	8,694.2	63	
	Parallel	-	-	-	3,043.7	43	4	-	-	1	-	-	3,043.7	48	3,043.7	48	
All	All	4,245.3	21	3	20,056.3	95	6	4	2,679.5	64	4,245.3	28	22,735.7	165	26,981.1	193	
<b>2001 Fisheries</b>																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	7.6	6	-	-	7.6	7	7.6	7	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	154.9	16	-	-	154.9	18	154.9	18	
	State	-	-	-	185.8	11	-	-	1,198.8	60	-	-	1,384.5	71	1,384.5	71	
HAL	EEZ	3,347.8	10	1	-	-	1	3	-	3	3,347.8	14	-	4	3,347.8	18	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	4	-	4	
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
POT	EEZ	-	2	1	717.9	11	-	-	271.3	8	-	3	989.2	19	989.2	22	
	Parallel	-	-	-	1,340.6	31	1	-	172.3	6	-	-	1,512.9	38	1,512.9	38	
	State	-	-	-	4,249.3	49	1	-	605.3	9	-	-	4,854.6	59	4,854.6	59	
TRW	EEZ	617.8	13	-	5,044.7	40	3	-	-	1	617.8	13	5,044.7	44	5,662.5	57	
	Parallel	-	-	-	948.8	40	3	-	-	-	-	-	948.8	43	948.8	43	
All	All	3,965.6	23	2	12,487.1	91	6	3	2,410.2	93	3,965.6	28	14,897.3	190	18,862.9	218	
<b>2002 Fisheries</b>																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	8.0	4	-	-	8.1	5	-	-	16.1	9	16.1	9	
	Parallel	-	-	-	45.1	7	-	-	137.6	25	-	-	182.7	32	182.7	32	
	State	-	-	-	244.3	17	1	-	739.4	55	-	-	983.7	73	983.7	73	
HAL	EEZ	4,694.3	9	3	493.6	3	1	1,092.9	4	36.7	4	5,787.1	16	530.3	8	6,317.5	24
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
POT	EEZ	-	1	1	1,531.0	13	3	-	522.6	8	-	2	2,053.6	24	2,053.6	26	
	Parallel	-	-	-	2,292.5	29	1	-	440.8	6	-	-	2,733.2	36	2,733.2	36	
	State	-	-	-	4,438.6	46	1	-	865.9	12	-	-	5,304.5	59	5,304.5	59	
TRW	EEZ	419.2	14	-	4,736.1	38	3	-	-	2	419.2	14	4,736.1	43	5,155.3	57	
	Parallel	-	-	-	285.9	26	3	-	-	2	-	-	285.9	31	285.9	31	
All	All	5,113.5	24	4	14,075.0	92	6	1,092.9	4	2,751.2	89	6,206.3	32	16,826.2	187	23,032.5	219
<b>2003 Fisheries</b>																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	2	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	10	-	10	
	State	-	-	-	309.5	21	-	-	1,375.0	48	-	-	1,684.5	69	1,684.5	69	
HAL	EEZ	3,687.9	11	4	834.1	3	1	235.1	4	-	3,923.0	19	834.1	6	4,757.1	25	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
POT	EEZ	-	1	-	3,220.2	25	2	-	386.0	5	-	1	3,606.3	32	3,606.3	33	
	Parallel	-	-	-	5,090.0	41	2	-	741.3	10	-	-	5,831.4	53	5,831.4	53	
	State	-	-	-	3,513.8	39	1	-	425.9	8	-	-	3,939.7	48	3,939.7	48	
TRW	EEZ	317.2	9	-	1,198.1	22	3	-	-	-	317.2	9	1,198.1	25	1,515.3	34	
	Parallel	-	-	-	116.4	25	3	-	-	2	-	-	116.4	30	116.4	30	
All	All	4,005.1	21	4	14,282.3	89	5	235.1	4	2,928.3	70	4,240.2	29	17,210.6	164	21,450.7	193

Note: Shaded cells represent catch totals that cannot be released due to confidentiality restrictions. Catch totals in summary columns exclude catches from confidential cells.

**Table A2. Annual Catch Percentage by License, Vessel, and Gear in the Western Gulf Pacific Cod Fisheries, 1995-2003**

Gear	Fishery	Vessels with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			Vessels with No License			All Vessels		
		CP	CV	All Vessels	CP	CV	All Vessels	CP	CV	All Vessels
<b>1995 Fisheries</b>										
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	0.2	0.2	-	-	-	-	0.2	0.2
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HAL	EEZ	21.3	-	21.3	2.2	-	2.2	23.5	-	23.5
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	3.0	3.0	-	-	-	-	3.0	3.0
	Parallel	-	8.7	8.7	-	0.5	0.5	-	9.2	9.2
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	2.7	51.4	54.2	0.2	-	0.2	2.9	51.4	54.4
	Parallel	-	9.7	9.7	-	-	-	-	9.7	9.7
<b>All</b>	<b>All</b>	<b>24.0</b>	<b>73.1</b>	<b>97.1</b>	<b>2.4</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>2.9</b>	<b>26.4</b>	<b>73.6</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>1996 Fisheries</b>										
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	0.1	0.1	-	0.1	0.1	-	0.2	0.2
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HAL	EEZ	17.1	2.4	19.5	-	-	-	17.1	2.4	19.5
	Parallel	-	0.4	0.4	-	-	-	-	0.4	0.4
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	1.6	1.6	-	3.9	3.9	-	5.5	5.5
	Parallel	-	7.4	7.4	-	1.7	1.7	-	9.2	9.2
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	1.4	46.1	47.5	1.4	-	1.4	2.8	46.1	48.9
	Parallel	-	16.2	16.2	-	-	-	-	16.2	16.2
<b>All</b>	<b>All</b>	<b>18.5</b>	<b>74.3</b>	<b>92.9</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>5.7</b>	<b>7.1</b>	<b>19.9</b>	<b>80.1</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>1997 Fisheries</b>										
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	0.2	0.2	-	0.3	0.3	-	0.5	0.5
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HAL	EEZ	11.2	-	11.2	-	-	-	11.2	-	11.2
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	0.6	0.6	-	2.4	2.4	-	3.1	3.1
	Parallel	-	14.8	14.8	-	3.5	3.5	-	18.3	18.3
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	0.8	52.5	53.3	-	1.1	1.1	0.8	53.6	54.4
	Parallel	-	12.2	12.2	-	0.4	0.4	-	12.5	12.5
<b>All</b>	<b>All</b>	<b>12.0</b>	<b>80.3</b>	<b>92.3</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>12.0</b>	<b>88.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>1998 Fisheries</b>										
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	0.2	0.2	-	0.6	0.6	-	0.8	0.8
HAL	EEZ	11.7	-	11.7	-	-	-	11.7	-	11.7
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	2.0	2.0	-	2.3	2.3	-	4.4	4.4
	Parallel	-	6.2	6.2	-	1.3	1.3	-	7.5	7.5
	State	-	15.4	15.4	-	0.5	0.5	-	16.0	16.0
TRW	EEZ	0.8	52.0	52.8	-	0.4	0.4	0.8	52.3	53.2
	Parallel	-	6.5	6.5	-	-	-	-	6.5	6.5
<b>All</b>	<b>All</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>82.3</b>	<b>94.9</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>5.1</b>	<b>5.1</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>87.5</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Note: Shaded cells represent catch totals that cannot be released due to confidentiality restrictions. Calculation of percentages excludes all confidential numbers.

Table A2. (continued)

Gear	Fishery	Vessels with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			Vessels with No License			All Vessels		
		CP	CV	All Vessels	CP	CV	All Vessels	CP	CV	All Vessels
1999 Fisheries										
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	0.2	0.2	-	1.1	1.1	-	1.2	1.2
	State	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0
HAL	EEZ	15.8	-	15.8	1.7	-	1.7	17.5	-	17.5
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	2.1	2.1	-	1.0	1.0	-	3.1	3.1
	Parallel	-	5.2	5.2	-	1.0	1.0	-	6.2	6.2
	State	-	16.7	16.7	-	1.0	1.0	-	17.7	17.7
TRW	EEZ	2.2	43.4	45.6	-	-	-	2.2	43.4	45.6
	Parallel	-	8.5	8.5	-	-	-	-	8.5	8.5
All	All	18.0	76.1	94.1	1.7	4.1	5.9	19.7	80.3	100.0
2000 Fisheries										
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	0.1	0.1	-	1.2	1.2	-	1.3	1.3
HAL	EEZ	13.3	-	13.3	-	-	-	13.3	-	13.3
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	6.2	6.2	-	2.1	2.1	-	8.3	8.3
	Parallel	-	4.7	4.7	-	4.8	4.8	-	9.5	9.5
	State	-	22.3	22.3	-	1.8	1.8	-	24.0	24.0
TRW	EEZ	2.4	29.8	32.2	-	-	-	2.4	29.8	32.2
	Parallel	-	11.3	11.3	-	-	-	-	11.3	11.3
All	All	15.7	74.3	90.1	-	9.9	9.9	15.7	84.3	100.0
2001 Fisheries										
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	0.8	0.8	-	0.8	0.8
	State	-	1.0	1.0	-	6.4	6.4	-	7.3	7.3
HAL	EEZ	17.7	-	17.7	-	-	-	17.7	-	17.7
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	3.8	3.8	-	1.4	1.4	-	5.2	5.2
	Parallel	-	7.1	7.1	-	0.9	0.9	-	8.0	8.0
	State	-	22.5	22.5	-	3.2	3.2	-	25.7	25.7
TRW	EEZ	3.3	26.7	30.0	-	-	-	3.3	26.7	30.0
	Parallel	-	5.0	5.0	-	-	-	-	5.0	5.0
All	All	21.0	66.2	87.2	-	12.8	12.8	21.0	79.0	100.0
2002 Fisheries										
JIG	EEZ	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.1	0.1
	Parallel	-	0.2	0.2	-	0.6	0.6	-	0.8	0.8
	State	-	1.1	1.1	-	3.2	3.2	-	4.3	4.3
HAL	EEZ	20.4	2.1	22.5	4.7	0.2	4.9	25.1	2.3	27.4
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	6.6	6.6	-	2.3	2.3	-	8.9	8.9
	Parallel	-	10.0	10.0	-	1.9	1.9	-	11.9	11.9
	State	-	19.3	19.3	-	3.8	3.8	-	23.0	23.0
TRW	EEZ	1.8	20.6	22.4	-	-	-	1.8	20.6	22.4
	Parallel	-	1.2	1.2	-	-	-	-	1.2	1.2
All	All	22.2	61.1	83.3	4.7	11.9	16.7	26.9	73.1	100.0
2003 Fisheries										
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	1.4	1.4	-	6.4	6.4	-	7.9	7.9
HAL	EEZ	17.2	3.9	21.1	1.1	-	1.1	18.3	3.9	22.2
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	15.0	15.0	-	1.8	1.8	-	16.8	16.8
	Parallel	-	23.7	23.7	-	3.5	3.5	-	27.2	27.2
	State	-	16.4	16.4	-	2.0	2.0	-	18.4	18.4
TRW	EEZ	1.5	5.6	7.1	-	-	-	1.5	5.6	7.1
	Parallel	-	0.5	0.5	-	-	-	-	0.5	0.5
All	All	18.7	66.6	85.3	1.1	13.7	14.7	19.8	80.2	100.0

Note: Shaded cells represent catch totals that cannot be released due to confidentiality restrictions. Calculation of percentages excludes all confidential numbers.

**Table A3. Annual Catch and Participation in Western Gulf Area 610 Pollock Fisheries by License, Vessel, and Gear, 1995-2003**

Gear	Fishery	CPs with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			CVs with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			Vessels with No License CV				All CPs		All CVs		All Vessels	
		Catch (MT)	Perma- nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	Catch (MT)	Perma- nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	CP Catch (MT)	CP (No.)	Catch (MT)	CV (No.)	CP (MT)	CP (No.)	CV (MT)	CV (No.)	Total (MT)	Total (No.)
<b>1995 Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ		1	-	18,626.8	64	3	-	-		3		1	18,626.8	70	18,626.8	71
	Parallel		-	-	10,103.4	26	2	-	-		-	-	-	10,103.4	28	10,103.4	28
All	All		1	-	28,730.2	70	3	-	-		3		1		76	28,730.2	77
<b>1996 Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ		1	-	9,380.3	35	1		4		1		5	9,380.3	37	9,380.3	42
	Parallel		-	-	13,818.6	25	2	-	-		2	-	-	13,818.6	29	13,818.6	29
All	All		1	-	23,198.8	47	2	-	4		3		5		52	23,198.8	57
<b>1997 Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ		1	-	15,449.1	60	3		1	924.6	6		2	16,373.7	69	16,373.7	71
	Parallel		-	-	8,853.9	31	2	-	-		1	-	-	8,853.9	34	8,853.9	34
All	All		1	-	24,303.0	69	3	-	1	924.6	7	-	2		79	25,227.5	81
<b>1998 Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	19.8	8	-	10,613.9	57	2		1	1,200.4	5	19.8	9	11,814.3	64	11,834.1	73
	Parallel	-	-	-	15,728.5	42	2	-	-		3	-	-	15,728.5	47	15,728.5	47
All	All	19.8	8	-	26,342.3	73	3	-	1	1,200.4	7	19.8	9	27,542.8	83	27,562.6	92
<b>1999 Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	76.3	8	-	10,592.8	60	4	-	-	606.7	4	76.3	8	11,199.5	68	11,275.8	76
	Parallel	-	-	-	12,507.1	36	2	-	-		1	-	-	12,507.1	39	12,507.1	39
All	All	76.3	8	-	23,099.9	69	4	-	-	606.7	4	76.3	8	23,706.6	77	23,782.9	85
<b>2000 Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	87.5	11	-	4,465.2	11	2	-	-	-	-	87.5	11	4,465.2	13	4,552.8	24
	Parallel	-	-	-	16,749.0	31	3	-	-		1	-	-	16,749.0	35	16,749.0	35
All	All	87.5	11	-	21,214.3	41	4	-	-		1		11	21,214.3	46	21,301.8	57
<b>2001 Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	46.4	9	-	7,454.4	14	4	-	-		2	46.4	9	7,454.4	20	7,500.8	29
	Parallel	-	-	-	21,542.2	33	3	-	-		-	-	-	21,542.2	36	21,542.2	36
All	All	46.4	9	-	28,996.6	41	4	-	-		2		9	28,996.6	47	29,043.0	56
<b>2002 Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	89.2	10	-	7,906.8	23	2	-	-		2	89.2	10	7,906.8	27	7,996.0	37
	Parallel	-	-	-	8,147.1	25	3	-	-		-	-	-	8,147.1	28	8,147.1	28
All	All	89.2	10	-	16,053.8	39	3	-	-		2		10	16,053.8	44	16,143.1	54
<b>2003 Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	201.2	15	-	7,201.4	18	2	-	-	-	-	201.2	15	7,201.4	20	7,402.7	35
	Parallel	-	-	-	8,870.7	25	3	-	-		2	-	-	8,870.7	30	8,870.7	30
All	All	201.2	15	-	16,072.1	31	3	-	-		2		15	16,072.1	36	16,273.4	51

Note: Shaded cells represent catch totals that cannot be released due to confidentiality restrictions. Catch totals in summary columns exclude catches from confidential cells.

**Table A4. Annual Catch Percentage by License, Vessel, and Gear in the Western Gulf Area 610 Pollock Fisheries, 1995-2003**

Gear	Fishery	Vessels with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			Vessels with No License			All Vessels		
		CP	CV	All Vessels	CP	CV	All Vessels	CP	CV	All Vessels
<b>1995 Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ		64.8	64.8	-			-	64.8	64.8
	Parallel	-	35.2	35.2	-	-	-	-	35.2	35.2
All	All		100.0	100.0					100.0	100.0
<b>1996 Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ		40.4	40.4					40.4	40.4
	Parallel	-	59.6	59.6	-			-	59.6	59.6
All	All		100.0	100.0					100.0	100.0
<b>1997 Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ		61.2	61.2		3.7	3.7		64.9	64.9
	Parallel	-	35.1	35.1	-			-	35.1	35.1
All	All		96.3	96.3		3.7	3.7		100.0	100.0
<b>1998 Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	0.1	38.5	38.6		4.4	4.4	0.1	42.9	42.9
	Parallel	-	57.1	57.1	-			-	57.1	57.1
All	All	0.1	95.6	95.6		4.4	4.4	0.1	99.9	100.0
<b>1999 Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	0.3	44.5	44.9		2.6	2.6	0.3	47.1	47.4
	Parallel	-	52.6	52.6	-			-	52.6	52.6
All	All	0.3	97.1	97.4		2.6	2.6	0.3	99.7	100.0
<b>2000 Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	0.4	21.0	21.4		-	-	0.4	21.0	21.4
	Parallel	-	78.6	78.6	-			-	78.6	78.6
All	All	0.4	99.6	100.0				0.4	99.6	100.0
<b>2001 Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	0.2	25.7	25.8				0.2	25.7	25.8
	Parallel	-	74.2	74.2	-			-	74.2	74.2
All	All	0.2	99.8	100.0				0.2	99.8	100.0
<b>2002 Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	0.6	49.0	49.5				0.6	49.0	49.5
	Parallel	-	50.5	50.5	-			-	50.5	50.5
All	All	0.6	99.4	100.0				0.6	99.4	100.0
<b>2003 Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	1.2	44.3	45.5		-	-	1.2	44.3	45.5
	Parallel	-	54.5	54.5	-			-	54.5	54.5
All	All	1.2	98.8	100.0				1.2	98.8	100.0

Note: Shaded cells represent catch totals that cannot be released due to confidentiality restrictions. Calculation of percentages excludes all confidential numbers.

**Table A5. Annual Catch and Participation in Central Gulf Pacific Cod Fisheries by License, Vessel, and Gear, 1995-2003**

Gear	Fishery	CPs with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			CVs with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			Vessels with No License				All CPs		All CVs		All Vessels	
		Catch (MT)	Perma- nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	Catch (MT)	Perma- nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	CP Catch (MT)	CP (No.)	CV Catch (MT)	CV (No.)	CP (MT)	CP (No.)	CV (MT)	CV (No.)	Total (MT)	Total (No.)
<b>1995 Fisheries</b>																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	11.5	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	11.5	12	11.5	12	
	Parallel	-	-	-	21.1	9	-	-	17.4	7	-	-	38.6	16	38.6	16	
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
HAL	EEZ	216.1	7	1	2,273.2	78	-	-	77.7	10	216.1	8	2,350.9	88	2,567.0	96	
	Parallel	-	-	-	1,847.7	81	1	-	153.2	16	-	-	2,000.9	98	2,000.9	98	
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
POT	EEZ	-	-	-	6,070.2	64	1	-	530.4	11	-	-	6,600.5	76	6,600.5	76	
	Parallel	-	-	-	6,879.8	72	1	-	274.8	10	-	-	7,154.6	83	7,154.6	83	
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
TRW	EEZ	1,776.4	18	3	22,521.9	105	6	83.6	5	3	1,860.0	26	22,521.9	114	24,381.9	140	
	Parallel	-	-	-	618.5	42	2	-	-	1	-	-	618.5	45	618.5	45	
All	All	1,992.4	25	4	40,243.9	310	9	83.6	5	1,053.5	46	2,076.1	34	41,297.4	365	43,373.5	399
<b>1996 Fisheries</b>																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	19.7	4	1	-	-	2	-	-	19.7	7	19.7	7	
	Parallel	-	-	-	12.4	6	-	-	1.5	6	-	-	13.9	12	13.9	12	
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
HAL	EEZ	494.2	4	-	2,738.6	81	1	-	67.5	9	494.2	4	2,806.0	91	3,300.2	95	
	Parallel	-	-	-	1,543.0	84	-	-	280.6	22	-	-	1,823.6	106	1,823.6	106	
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
POT	EEZ	-	-	-	5,715.8	55	1	-	121.2	5	-	-	5,837.0	61	5,837.0	61	
	Parallel	-	-	-	4,392.3	54	1	-	309.7	7	-	-	4,702.0	62	4,702.0	62	
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
TRW	EEZ	381.7	12	3	22,508.3	104	5	1,717.8	7	3	2,099.6	22	22,508.3	112	24,607.9	134	
	Parallel	-	-	-	1,007.3	32	1	-	-	1	-	-	1,007.3	34	1,007.3	34	
All	All	875.9	16	2	37,937.4	286	9	1,717.8	7	780.4	116	2,593.7	22	38,717.8	436	41,311.5	458
<b>1997 Fisheries</b>																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	7.1	8	-	-	4.2	9	-	-	11.4	17	11.4	17	
	Parallel	-	-	-	562.3	47	1	-	592.6	63	-	-	1,154.9	111	1,154.9	111	
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
HAL	EEZ	-	1	-	4,246.2	108	-	-	202.0	18	-	1	4,448.2	126	4,448.2	127	
	Parallel	-	-	-	1,560.0	87	-	-	229.4	25	-	-	1,789.3	112	1,789.3	112	
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
POT	EEZ	-	-	-	3,788.3	35	1	-	-	2	-	-	3,788.3	38	3,788.3	38	
	Parallel	-	-	-	7,133.5	57	2	-	497.1	21	-	-	7,630.7	80	7,630.7	80	
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
TRW	EEZ	770.6	15	2	23,987.8	110	6	19.4	4	1,456.3	12	790.0	21	25,444.2	128	26,234.2	149
	Parallel	-	-	-	403.1	66	4	-	-	3	-	-	403.1	73	403.1	73	
All	All	770.6	16	2	41,688.4	286	9	19.4	7	2,981.7	116	79	44,670.1	436	45,460.1	458	
<b>1998 Fisheries</b>																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	20.4	7	-	-	2.8	5	-	-	23.1	12	23.1	12	
	Parallel	-	-	-	25.7	6	-	-	5.3	8	-	-	31.0	14	31.0	14	
	State	-	-	-	482.2	48	-	-	586.1	73	-	-	1,068.2	121	1,068.2	121	
HAL	EEZ	8.1	4	-	3,745.7	82	1	-	66.4	7	8.1	5	3,812.1	90	3,820.2	95	
	Parallel	-	-	-	1,670.4	71	1	-	138.1	15	-	-	1,808.5	87	1,808.5	87	
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
POT	EEZ	-	-	-	6,184.0	42	1	-	445.3	7	-	-	6,629.3	50	6,629.3	50	
	Parallel	-	-	-	2,569.0	35	1	-	87.3	5	-	-	2,656.3	41	2,656.3	41	
	State	-	-	-	4,269.0	59	4	-	708.7	22	-	-	4,977.7	85	4,977.7	85	
TRW	EEZ	3,906.1	10	1	19,141.0	115	6	248.7	6	1,316.8	14	4,154.9	17	20,457.8	135	24,612.7	152
	Parallel	-	-	-	461.6	76	3	-	6.9	5	-	-	468.5	84	468.5	84	
All	All	3,914.3	14	1	38,569.0	310	12	248.7	7	3,363.6	122	4,163.0	22	41,932.6	444	46,095.6	466

Note: Shaded cells represent catch totals that cannot be released due to confidentiality restrictions. Catch totals in summary columns exclude catches from confidential cells.

