

Litigation Update for the June 2021 Meeting of the North Pacific Fishery Management Council: *Wild Fish Conservancy v. Thom*, 2:20-cv-00417-RAJ-MLP (Western District of Washington)

Parties:

Plaintiff: Wild Fish Conservancy.

Federal Defendants: Barry Thom, Regional Administrator, NMFS West Coast Region; Paul Doremus, Acting Assistant Administrator for Fisheries of the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS); NMFS; Department of Commerce; and Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo.

Defendant-Intervenors: The State of Alaska and Alaska Trollers Association.

Case:

This case involves a challenge to a biological opinion NMFS issued in April 2019 that examined the effects of three actions—reinitiation on the delegation of salmon fishery management in the federal waters off of Southeast Alaska to the State of Alaska, the funding of grants to the State of Alaska, and the establishment of a conservation framework for habitat improvement and hatchery production—on seven species listed under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).

Current Case Activity:

The parties are in the middle of briefing on motions and cross-motions for summary judgment. Pursuant to the existing briefing schedule, briefing is proceeding as follows:

- Plaintiff Wild Fish Conservancy filed its motion for summary judgment on May 5, 2021.
- Federal Defendants filed a combined cross-motion for summary judgment and response in opposition to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on May 26, 2021. Defendant-Intervenors State of Alaska and Alaska Trollers Association also filed their combined cross-motions for summary judgment and responses on May 26, 2021.
- Plaintiff Wild Fish Conservancy's combined response and reply is due June 9, 2021.
- Federal Defendants' reply is due June 16, 2021. Defendant-Intervenors State of Alaska and Alaska Trollers Association also must file replies by June 16, 2021.

Attachment:

The parties' briefs on summary judgment (without supporting attachments) are included.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

WILD FISH CONSERVANCY,)
)
Plaintiff,)
)
v.)
)
BARRY THOM, in his official capacity as)
Regional Administrator for the National)
Marine Fisheries Service, *et al.*,)
)
Defendants,)
)
and)
)
ALASKA TROLLERS ASSOCIATION,)
and STATE OF ALASKA,)
)
Defendant-Intervenors.)
_____)

Case No. 2:20-cv-00417-RAJ-MLP
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
NOTE ON MOTION CALENDAR:
June 16, 2021
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

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APA	Administrative Procedure Act
AR	Administrative Record
BiOp	Biological Opinion
DPS	Distinct Population Segment
EA	Environmental Assessment
EIS	Environmental Impact Statement
ESA	Endangered Species Act
ESU	Evolutionarily Significant Unit
FONSI	Finding of No Significant Impact
FWS	United States Fish and Wildlife Service
HSRG	Hatchery Scientific Review Group
ITS	Incidental Take Statement
NEPA	National Environmental Policy Act
NMFS	National Marine Fisheries Service
pHOS	Proportion of Hatchery-Origin Spawners
SEAK	Southeast Alaska

1 **I. MOTION.**

2 Plaintiff Wild Fish Conservancy (the “Conservancy”) hereby moves for summary
3 judgment and respectfully requests the Court: 1) determine that the National Marine Fisheries
4 Service’s (“NMFS”) biological opinion for salmon fisheries in Southeast Alaska (“2019 SEAK
5 BiOp”) is not in accordance with law; 2) determine NMFS is violating section 7(a)(2) of the
6 Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) by failing to ensure its actions identified in the 2019 SEAK
7 BiOp do not jeopardize species; 3) determine NMFS violated the National Environmental Policy
8 Act (“NEPA”) by issuing and adopting the 2019 SEAK BiOp without NEPA processes;
9 (4) vacate the 2019 SEAK BiOp