Table A5. (continued)

Gear	Fishery	CPs with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			CVs with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			Vessels with No License				All CPs		All CVs		All Vessels	
		Catch (MT)	Perma- nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	Catch (MT)	Perma- nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	CP Catch (MT)	CP (No.)	CV Catch (MT)	CV (No.)	CP (MT)	CP (No.)	CV (MT)	CV (No.)	Total (MT)	Total (No.)
<b>1999 Fisheries</b>																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	7.4	5	-	-	-	10.3	7	-	-	17.6	12	17.6	12
	Parallel	-	-	-	12.3	5	-	-	-	57.3	11	-	-	69.7	16	69.7	16
	State	-	-	-	326.8	38	1	-	-	716.0	77	-	-	1,042.8	116	1,042.8	116
HAL	EEZ	309.4	6	-	3,809.2	72	3	-	2	50.7	9	309.4	8	3,859.9	84	4,169.3	92
	Parallel	-	-	-	1,895.0	72	2	-	-	166.9	15	-	-	2,061.9	89	2,061.9	89
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	729.2	2	2	7,459.5	49	2	2,202.9	7	663.2	15	2,932.2	11	8,122.7	66	11,054.9	77
	Parallel	-	-	-	4,090.2	37	1	-	-	304.5	11	-	-	4,394.7	49	4,394.7	49
	State	-	-	-	5,355.7	79	4	-	-	1,417.8	39	-	-	6,773.5	122	6,773.5	122
TRW	EEZ	1,377.7	11	1	18,717.9	81	5	-	3	348.6	6	1,377.7	15	19,066.6	92	20,444.2	107
	Parallel	-	-	-	541.6	61	3	-	-	-	3	-	-	541.6	67	541.6	67
All	All	2,416.3	19	3	42,215.6	292	13	2,202.9	12	3,735.4	146	4,619.2	34	45,951.0	451	50,570.3	485
<b>2000 Fisheries</b>																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	3	-	3
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	29.1	11	-	-	29.1	14	29.1	14
	State	-	-	-	352.2	40	1	-	-	898.7	100	-	-	1,250.8	141	1,250.8	141
HAL	EEZ	207.9	7	-	4,294.5	91	4	-	1	139.6	17	207.9	8	4,434.0	112	4,641.9	120
	Parallel	-	-	-	1,645.0	83	4	-	-	282.6	28	-	-	1,927.6	115	1,927.6	115
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	2	-	7,596.0	63	3	-	1	1,847.2	14	-	3	9,443.2	80	9,443.2	83
	Parallel	-	-	-	1,824.9	45	1	-	-	694.9	19	-	-	2,519.9	65	2,519.9	65
	State	-	-	-	3,373.2	75	2	-	-	507.7	26	-	-	3,880.9	103	3,880.9	103
TRW	EEZ	1,712.1	10	1	10,625.9	56	2	-	-	-	2	1,712.1	11	10,625.9	60	12,337.9	71
	Parallel	-	-	-	108.3	18	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	108.3	19	108.3	19
All	All	1,920.0	19	1	29,819.9	286	9	-	2	4,399.8	160	1,920.0	22	34,219.7	455	36,139.6	477
<b>2001 Fisheries</b>																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	6	-	6
	Parallel	-	-	-	3.4	4	-	-	-	6.7	8	-	-	10.2	12	10.2	12
	State	-	-	-	232.0	18	1	-	-	402.2	63	-	-	634.1	82	634.1	82
HAL	EEZ	-	1	-	4,239.1	79	2	-	1	161.2	8	-	2	4,400.4	89	4,400.4	91
	Parallel	-	-	-	973.5	61	-	-	-	156.9	19	-	-	1,130.3	80	1,130.3	80
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	2	1	2,017.3	44	1	-	-	-	2	-	3	2,017.3	47	2,017.3	50
	Parallel	-	-	-	1,388.5	36	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	1,388.5	39	1,388.5	39
	State	-	-	-	2,625.1	46	1	-	-	328.7	10	-	-	2,953.8	57	2,953.8	57
TRW	EEZ	2,446.6	10	1	14,477.0	65	4	-	-	-	2	2,446.6	11	14,477.0	72	16,923.6	83
	Parallel	-	-	-	100.4	44	2	-	-	-	2	-	-	100.4	48	100.4	48
All	All	2,446.6	13	2	26,056.4	235	8	-	1	1,055.7	96	2,446.6	16	27,112.1	339	29,558.7	355
<b>2002 Fisheries</b>																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	2.9	4	-	-	-	5.8	4	-	-	8.7	8	8.7	8
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	5	-	5
	State	-	-	-	364.6	23	-	-	-	331.1	41	-	-	695.6	64	695.6	64
HAL	EEZ	1,276.4	2	3	5,888.7	59	1	-	1	-	1	1,276.4	6	5,888.7	61	7,165.1	67
	Parallel	-	-	-	751.9	44	-	-	-	78.0	6	-	-	829.9	50	829.9	50
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	-	1	1,909.1	28	1	-	1	-	1	-	2	1,909.1	30	1,909.1	32
	Parallel	-	-	-	1,273.5	28	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1,273.5	29	1,273.5	29
	State	-	-	-	4,508.4	45	-	-	-	450.0	5	-	-	4,958.3	50	4,958.3	50
TRW	EEZ	686.8	8	1	10,125.6	53	1	-	-	-	-	686.8	9	10,125.6	54	10,812.4	63
	Parallel	-	-	-	130.0	46	2	-	-	-	1	-	-	130.0	49	130.0	49
All	All	1,963.2	10	5	24,954.8	196	5	-	2	864.8	54	1,963.2	17	25,819.6	255	27,782.8	272
<b>2003 Fisheries</b>																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	4	-	4
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	10	-	10
	State	-	-	-	641.5	41	-	-	-	1,157.3	84	-	-	1,798.8	125	1,798.8	125
HAL	EEZ	1,254.3	4	3	2,254.6	50	1	-	1	-	1	1,254.3	8	2,254.6	52	3,508.8	60
	Parallel	-	-	-	1,242.2	51	1	-	-	7.9	4	-	-	1,250.0	56	1,250.0	56
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	1	-	1,556.0	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1,556.0	20	1,556.0	21
	Parallel	-	-	-	1,574.6	21	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1,574.6	22	1,574.6	22
	State	-	-	-	3,842.2	54	-	-	-	350.4	11	-	-	4,192.6	65	4,192.6	65
TRW	EEZ	1,447.8	10	2	13,950.1	49	3	-	-	-	-	1,447.8	12	13,950.1	52	15,397.9	64
	Parallel	-	-	-	170.8	27	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	170.8	30	170.8	30
All	All	2,702.0	15	5	25,231.8	192	5	-	1	1,515.5	92	2,702.0	21	26,747.4	289	29,449.4	310

Note: Shaded cells represent catch totals that cannot be released due to confidentiality restrictions. Catch totals in summary columns exclude catches from confidential cells.



**Table A6. Annual Catch Percentage by License, Vessel, and Gear in the Central Gulf Pacific Cod Fisheries, 1995-2003**

Gear	Fishery	Vessels with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			Vessels with No License			All Vessels		
		CP	CV	All Vessels	CP	CV	All Vessels	CP	CV	All Vessels
<b>1995 Fisheries</b>										
JIG	EEZ	-	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.0
	Parallel	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.1	0.1
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HAL	EEZ	0.5	5.2	5.7	-	0.2	0.2	0.5	5.4	5.9
	Parallel	-	4.3	4.3	-	0.4	0.4	-	4.6	4.6
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	14.0	14.0	-	1.2	1.2	-	15.2	15.2
	Parallel	-	15.9	15.9	-	0.6	0.6	-	16.5	16.5
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	4.1	51.9	56.0	0.2	-	0.2	4.3	51.9	56.2
	Parallel	-	1.4	1.4	-	-	-	-	1.4	1.4
<b>All</b>	<b>All</b>	<b>4.6</b>	<b>92.8</b>	<b>97.4</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>2.4</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>4.8</b>	<b>95.2</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>1996 Fisheries</b>										
JIG	EEZ	-	0.0	0.0	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.0
	Parallel	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HAL	EEZ	1.2	6.6	7.8	-	0.2	0.2	1.2	6.8	8.0
	Parallel	-	3.7	3.7	-	0.7	0.7	-	4.4	4.4
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	13.8	13.8	-	0.3	0.3	-	14.1	14.1
	Parallel	-	10.6	10.6	-	0.7	0.7	-	11.4	11.4
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	0.9	54.5	55.4	4.2	-	4.2	5.1	54.5	59.6
	Parallel	-	2.4	2.4	-	-	-	-	2.4	2.4
<b>All</b>	<b>All</b>	<b>2.1</b>	<b>91.8</b>	<b>94.0</b>	<b>4.2</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>6.0</b>	<b>6.3</b>	<b>93.7</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>1997 Fisheries</b>										
JIG	EEZ	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0
	Parallel	-	1.2	1.2	-	1.3	1.3	-	2.5	2.5
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HAL	EEZ	-	9.3	9.3	-	0.4	0.4	-	9.8	9.8
	Parallel	-	3.4	3.4	-	0.5	0.5	-	3.9	3.9
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	8.3	8.3	-	-	-	-	8.3	8.3
	Parallel	-	15.7	15.7	-	1.1	1.1	-	16.8	16.8
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	1.7	52.8	54.5	0.0	3.2	3.2	1.7	56.0	57.7
	Parallel	-	0.9	0.9	-	-	-	-	0.9	0.9
<b>All</b>	<b>All</b>	<b>1.7</b>	<b>91.7</b>	<b>93.4</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>6.6</b>	<b>6.6</b>	<b>1.7</b>	<b>98.3</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>1998 Fisheries</b>										
JIG	EEZ	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.1	0.1
	Parallel	-	0.1	0.1	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.1	0.1
	State	-	1.0	1.0	-	1.3	1.3	-	2.3	2.3
HAL	EEZ	0.0	8.1	8.1	-	0.1	0.1	0.0	8.3	8.3
	Parallel	-	3.6	3.6	-	0.3	0.3	-	3.9	3.9
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	13.4	13.4	-	1.0	1.0	-	14.4	14.4
	Parallel	-	5.6	5.6	-	0.2	0.2	-	5.8	5.8
	State	-	9.3	9.3	-	1.5	1.5	-	10.8	10.8
TRW	EEZ	8.5	41.5	50.0	0.5	2.9	3.4	9.0	44.4	53.4
	Parallel	-	1.0	1.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	1.0	1.0
<b>All</b>	<b>All</b>	<b>8.5</b>	<b>83.7</b>	<b>92.2</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>7.3</b>	<b>7.8</b>	<b>9.0</b>	<b>91.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Note: Shaded cells represent catch totals that cannot be released due to confidentiality restrictions. Calculation of percentages excludes all confidential numbers.

Table A6. (continued)

Gear	Fishery	Vessels with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			Vessels with No License			All Vessels		
		CP	CV	All Vessels	CP	CV	All Vessels	CP	CV	All Vessels
1999 Fisheries										
JIG	EEZ	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0
	Parallel	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.1	0.1	-	0.1	0.1
	State	-	0.6	0.6	-	1.4	1.4	-	2.1	2.1
HAL	EEZ	0.6	7.5	8.1	-	0.1	0.1	0.6	7.6	8.2
	Parallel	-	3.7	3.7	-	0.3	0.3	-	4.1	4.1
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	1.4	14.8	16.2	4.4	1.3	5.7	5.8	16.1	21.9
	Parallel	-	8.1	8.1	-	0.6	0.6	-	8.7	8.7
	State	-	10.6	10.6	-	2.8	2.8	-	13.4	13.4
TRW	EEZ	2.7	37.0	39.7	-	0.7	0.7	2.7	37.7	40.4
	Parallel	-	1.1	1.1	-	-	-	-	1.1	1.1
All	All	4.8	83.5	88.3	4.4	7.4	11.7	9.1	90.9	100.0
2000 Fisheries										
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.1	-	0.1	0.1
	State	-	1.0	1.0	-	2.5	2.5	-	3.5	3.5
HAL	EEZ	0.6	11.9	12.5	-	0.4	0.4	0.6	12.3	12.8
	Parallel	-	4.6	4.6	-	0.8	0.8	-	5.3	5.3
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	21.0	21.0	-	5.1	5.1	-	26.1	26.1
	Parallel	-	5.0	5.0	-	1.9	1.9	-	7.0	7.0
	State	-	9.3	9.3	-	1.4	1.4	-	10.7	10.7
TRW	EEZ	4.7	29.4	34.1	-	-	-	4.7	29.4	34.1
	Parallel	-	0.3	0.3	-	-	-	-	0.3	0.3
All	All	5.3	82.5	87.8	-	12.2	12.2	5.3	94.7	100.0
2001 Fisheries										
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0
	State	-	0.8	0.8	-	1.4	1.4	-	2.1	2.1
HAL	EEZ	-	14.3	14.3	-	0.5	0.5	-	14.9	14.9
	Parallel	-	3.3	3.3	-	0.5	0.5	-	3.8	3.8
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	6.8	6.8	-	-	-	-	6.8	6.8
	Parallel	-	4.7	4.7	-	-	-	-	4.7	4.7
	State	-	8.9	8.9	-	1.1	1.1	-	10.0	10.0
TRW	EEZ	8.3	49.0	57.3	-	-	-	8.3	49.0	57.3
	Parallel	-	0.3	0.3	-	-	-	-	0.3	0.3
All	All	8.3	88.2	96.4	-	3.6	3.6	8.3	91.7	100.0
2002 Fisheries										
JIG	EEZ	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.0
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	1.3	1.3	-	1.2	1.2	-	2.5	2.5
HAL	EEZ	4.6	21.2	25.8	-	-	-	4.6	21.2	25.8
	Parallel	-	2.7	2.7	-	0.3	0.3	-	3.0	3.0
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	6.9	6.9	-	-	-	-	6.9	6.9
	Parallel	-	4.6	4.6	-	-	-	-	4.6	4.6
	State	-	16.2	16.2	-	1.6	1.6	-	17.8	17.8
TRW	EEZ	2.5	36.4	38.9	-	-	-	2.5	36.4	38.9
	Parallel	-	0.5	0.5	-	-	-	-	0.5	0.5
All	All	7.1	89.8	96.9	-	3.1	3.1	7.1	92.9	100.0
2003 Fisheries										
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	2.2	2.2	-	3.9	3.9	-	6.1	6.1
HAL	EEZ	4.3	7.7	11.9	-	-	-	4.3	7.7	11.9
	Parallel	-	4.2	4.2	-	0.0	0.0	-	4.2	4.2
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	5.3	5.3	-	-	-	-	5.3	5.3
	Parallel	-	5.3	5.3	-	-	-	-	5.3	5.3
	State	-	13.0	13.0	-	1.2	1.2	-	14.2	14.2
TRW	EEZ	4.9	47.4	52.3	-	-	-	4.9	47.4	52.3
	Parallel	-	0.6	0.6	-	-	-	-	0.6	0.6
All	All	9.2	85.7	94.9	-	5.1	5.1	9.2	90.8	100.0

Note: Shaded cells represent catch totals that cannot be released due to confidentiality restrictions. Calculation of percentages excludes all confidential numbers.

**Table A7. Annual Catch and Participation in Central Gulf Area 620 and 621 Pollock Fisheries by License, Vessel, and Gear, 1995-2003**

Gear	Fishery	CPs with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			CVs with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			Vessels with No License				All CPs		All CVs		All Vessels	
		Catch (MT)	Perma- nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	Catch (MT)	Perma- nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	CP Catch (MT)	CP (No.)	CV Catch (MT)	CV (No.)	CP (MT)	CP (No.)	CV (MT)	CV (No.)	Total (MT)	Total (No.)
1995 Fisheries																	
TRW	EEZ		2	-	8,554.9	61	2	-	-		3		2	8,554.9	66	8,554.9	68
	Parallel	-	-	-	2,288.9	37	1	-	-		1	-	-	2,288.9	39	2,288.9	39
All	All		2	-	10,843.8	68	2	-	-		3		2		73	10,843.8	75
1996 Fisheries																	
TRW	EEZ		2	-	6,435.9	56	3		4		1		6	6,435.9	60	6,435.9	66
	Parallel	-	-	-	3,911.0	35	2	-	-		1	-	-	3,911.0	38	3,911.0	38
All	All		2	-	10,346.9	61	3	-	4		1		6		65	10,346.9	71
1997 Fisheries																	
TRW	EEZ	-	-	-	16,869.6	72	3	-	-	576.0	5	-	-	17,445.6	80	17,445.6	80
	Parallel	-	-	-	12,187.8	57	3	-	-		2	-	-	12,187.8	62	12,187.8	62
All	All	-	-	-	29,057.4	77	3	-	-	576.0	5	-	-	29,633.4	85	29,633.4	85
1998 Fisheries																	
TRW	EEZ	12.0	7	1	23,878.1	69	2		1,291.2	10	12.0	9	25,169.3	81	25,181.3	90	
	Parallel	-	-	-	21,945.1	70	3	-	1,376.8	5	-	-	23,321.8	78	23,321.8	78	
All	All	12.0	7	1	45,823.2	87	3	-	1,267.9	13	12.0	9	48,491.1	103	48,503.1	112	
1999 Fisheries																	
TRW	EEZ	6.6	8	-	26,510.9	66	3	-	1,112.7	8	6.6	8	27,623.6	77	27,630.2	85	
	Parallel	-	-	-	9,052.8	52	3	-	-	-	-	-	9,052.8	55	9,052.8	55	
All	All	6.6	8	-	35,563.7	77	3	-	1,112.7	8	6.6	8	36,676.4	88	36,683.0	96	
2000 Fisheries																	
TRW	EEZ	20.5	4	1	9,830.1	40	1	-	-		1	20.5	5	9,830.1	42	9,850.7	47
	Parallel	-	-	-	816.9	12	1	-	-	-	-	-	816.9	13	816.9	13	
All	All	20.5	4	1	10,647.0	41	1	-	-		1	20.5	5	10,647.0	43	10,667.6	48
2001 Fisheries																	
TRW	EEZ	12.0	7	1	13,667.6	53	3	-	-		2	12.0	8	13,667.6	58	13,679.6	66
	Parallel	-	-	-	2,440.6	35	1	-	-		2	-	-	2,440.6	38	2,440.6	38
All	All	12.0	7	1	16,108.2	53	3	-	-		2	12.0	8	16,108.2	58	16,120.2	66
2002 Fisheries																	
TRW	EEZ	7.9	4	1	13,706.7	45	1	-	-		1	7.9	5	13,706.7	47	13,714.6	52
	Parallel	-	-	-	6,350.2	42	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,350.2	45	6,350.2	45
All	All	7.9	4	1	20,056.9	58	3	-	-		1	7.9	5	20,056.9	62	20,064.9	67
2003 Fisheries																	
TRW	EEZ	42.2	7	1	15,818.8	38	2	-	-	-	42.2	8	15,818.8	40	15,861.0	48	
	Parallel	-	-	-	2,827.0	29	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,827.0	32	2,827.0	32
All	All	42.2	7	1	18,645.8	44	3	-	-	-	42.2	8	18,645.8	47	18,688.0	55	

Note: Shaded cells represent catch totals that cannot be released due to confidentiality restrictions. Catch totals in summary columns exclude catches from confidential cells.

**Table A8. Annual Catch Percentage by License, Vessel, and Gear in the Central Gulf Area 620 and 621 Pollock Fisheries, 1995-2003**

Gear	Fishery	Vessels with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			Vessels with No License			All Vessels		
		CP	CV	All Vessels	CP	CV	All Vessels	CP	CV	All Vessels
<b>1995 Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ		78.9	78.9	-			-	78.9	78.9
	Parallel	-	21.1	21.1	-			-	21.1	21.1
All	All		100.0	100.0					100.0	100.0
<b>1996 Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ		62.2	62.2					62.2	62.2
	Parallel	-	37.8	37.8	-			-	37.8	37.8
All	All		100.0	100.0					100.0	100.0
<b>1997 Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	-	56.9	56.9	-	1.9	1.9	-	58.9	58.9
	Parallel	-	41.1	41.1	-			-	41.1	41.1
All	All	-	98.1	98.1	-	1.9	1.9	-	100.0	100.0
<b>1998 Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	0.0	49.2	49.3		2.7	2.7	0.0	51.9	51.9
	Parallel	-	45.2	45.2	-	2.8	2.8	-	48.1	48.1
All	All	0.0	94.5	94.5		5.5	5.5	0.0	100.0	100.0
<b>1999 Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	0.0	72.3	72.3		3.0	3.0	0.0	75.3	75.3
	Parallel	-	24.7	24.7	-	-	-	-	24.7	24.7
All	All	0.0	96.9	97.0		3.0	3.0	0.0	100.0	100.0
<b>2000 Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	0.2	92.1	92.3				0.2	92.1	92.3
	Parallel	-	7.7	7.7	-	-	-	-	7.7	7.7
All	All	0.2	99.8	100.0				0.2	99.8	100.0
<b>2001 Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	0.1	84.8	84.9				0.1	84.8	84.9
	Parallel	-	15.1	15.1	-			-	15.1	15.1
All	All	0.1	99.9	100.0				0.1	99.9	100.0
<b>2002 Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	0.0	68.3	68.4				0.0	68.3	68.4
	Parallel	-	31.6	31.6	-	-	-	-	31.6	31.6
All	All	0.0	100.0	100.0				0.0	100.0	100.0
<b>2003 Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	0.2	84.6	84.9		-	-	0.2	84.6	84.9
	Parallel	-	15.1	15.1	-	-	-	-	15.1	15.1
All	All	0.2	99.8	100.0		-	-	0.2	99.8	100.0

Note: Shaded cells represent catch totals that cannot be released due to confidentiality restrictions. Calculation of percentages excludes all confidential numbers.

**Table A9. Annual Catch and Participation in Central Gulf Area 630 and 631 Pollock Fisheries by License, Vessel, and Gear, 1995-2003**

Gear	Fishery	CPs with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			CVs with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			Vessels with No License				All CPs		All CVs		All Vessels	
		Catch (MT)	Perma- nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	Catch (MT)	Perma- nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	CP Catch (MT)	CP (No.)	CV Catch (MT)	CV (No.)	CP (MT)	CP (No.)	CV (MT)	CV (No.)	Total (MT)	Total (No.)
<b>1995 Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	-	-	-	19,939.8	70	2	-	-	2	-	-	19,939.8	74	19,939.8	74	
	Parallel	-	-	-	1,661.5	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,661.5	19	1,661.5	19	
All	All	-	-	-	21,601.3	70	2	-	-	2	-	-	21,601.3	74	21,601.3	74	
<b>1996 Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ		2	-	8,619.9	52	1	-	-	2		2	8,619.9	55	8,619.9	57	
	Parallel	-	-	-	2,062.3	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,062.3	24	2,062.3	24	
All	All		2	-	10,682.2	56	1	-	-	2		2	10,682.2	59	10,682.2	61	
<b>1997 Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ		1	-	17,812.9	60	2	-	-	139.5	5		17,952.4	67	17,952.4	68	
	Parallel	-	-	-	4,037.6	36	1	-	-		1	-	4,037.6	38	4,037.6	38	
All	All		1	-	21,850.5	61	2	-	-	139.5	5	-	21,850.5	68	21,850.5	69	
<b>1998 Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	46.2	7	1	29,232.0	66	1		1	1,529.0	6	46.2	9	30,761.0	73	30,807.3	82
	Parallel	-	-	-	6,842.6	37	2	-	-		1	-	6,842.6	40	6,842.6	40	
All	All	46.2	7	1	36,074.6	70	2	-	1	1,529.0	7	46.2	9	37,603.6	79	37,649.9	88
<b>1999 Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	37.8	7	1	19,399.2	56	1	-	-		2	37.8	8	19,399.2	59	19,437.0	67
	Parallel	-	-	-	8,531.0	45	1	-	-		2	-	8,531.0	48	8,531.0	48	
All	All	37.8	7	1	27,930.2	58	1	-	-		2	37.8	8	27,930.2	61	27,967.9	69
<b>2000 Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	59.4	6	1	33,489.6	54	1	-	-		1	59.4	7	33,489.6	56	33,549.1	63
	Parallel	-	-	-	1,141.8	18	1	-	-		-	-	1,141.8	19	1,141.8	19	
All	All	59.4	6	1	34,631.4	54	1	-	-		1	59.4	7	34,631.4	56	34,690.8	63
<b>2001 Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	34.6	6	1	14,311.8	62	2	-	-	533.7	4	34.6	7	14,845.5	68	14,880.1	75
	Parallel	-	-	-	4,006.3	42	2	-	-		1	-	4,006.3	45	4,006.3	45	
All	All	34.6	6	1	18,318.1	62	2	-	-	533.7	4	34.6	7	18,851.8	68	18,886.4	75
<b>2002 Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	48.1	4	1	3,019.3	49	1	-	-	-	-	48.1	5	3,019.3	50	3,067.5	55
	Parallel	-	-	-	5,504.7	34	1	-	-	-	-	-	5,504.7	35	5,504.7	35	
All	All	48.1	4	1	8,524.0	50	1	-	-	-	-	48.1	5	8,524.0	51	8,572.2	56
<b>2003 Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	139.4	6	1	7,216.5	41	2	-	-	-	-	139.4	7	7,216.5	43	7,355.9	50
	Parallel	-	-	-	4,417.7	29	2	-	-	-	-	-	4,417.7	31	4,417.7	31	
All	All	139.4	6	1	11,634.2	47	3	-	-	-	-	139.4	7	11,634.2	50	11,773.6	57

Note: Shaded cells represent catch totals that cannot be released due to confidentiality restrictions. Catch totals in summary columns exclude catches from confidential cells.

**Table A10. Annual Catch Percentage by License, Vessel, and Gear in the Central Gulf Area 630 and 631 Pollock Fisheries, 1995-2003**

Gear	Fishery	Vessels with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			Vessels with No License			All Vessels		
		CP	CV	All Vessels	CP	CV	All Vessels	CP	CV	All Vessels
1995 Fisheries										
TRW	EEZ	-	92.3	92.3	-	-	-	-	92.3	92.3
	Parallel	-	7.7	7.7	-	-	-	-	7.7	7.7
All	All	-	100.0	100.0	-	-	-	-	100.0	100.0
1996 Fisheries										
TRW	EEZ	-	80.7	80.7	-	-	-	-	80.7	80.7
	Parallel	-	19.3	19.3	-	-	-	-	19.3	19.3
All	All	-	100.0	100.0	-	-	-	-	100.0	100.0
1997 Fisheries										
TRW	EEZ	-	81.0	81.0	-	0.6	0.6	-	81.6	81.6
	Parallel	-	18.4	18.4	-	-	-	-	18.4	18.4
All	All	-	99.4	99.4	-	0.6	0.6	-	100.0	100.0
1998 Fisheries										
TRW	EEZ	0.1	77.6	77.8	-	4.1	4.1	0.1	81.7	81.8
	Parallel	-	18.2	18.2	-	-	-	-	18.2	18.2
All	All	0.1	95.8	95.9	-	4.1	4.1	0.1	99.9	100.0
1999 Fisheries										
TRW	EEZ	0.1	69.4	69.5	-	-	-	0.1	69.4	69.5
	Parallel	-	30.5	30.5	-	-	-	-	30.5	30.5
All	All	0.1	99.9	100.0	-	-	-	0.1	99.9	100.0
2000 Fisheries										
TRW	EEZ	0.2	96.5	96.7	-	-	-	0.2	96.5	96.7
	Parallel	-	3.3	3.3	-	-	-	-	3.3	3.3
All	All	0.2	99.8	100.0	-	-	-	0.2	99.8	100.0
2001 Fisheries										
TRW	EEZ	0.2	75.8	76.0	-	2.8	2.8	0.2	78.6	78.8
	Parallel	-	21.2	21.2	-	-	-	-	21.2	21.2
All	All	0.2	97.0	97.2	-	2.8	2.8	0.2	99.8	100.0
2002 Fisheries										
TRW	EEZ	0.6	35.2	35.8	-	-	-	0.6	35.2	35.8
	Parallel	-	64.2	64.2	-	-	-	-	64.2	64.2
All	All	0.6	99.4	100.0	-	-	-	0.6	99.4	100.0
2003 Fisheries										
TRW	EEZ	1.2	61.3	62.5	-	-	-	1.2	61.3	62.5
	Parallel	-	37.5	37.5	-	-	-	-	37.5	37.5
All	All	1.2	98.8	100.0	-	-	-	1.2	98.8	100.0

Note: Shaded cells represent catch totals that cannot be released due to confidentiality restrictions. Calculation of percentages excludes all confidential numbers.

**Table A11. Annual Catch and Participation in West Yakutat Pacific Cod Fisheries by License, Vessel, and Gear, 1995-2003**

Gear	Fishery	CPs with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			CVs with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			Vessels with No License				All CPs		All CVs		All Vessels	
		Catch (MT)	Perma- nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	Catch (MT)	Perma- nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	CP Catch (MT)	CP (No.)	CV Catch (MT)	CV (No.)	CP (MT)	CP (No.)	CV (MT)	CV (No.)	Total (MT)	Total (No.)
<b>1999 Fisheries</b>																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35.9	6	-	-	35.9	6	35.9	6	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HAL	EEZ	-	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	3
	Parallel	-	-	-	140.3	10	-	-	134.8	10	-	-	275.1	20	275.1	20	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	4	-	4	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	9.3	4	-	25.2	7	-	-	-	-	9.3	4	25.2	7	34.5	11	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-
All	All	9.3	6	-	165.5	24	-	-	170.7	16	9.3	6	336.2	40	345.5	46	-
<b>2000 Fisheries</b>																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	5	-	5	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	78.2	10	-	-	98.1	17	-	-	176.4	27	176.4	27	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	3	-	3	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	81.3	5	-	-	175.5	5	-	-	256.7	10	256.7	10	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	-	1	-	52.4	4	-	-	-	-	-	1	52.4	4	52.4	5	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
All	All	-	1	-	211.9	21	-	-	273.6	23	-	1	485.5	44	485.5	45	-
<b>2001 Fisheries</b>																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	3	-	3	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	36.0	4	-	-	36.0	6	36.0	6	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	2	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	3	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-
All	All	-	-	1	-	7	1	-	36.0	8	-	-	36.0	16	36.0	16	-
<b>2002 Fisheries</b>																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	2	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
All	All	-	-	1	-	2	-	-	1	-	-	2	-	2	-	4	-
<b>2003 Fisheries</b>																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	2	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	-
All	All	-	-	-	-	3	1	-	1	2	-	1	-	6	-	7	-

Note: Shaded cells represent catch totals that cannot be released due to confidentiality restrictions. Catch totals in summary columns exclude catches from confidential cells.

Table A11. (continued)

Gear	Fishery	CPs with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			CVs with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			Vessels with No License CV				All CPs		All CVs		All Vessels	
		Catch (MT)	Perma-nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	Catch (MT)	Perma-nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	CP Catch (MT)	CP (No.)	Catch (MT)	CV (No.)	CP (MT)	CP (No.)	CV (MT)	CV (No.)	Total (MT)	Total (No.)
1995 Fisheries																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	2
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HAL	EEZ	-	2	-	-	3	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	4	-	6	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	69.4	16	-	-	89.5	21	-	-	158.9	37	158.9	37	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	2	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	305.7	6	-	-	-	2	-	-	305.7	8	305.7	8	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	2.4	4	-	121.0	6	-	-	-	2	-	2.4	6	121.0	6	123.4	12
	Parallel	-	-	-	10.9	4	1	-	-	-	-	-	10.9	5	10.9	5	-
All	All	2.4	6	-	507.0	33	1	-	2	89.5	24	2.4	8	596.5	58	598.9	66
1996 Fisheries																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	2	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HAL	EEZ	-	3	-	2.6	4	-	-	-	2	-	3	2.6	6	2.6	9	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	15.3	10	-	-	51.3	16	-	-	66.7	26	66.7	26	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	3	-	3	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	71.2	4	-	-	-	2	-	-	71.2	6	71.2	6	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	-	1	-	15.0	4	-	-	-	-	-	1	15.0	4	15.0	5	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	98.4	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	98.4	7	98.4	7	-
All	All	-	4	-	202.4	25	1	-	51.3	24	-	1	253.7	47	253.7	48	-
1997 Fisheries																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.5	4	-	-	5.5	4	5.5	4	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	3	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	42.2	8	-	-	59.3	15	-	-	101.5	23	101.5	23	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	232.0	5	-	-	232.0	7	232.0	7	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	-	1	-	54.5	7	1	-	-	1	-	1	54.5	9	54.5	10	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	0.2	4	1	-	-	1	-	-	0.2	6	0.2	6	-
All	All	-	4	-	96.8	25	1	-	296.8	24	-	1	393.6	47	393.6	48	-
1998 Fisheries																	
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	3	-	3	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HAL	EEZ	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	2	-	3	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	117.4	7	-	-	117.3	12	-	-	234.8	19	234.8	19	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	6	-	6	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	-	1	-	94.5	5	-	-	1	-	-	2	94.5	5	94.5	7	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	1.2	8	1	-	-	-	-	-	1.2	9	1.2	9	-
All	All	-	2	-	213.2	21	1	-	117.3	19	-	3	330.5	41	330.5	44	-

Note: Shaded cells represent catch totals that cannot be released due to confidentiality restrictions. Catch totals in summary columns exclude catches from confidential cells.



**Table A12. Annual Catch Percentage by License, Vessel, and Gear in the West Yakutat Pacific Cod Fisheries, 1995-2003**

Gear	Fishery	Vessels with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			Vessels with No License			All Vessels		
		CP	CV	All Vessels	CP	CV	All Vessels	CP	CV	All Vessels
<b>1995 Fisheries</b>										
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	11.6	11.6	-	14.9	14.9	-	26.5	26.5
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	51.1	51.1	-	-	-	-	51.1	51.1
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	0.4	20.2	20.6	-	-	-	0.4	20.2	20.6
	Parallel	-	1.8	1.8	-	-	-	-	1.8	1.8
<b>All</b>	<b>All</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>84.7</b>	<b>85.1</b>	-	<b>14.9</b>	<b>14.9</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>99.6</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>1996 Fisheries</b>										
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HAL	EEZ	-	1.0	1.0	-	-	-	-	1.0	1.0
	Parallel	-	6.0	6.0	-	20.2	20.2	-	26.3	26.3
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	28.0	28.0	-	-	-	-	28.0	28.0
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	-	5.9	5.9	-	-	-	-	5.9	5.9
	Parallel	-	38.8	38.8	-	-	-	-	38.8	38.8
<b>All</b>	<b>All</b>	-	<b>79.8</b>	<b>79.8</b>	-	<b>20.2</b>	<b>20.2</b>	-	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>1997 Fisheries</b>										
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	1.4	1.4	-	1.4	1.4
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	10.7	10.7	-	15.1	15.1	-	25.8	25.8
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	58.9	58.9	-	58.9	58.9
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	-	13.8	13.8	-	-	-	-	13.8	13.8
	Parallel	-	0.1	0.1	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.1
<b>All</b>	<b>All</b>	-	<b>24.6</b>	<b>24.6</b>	-	<b>75.4</b>	<b>75.4</b>	-	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>1998 Fisheries</b>										
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	35.5	35.5	-	35.5	35.5	-	71.0	71.0
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	-	28.6	28.6	-	-	-	-	28.6	28.6
	Parallel	-	0.4	0.4	-	-	-	-	0.4	0.4
<b>All</b>	<b>All</b>	-	<b>64.5</b>	<b>64.5</b>	-	<b>35.5</b>	<b>35.5</b>	-	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Note: Shaded cells represent catch totals that cannot be released due to confidentiality restrictions. Calculation of percentages excludes all confidential numbers.

Table A12. (continued)

Gear	Fishery	Vessels with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			Vessels with No License			All Vessels		
		CP	CV	All Vessels	CP	CV	All Vessels	CP	CV	All Vessels
1999 Fisheries										
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	10.4	10.4	-	10.4	10.4
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	40.6	40.6	-	39.0	39.0	-	79.6	79.6
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	2.7	7.3	10.0	-	-	-	2.7	7.3	10.0
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
All	All	2.7	47.9	50.6	-	49.4	49.4	2.7	97.3	100.0
2000 Fisheries										
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	16.1	16.1	-	20.2	20.2	-	36.3	36.3
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	16.7	16.7	-	36.1	36.1	-	52.9	52.9
TRW	EEZ	-	10.8	10.8	-	-	-	-	10.8	10.8
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
All	All	-	43.6	43.6	-	56.4	56.4	-	100.0	100.0
2001 Fisheries										
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	100.0	100.0	-	100.0	100.0
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
All	All	-	-	-	-	100.0	100.0	-	100.0	100.0
2002 Fisheries										
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
All	All	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2003 Fisheries										
JIG	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HAL	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
POT	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRW	EEZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
All	All	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Note: Shaded cells represent catch totals that cannot be released due to confidentiality restrictions. Calculation of percentages excludes all confidential numbers.

**Table A13. Annual Catch and Participation in West Yakutat Area 640 and 649 Pollock Fisheries by License, Vessel, and Gear, 1995-2003**

Gear	Fishery	CPs with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			CVs with Licenses (Permanent or Interim)			Vessels with No License CV				All CPs		All CVs		All Vessels	
		Catch (MT)	Perma- nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	Catch (MT)	Perma- nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	CP Catch (MT)	CP (No.)	Catch (MT)	CV (No.)	CP (MT)	CP (No.)	CV (MT)	CV (No.)	Total (MT)	Total (No.)
<b>1995 Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	-	-	-	317.7	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	317.7	5	317.7	5	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	State	-	-	-	2,806.6	8	1	-	-	-	-	-	2,806.6	9	2,806.6	9	
All	All	-	-	-	3,124.3	12	1	-	-	-	-	-	3,124.3	13	3,124.3	13	
<b>1996 Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	-	-	-	508.1	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	508.1	6	508.1	6	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	State	-	-	-	1,473.8	9	-	-	-	2	-	-	1,473.8	11	1,473.8	11	
All	All	-	-	-	1,981.9	13	-	-	-	2	-	-	1,981.9	15	1,981.9	15	
<b>1997 Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	-	-	-	1,809.9	4	1	-	-	1	-	-	1,809.9	6	1,809.9	6	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	State	-	-	-	1,872.6	8	1	-	-	1	-	-	1,872.6	10	1,872.6	10	
All	All	-	-	-	3,682.4	11	1	-	-	2	-	-	3,682.4	14	3,682.4	14	
<b>1998 Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	-	1	-	3,912.8	5	1	-	-	1	-	1	3,912.8	7	3,912.8	8	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	State	-	-	-	1,798.4	10	1	-	-	-	-	-	1,798.4	11	1,798.4	11	
All	All	-	1	-	5,711.2	13	1	-	-	1	-	1	5,711.2	15	5,711.2	16	
<b>1999 Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	-	-	-	1,159.6	5	1	-	-	1	-	-	1,159.6	7	1,159.6	7	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	State	-	-	-	1,939.1	4	1	-	-	1	-	-	1,939.1	6	1,939.1	6	
All	All	-	-	-	3,098.7	8	1	-	-	2	-	-	3,098.7	11	3,098.7	11	
<b>2000 Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	-	-	-	1,918.6	5	1	-	-	-	-	-	1,918.6	6	1,918.6	6	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	State	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	3	
All	All	-	-	-	1,918.6	7	1	-	-	-	-	-	1,918.6	8	1,918.6	8	
<b>2001 Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	-	-	-	2,347.4	14	1	-	-	-	-	-	2,347.4	15	2,347.4	15	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	State	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	
All	All	-	-	-	2,347.4	15	1	-	-	-	-	-	2,347.4	16	2,347.4	16	
<b>2002 Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	-	-	-	1,741.3	10	1	-	-	-	-	-	1,741.3	11	1,741.3	11	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	State	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	3	
All	All	-	-	-	1,741.3	11	1	-	-	-	-	-	1,741.3	12	1,741.3	12	
<b>2003 Fisheries</b>																	
TRW	EEZ	-	-	-	934.1	8	1	-	-	-	-	-	934.1	9	934.1	9	
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	State	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	3	
All	All	-	-	-	934.1	9	1	-	-	-	-	-	934.1	10	934.1	10	

Note: Shaded cells represent catch totals that cannot be released due to confidentiality restrictions. Catch totals in summary columns exclude catches from confidential cells.

**Table A14. Annual Catch Percentage by License, Vessel, and Gear in the West Yakutat Area 640 and 649 Pollock Fisheries, 1995-2003**

Gear	Fishery	Vessels with Licenses (Permanent or interim)			Vessels with No License			All Vessels		
		CP	CV	All Vessels	CP	CV	All Vessels	CP	CV	All Vessels
<b>1995 Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	-	10.2	10.2	-	-	-	-	10.2	10.2
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	89.8	89.8	-	-	-	-	89.8	89.8
All	All	-	100.0	100.0	-	-	-	-	100.0	100.0
<b>1996 Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	-	25.6	25.6	-	-	-	-	25.6	25.6
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	74.4	74.4	-	-	-	-	74.4	74.4
All	All	-	100.0	100.0	-	-	-	-	100.0	100.0
<b>1997 Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	-	49.1	49.1	-	-	-	-	49.1	49.1
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	50.9	50.9	-	-	-	-	50.9	50.9
All	All	-	100.0	100.0	-	-	-	-	100.0	100.0
<b>1998 Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	-	68.5	68.5	-	-	-	-	68.5	68.5
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	31.5	31.5	-	-	-	-	31.5	31.5
All	All	-	100.0	100.0	-	-	-	-	100.0	100.0
<b>1999 Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	-	37.4	37.4	-	-	-	-	37.4	37.4
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	62.6	62.6	-	-	-	-	62.6	62.6
All	All	-	100.0	100.0	-	-	-	-	100.0	100.0
<b>2000 Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	-	100.0	100.0	-	-	-	-	100.0	100.0
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
All	All	-	100.0	100.0	-	-	-	-	100.0	100.0
<b>2001 Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	-	100.0	100.0	-	-	-	-	100.0	100.0
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
All	All	-	100.0	100.0	-	-	-	-	100.0	100.0
<b>2002 Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	-	100.0	100.0	-	-	-	-	100.0	100.0
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
All	All	-	100.0	100.0	-	-	-	-	100.0	100.0
<b>2003 Fisheries</b>										
TRW	EEZ	-	100.0	100.0	-	-	-	-	100.0	100.0
	Parallel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
All	All	-	100.0	100.0	-	-	-	-	100.0	100.0

Note: Shaded cells represent catch totals that cannot be released due to confidentiality restrictions. Calculation of percentages excludes all confidential numbers.

## **Appendix B. Catch by Jurisdictions of Participation**

At its June 2005 meeting, the Council asked for additional catch information with respect to participation by jurisdiction. Specifically, the Council wished to see data that showed the unique number of vessels by gear that fished in the different combinations of jurisdictions. This information may be valuable in Council decisions to include or exclude catches in State-water and parallel fisheries.

Three jurisdictions are defined for the Pacific Cod fisheries and for Area 64 pollock fisheries, as follows:

State-water fisheries are those fisheries inside three miles that are managed with a state-water TAC, and which take place after the federally managed TAC is caught.

Parallel Fisheries are fisheries that take place inside three miles at times when the federally managed fisheries are open.

EEZ Fisheries are fisheries that take place in the EEZ.

Because there are three jurisdictions, there are seven possible combinations of jurisdictions in which a vessel could participate as shown list below:

Vessels that fished in State-water fisheries only.

Vessels that fished in Parallel fisheries only

Vessels that fished in Parallel and State-water fisheries only

Vessels that fished in EEZ fisheries only

Vessels that fished in EEZ and State-water fisheries only

Vessels that fished in EEZ and Parallel fisheries only

Vessels that fished in EEZ, Parallel, and State-water fisheries

The tables in this appendix show total catch and vessel counts from 1995-2003 of Pacific Cod and Pollock in each management area by license type, vessel type, gear and the jurisdictions in which individual vessels participated. The tables are set up in the same way as tables in the main report, except that each section represents a jurisdictional participation combination—each section shows a unique set of participants with no vessel/gear combinations occurring in more than one of the sections. It should be noted however, that vessels that used multiple gears may show up in more than row. Therefore it is possible that the number of vessels in the rows labeled “All Gears” is less than the gear specific rows that precede it.

It also should be noted that there were no State-water fisheries for pollock in the Western and Central Gulf, nor for Pacific cod in West Yakutat—therefore the number of jurisdictional combinations are reduced to three. Further because only jig and pot gears are allowed in State-water fisheries for Pacific cod no trawl or hook and line participation will be seen in jurisdiction combinations that include State-water fisheries. Also note that trawl gear is the only gear for which pollock is a primary species, and therefore pollock tables don't include a column for gear.

The order of the tables in the appendix is the same as used in the main report—moving from west to east—Western Gulf, followed by Central Gulf and West Yakutat.

**Table B1. Catch and Participation by Jurisdictional Combinations in Western Gulf Pacific Cod Fisheries, 1995-2003**

Gear	Catcher Processors with Licenses			Catcher Vessels with Licenses			Vessels with No License				All CPs		All CVs		All Vessels	
	Catch (MT)	Perma-nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	Catch (MT)	Perma-nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	CP Catch (MT)	CP (No.)	CV Catch (MT)	CV (No.)	CP (MT)	CP (No.)	CV (MT)	CV (No.)	Total (MT)	Total (No.)
<b>Fished in State-water Fisheries Only</b>																
Jig	-	-	-	319.3	14	1	-	-	1,997.5	65	-	-	2,316.8	80	2,316.8	80
Pot	-	-	-	2,032.7	7	1	-	-	964.8	12	-	-	2,997.5	20	2,997.5	20
All Gears	-	-	-	2,352.0	21	2	-	-	2,962.3	76	-	-	5,314.3	99	5,314.3	99
<b>Fished in Parallel Fisheries Only</b>																
Jig	-	-	-	19.1	5	-	-	-	75.2	24	-	-	94.3	29	94.3	29
HAL	-	-	-	103.5	8	2	-	-	95.1	11	-	-	198.6	21	198.6	21
Pot	-	-	-	506.0	16	-	-	-	1,962.1	36	-	-	2,468.2	52	2,468.2	52
TRW	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	99.2	8	-	-	99.2	9	99.2	9
All Gears	-	-	-	628.7	27	2	-	-	2,231.7	77	-	-	2,860.4	106	2,860.4	106
<b>Fished in Parallel and State-water Fisheries Only</b>																
Jig	-	-	-	497.3	15	-	-	-	1,584.0	37	-	-	2,081.3	52	2,081.3	52
Pot	-	-	-	13,465.5	27	-	-	-	2,429.1	10	-	-	15,894.5	37	15,894.5	37
All Gears	-	-	-	13,962.7	41	-	-	-	4,013.1	46	-	-	17,975.8	87	17,975.8	87
<b>Fished in EEZ Fisheries Only</b>																
Jig	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	3	-	3
HAL	34,108.6	21	6	2,105.6	7	4	4,064.1	12	458.8	11	38,172.7	39	2,564.4	22	40,737.2	61
Pot	2,500.8	4	2	470.9	8	-	813.5	5	1,506.6	15	3,314.4	11	1,977.4	23	5,291.8	34
TRW	3,943.4	22	2	5,009.0	50	-	442.3	13	287.4	14	4,385.7	37	5,296.4	64	9,682.1	101
All Gears	40,552.9	44	9	7,585.5	64	4	5,320.0	30	2,252.8	42	45,872.8	83	9,838.2	110	55,711.1	193
<b>Fished in EEZ and State-water Fisheries Only</b>																
Jig	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	4	-	4
Pot	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	4	-	4
All Gears	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	8	-	8
<b>Fished in EEZ and Parallel Fisheries Only</b>																
Jig	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	13.5	4	-	-	13.5	6	13.5	6
HAL	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	5	-	5
Pot	-	-	-	9,243.3	19	2	-	-	3,777.8	30	-	-	13,021.2	51	13,021.2	51
TRW	-	-	-	92,564.3	83	4	-	-	302.1	5	-	-	92,866.3	92	92,866.3	92
All Gears	-	-	-	101,807.6	104	6	-	-	4,093.4	40	-	-	105,901.0	150	105,901.0	150
<b>Fished in EEZ, Parallel and State-water Fisheries</b>																
Jig	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	201.8	9	-	-	201.8	11	201.8	11
Pot	-	-	-	30,376.0	34	1	-	-	-	3	-	-	30,376.0	38	30,376.0	38
All Gears	-	-	-	30,376.0	36	1	-	-	201.8	12	-	-	30,577.7	49	30,577.7	49

**Table B2. Catch and Participation by Jurisdictional Combinations in Area 610 Pollock Fisheries, 1995-2005**

Catcher Processors with Licenses			Catcher Vessels with Licenses			Vessels with No License				All CPs		All CVs		All Vessels	
Catch (MT)	Perma-nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	Catch (MT)	Perma-nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	CP Catch (MT)	CP (No.)	CV Catch (MT)	CV (No.)	CP (MT)	CP (No.)	CV (MT)	CV (No.)	Total (MT)	Total (No.)
<b>Fished in Parallel Fisheries Only</b>															
-	-	-	424.1	7	-	506.0	5	930.1	12	506.0	5	1,354.2	19	1,860.2	24
<b>Fished in EEZ Fisheries Only</b>															
599.0	18	1	16,306.3	35	5	3,733.1	13	20,638.4	72	4,332.1	32	36,944.8	112	41,276.9	144
<b>Fished in EEZ and Parallel Fisheries Only</b>															
-	-	3	177,909.9	80	-	933.7	4	192,440.5	87	933.7	7	370,350.4	167	371,284.1	174

**Table B3. Catch and Participation by Jurisdictional Combinations in Central Gulf Pacific Cod Fisheries, 1995-2003**

Gear	Catcher Processors with Licenses			Catcher Vessels with Licenses			Vessels with No License				All CPs		All CVs		All Vessels	
	Catch (MT)	Perma-nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	Catch (MT)	Perma-nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	CP Catch (MT)	CP (No.)	CV Catch (MT)	CV (No.)	CP (MT)	CP (No.)	CV (MT)	CV (No.)	Total (MT)	Total (No.)
Fished in State-water Fisheries Only																
Jig	-	-	-	988.9	61	-	-	-	2,066.0	145	-	-	3,054.9	206	3,054.9	206
Pot	-	-	-	1,781.1	21	1	-	-	903.8	32	-	-	2,684.8	54	2,684.8	54
All Gears	-	-	-	2,769.9	80	1	-	-	2,969.8	171	-	-	5,739.7	252	5,739.7	252
Fished in Parallel Fisheries Only																
Jig	-	-	-	56.4	13	1	-	-	188.2	41	-	-	244.6	55	244.6	55
HAL	-	-	-	892.7	40	-	-	-	607.4	49	-	-	1,500.2	89	1,500.2	89
Pot	-	-	-	661.6	21	1	-	-	385.5	14	-	-	1,047.0	36	1,047.0	36
TRW	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	2
All Gears	-	-	-	1,610.8	70	2	-	-	1,181.0	99	-	-	2,791.8	171	2,791.8	171
Fished in Parallel and State-water Fisheries Only																
Jig	-	-	-	356.5	25	-	-	-	1,412.8	49	-	-	1,769.3	74	1,769.3	74
Pot	-	-	-	1,560.2	14	-	-	-	1,796.5	14	-	-	3,356.6	28	3,356.6	28
All Gears	-	-	-	1,916.7	38	-	-	-	3,209.3	62	-	-	5,126.0	100	5,126.0	100
Fished in EEZ Fisheries Only																
Jig	-	-	-	22.3	5	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	22.3	8	22.3	8
HAL	3,838.6	17	5	1,307.6	44	-	-	3	48.7	16	3,838.6	25	1,356.3	60	5,194.9	85
Pot	1,836.0	4	3	4,662.8	18	-	2,584.1	7	1,399.7	14	4,420.1	14	6,062.5	32	10,482.6	46
TRW	14,505.7	21	3	12,326.5	42	2	2,143.2	14	1,595.6	19	16,649.0	38	13,922.1	63	30,571.0	101
All Gears	20,180.3	42	9	18,319.2	107	3	4,727.3	24	3,044.0	50	24,907.6	75	21,363.2	160	46,270.9	235
Fished in EEZ and State-water Fisheries Only																
Jig	-	-	-	135.5	6	1	-	-	539.5	12	-	-	675.0	19	675.0	19
Pot	-	-	-	9,748.0	16	1	-	-	1,081.2	4	-	-	10,829.1	21	10,829.1	21
All Gears	-	-	-	9,883.5	22	2	-	-	1,620.7	16	-	-	11,504.2	40	11,504.2	40
Fished in EEZ and Parallel Fisheries Only																
Jig	-	-	-	108.0	13	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	108.0	16	108.0	16
HAL	-	-	-	44,418.0	155	4	-	-	1,604.4	39	-	-	46,022.4	198	46,022.4	198
Pot	-	-	-	2,882.4	25	1	-	-	853.0	6	-	-	3,735.4	32	3,735.4	32
TRW	-	-	-	147,270.7	104	4	-	-	2,817.9	9	-	-	150,088.6	117	150,088.6	117
All Gears	-	-	-	194,679.2	276	9	-	-	5,275.3	57	-	-	199,954.4	342	199,954.4	342
Fished in EEZ, Parallel and State-water Fisheries																
Jig	-	-	-	1,455.7	15	-	-	-	110.2	14	-	-	1,565.9	29	1,565.9	29
Pot	-	-	-	76,100.2	71	3	-	-	2,302.3	16	-	-	78,402.5	90	78,402.5	90
All Gears	-	-	-	77,555.9	86	3	-	-	2,412.5	30	-	-	79,968.4	119	79,968.4	119

**Table B4. Catch and Participation by Jurisdictional Combinations in Area 620 and 621 Pollock Fisheries, 1995-2003**

Catcher Processors with Licenses			Catcher Vessels with Licenses			Vessels with No License				All CPs		All CVs		All Vessels	
Catch (MT)	Perma-nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	Catch (MT)	Perma-nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	CP Catch (MT)	CP (No.)	CV Catch (MT)	CV (No.)	CP (MT)	CP (No.)	CV (MT)	CV (No.)	Total (MT)	Total (No.)
Fished in Parallel Fisheries Only															
-	-	-	399.1	5	1	-	-	-	3	-	-	399.1	9	399.1	9
Fished in EEZ Fisheries Only															
120.5	13	1	4,837.9	22	-	121.4	5	2,447.8	13	241.9	19	7,285.7	35	7,527.6	54
Fished in EEZ and Parallel Fisheries Only															
-	-	-	191,855.8	92	4	-	-	3,125.3	4	-	-	194,981.2	100	194,981.2	100

**Table B5. Catch and Participation by Jurisdictional Combinations in Area 630 and 631 Pollock Fisheries, 1995-2003**

Catcher Processors with Licenses			Catcher Vessels with Licenses			Vessels with No License				All CPs		All CVs		All Vessels	
Catch (MT)	Perma-nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	Catch (MT)	Perma-nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	CP Catch (MT)	CP (No.)	CV Catch (MT)	CV (No.)	CP (MT)	CP (No.)	CV (MT)	CV (No.)	Total (MT)	Total (No.)
Fished in Parallel Fisheries Only															
-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Fished in EEZ Fisheries Only															
392.0	13	1	7,405.0	28	-	-	1	1,209.6	9	392.0	15	8,614.7	37	9,006.7	52
Fished in EEZ and Parallel Fisheries Only															
-	-	-	183,840.9	73	3	-	-	2,432.0	4	-	-	186,272.9	80	186,272.9	80

**Table B6. Catch and Participation by Jurisdictional Combinations in West Yakutat Pacific Cod Fisheries, 1995-2003**

Gear	Catcher Processors with Licenses			Catcher Vessels with Licenses			Vessels with No License				All CPs		All CVs		All Vessels	
	Catch (MT)	Perma-nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	Catch (MT)	Perma-nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	CP Catch (MT)	CP (No.)	CV Catch (MT)	CV (No.)	CP (MT)	CP (No.)	CV (MT)	CV (No.)	Total (MT)	Total (No.)
Fished in Parallel Fisheries Only																
Jig	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	66.6	20	-	-	66.6	23	66.6	23
HAL	-	-	-	348.7	27	-	-	-	585.3	57	-	-	934.0	84	934.0	84
Pot	-	-	-	315.9	8	-	-	-	230.9	10	-	-	546.8	18	546.8	18
TRW	-	-	-	1.1	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.1	6	1.1	6
All Gears	-	-	-	665.7	41	-	-	-	882.8	79	-	-	1,548.4	120	1,548.4	120
Fished in EEZ Fisheries Only																
Jig	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HAL	1.5	5	-	7.0	8	-	-	-	-	2	1.5	5	7.0	10	8.6	15
Pot	-	-	1	-	2	-	-	2	-	1	-	3	-	3	-	6
TRW	20.7	7	-	232.3	16	-	-	3	-	-	20.7	10	232.3	16	253.1	26
All Gears	22.3	12	1	239.4	26	-	-	5	-	3	22.3	18	239.4	29	261.6	47
Fished in EEZ and Parallel Fisheries																
Jig	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HAL	-	-	-	143.7	5	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	143.7	8	143.7	8
Pot	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	4	-	4
TRW	-	-	-	240.7	9	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	240.7	11	240.7	11
All Gears	-	-	-	384.3	16	1	-	-	-	5	-	-	384.3	22	384.3	22

**Table B7. Catch and Participation by Jurisdictional Combinations in Area 640 and 649 Pollock Fisheries, 1995-2003**

Catcher Processors with Licenses			Catcher Vessels with Licenses			Vessels with No License				All CPs		All CVs		All Vessels	
Catch (MT)	Perma-nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	Catch (MT)	Perma-nent Lic.(No.)	Interim Lic.(No.)	CP Catch (MT)	CP (No.)	CV Catch (MT)	CV (No.)	CP (MT)	CP (No.)	CV (MT)	CV (No.)	Total (MT)	Total (No.)
Fished in State-water Fisheries Only															
-	-	-	1,198.7	7	3	1,198.7	10	-	-	1,198.7	10	1,198.7	10	2,397.5	20
Fished in Parallel Fisheries Only															
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fished in Parallel and State-water Fisheries Only															
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fished in EEZ Fisheries Only															
-	1	1	13,800.5	25	1	13,868.0	28	-	-	13,868.0	30	13,800.5	26	27,668.5	56
Fished in EEZ and State-water Fisheries Only															
-	-	1	13,405.4	11	-	19,117.2	12	-	-	19,117.2	13	13,405.4	11	32,522.5	24
Fished in EEZ and Parallel Fisheries Only															
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fished in EEZ, Parallel and State-water Fisheries															
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-



**North Pacific Fishery Management Council  
GULF OF ALASKA GROUND FISH RATIONALIZATION  
Updated to December 11, 2004**

**Annotated by Staff for the October 2005 Meeting**

**The following provisions apply to Alternative 2 only:**

2.2 Harvest Sector Provisions

2.2.1 Management Areas:

Areas are Western Gulf, Central Gulf, and West Yakutat—separate areas

For Pollock: 610 (Western Gulf), 620 and 630 (Central Gulf), 640 (West Yakutat (WY))

- Shortraker and rougheye (SR/RE) and thornyhead rockfishes will be divided between Southeast Outside (SEO) and WY
- The allocation of rockfish bycatch to the halibut IFQ fishery will be on a NMFS management area basis
- Non-SR/RE and thornyhead rockfish trawl catch history in SEO during 95-98 will be used in the calculation of WYAK allocation
- SEO is exempt except for SR/RE and thornyhead rockfishes as secondary species. Allocation will be based on target catch in sablefish, halibut, Demersal Shelf Rockfish and P. cod fishery

Gear: Applies to all gear except jig gear—

Option 1. The jig fishery would receive an allocation based on its historic landings in the qualifying years – the jig fishery would be conducted on an open access basis.

Option 2. Catch by jig would be accounted for in a manner similar to sport halibut harvests in halibut IFQ fishery.

Suboption: Cap jig harvest at \_\_\_% of current harvest by species and area:

1. 100%
2. 125%
3. 150%
4. 200%

2.2.2 Qualifying periods and landing criteria (same for all gears in all areas)

(The analysis will assess AFA vessels as a group)

Option 1. 95-01 drop 1, on a species by species basis

Option 2. 95-02 drop 1, on a species by species basis

Option 3. 95-02 drop 2, on a species by species basis

Option 4. 98-02 drop 1, on a species by species basis

Option 5. 98-03 drop 1, on a species by species basis

Suboption 1: For Pacific cod under all options consider only A season harvests for 2001 and 2002.

Suboption 2: For Pacific cod consider a sector allocation based on specified percentages prior to individual allocations.

2.2.2.1 Qualifying landing criteria

Landings based on retained catch for all species (includes weekly processor report for Catcher/Processor sector)

NOTE: Total pounds landed will be used as the denominator.

Catch history determined based on the poundage of retained catch year (does not include meal)

Suboption: catch history for P. cod fisheries determined based on a percentage of retained catch per year (does not include meal)

*The Council should clarify for staff whether harvests inside of 3nm should be considered in making allocations under the Federal program. Exclusion of catch inside 3nm could be justified, if that catch is used for making an allocation to a State water fishery. On the other hand, some federal participants with extensive catch history from the parallel fishery may wish to have their catch credited in making a federal fishery allocation. Uncertainty concerning the treatment of harvests inside 3nm greatly complicates the quantitative analysis.*

***Note: Quantitative estimates of allocations developed by staff for this meeting exclude catch inside 3 nm.***

#### 2.2.2.2 Eligibility

##### LLP participation

Option 1. Eligibility to receive catch history is any person that holds a valid, permanent, fully transferable LLP license.

Basis for the distribution to the LLP license holder is: the catch history of the vessel on which the LLP license is based and shall be on a fishery-by-fishery basis. The underlying principle of this program is one history per license. In cases where the fishing privileges (i.e., moratorium qualification or LLP license) of an LLP qualifying vessel have been transferred, the distribution of harvest shares to the LLP shall be based on the aggregate catch histories of (1) the vessel on which LLP license was based up to the date of transfer, and (2) the vessel owned or controlled by the LLP license holder and identified by the license holder as having been operated under the fishing privileges of the LLP qualifying vessel after the date of transfer. (Only one catch history per LLP license.)

Option 2. Non-LLP (State water parallel fishery) participation

Suboption 1. Any individual who has imprinted a fish ticket making non-federally permitted legal landings during a State of Alaska fishery in a state waters parallel fisheries for species under the rationalized fisheries.

Suboption 2. Vessel owner at time of non-federally permitted legal landing during a State of Alaska fishery in a state waters parallel fisheries for species under the rationalized fisheries.

It is the intent of the Council that catch history, whether harvested in the state water parallel or the federal fishery, will be credited a single time, either in the state or federal program.

***The Council could select a preferred option for eligibility to receive an allocation under the program. Since LLP licenses are used to control access to the fishery, the use of LLP licenses for determining eligibility to receive an allocation in the rationalized fishery would be consistent with current regulation of entry. In addition, allowing entry to persons not holding permanent LLPs might be unfair to persons that have relied on the LLP regulations in trading licenses.***

***Including holders of interim LLP licenses could be argued by some to be fair, since these licenses have not been fully adjudicated and may be held by some persons that would ultimately be awarded permanent licenses. However, the agency anticipates having all appeals resolved prior to implementation of this program, so outstanding appeals concerning interim licenses should not be an issue at the time of implementation. Using a threshold date (such as January 1, 2003 in Suboption 1) could be supported by an argument that persons who maintained appeals through that date should be included. As written in suboption 1, persons whose appeals were denied after that date would still be eligible for an allocation. Eligibility for any holders of interim permits, however, could be argued to be unfair by those that either met the requirements for a permanent license or chose to purchase a license to continue in the fisheries. Persons that have purchased licenses to remain in the fishery, in particular, have a compelling argument that holders of interim licenses should be excluded. In some cases, appeals are likely to have been perpetuated by persons that knew their appeals would be denied to avoid having to purchase a license. Even in the case of legitimate***

*appeals, including persons denied licenses would not have met the threshold requirements for the license appears to be inconsistent with the Council's earlier decisions concerning eligibility.*

*The treatment of participation inside of 3nm should be coordinated across this section, section 2.2.2.1 above, and section 2.2.2.3 below. Including parallel fishery participants in the program could be desirable, if no State water fishery is developed to accommodate these participants. If a State water allocation is made to support fisheries for State water participants that do not hold LLPs, the inclusion of parallel water fisheries participants in the Federal allocation could be viewed as rewarding their historic participation twice.*

*Note: Quantitative estimates of allocations prepared for this meeting include catch made with LLP licenses that are currently permanent or interim status.*

### 2.2.2.3 State Waters - Parallel Fisheries and State Groundfish Management

A portion of the TAC will be allocated to fisheries inside of 3 nm and will be subject to State management:

- Option 1. An amount equivalent to the total annual catch (for each groundfish species/group) from state waters (inside of 3 nautical miles [e.g., parallel and 25% Pacific cod fishery]) by all vessels will be managed directly by the State of Alaska Board of Fisheries as a TAC/GHL equivalent to:
  - a. Highest amount taken in state waters by area
  - b. Highest amount taken in state waters by area plus 15%
  - c. Most recent four-year average harvest from state waters
- Option 2. All catch inside of 3 nautical miles by non-federally permitted vessels fishing the parallel fishery plus all catch under the 25% state water cod fishery and the PWS Pollock fishery remains under the authority of the State of Alaska Board of Fisheries.
- Option 3. Only the catch associated with the 25% state water cod fishery and the PWS Pollock fishery remains under the authority of the State of Alaska Board of Fisheries.

*The Council could consider establishing criteria for making allocations (both the allocation between the State and Federal fisheries and the allocations to individuals under the Federal program). In making these allocation decisions, the Council should consider the interactions of the different allocations. Catch history that is valued in the allocations to State water fisheries, might not be necessary to value in the Federal program. The Council should provide a rationale for its decisions, particularly if catch that is counted in making an allocation to a State water fishery is also counted in the Federal program.*

#### Future analysis by staff would benefit from the following Council decisions

- 1) defining individuals eligible for the federal program (i.e., permanent LLPs, interim LLPs, any State permitted harvests in a parallel fishery)
- 2) deciding whether catch of eligible participants inside of 3nm will be credited in the federal program

### 2.2.3 Primary Species Rationalization Plan

#### Primary Species by Gear

#### 2.2.3.1 Initial Allocation of catch history

Allocate catch history on an individual basis

- a. Trawl CV and CP:  
Pollock, Pacific cod, deepwater flatfish, rex sole, shallow water flatfish, flathead sole, Arrowtooth flounder, northern rockfish, Pacific ocean perch, Pelagic shelf rockfish
- b. Longline CV and CP:

Pacific Cod, pelagic shelf rockfish, Pacific ocean perch, deep water flatfish (if turbot is targeted), northern rockfish, Arrowtooth flounder

- c. Pot CV and CP:  
Pacific Cod

### 2.2.3.2 Harvest share (or QS/IFQ) Designations

#### 2.2.3.2.1 Vessel Designation of low producers and high producers in the fixed gear class.

Low producing vessels are:

- Option 1: less than average primary species harvest shares initially allocated by gear and area.  
Option 2: less than the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile primary species harvest shares initially allocated by gear and area.

High producing vessels are the remainder.

#### 2.2.3.2.2 Harvest share sector designations:

Designate harvest shares (or QS/IFQ) as CV or CP. Annual CV harvest share allocation (or IFQ) conveys a privilege to harvest a specified amount. Annual CP harvest share allocation (or IFQ) conveys the privilege to harvest and process a specified amount. Designation will be based on:

Actual amount of catch harvested and processed onboard a vessel by species.

#### 2.2.3.2.3 Harvest share gear designations

Designate CV harvest shares as Trawl, longline, and Pot  
Designate CP harvest shares as CP trawl, CP longline, CP pot.

Option: Designate harvest shares as high and low producer fixed gear

#### 2.2.3.2.4 Harvest Share Restrictions—Harvest restrictions apply to primary species only.

Harvest restrictions for primary harvest shares (or IFQ) may be used by other gear types except that:

Option 1: No restrictions

Option 2: Fixed gear harvest share (or IFQ) may not be harvested using trawl gear

Option 3: Pot gear harvest shares may not be harvested by longline or trawl gear

#### 2.2.3.2.5 If a processor limited entry alternative is chosen, CV primary species harvest shares will be issued in two classes. Class A shares will be deliverable to a licensed processor. Class B shares will be deliverable to any processor as authorized under this program.

Only the annual allocations will be subject to the Class A/Class B distinction. All long term shares or history will be of a single class.

Suboption : Processor affiliated vessels to receive entire allocation as A shares.

*The Council could make a decision on the suboption, namely, whether processor affiliates would receive only A shares (and no B shares). In making the determination, the Council should consider the purpose of distinguishing Class A and Class B shares and the effects of the determination on differently situated participants. Differences in Alternative 2A (license limitation for processors) and Alternative 2B (harvest shares with processor linkages), which could affect the impacts of this provision, should also be considered.*

*Recall, that Class A shares are subject to delivery restrictions. Under Alternative 2A, Class A shares may be delivered to any licensed processor. Under Alternative 2B, Class A shares are required to be delivered to the processor that the shares are associated with. Processor associations can be changed (or removed) by the harvester forfeiting a portion of its shares for a period of time. Class B shares are not subject to landing limitations. Because of this lack of landings restrictions, B share landings could command a higher price than A share landings. The price disparity for B share landings is likely larger under Alternative 2B, because of the greater limit on landings under that alternative. Class B shares are generally intended to provide bargaining leverage to independent harvesters. This purpose generally suggests that Class B shares*

*should not be issued to vertically integrated harvesters (i.e., processor affiliates). Likewise, to the extent that Class B shares are intended to create opportunities for entry in the processing sector, issuance of B shares only to independent harvesters is most likely to facilitate that entry, since Class B shares provide the only opportunity for unlicensed processors to enter the general fishery.*

*One possible competing effect under Alternative 2B could support an argument for allocating B shares to processor affiliates. Under Alternative 2B, if Class B shares are issued only to independent harvesters, the relative Class B share allocation to each independent share holder will increase with each increase in the vertical integration in the fishery. This could increase the incentive for processors to vertically integrate, as processors that are not vertically integrated would be faced with associated share holders that would hold substantially fewer Class A shares. For example, in a fishery with no vertical integration if the A share/B share ratio is 80/20, a non-vertically integrated processor that is associated with 100 quota shares (long term shares) would have 80 IFQ associated with it. If instead 50 percent of the harvest shares in the fishery are vertically integrated and B shares are issued only to independent harvesters, the same non-vertically integrated processor that associated with 100 QS would be associated with only 60 IFQ (since the B share allocation to the independent harvesters would be doubled). This effect could be mitigated by limits on vertical integration and would be affected by the A share/B share ratio adopted by the Council. No similar issue arises under Alternative 2A because of the lack of processor associations in that alternative.*

*An additional aspect of Alternative 2B could suggest that the allocation of only A shares to licensed processors may have unintended consequences. Under Alternative 2B, if a vertically integrated processor were to hold shares that are associated with a different processor, the allocation of only A shares to the vertically integrated processor would disadvantage that vertically integrated processor in its negotiations with the processor to which its shares are linked. To overcome this potential problem, a provision could be adopted for Alternative 2B under which only A shares would be issued for QS held by the processor to which the QS is linked.*

*From a management perspective, determinations of affiliation are problematic. Corporate structures can change year-to-year complicating both administration and enforcement of a system that allocates only A shares to affiliated harvesters. Administration of annual allocations is greatly complicated, if affiliation affects the nature of annual allocations.*

### 2.2.3.3 Transferability and Restrictions on Ownership of Harvest shares (or QS/IFQ)

#### 2.2.3.3.1 Persons eligible to receive harvest shares by transfer must be:

Entities eligible to document a vessel (apply to CP).

Initial recipients of CV or C/P harvest share.

Community administrative entities would be eligible to receive harvest shares by transfer.

Individuals eligible to document a vessel with at least 150 days of sea time (apply to CV shares)

Definition of sea time:

Sea time in any of the U.S. commercial fisheries in a harvesting capacity.

#### 2.2.3.3.2 Restrictions on transferability of CP harvest shares

CP harvest shares maintain their designation when transferred to persons who continue to catch and process CP harvest shares at sea, if CP harvest shares are processed onshore after transfer, CP harvest shares convert to CV harvest shares.

#### 2.2.3.3.3 When CP shares are redesignated as CV shares;

CP harvest shares retain their gear designation upon transfer.

Purchaser must further identify which processing provision and regionalization provision apply to the shares, consistent with the gear type.

#### 2.2.3.3.4 Vertical integration

Harvest shares initial recipients with more than 10% limited threshold ownership by licensed processors are capped at:

115-150% of initial allocation of harvest CV shares.

#### 2.2.3.3.5 Leasing of QS outside of a co-op

Leasing of QS is defined as the transfer of annual IFQ permit to a person who is not the holder of the underlying QS for use on any vessel and use of IFQ by an individual designated by the QS holder on a vessel which the QS holder owns less than 20% -- same as "hired skipper" requirement in halibut/sablefish program.

##### For catcher vessels

Option 1. No leasing of CV QS (QS holder must be on board or own at least 20% of the vessel upon which a designated skipper fishes the IFQ).

Suboption: Allowing leasing by initial recipients of QS (grandfather clause)

Option 2. Allow leasing of CV QS, but only to individuals and entities eligible to receive QS/IFQ by transfer.

Option 3. For individuals and entities with CV QS, no leasing restrictions for the first three years. After this grace period, leasing will be allowed in the following calendar year if the QS holder is on board or owns 20 percent or greater of a vessel on which 30 percent of the primary species shares held by the QS holder in at least 2 of the most recent 4 years were harvested.

Suboption: Leasing restrictions apply within cooperatives

***The Council could decide the extent of any limits on catcher vessel leasing at this time.***

***Leasing prohibitions tend to be supported as a means of discouraging absentee ownership of interests in the fisheries. Although a share holder need not actively fish on a vessel, if leasing is prohibited the share holder would have to own a portion of a vessel, an investment in physical capital in the fishing industry. In considering whether to apply the above limitations on leasing, the Council should consider that cooperative members could be exempted from the leasing limitations (i.e., allowing free leasing to cooperative members). While the Council may wish to encourage cooperative membership by allowing free leasing in cooperatives, preventing any leasing by non-members of cooperatives may limit the effectiveness of any prohibition on leasing from serving any purpose other than encouraging cooperative membership.***

***In considering selecting preferred options, the Council could apply different leasing provisions to different sectors (i.e., low producing fixed gear catcher vessels, high producing fixed gear catcher vessels, trawl catcher vessels).***

##### For catcher processors

Allow leasing of CP QS, but only to individuals and entities eligible to receive QS/IFQ by transfer.

#### 2.2.3.3.6 Separate and distinct harvest share use caps

Caps will be expressed as QS units indexed to the first year of implementation.

Option 1. Caps apply to all harvesting categories by species with the following provisions:

1. Apply individually and collectively to all harvest share holders in each sector and fishery.
2. Percentage-caps by species and management area are as follows (a different percentage cap may be chosen for each fishery):
  - i. Trawl CV and CP (can be different caps):
 

Use cap based at the following percentile of catch history for the following species:  
(i.e., 75<sup>th</sup> percentile represents the amount of harvest shares that is greater than the amount of harvest shares for which 75% of the fleet will qualify.)

pollock, Pacific cod, deepwater flatfish, rex sole, shallow water flatfish, flathead sole, Arrowtooth flounder, northern rockfish, Pacific ocean perch, pelagic shelf rockfish

Suboption 1. 75 %

Suboption 2. 85%

Suboption 3. 95 %

ii. Longline and Pot CV and/or CP (can be different caps)

based on the following percentiles of catch history for the following species:

Pacific cod, pelagic shelf rockfish, Pacific ocean perch, deep water flatfish (if Greenland turbot is targeted), northern rockfish

Suboption 1. 75 %

Suboption 2. 85%

Suboption 3. 95 %

Option 2. Caps equal to a percentage that would allow contraction of QS holders in the fishery by 20%, 30% or 50% of the number of initially qualified QS recipients by species and sector.

Conversion of CP shares:

i. CP shares converted to CV shares will count toward CV caps

Caps will be applied to prohibit acquisition of shares in excess of the cap.

Vessel use caps on harvest shares harvested on any given vessel shall be set at

i. 100%

ii. 150%

iii. 200%

the individual use cap for each species. Initial issues that exceed the individual or vessel use caps are grandfathered at their current level as of a control date of April 3, 2003, including transfers by contract entered into as of that date.

#### 2.2.3.3.7 Owner On Board Provisions

Provisions may vary depending on the sector or fishery under consideration (this provision may be applied differently pending data analysis)

i. All initial issues (individuals and corporations) would be grandfathered as not being required to be aboard the vessel to fish shares initially issued as "owner on board" shares. This exemption applies only to those initially issued harvest share units.

A range of 0-80% for fixed gear CVs and 0-70% for trawl gear CVs, of the quota shares initially issued to fishers/harvesters would be designated as "owner on board."

In cases of hardship (injury, medical incapacity, loss of vessel, etc.) a holder of "owner on board" quota shares may, upon documentation and approval, transfer/lease his or her shares a maximum period of 3 years out of any 10 year period.

Suboption: Owner on board provision would not apply within a cooperative.

***The Council could consider selecting a preferred owner on board provision. In determining whether to require owner-on-board use of shares, the Council should consider the nature of the fisheries and whether such a requirement is reasonable for the future conduct of these fisheries. Establishing a portion of shares as owner-on-board could lead to a more fluid market for those shares since holders would be required to be on the vessel fishing those shares. Tenure of share holdings would likely decline for the owner-on-board shares. Owner-on-board shares are also likely to trade at a lower price than shares not subject to an owner-on-board requirement.***

***As with the leasing limitations discussed in 2.2.3.3.5 above, the Council should consider that the provisions as drafted would apply only to cooperative members (suggesting that no owner-on-board requirement would apply to cooperative members). The Council should bear in mind that removing owner on board***

*requirements for members of cooperatives may limit the effectiveness of owner-on-board provisions in achieving any purpose other than encouraging cooperative membership.*

*The Council could also apply different owner-on-board provisions to different sectors (i.e., low producing fixed gear catcher vessels, high producing fixed gear catcher vessels, trawl catcher vessels).*

#### 2.2.3.3.8 Overage Provisions

A 7 day grace period after an overage occurs for the owner to lease sufficient IFQ to cover the overage. Failure to secure sufficient IFQ would result in forfeiture of the overages and fines.

##### i. Trawl CV and CP:

Suboption 1. Overages up to 15% or 20% of the last trip will be allowed— greater than a 15% or 20% overage result in forfeiture and civil penalties. An overage of 15% or 20% or less, results in the reduction of the subsequent year's annual allocation or IFQ. Underages up to 10% of harvest shares (or IFQ).

Suboption 2. Overage provisions would not be applicable in fisheries where there is an incentive fishery that has not been fully utilized for the year. (i.e., no overages would be charged if a harvest share (or IFQ) holder goes over his/her annual allocation (or IFQ) when incentive fisheries are still available).

##### ii. Longline and pot CV and CP:

Overages up to 10% of the last trip will be allowed with rollover provisions for underages up to 10% of harvest shares (or IFQ).

Suboption. Overages would not be applicable in fisheries where there is an incentive fishery that has not been fully utilized for the year. (i.e., no overages would be allowed if a harvest share (or IFQ) holder goes over his/her annual allocation (or IFQ) when incentive fisheries are still available).

*The Council could consider finalizing overage and underage provisions. The Council should make clear its purpose for establishing overage and underage provisions and make certain that the provision is consistent with that purpose. Under the proposed underage carryover provision a share holder that underharvests an allocation would be permitted to carryover up to 10 percent of their annual allocation to the following year. Underage carryover provisions can have an advantage, in reducing a person's incentive to attempt to fish all allocated shares, if there is a risk of overage. This incentive, in turn, reduces the possibility of an overharvest of the fleet share allocation. A downside of an underage carryover is that the agency may have to allocate in excess of the TAC to allocate both the annual share allocations and the underage carryover.*

*Overage carryover provisions, on the other hand, allow a person to exceed their allocation by a specific percentage without risk, since shares would be deducted from the following year's allocation. An overage carryover provision reduces any incentive to limit catch to one's allocation, since the risk of loss of catch or penalty for overages is reduced (or possibly removed). Including both overage and underage carryovers in a program could allow participants to speculate at the margin of their allocations, either intentionally underharvesting or overharvesting allocations, depending on the condition of markets.*

*Including both provisions could be important for smaller participants, who are less likely to be able to project their harvest within the bounds of the overage and underage provisions because they fish relatively small allocations. The extent of this complication is compounded for persons fishing multispecies allocations, who may be limited by the allocation of one species while still having a substantial allocation of another. Allowing*



*limited overage and/or underage provisions could reduce the amount of allocated catches that are not harvested.*

- 2.2.3.3.9 Retention requirements for rockfish, sablefish and Atka mackerel:
- Option 1. no retention requirements.
  - Option 2. require retention (all species) until the annual allocation (or IFQ) for that species is taken with discards allowed for overages
  - Option 3. require 100% retention (all species) until the annual allocation (or IFQ) for that species is taken and then stop fishing.
- 2.2.3.3.10 Limited processing for CVs  
Limited processing of groundfish species by owners of CV harvest shares of groundfish species not subject to processor landing requirements are allowed up to 1 mt of round weight equivalent of groundfish per day on a vessel less than or equal to 60ft LOA. (consistent with LLPs - 679.4(k)(3)(ii)(D)).
- 2.2.3.3.11 Processing Restrictions
- Option 1. CPs may buy CV share fish not subject to processor landing requirements.  
Suboption. 3 year sunset
  - Option 2. CPs would be prohibited from buying CV fish.
  - Option 3. CPs may buy incentive fish and incidental catches of CV fish not subject to processor landing requirements.
  - Option 4. CPs may buy delivery restricted CV fish, if they hold a processing license.

A CP is a vessel that harvests CP shares under the program in a year.

*The Council could select a preferred provision concerning the extent of catcher vessel harvests that may be processed by catcher processors. If Option 2 is adopted as a preferred provision, the Council should clarify whether it would permit catcher processors to process harvest shares subject to processor landing requirements, if the catcher processor met those requirements. For example, in Alternative 2A a licensed processor is permitted to receive deliveries of any A share landings. The Council should clarify whether a catcher processor that purchased a processing license would be permitted to purchase A share landings under that alternative. Similarly, under Alternative 2B, whether a catcher processor could purchase a license and establish linkages with harvest shares should be clarified. Although deliveries to catcher processors are very limited in the Gulf of Alaska fisheries, the Council should clarify whether a catcher processor that met qualifications for either a processing license or a linkage would be permitted to receive landings to the extent permitted by the license and linkage. Option 3 would allow catcher vessels to deliver harvests (including incidental harvests) from the incentive fishery to catcher processors.*

*Current inshore/offshore regulations allocate all directed pollock and 90 percent of the all Pacific cod to the inshore sector and 10 percent of the all Pacific cod to the offshore sector. The inshore sector is defined as shore-based processors, floating processors that remain in a single geographic location during a fishing year, and vessels less than 125 feet LOA that hold an inshore processing permit and process less than 126 mt of aggregate pollock and Pacific cod in a week. Since the current provision includes limited processing by catcher processors in the inshore sector, the division between inshore and offshore is not equivalent to the distribution between catcher processors and shore-based and floating processors.*

*Any allocation of species under this program would supersede these allocations. Quantitative analyses of the share distributions to catcher vessels and catcher processors under this program could be provided at a future time. In general, the affects of the program on the distribution between the inshore and offshore sectors, however, depends on the degree to which individuals would choose to take advantage of the different provisions to adapt their behavior and not the share allocations. For example, a provision allowing catcher*

*vessels to deliver B share landings to catcher processors would only affect the distribution of landings, if catcher vessels choose to use the latitude of the provision. The size of the B share allocation (which the Council has yet to decide) could also affect the extent of the effects.*

#### 2.2.4 Allocation of Secondary Species

Thornyhead, rougheye, shortraker, other slope rockfish, Atka mackerel, and trawl sablefish  
Includes SEO shortraker, rougheye, and thornyhead rockfish.

##### i. Allocation of shares

Option 1. Allocate shares to all fishermen (including sablefish & halibut QS fishermen) based on fleet bycatch rates by gear:

Suboption 1. based on average catch history by area and target fishery

Suboption 2. based on 75<sup>th</sup> percentile by area by target fishery

Option 2. Allocation of shares will be adjusted pro rata to allocate 100% of the annual TAC for each bycatch species.

Suboption 1. Other slope rockfish in the Western Gulf will not be allocated, but will be managed by MRB and will go to PSC status when the TAC is reached.

Option 3. Secondary species allocations will be awarded to the owners of sablefish and halibut QS.

ii. Include these species for one gear type only (e.g., trawl). Deduct the secondary species catch from gear types from TAC. If deduction is not adequate to cover secondary species catch in other gear types, on a seasonal basis, place that species on PSC status until overfishing is reached.

iii. Retain these species on bycatch status for all gear types with current MRAs.

iv. Allow trawl sablefish catch history to be issued as a new category of sablefish harvest shares ("T" shares) by area. "T" shares would be fully leasable, exempt from vessel size and block restrictions, and retain sector designation upon sale.

Suboption. These shares may be used with either fixed gear or trawl gear.

##### v. Permit transfer of secondary species QS

Option 1. Primary species shares and secondary species shares are non-separable and must be transferred as a unit.

Option 2. Primary species shares and secondary species shares are separable and may be transferred separately

#### 2.2.5 Halibut PSC

##### 2.2.5.1 Accounting of Halibut Bycatch

Pot vessels continue their exemption from halibut PSC caps.

##### Hook and line

Option 1: Modeled after sablefish IFQ program (no direct inseason accounting of halibut PSC. Holders of halibut IFQ are required to land legal halibut. Estimates of sub-legal and legal size incidental mortality are accounted for when setting annual CEY.

Option 2: Halibut PSC will be managed through harvest share allocations.

Option 3: Continue to fish under halibut PSC caps.

Suboption (to all options): Holders of halibut IFQ are required to land legal halibut. Halibut bycatch occurring without sufficient IFQs would count against halibut PSC allocations.

##### Trawl Entities:

Option 1: Halibut PSC will be managed through harvest share allocations.

Option 2: Continue to fish under halibut PSC caps.

**2.2.5.2 Halibut PSC Allocation**

Each recipient of fishing history would receive an allocation of halibut mortality (harvest shares) based on their allocation of the primary species shares. Secondary species would receive no halibut allocation. Initial allocation based on average halibut bycatch by directed primary species during the qualifying years. Allocations will be adjusted pro rata to equal the existing halibut PSC cap.

By sector average bycatch rates by area by gear:

Option 1. Both sectors

Option 2. Catcher Processor/Catcher Vessel

**2.2.5.3 Annual transfer/Leasing of Trawl or Fixed Gear Halibut PSC mortality**

Option A: Halibut PSC annual allocations are separable from primary groundfish annual allocations and may be transferred independently within gear types. When transferred separately, the amount of Halibut PSC allocation would be reduced, for that year, by:

Suboption 1. 0%

Suboption 2. 5%

Suboption 3. 7%

Suboption 4. 10%

Suboption 5: Exclude any halibut PSC transferred for participation in the incentive fisheries (includes transfers outside the cooperative).

Suboption 6: Exclude any halibut PSC transferred within a cooperative.

Option B: No leasing/annual transfer of halibut PSC outside of cooperatives.

All halibut PSC reductions under this section will remain unfished (in the water).

**2.2.5.3.1 Halibut PSC Reduction for Non-Members of Cooperatives**

Non-members of cooperatives would have halibut PSC reduced by:

i 5%

ii 15%

iii 30%

Halibut PSC reduction will not apply to low-producing fixed gear participants.

All halibut PSC reductions under this section will remain unfished (in the water).

**2.2.5.4 Permanent transfer of Halibut PSC harvest share mortality**

Option 1. Groundfish primary species harvest shares (QS) and Halibut PSC harvest shares (QS) are non-separable and must be transferred as a unit  
Suboption. exempt Pacific cod

Option 2. Groundfish primary species harvest shares (QS) and Halibut PSC harvest shares (QS) are separable and may be transferred separately

**2.2.5.5 Retention of halibut incidentally caught by fixed gear vessels**

Halibut incidentally caught may be retained outside the halibut season from Jan. 1 to start of commercial fishery. Any person retaining halibut must have adequate halibut IFQ to cover the landing. Retention is limited to (range 10-20%) of primary species.

Option 1: In all GOA areas.

Option 2: Limited to Areas 3A, 3B, and 4A.

The Council requests that staff notify the IPHC concerning these provisions.

**2.2.6 Incentive species**

Arrowtooth flounder, deepwater flatfish, flathead sole, rex sole, shallow water flatfish.

Owners of shares must utilize all their shares for an incentive species before participating in incentive fishery for that species.

Option. The portion of historic unharvested West Yakutat Pacific cod TAC will be made available as an incentive fishery, subject to provision of incentive fisheries.

#### 2.2.6.1 Eligibility to fish in the incentive fisheries

A. The unallocated QS for the incentive fisheries are available for harvest, providing the vessel has adequate halibut PSC and secondary species.

Suboption: vessels must be a member of a GOA fishing cooperative to fish in the incentive fishery.

B. Any holder of halibut or sablefish IFQ that has adequate IFQ or halibut PSC and secondary species.

#### 2.2.6.2 Catch accounting for the incentive fisheries – Allocated QS and Incentive fishery quota

Option 1. The individual co-op member's apportionment of the allocated incentive species QS must be used prior to the individual gaining access to the incentive fishery unallocated portion. The co-op will notify NMFS when a vessel enters the incentive fishery quota pool.

Option 2. The co-op's allocation of incentive species QS must be fished before gaining access to the unallocated portion of the incentive species quotas. The co-op members through a contractual coop agreement will address catch accounting amongst the co-op members.

Option 3. For shareholders not participating in co-op, the unallocated incentive species are available for harvest once the individual IFQ holder's allocation of the incentive species has been used.

#### 2.2.6.3 Allocation of incentive species

Allocates incentive species groundfish primary species harvest shares (QS) to the historical participants. Available incentive fishery quota is available TAC for that fishing year minus the incentive species groundfish primary species harvest share allocated to the historical participants.

Threshold approach-Allocate harvest share as a fixed allocation in metric tons. If available TAC is less than the total fixed allocation in metric tons, then reduce participants' allocation pro-rata amongst shareholders.

Option 1. Total retained catch of the participants divided by the number of years in the qualifying period.

Option 2. Total retained catch of the participants plus 25% divided by the number of years in the qualifying period.

Option 3. Total catch of the participants divided by the number of years in the qualifying period.

#### 2.2.7 Preserving entry level opportunities for P. cod

2.2.7.1 Each initial allocation of P.cod harvest shares based on the final year of the qualifying period to fixed gear catcher vessels below the block threshold size would be a block of quota and could only be permanently sold or transferred as a block.

Option 1 10,000 pounds constitutes one block

Option 2 20,000 pounds constitutes one block

Option 3 No Block Program

Suboption. Lowest producer harvest shares earned as a bycatch in the halibut sablefish ITQ program would be exempt from the block program

#### 2.2.7.2 Eligible participants would be allowed to hold a maximum of:

Option 1, 1 block

Option 2. 2 blocks

Option 3. 4 blocks

#### 2.2.7.3 Any person may hold:

- Option 1. One block and any amount of unblocked shares
- Option 2. Two blocks and any amount of unblocked shares
- Option 3. Four blocks and any amount of unblocked shares

#### 2.2.8 Skipper/Crew

A skipper is defined as the individual owning the Commercial Fishery Entry Permit and signing the fish ticket.

- Option 1. No skipper and/or crew provisions
- Option 2. Allocate to skippers and/or crew
  - Suboption 1. Initial allocation of 5% shall be reserved for captains and/or crew
  - Suboption 2. Initial allocation of 10% shall be reserved for captains and/or crew
  - Suboption 3. Initial allocation of 15% shall be reserved for captains and/or crew
- Option 3. Establish license program for certified skippers. For initial allocation Certified Skippers are either:
  - i. Vessel owners receiving initial QS or harvest privileges; or
  - ii. Hired skippers who have demonstrated fishing experience in Federal or State groundfish fisheries in the BSAI or GOA for 3 out of the past 5 years as documented by a CFEC permit and signed fish tickets and/or appropriate NMFS documentation (starting date for five years is 2003).
    - Suboption 1. include crew in the license program.
    - Suboption 2. require that new Certified Skippers licenses accrue to individuals with demonstrated fishing experience (Groundfish – BSAI/GOA, state or federal waters) similar to halibut/sablefish program.

Under any alternative that establishes QS and annual harvest privileges, access to those annual harvest privileges is allowed only when fishing with a Certified Skipper onboard. Certified Skipper Licenses are non-transferable. They accrue to an individual and may not be sold, leased, bartered, traded, or otherwise used by any other individual.

Defer remaining issues to a trailing amendment and assumes simultaneous implementation with rationalization program.

#### 2.2.9.1 Regionalization

If adopted, all processing licenses (for shore-based and floating processors) will be categorized by region.

*(applies only to the Central Gulf)*

Processing licenses that are regionally designated cannot be reassigned to another region.

Catcher vessel harvest shares are regionalized based on where the catch was processed, not where it was caught.

Harvest shares would be regionalized based on the landings history during the regionalization qualifying period.

Catcher processor shares and incentive fisheries are not subject to regionalization.

In the event harvest shares are regionalized and the processor linkage option is chosen, a harvester's shares in a region will be linked to the processor entity in the region to which the harvester delivered the most pounds during the qualifying years used for determining linkages under 2.3.1.1.2.

The following describes the regions established and fisheries that would be subject to regionalization:

**Central Gulf:** Two regions are proposed to classify harvesting shares: North - South line at 58 51.10' North Latitude (Cape Douglas corner for Cook Inlet bottom trawl ban area) extending west to east to the intersection with 140° W long, and then southerly along 140° W long.).

The following fisheries will be regionalized for shorebased (including floating) catch and subject to the North-South distribution: CGOA Pollock (area 620 and 630) CGOA aggregate flatfish, CGOA aggregate rockfish and

CGOA Pacific cod. CGOA trawl sablefish will be regionalized based on all landing of primary species in the CGOA associated with the license during regionalization qualifying period.

2.2.9.1.1 Secondary species shares  
Secondary species shares would not be subject to regionalization

2.2.9.1.2 Qualifying years to determine the distribution of shares between regions will be:  
Option 1. consistent with the preferred option under "Section 2.2.2 Qualifying Periods"  
Option 2. 1999 – 2002

Other community provisions (CFQ and CPP) moved to separate portion of the motion.

PSC for Crab and Salmon move to separate portion of the motion.

2.2.10 Review and Evaluation

2.2.10.1 Data collection.

A mandatory data collection program would be developed and implemented. The program would collect cost, revenue, ownership and employment data on a periodic basis to provide the information necessary to study the impacts of the program. Details of this program will be developed in the analysis of the alternatives.

2.2.10.2 Review

Preliminary program review at the first Council Meeting in the 3<sup>rd</sup> year and formal review in the 5<sup>th</sup> year after implementation to objectively measure the success of the program, including benefits and impacts to harvesters (including vessel owners, skippers and crew), processors and communities, by addressing concerns, goals and objectives identified in the problem statement and the Magnuson Stevens Act standards. This review shall include analysis of post-rationalization impacts to coastal communities, harvesters and processors in terms of economic impacts and options for mitigating those impacts. Subsequent reviews are required every 5 years.

2.2.12 Sideboards

On completion of a rationalization program in the Bering Sea, any sideboards from GOA Rationalization under this section will be superseded for the fleet subject to rationalization.

GOA Groundfish sideboards under the crab rationalization plan, under the AFA, and the CGOA rockfish pilot project would be superceded by the GOA rationalization program allocations upon implementation.

Vessels (Steel) and LLPs used to generate harvest shares used in a co-op may not participate in other federally managed open access fisheries in excess of sideboard allotments.

Participants in the GOA rationalized fisheries are limited to their aggregate historical participation based on GOA rationalized qualifying years in BSAI and SEO groundfish fisheries.

The Council should consider adding sideboards for the GOA jig fishery, which will not be included in the rationalization program.

Staff analysis of sideboard issues should examine the potential consequences of the creation of a double set of sideboards relating to BSAI fisheries for vessels already subject to AFA sideboards in BSAI fisheries.

2.3 Processing Sector Provisions

*The Council could clarify the processing sector provisions for Alternatives 2A and 2B in several respects at this meeting. As the Council considers these issues, it will be important to develop a coherent package, which*

*incorporates several different consistent decisions into a comprehensive alternative. Since this section contains several overlapping decisions, to aid the Council's development of alternatives the following decisions are listed:*

**Alternative 2A**

- 1) *The percent of shares that will be delivery restricted (A shares) and unrestricted (B shares) (2.3.1.1.1)*
- 2) *The extent of any limits on the number or types of licenses that can be held by a processor (2.3.1.2.6)*
- 3) *Since entity based, determine whether a processor is limited in the number of facilities it may operate, if issued a license.*

**Alternative 2B**

- 1) *The percent of shares that will be delivery restricted (A shares) and unrestricted (B shares) (2.3.1.1.1)*
- 2) *The extent of any limits on the number or types of licenses that can be held by a processor (2.3.1.2.6)*
- 3) *The level of the penalty for movement between linked processors (2.3.1.1.3)*
  - a. *Percentage of shares*
  - b. *Number of years*
  - c. *Does the penalty apply to A shares or both A shares and B shares*
- 4) *Whether penalties are one-time or would apply to a second linkage (or are discounted after the first linkage is severed) (2.3.1.1.3)*
- 5) *The impact of a processor no longer operating in a community at the time of implementation (2.3.1.1.2)*
  - a. *Linked harvesters can deliver to*
    - i. *any licensed processor*
    - ii. *any licensed processor in the community*
    - iii. *the processor that the harvester delivered the second most pounds to.*
  - b. *Whether a linkage would be established*

For alternative 2A apply provisions generally at the company level.  
For 2B, apply provisions generally at the facility (plant) level.

2.3.1 Provisions for Processor License Limitation

- 2.3.1.1 Harvester Delivery requirements  
2.3.1.1.1 Harvester delivery requirements

- Option 1. 50-100% of CV harvest share allocation will be reserved for delivery to:
- i. the linked licensed closed trawl or fixed class processor (Applies to 2B).
  - ii. Any licensed trawl or fixed (Applies to 2A)

*The Council could decide the percentage of delivery restricted shares (A shares) in both alternatives. Generally, the Council should set the percentage of A shares to balance the interests of harvesters and processors. The larger the percentage of A shares, the greater the restriction on the harvest share holder's market for landings. Under Alternative 2A, share holders would be required to deliver A shares to processors holding licenses. Under Alternative 2B, a share holder would be required to deliver their delivery restricted A shares to the particular processor to which its shares are linked (with linkages based on historic landings patterns). Given the less restrictive delivery obligation under Alternative 2A, imposing delivery restrictions on a higher percentage of shares is likely reasonable. Under Alternative 2A, a harvester would be able to induce competition among several license-holding processors for all landings, with each processor, generally, on equal footing for attracting those landings. Under Alternative 2B, processors would be able to compete for A share landings only by inducing a share holder to break the linkage associated with those shares, which requires a share reduction penalty. B shares, which are not delivery restricted, could be used to attempt to*

*induce the linked processor to pay a higher price for A share landings or to induce a competing processor to pay a price for A shares that is high enough to make the penalty share reduction worthwhile. Under either alternative, the appropriate level for the restriction should balance the historic investment interests of the processors in having a closed market for a portion of the allocation against the interests of harvesters in having a broader, more competitive market for their landings.*

*The interests of potential entrants to the processing market should also be considered in setting the percentage. The Council should consider the need to allow new entrants to experiment with innovations, which could benefit the industry in the long run. Leaving a very small portion of the fishery for unrestricted delivery may severely limit opportunity for entry. Under Alternative 2B, the ability to land unrestricted shares with any processor could be of greater importance to new entrants for a few reasons. The linkage creates a relatively strong and specific relationship between the harvest share holder and the linked processor. This relationship could encompass not only the delivery restricted shares, but also the unrestricted shares. If only a small portion of the fishery is unrestricted, the ability of a processor to enter in an effective manner could require not only strong competition for the unrestricted shares, but also establishment of linkages with some share holders. While the establishment of linkages is a reasonable expectation for processors that are to be long term participants, entrants that are experimenting with relatively small quantities of deliveries should not be expected to make the investment in establishing linkages. Under Alternative 2A, the potential to enter the fishery by purchasing relatively small amounts of fish is also worth assessing. Since harvester shares do not have specific processor linkages, more harvesters will have less restrictive relationships with processors with greater competition for landings. The competition among licensed processors, however, is likely to be extensive and could affect the market for shares that are not delivery restricted.*

*When considering the appropriate percentage of delivery restricted shares under Alternative 2B, the Council should also consider other aspects of the processor dimension of the program. The protection provided to any processor will depend not only on the percentage of shares that are subject to the delivery restriction, but also on the penalty for share movement. While not a direct trade off, the two decisions are closely related. In general, a higher percentage of delivery restricted shares determines the quantity of shares for which a linked processor has a market advantage. The penalty determines the extent of the market advantage with respect to those linked shares.*

Option 2. Low producing vessels are exempt from delivery requirements (Applies to Fixed Gear 2 Low only)

2.3.1.1.2 Linkage (Linkages apply by area) (Applies to 2B):

A harvester's processor linked shares are associated with the licensed fixed or trawl processor to which the harvester delivered the most pounds of groundfish during the last \_\_\_ years of prior to 2004.

- |      |   |
|------|---|
| i.   | 1 |
| ii.  | 2 |
| iii. | 3 |

*The Council could decide at this time whether to credit history from one, two or three years for purposes of establishing processor associations. A longer term for establishing the association could be justified on the basis of protecting longer associations. Using fewer and more recent years could be justified as a means to support more current associations. The analysis is unlikely to be able to show any significant contrast across these options because of confidentiality restrictions. Establishing a consistent approach across Alternatives 2 and 3 would simplify the analysis, if a preferable option for associations can be determined.*

*Also, the Council should consider establishing consistent association standards across Alternatives 2 and 3, if one standard is clearly superior to the others (Alt. 2 uses "most pounds of all groundfish," while Alternative 3 uses "most pounds of primary species" or "species aggregations"). Differences across alternatives could complicate the analysis significantly.*



Processors with history at multiple facilities in a community may aggregate those histories for determining associations.

Option 1: If the processing facility with whom the harvester is associated is no longer operating in the community, and another processing facility within the community has not purchased the history, the harvester is eligible to deliver to

- i. any licensed processor
- ii. any licensed processor in the community
- iii. the licensed processor to whom the harvester delivered the second most pounds

Option 2: If the processing facility with whom the harvester is associated is no longer operating in the community, the harvester is eligible to deliver to

- i. any licensed processor
- ii. any licensed processor in the community
- iii. the licensed processor to whom the harvester delivered the second most pounds

***The Council could decide whether to choose option 1 or option 2 and which of the suboptions (i, ii, or iii) to select, if an option is chosen. (This provision applies only to Alternative 2B.) Since this provision is in the section on establishing linkages at the outset of the program, staff assumes that the provision applies only on implementation (provisions later in the section would apply to circumstances that arise after implementation). This option could be used to limit the potential for a harvester to be linked to a secondary processor, should the processor it would otherwise be linked to stop operating in the community. The provision could be justified, if the Council believes it is unreasonable to require a harvester to deliver to either the same processor in another community or to another processor in the same community. The rationale for removing the linkage could be that the intent of the processor linkage provision in general is to protect only the processing plant with the strongest relationship to a harvester historically.***

***In approaching this question, the Council should consider the interaction of this provision with other provisions in this section (2.3). The outcome should be a package of consistent provisions that meet Council objectives. As a starting point, the Council decided at a previous meeting to use a facility-based approach under Alternative 2B. So, a harvest share/processor linkage would be determined at the facility level (which by its nature would establish the association within a single community). The first choice is whether a harvester that would be associated with a processor that is no longer operating should have any processor association. The Council could choose either option 1 or 2 to first clarify whether any linkage would be established for harvesters that delivered a majority of catch to a processor that is no longer operating.***

***The choice between option 1 or 2 should be decided based on whether the Council believes that a transfer of processor history among processors (independent of a harvester) should be credited under the program. Under option 1, if a processor in the same community purchases the history of a defunct processor, the purchaser would receive any associations of the defunct facility. Under option 2, the associations would not transfer to the purchaser of the history.***

***The suboptions (i, ii, or iii) would be used to define the processors that a harvester may deliver to, if its associated processor is no longer in operation. In selecting an option the Council should clearly state whether an association will arise.***

***If the Council selects option i, the harvest shares could be delivered to any processor, if the associated processor discontinued operations. The Council could either allow the shares to be delivered freely to any processor thereafter or require a linkage to a processor selected by the harvester. This first approach could be***

*applied, if the Council intended Alternative 2B to establish a one-time linkage that would not be transferred to a second processor once severed (i.e., suboption C from 2.3.1.1.3 is consistent with the approach). This approach would create an initial linkage for each delivery restricted share, but once the linkage is broken the shares would be subject to a license limitation program for processors similar to Alternative 2A. The second approach, which would create a linkage, could be applied to a system that establishes either a one-time linkage or a system of perpetual associations (i.e. suboptions A or B from 2.3.1.1.3 is consistent with the approach.*

*The Council could alternatively choose to limit the harvester to delivering to a processor within the community (suboption ii) or to the processor it delivered the second most pounds to (suboption iii). The provision that limits landings to the same community would be intended to ensure that the community benefits from the processing association even if a processing plant closes. Creating an association with the processor that the harvester delivered the second most pounds to would create a system that credits the processing plant with landings regardless of the potential loss to the community of the closed facility. The provision is not inconsistent with efforts that attempt to protect community interests with processing associations, since it would create an association with open processor facility that the harvester delivered the most pounds to. The community of that facility would receive the benefits of the association. These provisions would be consistent with either a system with a single association or a system with perpetual linkages (any of the suboptions under 2.3.1.1.3).*

*The Council requests that staff provide a discussion paper addressing the effect of a use cap on the number of processors in a region.*

#### 2.3.1.1.3 Movement between linked processors (Applies to 2B)

Any vessel that is linked to a processor, may with the consent of that processor, deliver A shares to another plant.

Share reductions of 10% - 20% when a harvester moves from a linked processor for:

- i. 1 year
- ii. 2 years
- iii. 4 years

Suboptions:

- i. Penalty applies to A shares only.
- ii. Penalty applies to both A and B shares.
  - A. Full penalty applies to each move
  - B. Full penalty applies to the first move, subsequent moves are penalized at half of that rate.
  - C. Full penalty applies only to the first transfer

The share reduction shall be redistributed to:

The shareholders in association with that processor that the shareholder left (if it continues to exist).

*The Council could decide several issues under this section.*

*First, the penalty for movement between linked processors could be decided at this meeting. The level of penalty should balance the interests of processors that have established histories in the fisheries and the processor protection arising from the linkage/penalty provisions against the interests of harvesters in having a broader market in which to sell their harvests. The penalty represents a loss of revenues to a harvester, which could be used to defer long term fixed costs, such as vessel loans, in addition to variable costs, which are reduced by not having to harvest the shares subject to penalty. This loss of revenues should be balanced against the long term loss of revenues to a processor that occurs, if a processor loses the linkage. In a program of perpetual linkages, the linkages could be of greater importance to a processor, since the*

*competition for delivery restricted shares linked to other processors will be limited by the need to pay an ex-vessel price that covers the penalty.*

*As a part of this decision, the Council could decide whether the penalty will be applied in a single year or over the course of more than one year. Extended terms for penalties are likely to discourage movement between processors by increasing the cost of movement. Discounting suggests that extending a penalty over several years, however, is likely to be less costly to a harvester than imposing a penalty of the same magnitude of fish over a shorter period of time (i.e., 2 percent per year for 4 years is less costly than 8 percent in a single year, if the TAC and product markets remain constant). Extending the penalty to reduce its magnitude in a single year could also avoid disruption to a harvester's operations that could occur from imposing a larger penalty in a single year. Long term penalties, however, could discourage movement and competition. On the other hand, penalties of relatively long terms could contribute to stronger relationships between harvesters and processors. If a penalty is imposed over several years, the processor with which a new linkage is established could establish a relationship for the term of the penalty (or beyond) to cover the harvester's costs of penalty.*

*The Council could decide whether to apply the penalty to delivery restricted A shares or to both the delivery restricted A shares and the unrestricted B shares. Assessing the penalty on both types of shares would affect the magnitude of the penalty and the nature of the penalty. Reducing B share allocations to a share holder on severing a linkage, would reduce not only the allocation, but the ability of a harvester to use B share revenues (which are likely to be at least as large as A share revenues on a per pound basis) to disburse the cost of the penalty.*

*The Council could also decide whether penalties are discounted (or entirely waived) after the first move between linked processors. The possible rationale for discounting (or waiving) the penalty is that the second processor would not have the historic processing association with the share holder that is the justification for the system of linkages. On the other hand, retaining the penalty could be justified as a means to add stability to the processing sector. A discounted penalty could provide a middle ground, diminishing the potential for a harvester to move among freely among processors every year, but recognizing that a the second linked processor has less of a historic interest than the initial linked processor. Discounting penalties after the first move will have two competing effects in the market for ex vessel landings. On one side, the second linked processor will have a lower incentive to pay to establish a new association with a share holder, since its association can be more easily severed by the share holder. On the other side, a share holder will be willing to accept less from the secondary processor for severing the linkage since the share holder will have greater freedom to move among processors thereafter (because of the decreased penalty). This effect is more pronounced, if penalties apply only to the first movement. If no penalty is applied after the first move, a share holder would move, if the fair market value of unrestricted share landings are large enough to cover the cost of the loss of shares through the penalty. In either case (the reduced penalty or no penalty after the first linkage), a share holder and processor could negotiate a long term agreement under which the share holder voluntarily commits landings to a processor to induce the processor to cover the cost of the penalty for the first move.*

*[If the Council elects to structure Alternative 2B so that no penalty applies after the first move from a linked processor, shares that are subject to delivery restrictions (A shares) would be landed under a limited license program for processors. If the Council intends the program to operate differently, clarification should be made.]*

### **2.3.1.2 Processor License Qualifications (Applies to 2A and 2B)**

**2.3.1.2.1** To qualify for a processor license, a processor must have purchased and processed a minimum amount of groundfish by region as described below in at least 4 of the following years:

Option 1. 1995-99.

Option 2. 1995-01

## Option 3. 1995-02

If a processor meets the threshold for total purchased and processed groundfish for all their facilities combined, but does not meet the threshold for any one facility then the processor would be issued a license for the facility in which it processed most fish. **(Applies to 2B only since 2A is entity based).**

- Option 1.
- a. Trawl eligible Processors
    - Suboption 1. 2000 mt
    - Suboption 2. 1000 mt
    - Suboption 3. 500 mt
  - b. Fixed gear eligible Processors
    - Suboption 1. 500 mt
    - Suboption 2. 200 mt
    - Suboption 3. 50 mt
  - c. Trawl and Fixed gear eligible processors
    - Meet criteria for both the trawl processor license and fixed gear processor license as described above

*This provision would entitle any processor that receive the threshold landings in an area (and region, if Central Gulf) to a license. Under Alternative 2A, landings could be aggregated across multiple facilities in a region for determining whether a threshold is met. Under Alternative 2B, the threshold must be met at a single plant, since licensing under that provision is plant based.*

*Under Alternative 2A, it is unclear whether a licensed processor would be limited in the number of plants that could be operated using single license. The Council should clarify whether any such limitation would exist under Alternative 2A.*

- 2.3.1.2.2 Processor history would be credited to (and licenses would be issued to):  
Operator – must hold a federal or state processor permit.

Custom processing history would be credited to:  
the processor that purchased the fish as indicated on the fish ticket and paid for processing

- 2.3.1.2.3 Transferability of eligible processor licenses  
Processor licenses can be sold, leased, or transferred.  
Within the same region  
If the license is transferred outside the community of origin, then vessel linkages are broken and vessels are allowed to deliver to any licensed processor.

- 2.3.1.2.3.1 License Transfers Among Processors (applies to processor limited entry)
- Option 1. any share association with that license will transfer to the processor receiving the license. All harvest share/history holders will be subject to any share reduction on severing the linkage, as would have been made in the absence of the transfer.
  - Option 2. any share associated with the license will be free to associate with any licensed processor. Harvest share/history holders will be free to move among processors without share/history reduction.

*Allowing the processor association to transfer would grant a transferable interest to a processor of a portion of each harvester's landings market. Some harvesters are likely to argue that this provides a processor with too much control of a harvester's interests and could result in processor associations that a harvester would*

*never voluntarily enter. In addition, allowing transfers of the association could result in a harvester having to deliver to a different port/community.*

*On the other hand, whether cooperative associations transfer with a processor license will greatly impact the value of processor licenses and the associated linkages. A processor that is interested in exiting the fishery will have a strong disincentive to exit, if the linkages are non-transferable. Harvesters in the association could suffer, if a processor chooses not to sell a license because of the loss of value because of lost associations. In these circumstances, private agreements between the affected share holders and the processor could mitigate any harm. For example, harvesters could agree to maintain the linkage with the new processor in the event that the license sale is agreeable.*

2.3.1.2.4 Processing Use caps by processor license type (trawl, fixed or trawl and fixed, by CGOA and WGOA regulatory areas:

- Option 1. Range 70% to 130% of TAC processed for all groundfish species for the largest licensed processor
- Option 2. Processing use caps would be equal to a percentage that would allow contraction of processing companies in the fishery by 20%, 30%, or 50% of the number initially qualified processing companies

(Note: There is no limit on the amount of fish either a trawl or fixed gear licensed processor can buy from the open B share classed fish)

2.3.1.2.5 Processing Caps may apply at the entity level

2.3.1.2.6 License ownership restrictions on processors

- Option 1. No restrictions
- Option 2. Trawl/fixed license holders cannot hold any additional fixed gear only licenses.

*The Council could consider adopting provisions that limit licenses that a processor could hold. Although option 2 could be used to limit holding of fixed gear licenses by persons holding licenses endorsed for fixed and trawl gear, the Council should also consider whether to limit the number of licenses that a processor can hold, as aggregating licenses in the absence of such a limitation could be an effective way of limiting competition in the processing sector. Consolidation of license holdings could be an effective way to limit competition in processing and prevent entry. Under Alternative 2A, consolidating licenses would simply limit the number of processors competing for A share landings. Under Alternative 2B, consolidation of licenses could also effectively limit competition. Given that the Council has included processor linkages as a means of protecting processors' historic interests, allowing processors to consolidate licenses could distort any balance of negotiating power between harvesters and processors that the Council intended to establish by selecting the percent of delivery restricted shares (A shares) and the penalty for changing linkages. For example, if a few processors purchase several licenses, the prospect of entry and the competition for linkages could be drastically reduced.*

2.3.2 Provisions affecting Allocation of Harvest Shares to Processors (Alternative 2C)

1. Processors are eligible to receive an allocation of QS if they meet eligibility criteria identified in 2.3.1.2.1. Any shareholder under this program is intended to comply with all existing laws concerning the documentation of vessels and entry of vessels to U.S. fisheries in fishing those shares. Shareholders unable to enter a vessel into U.S. fisheries may lease share holdings or use holdings through cooperative membership to the extent permitted by the program, but not in contravention of current law pertaining to entry of vessels in U.S. fisheries.
2. Up to 30% of CV shares shall be designated as "CVP" shares and eligible to be held by processors and CV recipients. A portion of the CVP share allocation will be divided among eligible processors proportional to

their history in the qualifying years as outlined in 2.3.1.2.1. Any balance of CVP not distributed initially to processors shall be distributed proportionally to CV recipients.

*The Council could determine the portion of CVP that will be allocated to processors. The Council's table identifying the alternative structures specifies an allocation of between 10 percent and 30 percent of the harvest share allocation would be to eligible processors. This level should be specified for the analysis.*

3. CVP is transferable between eligible CV holders and /or processors
4. CVP shares may be fished on any catcher vessel and subject to existing share designations and existing vessel use caps
5. CVP shares may be transferred or leased to any entity eligible to receive CV QS by transfer in 2.2.3.3
6. Caps of CVP will apply at the company level by management area and will be a 10-30% of the total pool of CVP shares available in the management area. Recipients of CVP that exceed the cap will be grandfathered.
7. No processors (and processor affiliates using the 10% rule) may own or control CV quota shares. CVP initially issued to processor affiliates will be grandfathered.
8. CVP shares will be regionalized.

#### 2.4 Cooperative Provisions

*Several cooperative provisions contain options. The Council could choose to identify the different options for each of the alternatives. The Council could select different provisions for the alternatives, since the interactions and relationships created under the alternatives are not the same. Differences among the catcher vessels and catcher processors arise out of the processor protections that are contained in most of the catcher vessel alternatives. In addition, low producing fixed gear catcher vessel provisions could differ because of the absence of processor protections under that alternative.*

*Several provisions in the Council motion together define the rules for cooperative formation, movement among cooperatives, and participation in the fisheries inside and outside of cooperatives. These provisions together are likely to impact the internal rules of the cooperatives, which in turn will affect the return that different participants are able to realize from their allocations. If these provisions are not carefully developed, some participants may be inadvertently affected by differences in negotiating strength across members of a cooperative. For example, in a cooperative composed primarily of pollock fishermen, a cod fisherman could have little leverage for changing rules to reasonably accommodate cod fishing. In the extreme, share holders with little or no direct activity in fisheries could control the harvests of active participants, if the active participants have no reasonable alternative to joining a particular cooperative. In considering rules, the Council should be wary of rules that create incentives to modify share holdings. A rule that requires 90 percent of eligible share holders for cooperative formation may create an incentive for a single share holder to subdivide holdings among his friends and family to affect bargaining strength relative to other eligible share holders.*

*In general, the assessment of the relative power of participants in a cooperative depends on several factors. These determinants of negotiating strength can be generalized to two categories, internal and external. Internal effects are generated by the rules governing cooperatives, such as rules of cooperative formation and any rules that define membership. External effects, which are equally important, are generated by the outside options available to a harvester that chooses not to join a cooperative. For example, a person's negotiating leverage with respect to another is highly dependent on the ability to walk away from a transaction and pursue other opportunities. In the context of these cooperatives, the harvester's negotiating strength with respect to members of a particular cooperative depend on the ability of the harvester to choose not to join the cooperative and remain in the fishery. In the discussion that follows both internal and external affects are considered. Under the alternatives under consideration, processor protections are also an integral part of the cooperatives programs. The indirect impacts on processors arising from rules that affect cooperative membership decisions should be considered in fashioning cooperative programs.*

*In assessing the different options below, the Council should take care to develop a comprehensive cooperative program for each alternative. To do so will require that the interaction of the different provisions be assessed for both operational consistency and consistency of purpose.*

2.4.1 Cooperative requirements

Cooperative membership is not required to receive an annual harvest share allocation. (i.e., IFQ will be allocated to non-members)

2.4.2 Cooperative formation

2.4.2.1 Co-ops can be formed

- a. between holders of harvest shares or history in an area:
  - Trawl catcher vessels
  - “High producing” fixed gear catcher vessels
  - “Low producing” fixed gear catcher vessels
- b. between holders of harvest shares or history of a catcher/processor

Each group of share/history holders of a defined class that may form cooperatives is defined as a “sector.”

2.4.2.1.1 Co-op/processor affiliations

Option 1. No association required between processors and co-ops

Option 2. CV cooperatives must be associated with

- a) a processing facility
- b) a processing company

The associated processor must be:

- a) any processor
- b) a limited entry processing license holder (if processor limited entry is selected)
- c) a limited entry processing license holder to which the share holder’s shares are linked

Processors can associate with more than one co-op

Note: A processor association will not be required for a C/P cooperative.

2.4.2.2 Cooperatives are required to have at least:

4 distinct and separate harvesters (using the 10% threshold rule)

*The Council should consider the effects on processor entry of requiring 4 distinct entities for cooperative formation. If penalties (such as PSC reductions in 2.2.5.3.1) are imposed on persons that choose not to join a cooperative and cooperative formation requires 4 entities, it is possible that some processor entry could be discouraged. This issue could be addressed either by removing penalties intended to encourage cooperative membership or by reducing the threshold to cooperative formation. The need for penalties to encourage cooperative formation might be questioned, if cooperative fishing has intrinsic benefits.*

2.4.2.3 Duration of cooperative agreements:

- Option 1. 1 year
- Option 2. 3 years
- Option 3. 5 years

Suboption 1: Duration is minimum.

Suboption 2: Duration is maximum.

*The Council could choose an option for length of cooperative agreements. Longer term cooperative agreements could provide stability to participants. The ability to reformulate a cooperative agreement, however, could be important as relationships change. Although these changes could be accommodated through amendments to the agreement, shorter term agreements could provide added flexibility.*

### 2.4.3 Rules Governing Cooperatives

#### 2.4.3.1 Annual Allocations

Annual allocations of cooperative members would be issued to the cooperative.

- Co-op members may internally allocate and manage the co-op's allocation per the co-op membership agreement. Subject to any harvesting caps that may be adopted, member allocations may be transferred and consolidated within the co-op to the extent permitted under the membership agreement.
- Monitoring and enforcement requirements would be at the co-op level. Co-op members are jointly and severally responsible for co-op vessels harvesting in the aggregate no more than their co-op's allocation of primary species, secondary species and halibut mortality, as may be adjusted by interco-op transfers.
- Co-ops may adopt and enforce fishing practice codes of conduct as part of their membership agreement. Co-ops may penalize or expel members who fail to comply with their membership agreement. Processor affiliates cannot participate in price setting negotiations except as permitted by general antitrust law.
- Co-ops may engage in inter-cooperative transfers to the extent permitted by rules governing transfers of shares among sectors (e.g., gear groups, vessel types).
- Require that a cooperative accept membership of any eligible participant subject to the same terms and conditions that apply to other cooperative members.

### 2.4.4 Ownership and Use Caps and Underages

#### 2.4.4.1 Set co-op use caps at 25 to 100% of total TAC by species

#### 2.4.4.2 Co-op use caps for harvest shares on any given vessel shall be:

- Option 1. Set at the same level as the individual vessel level.
- Option 2. 3 times individual vessel use cap.
- Option 3. No use caps

- To effectively apply individual ownership caps, the number of shares or history that each cooperative member could hold and bring to cooperatives would be subject to the individual ownership caps (with initial allocations grandfathered). Transfers between cooperatives would be undertaken by the members individually, subject to individual ownership caps.
- Underage limits would be applied in the aggregate at the co-op level

### 2.4.5 Movement between cooperatives

#### 2.4.5.1 Harvesters may move between cooperatives at:

- Option 1. the end of each year.
- Option 2. the expiration of the cooperative agreement.
- Option 3. no movement in the first two years

*Allowing movement between cooperatives could be important to maintain competition in the fisheries. Requiring a commitment beyond a single year, however, could provide some stability in the fisheries. While a provision that prevents movement in the first two years could aid stability in the early years of the program (when relationships are likely to be least settled), during these early years the ability to make changes may be most important.*



**Entry Level and Second Generation Provisions**

The Council would like a review of existing program elements intended for entry level and second generation access in the GOA groundfish fisheries and a qualitative discussion of the MSA expectations for entry level opportunities, i.e., new, open access fisheries v. affordable license opportunities.

**TRAILING AMENDMENTS**

The Council intent is for these trailing amendments to be implemented simultaneously with the main rationalization program.

1. Fee and Loan Program
2. Skipper/Crew Share Program issues

**Alternative 3  
Sector Allocations and Voluntary Co-op Structure  
Updated to December 11, 2004**

**Annotated by Staff for the October 2005 Meeting**

Alternative 3 is a sector allocation and co-op proposal. This proposal allows new processor entrants and provides a mechanism for harvesters to either enter co-ops voluntarily or continue to fish in LLP/open access fisheries. The alternative provides a flexible structure intended to reflect the diversity of the fisheries in the GOA. It recognizes that harvesters, processors, and communities all have a stake in the fisheries. The nature of the fisheries in the Gulf, however, requires a flexible rationalization program that can accommodate all of the different fisheries. This alternative would:

- Allocate primary and secondary species, and halibut PSC by sector.
- Establish a mechanism which would facilitate co-op formation within each sector.
- Specify the operational rules for co-ops.
- Provide fishing opportunities for harvesters that choose not to participate in co-ops
- Include community protection measures appropriate to a cooperative-based program.

The proposal sets up a step-wise process for the establishment of co-ops. The first step includes a sectoral allocation. This is followed by an initial co-op formation period to provide co-ops time to refine their operations. The third step is ongoing, and establishes rules to govern co-op formation, dissolution, and operation after the initial period of co-op formation.

This proposal would not require the assignation of different classes of history or shares (i.e., class A/B class designations). Gulf History (GH) is generic and would originate from an eligible participant's history. GH is only developed through cooperatives. Co-op participation, however, is strictly voluntary so a harvester may choose to continue to fish in a limited entry (LLP) open access fishery.

The proposal does not limit processor entry. A harvester is initially eligible to join a cooperative associated with the processor that it made the most primary species landings to during the qualification period. The program establishes requirements for contracts between a cooperative and its associated processor. The initial contract between a co-op and its associated processor is required to contain the terms for dissolution of the co-op or the movement of a harvester from one co-op to another. During the initial co-op formation period, inter-co-op agreements are allowed within sectors to address operational issues and ensure further rationalization of the fishery between co-ops. Harvesters may not move between cooperatives during the initial co-op formation period.

Following the initial co-op formation period, new co-ops can form and harvesters can move from co-op to co-op or exit a co-op and move back into open access. The rules for such movement, including compensation to other members of the co-op and the associated processor are part of the contract agreement. New processors can enter the fishery at any time, and following the initial co-op formation period, harvesters can form co-ops with those processors.

Monitoring of harvests and PSC for the co-op fishery will be at the co-op level. Assignments of GH, including transfers, will be monitored by RAM to ensure proper catch allocations and accounting. GH will result in annual allocations of Gulf Quota (GQ). Current monitoring programs for the open access fishery will continue.

**The following provisions apply to Alternative 3 only:**

**I. SECTOR ALLOCATION PROVISIONS.**

**3.1 Management Areas:**

Areas are Western Gulf, Central Gulf, and West Yakutat—separate areas

For Pollock: 610 (Western Gulf), 620 and 630 (Central Gulf), 640 (West Yakutat (WYAK))

- Shortraker and rougheye (SR/RE) and thornyhead rockfishes will be divided between Southeast Outside (SEO) and WY
- The allocation of rockfish bycatch to the halibut IFQ fishery will be on a NMFS management area basis
- Non-SR/RE and thornyhead rockfish trawl catch history in SEO during 95-98 will be used in the calculation of WYAK allocation
- SEO is exempt from this program. SEO groundfish will be managed in accordance with 3.11 below.

Gear: All gear types are considered.

Option 1. The jig fishery would receive an allocation based on its historic landings in the qualifying years –

1. 100%
2. 125%
3. 150%
4. 200%

**3.2 Sector definitions and allocations:**

- CV trawl
- CV longline
- CV pot
- C/P trawl
- C/P longline
- C/P pot
- jig
- low producing fixed gear

Low producing catcher vessel sector is

- Option 1. fixed gear catcher vessels under 60 feet that are below the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile of primary species qualified harvest history by gear and area.
- Option 2. fixed gear catcher vessels less than average qualified harvest history by gear and area
- Option 3. fixed gear catcher vessels that are below the 75th percentile in qualified harvest history by gear and area

High producing catcher vessels are the remainder and are divided into a catcher vessel longline and catcher vessel pot sector. Sector definitions apply throughout Alternative 3.

To be determined as a CP a vessel must have a CP LLP license and process no less than

- a) 90%
- b) 50%
- c) 25%

of its qualifying catch on-board on average over the qualifying period.

- Option 1: determined by the aggregate of all species
- Option 2: determined by primary species groupings in Section 3.3.5

Option for jig sector: jig sectors would be exempt from co-op provisions.

*The Council could decide qualification for catcher processor shares on a policy basis. If the data are necessary for deciding this issue, they can be provided at a future meeting. Determining that a participant is a catcher processor for some species and a catcher vessel for others could result in an allocation that cannot be easily used and could result in some inefficiency.*

Option for Fixed Gear Catcher Vessel Low Producers:

- Option 1. Apply same rules for initial co-op formation and general co-op operation as apply to other sectors.
- Option 2. Exclude from co-op program, provide sector allocation and continue as an LLP/Open Access fishery.
- Option 3. Apply all co-op rules except processor affiliation requirement for initial co-op formation (i.e. harvester co-op without processor association).

3.2.1 Sector allocations will be based on the aggregate history of vessels in each sector during the qualifying period. Sector allocation qualifying periods and landing criteria (same for all gears in all areas). The analysis will assess AFA vessels as a group.

- Option 1. 95-01
- Option 2. 95-02
- Option 3. 98-02

Suboption: for each sector drop the year of lowest tonnage.

3.2.2 Sector Qualifying landing criteria (same for all gears in all areas)

Landings based on retained catch for each species (includes weekly production report for Catcher/ Processor sector). Total pounds landed will be used as the denominator. Exclude retained catch that is used for meal production.

3.2.3 Sector Allocation: Primary Species:

Allocate catch history by sector and gear type as follows:

Trawl CV and CP:

Pollock, Pacific cod, deepwater flatfish, rex sole, shallow water flatfish, flathead sole, Arrowtooth flounder, northern rockfish, Pacific ocean perch, Pelagic shelf rockfish

Longline CV and CP:

Pacific cod, pelagic shelf rockfish, Pacific ocean perch, deep water flatfish (if turbot is targeted), northern rockfish, Arrowtooth flounder

Pot CV and CP:

Pacific cod

Fixed gear low producers:

Pacific cod

Jig gear

Pacific cod

3.2.4 Sector Allocation: Secondary species and halibut PSC:

Secondary species: Thornyhead, rougheye, shorttraker, other slope rockfish, Atka mackerel, and trawl sablefish. Includes SEO shorttraker, rougheye, and thornyhead rockfish.

Option 1: Sector allocation for both secondary species and halibut PSC is based on each sector's average catch during the sector allocation qualifying period by area and primary species target fishery.

Option 2: Maintain current halibut PSC allocations, and MRA management for secondary species.

## II. Voluntary Co-op Structure

3.3 INITIAL CO-OP FORMATION PROVISIONS. Voluntary co-ops may form between eligible harvesters in association with processors. Harvesters may elect not to join a co-op, and continue to fish in the LLP/Open Access fishery.

### 3.3.1 Eligibility.

#### LLP participation

Option 1. Any person that holds a valid, permanent, fully transferable LLP license is eligible to receive an initial allocation of Gulf catch history (as generic GH) through co-op membership.

Basis for the distribution to the LLP license holder is: the catch history of the vessel on which the LLP license is based and shall be on a fishery-by-fishery basis. The underlying principle of this program is one history per license. In cases where the fishing privileges (i.e., moratorium qualification or LLP license) of an LLP qualifying vessel have been transferred, the distribution of harvest shares to the LLP shall be based on the aggregate catch histories of (1) the vessel on which LLP license was based up to the date of transfer, and (2) the vessel owned or controlled by the LLP license holder and identified by the license holder as having been operated under the fishing privileges of the LLP qualifying vessel after the date of transfer. (Only one catch history per LLP license.)

Option 2. Non-LLP (State water parallel fishery) participation

Suboption 1. Any individual who has imprinted a fish ticket making non-federally permitted legal landings during a State of Alaska fishery in a state waters parallel fisheries for species under the rationalized fisheries.

Suboption 2. Vessel owner at time of non-federally permitted legal landing during a State of Alaska fishery in a state waters parallel fisheries for species under the rationalized fisheries

It is the intent of the Council that catch history, whether harvested in the state water parallel fishery or the federal fishery, will be credited a single time, either in the state or federal program.

#### 3.3.1.1 State Waters - Parallel Fisheries and State Groundfish Management

A portion of the TAC will be allocated to fisheries inside of 3 nm and will be subject to State management:

- Option 1. An amount equivalent to the total annual catch (for each groundfish species/group) from state waters (inside of 3 nautical miles [e.g., parallel and 25% Pacific cod fishery]) by all vessels will be managed directly by the State of Alaska Board of Fisheries as a TAC/GHL equivalent to:
  - a. Highest amount taken in state waters by area
  - b. Highest amount taken in state waters by area plus 15%
  - c. Most recent four-year average harvest from state waters
- Option 2. All catch inside of 3 nautical miles by non-federally permitted vessels fishing the parallel fishery plus all catch under the 25% state water cod fishery and the PWS Pollock fishery remains under the authority of the State of Alaska Board of Fisheries.
- Option 3. Only the catch associated with the 25% state water cod fishery and the PWS Pollock fishery remains under the authority of the State of Alaska Board of Fisheries.

*The Council could select a preferred option for eligibility to receive an allocation under the program. Since LLP licenses are used to control access to the fishery, the use of LLP licenses for determining eligibility to receive an allocation in the rationalized fishery would be consistent with current regulation of entry. In addition, allowing entry to persons not holding permanent LLPs might be unfair to persons that have relied on the LLP regulations in trading licenses.*

*Including holders of interim LLP licenses could be argued by some to be fair, since these licenses have not been fully adjudicated and may be held by some persons that would ultimately be awarded permanent licenses. The agency anticipates having all appeals resolved prior to implementation of this program, so outstanding appeals concerning interim licenses should not be an issue at the time of implementation. Using a threshold date (such as January 1, 2003 in Suboption 1) could be supported by an argument that persons who maintained appeals through that date should be included. As written in suboption 1, persons whose appeals were denied after that date would still be eligible for an allocation. Eligibility for any holders of interim permits, however, could be argued to be unfair by those that either met the requirements for a permanent license or chose to purchase a license to continue in the fisheries. Persons that have purchased licenses to remain in the fishery, in particular, have a compelling argument that holders of interim licenses should be excluded. In some cases, appeals are likely to have been perpetuated by persons that knew their appeals would be denied to avoid having to purchase a license. Even in the case of legitimate appeals, including persons denied licenses would not have met the threshold requirements for the license appears to be inconsistent with the Council's earlier decisions concerning eligibility.*

*The treatment of participation inside of 3nm should be coordinated across this section, section 3.2.1 above, and section 3.3.2 below. Including parallel fishery participants in the program could be desirable, if no State water fishery is developed to accommodate these participants. If a State water allocation is made to support fisheries for State water participants that do not hold LLPs, the inclusion of parallel water fisheries participants in the allocation could be viewed as rewarding their historic participation twice (once with federal allocation and a second time with the allocation to a State water fishery.)*

*The Council should clarify for staff whether harvests inside of 3nm should be considered in making allocations under the program. Exclusion of catch inside 3nm could be justified, if that catch is valued for making an allocation to a State water fishery. On the other hand, some Federal participants with extensive catch history from the parallel fishery may wish to have their catch credited in making a Federal fishery allocation. Uncertainty concerning the treatment of harvests inside 3nm greatly complicates the quantitative analysis.*

### 3.3.2 Initial Allocation of primary species catch history

Allocate catch history as generic Gulf history (GH) on an individual harvester basis for the following primary species:

#### Trawl CV and CP:

Pollock, Pacific cod, deepwater flatfish, rex sole, shallow water flatfish, flathead sole, Arrowtooth flounder, northern rockfish, Pacific ocean perch, Pelagic shelf rockfish

#### Longline CV and CP:

Pacific Cod, pelagic shelf rockfish, Pacific ocean perch, deep water flatfish (if turbot is targeted), northern rockfish, Arrowtooth flounder

#### Pot CV and CP:

Pacific Cod

GH is designated by sector:

Option 1. Trawl GQ may be fished using fixed gear, if yes – appropriate mechanism to transfer GH/GQ across sectors needed.

Gulf Quota (GQ) is the annual allocation to a cooperative based on the GH of its members.

3.3.2.2 Qualifying periods and landing criteria (same for all gears in all areas) for determining GH  
(The analysis will assess AFA vessels as a group).

- Option 1. 95-01 drop 1, on a species by species basis
- Option 2. 95-02 drop 1, on a species by species basis
- Option 3. 95-02 drop 2, on a species by species basis
- Option 4. 98-02 drop 1, on a species by species basis
- Option 5. 98-03 drop 1, on a species by species basis

Options to drop years would be to accommodate SSL restrictions or the inclusion of the state portion of the parallel fishery.

Individual GH will be based on retained catch for each species (includes weekly production report for Catcher/Processor sector). The denominator shall be total landed catch by species.

Exclude retained catch that is used for meal production

3.3.3 Allocation of secondary species and halibut PSC within the cooperative will be based on the primary species GH of the individual members of the cooperative using the same criteria used to allocate secondary species and halibut PSC to the sectors (i.e., the option selected in Section 3.2.4). If Option 2 in 3.2.4 is chosen, the current halibut PSC and secondary species management is used.

Secondary species are: thornyhead, rougheye, shortraker, other slope rockfish, Atka mackerel, and trawl sablefish. Includes SEO shortraker, rougheye, and thornyhead rockfish. Secondary species would receive no halibut allocation.

3.3.3.3 Transfer of secondary species and halibut PSC GH:

As permitted by and subject to any other transfer rules:

- Option 1. Primary species and the associated secondary species and/or halibut PSC GH are non-separable and must be transferred as a unit.
- Option 2. Primary species and the associated secondary species and/or halibut PSC GH are separable and may be transferred separately.

**III. Co-op Rules for all CPs, trawl, longline, pot and catcher vessels**

Option: Jig and low producer fixed gear exempted.

Initial Co-op Formation Rules:

3.3.5 Catcher Vessel Co-ops.

Catcher vessel co-ops may be established within sectors between eligible harvesters in association with an eligible processor. A harvester is initially eligible to join a cooperative in association with the processor to which the harvester delivered the most pounds of primary species by area (Western Gulf, Central Gulf, West Yakutat) and region (North/South)

during the

- a) qualifying years.
- b) most recent 1, 2, or 3 years from the qualifying years.

Provisions applied to a & b:  
For the following species groups:

- Pollock
- Pacific cod
- Aggregate rockfish
- Aggregate flatfish

3.3.6 Catcher processor co-ops may be formed by eligible CPs within each CP sector. No processor affiliation is required for CP co-op formation.

3.3.7 Cooperatives are required to have at least:

- |           |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Option 1. | 4 distinct and separate harvesters (using the 10% threshold rule)<br>Applies to low producer fixed gear, high producer fixed gear, CV trawl, and CPs                                                                                                                                              |
| Option 2. | 50-100 percent of the GH of its sector. Council may choose different percentages for different sectors.<br>Applies to catcher processors only                                                                                                                                                     |
| Option 3. | 50-75 percent of the eligible GH for each co-op associated with its processor<br>Applies to low producer fixed gear, high producer fixed gear, and CV trawl for processor associated cooperatives, if less than 4 distinct and separate harvesters are available to associate with the processor. |
| Option 4. | Any number of eligible harvesters within the sector (allows single person co-op)                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |

Note: Requirements may differ across sectors (or for CV and CP Cooperatives)

***The Council could consider selecting cooperative formation thresholds for the alternatives at this meeting. Since the alternatives created under section 2 of the motion differ from one another, the Council could consider establishing different rules for the different alternatives.***

***For all sectors, harvesters can access Gulf History only by joining a cooperative. Limiting harvesters' access to the rationalized fishery through cooperative membership should raise concern that the cooperative formation rules and agreements may provide undue negotiating leverage to some participants. In addition, if the Council should choose to reduce PSC allocations to the limited access fishery for non-members of a cooperative, it would be possible for members of a cooperative to assert greater negotiating leverage over non-members. Rules that require a majority of share holders eligible for cooperative formation could provide negotiating leverage to either those agreeing to join the cooperative or those that have yet to join, depending on the circumstances. Generally, the power will be with the non-members until the membership threshold is met and will shift to members once that threshold is reached. As should be apparent, the level of the threshold will determine whether the negotiating leverage lies with a majority of those eligible for the cooperative or a minority and the size of that majority or minority, as the case may be. This leverage could be used to distributions from cooperative harvests, which could redistribute benefits of share holdings under the program.***

***Allowing each harvester to be eligible to join more than one cooperative should limit the ability of harvesters to use cooperative rules to obtain undue negotiating leverage over one another. For example, a provision that requires 50 percent of eligible shares to form a cooperative would create a system in which holders of a majority of shares would have the ability to structure a cooperative agreement unfavorable to other share holders. In short, in a system in which a person is eligible to join only one cooperative, setting a threshold for cooperative formation without impacting the distribution benefits from the allocation of shares is likely not possible. Increasing the number of cooperatives that a person can join will reduce this effect.***



3.3.8 Duration of initial cooperative agreements:

- Option 1. 1 year
- Option 2. 2 years
- Option 3. 3 years
- Option 4. Any length agreed between the co-op participants.

***The Council could choose an option for length of cooperative agreements at this meeting. Longer term cooperative agreements could provide stability to participants. The ability to reformulate a cooperative agreement, however, could be important as relationships change. Although these changes could be accommodated through amendments to the agreement, shorter term agreements provide added flexibility.***

3.3.9 Catcher Vessel co-op/processor affiliations

Option 1: If the processing facility with whom the harvester is associated is no longer operating in the community, and another processing facility within the community has not purchased the history, the harvester is eligible to deliver to

- i. any licensed processor
- ii. any licensed processor in the community (If there are no eligible processors in that community, the harvester may join a co-op in association with any eligible processor within the region.)
- iii. the licensed processor to whom the harvester delivered the second most pounds

Option 2: If the processing facility with whom the harvester is associated is no longer operating in the community, the harvester is eligible to deliver to

- i. any licensed processor
- ii. any licensed processor in the community (If there are no eligible processors in that community, the harvester may join a co-op in association with any eligible processor within the region.)
- iii. the licensed processor to whom the harvester delivered the second most pounds

***The Council could decide whether either of the above options will be incorporated into this alternative. Both provide for processor/cooperative associations in the event a processor is no longer operating. The first could be adopted, if the Council wished to acknowledge transfers of history, while the second does not acknowledge transfers.***

***Under the either option, the first provision (i) would allow harvesters eligible for a cooperative with the closed processor to join a cooperative with any other processor. The first option may be favored, if the specific harvester-processor relationship is intended to be protected by the association and other associations are not relevant to the Council's purpose in establishing this element of the program. If a community interest is intended to be protected, the second option (ii) could be favored, which requires the harvester to join a cooperative that is associated with a processor in the community. The third provision (iii) would require the harvester to join a cooperative in association with the processor that the harvester delivered the second most landings to.***

CV cooperatives must be associated with an eligible processing facility  
Processors can associate with more than one co-op.

Processors with history at multiple facilities in a community may aggregate those histories for determining associations.

The eligible processor is:

- 1) initially, a processor that the harvester is eligible to associate with in a cooperative under section 3.3.5 above
- 2) any processor, after satisfaction of an exit requirement

### 3.3.10 Catcher Processor Co-op provisions

Allocation to CP co-ops will be based on the above, with the following exceptions:

- CP co-ops do not need a processor association.
- CP co-ops will be within CP gear sectors. Transfers of GH or leases of GQ across CP gear types is
  - a) not permitted
  - b) permitted.
- CP co-ops are subject to the other terms and conditions specified for CPs under this program

### 3.3.11 Initial Cooperative Requirements

The following provision is required for the initial co-op:

Catcher vessel co-ops may be formed by eligible harvesters (the co-op) subject to the terms and conditions of a co-op membership agreement. In order to receive an allocation of GH under this program, co-ops must enter into a duly executed contractual agreement (Contract) with the processor identified in Section 3.3.5.

Contracts established under this section shall specify the terms and conditions for transferring GQ or GH from the cooperative, including mechanisms whereby a member exiting the co-op (or transferring GH from the co-op) compensates the remaining co-op members and/or the associated processor for exiting the co-op (or transferring GH from the co-op). Compensation can take on any form agreed to by the members and the associated processor, including permanent transfer of some or all GH generated by the existing participant to the remaining co-op members and/or the associated processor.

Following the initial co-op period, new GH can be generated by eligible harvesters that have never been co-op members only by joining a co-op in association with the eligible processor pursuant to the terms of an agreement that meets the requirements for an initial co-op.

Any shareholder under this program is intended to comply with all existing laws concerning the documentation of vessels and entry of vessels to U.S. fisheries in fishing those shares. Shareholders unable to enter a vessel into U.S. fisheries may lease share holdings or use holdings through cooperative membership to the extent permitted by the program, but not in contravention of current law pertaining to entry of vessels in U.S. fisheries.

### 3.3.12 Initial Co-op Formation Period.

An Initial Co-op Formation period shall be established beginning with year one of program implementation and extended for the period identified below.

- Option 1. period is 1 year
- Option 2. period is 2 years
- Option 3. period is 3 years

***The Council could choose a term for initial cooperative formation at this meeting. A relatively long term could contribute to stability. Shorter terms, however, could provide flexibility. In deciding the appropriate term, the Council should bear in mind that a harvester would not be permitted to exit a cooperative during the initial cooperative formation period.***

### 3.4 General Operational Co-op Rules.

#### 3.4.1 General Cooperative Requirements

The following provisions apply to all cooperatives:

1. The harvesters that enter into a co-op membership agreement shall be the members of the co-op. The processor will be an associate of the cooperative but will not be a cooperative member.
2. Except for CP cooperative, a pre-season Contract between eligible, willing harvesters in association with a processor is a pre-requisite to a cooperative receiving an allocation of GQ. For an initial co-op, the Contract must meet the provisions in 3.3.11. After meeting the requirements of Section 3.3.11 and following any periods established pursuant to 3.3.12, a holder of GH may join a cooperative in association with any processor pursuant to a Contract that meets the provisions of this section.
3. The co-op membership agreement and the Contract will be filed with the RAM Division. The Contract must contain a fishing plan for the harvest of all co-op fish.
4. Co-op members shall internally allocate and manage the co-op's allocation per the Contract.
5. Subject to any harvesting caps that may be adopted, GH or GQ may be transferred and consolidated within the co-op to the extent permitted under the Contract.
6. The Contract must have a monitoring program. Monitoring and enforcement requirements would be at the co-op level. Co-op members are jointly and severally responsible for co-op vessels harvesting in the aggregate no more than their co-op's allocation of primary species, secondary species and halibut PSC mortality, as may be adjusted by inter-cooperative transfers.
7. Co-ops may adopt and enforce fishing practice codes of conduct as part of their membership agreement. Co-ops may penalize or expel members who fail to comply with their membership agreement.
8. Co-op membership agreements will specify that processor affiliated vessels cannot participate in negotiations concerning price setting, code of conduct, mechanisms for expelling members, or exit agreements.
9. Co-op membership agreements shall allow for the entry of other eligible harvesters into the co-op under the same terms and conditions as agreed to by the original agreement. Harvesters that have never been a member of a cooperative must enter an agreement that meets all requirements for an initial co-op, as specified under Section 3.3.11.

#### 3.4.2 General Provisions Concerning Transfers of GH and GQ.

Co-ops may engage in inter-cooperative transfers (leases) of GQ during and after the initial co-op formation period.

During the initial cooperative formation period, GH transfers will be permitted between members of the same cooperative, but not between members of different cooperatives.

Following the initial co-op formation period, members of a co-op may transfer GH-to members of other co-ops.

All transfers will be subject to such terms and conditions as may be specified in the applicable Contract and any ownership or use caps or other conditions as may be established pursuant to this program.

For persons that join cooperatives for the first time after any period established pursuant to 3.3.12, the limits on transfers shall apply for the same period of time as those in 3.3.12.

#### 3.4.2.1 Qualified Persons.

Persons qualified to receive GH by transfer include processors that associate with initial cooperatives pursuant to 3.3.11 and (not mutually exclusive):

- Option 1. US citizens who have had at least 150 days of sea time.
- Option 2. Entities that meet U.S. requirements to document a vessel.
- Option 3. Initial recipients of CV or C/P GH.
- Option 4. individuals who are U.S. citizens.

*The Council could choose preferred options for eligibility to receive shares by transfer. Options 1 and 4 would limit entry to the fishery through share holding to individuals. Option 2 would allow entities to hold shares that meet vessel documentation requirements (including 75 percent U.S. ownership). The lead-in to the options would allow any processor that is eligible to initially associate with a harvester cooperative to hold shares regardless whether the entity could document a vessel to fish the shares. A provision in 3.3.11 clarifies that it is the Council's intention that any shares held by such an entity would be required to be leased to be fished.*

#### 3.4.2.2 Definition of sea time

Sea time in any of the U.S. commercial fisheries in a harvesting capacity.

#### 3.4.3 Ownership caps.

Ownership of GH by a co-op member shall be capped at:

- Option 1. 1% of the GH by area, sector and species groups in Section 3.3.5 (pollock, Pacific cod aggregate rockfish, aggregate flatfish).
- Option 2. 5% of the GH by area, sector and species groups in Section 3.3.5.
- Option 3. 20% of the GH by area, sector and species groups in Section 3.3.5.
- Option 3 30% of the GH by area, sector and species groups in Section 3.3.5.
- Option 4 no cap.

Allocations to original issues would be grandfathered at the original level of GH.

#### 3.4.4 Co-op use caps.

Control of GH or use of GQ by a co-op shall be capped at:

- Option 1. 15% by area, sector and species groups in Section 3.3.5 (pollock, Pacific cod aggregate rockfish, aggregate flatfish).
- Option 2. 25% by area, sector and species groups in Section 3.3.5
- Option 3. 45% by area, sector and species groups in Section 3.3.5
- Option 4. no cap

#### 3.4.5 Vertical integration

Any processor holdings of GH, using the 10% limited threshold rule, are capped at:

- Option 1. initial allocation of harvest CV and CP shares.
- Option 2. 115%-150% of initial allocation of CV GH.
- Option 3. 115%-150% of initial allocation of CP GH.
- Option 4. no cap

## 3.4.6 Processor caps

Processors shall be capped at the entity level.

No processor shall process more than:

- Option 1. 25% of total harvest by area and primary species groups in Section 3.3.5
- Option 2. 50% of total harvest by area and primary species groups in Section 3.3.5
- Option 3. 75% of total harvest by area and primary species groups in Section 3.3.5
- Option 4. no cap

Processors eligible under 3.3.11 will be grandfathered.

## 3.4.7 Catcher/Processor Provisions

In addition to the rules specified above, the following provisions apply to Catcher/Processors:

## 3.4.7.1 Restrictions on transferability of CP harvest shares:

CP GH may be converted to CV GH. Once it is converted, it cannot be changed back to CP GH. CP GH maintains its designation when transferred to a person that continues to catch and process the resulting GQ at sea (within a cooperative or in open access.)

## 3.4.7.2 Re-designate CP GH as CV GH upon transfer to a person who is not an initial issuee of CP shares:

- Option 1. all CP shares
- Option 2. trawl CP shares
- Option 3. longline CP shares

***The Council could select options for the conversion of catcher processor history to catcher vessel history at this time. The Council should choose from 3.4.7.1 and 3.4.7.2.***

***The provisions of 3.4.7.1 would convert catcher processor history to catcher vessel history, if transferred and subsequently landed onshore. This provision would limit the conversion of history, with the conversion taking place only on the use of the history as catcher vessel history by the holder.***

***The options under 3.4.7.2 would limit the holders of catcher processor history to those that receive an initial allocation of catcher processor history. Options 2 and 3 of 3.4.7.2 would limit the provision to trawl and longline catcher processor history, respectively. In the event that the Council chose a provision that applied to only one type of history, it should also identify a provision for the other gear types. This provision would convert all catcher processor history to catcher vessel history once transferred from initial recipients limiting the market for those shares, and possibly diminishing their value in some fisheries.***

## 3.4.7.3 Leases of CP annual harvest allocations (GQ):

Allow leasing within cooperative or pursuant to an inter-co-op agreement within CP sectors (no CP leases allowed across gear types.)

## 3.4.7.4 Conversion of CP GH and GQ:

CP GH and GQ converted to CV GH and GQ will count toward CV caps

Caps will be applied to prohibit acquisition of shares in excess of the cap. Conversion of CP GH or GQ to CV GH or GQ alone will not require a CP GH holder or cooperative to divest CP GH and GQ for exceeding CP caps.

## 3.5 Skipper/Crew Provisions

A skipper is defined as the individual owning the Commercial Fishery Entry Permit and signing the fish ticket.

- Option 1. No skipper and/or crew provisions

- Option 2. Establish license program for certified skippers. For initial allocation Certified Skippers are either:
  - i. Vessel owners receiving initial GH or harvest privileges; or
  - ii. Hired skippers who have demonstrated fishing experience in Federal or State groundfish fisheries in the BSAI or GOA for 3 out of the past 5 years as documented by a CFEC permit and signed fish tickets and/or appropriate NMFS documentation (starting date for five years is 2003).
- Suboption 1. include crew in the license program.
- Suboption 2. require that new Certified Skippers licenses accrue to individuals with demonstrated fishing experience (Groundfish – BSAI/GOA, state or federal waters) similar to halibut/sablefish program.

Under any alternative that establishes GH and annual harvest privileges, access to those annual harvest privileges is allowed only when fishing with a Certified Skipper onboard. Certified Skipper Licenses are non-transferable. They accrue to an individual and may not be sold, leased, bartered, traded, or otherwise used by any other individual. Defer remaining issues to a trailing amendment and assumes simultaneous implementation with rationalization program.

3.6 LLP/Open Access fishery provisions:

The allocation for each sector of primary species, secondary species, and halibut PSC to the LLP/Open Access fishery will be those amounts remaining after allocation of the co-ops. Harvesters that choose not to participate in a co-op may continue to fish in the LLP/Open Access fishery.

Allow directed fishing for primary species only. Continue current MRA for secondary species and unallocated species.

Issue 1. Halibut PSC will be reduced by:

Option 1:

- a. 0 percent
- b. 10 percent
- c. 20 percent
- d. 30 percent

Note: this reduction may differ by sector

Option 2:

- 0 percent
- 5 percent beginning on the date of program implementation;
- an additional 5 percent beginning on the second year of program implementation;
- an additional 10 percent beginning on year 5 of program implementation; and

Issue 2:

The LLP of any vessel that has entered a co-op and generated GH pursuant to this program may not be subsequently used, or transferred to another vessel, to fish in the LLP/Open Access fishery for any primary or secondary species identified under this program unless all GH initially associated with the LLP is held by the LLP holder and is allocated to the LLP/Open Access fishery.

Note: The intent of this provision is to prevent a vessel from entering a co-op, transferring its GH to the co-op and then subsequently taking its LLP and re-entering the open access fishery or transferring its LLP to another vessel to fish in the Open Access fishery.

### 3.7 Communities and Regionalization

Community provisions are moved to a separate portion of the motion.

#### 3.7.1 Regionalization

If adopted, GH will be categorized by region (for the fisheries identified below).

GH that is regionally designated cannot be reassigned to another region.

Catcher vessel GH is regionalized based on where the catch was processed, not where it was caught.

Catcher processor GH is not subject to regionalization.

The GH associated with a license would be regionalized based on the landings history associated with that license during the regionalization qualifying period.

The following describes the regions established and fisheries that would be subject to regionalization:

Central Gulf: Two regions are proposed to classify harvesting shares: North - South line at 5851.10' North Latitude (Cape Douglas corner for Cook Inlet bottom trawl ban area) extending west to east to the intersection with 140° W long, and then southerly along 140° W long.).

The following fisheries will be regionalized for shorebased (including floating) catch and subject to the North-South distribution: CGOA Pollock (area 620 and 630) CGOA aggregate flatfish, CGOA aggregate rockfish and CGOA Pacific cod. CGOA trawl sablefish will be regionalized based on all landing of primary species in the CGOA associated with the license during regionalization qualifying period.

In the event GH is regionalized, a harvester will be eligible to bring its history in a region to a cooperative associated with the processor in the region to which the harvester delivered the most pounds during the cooperative formation qualifying period using species aggregations identified in 3.3.5 and:

- Option 1. the period identified in 3.3.5 or
- Option 2. the qualifying period under 3.3.2.2.

#### 3.7.1.1 Qualifying years to determine the distribution of GH between regions will be:

- Option 1. the years 1999-2002.
- Option 2. consistent with the qualifying period under cooperative formation in Section 3.3.5

### 3.8 Program Review and Data Collection:

#### 3.8.1 Data collection.

A mandatory data collection program would be developed and implemented. The program would collect cost, revenue, ownership and employment data on a periodic basis to provide the information necessary to study the impacts of the program for this and other Management Councils. Details of this program will be developed in the analysis of the alternatives.

#### 3.8.2 Program Review.

Preliminary program review at the first Council Meeting in the 3rd year and formal review at the Council meeting in the 5th year after implementation to objectively measure the success of the program, including benefits and impacts to harvesters (including vessel owners, skippers and crew), processors and communities, by addressing concerns, goals and objectives identified in the problem statement and the Magnuson Stevens Act standards. This review shall include analysis of post-rationalization impacts to coastal communities, harvesters and processors in terms of economic impacts and options for mitigating those impacts. Subsequent reviews are required every 5 years.

### 3.9 Sideboards

GOA Groundfish sideboards under the crab rationalization plan, under the AFA, and the CGOA rockfish project would be superseded by the GOA rationalization program allocations upon implementation.

Vessels (actual boats) and LLPs used to generate harvest shares used in a Co-op unless specifically authorized may not participate in other state and federally managed open access fisheries in excess of sideboard allotments.

Participants in the GOA rationalized fisheries are limited to their aggregate historical participation based on GOA rationalized qualifying years in BSAI and SEO groundfish fisheries.

On completion of a rationalization program in the BS, any sideboards from the GOA rationalization under this section will be superseded for the fleet subject to rationalization.

Provisions related to IFQ and SEO fisheries are moved to a separate portion of the motion.

Provisions related to salmon and crab bycatch are moved to a separate portion of the motion.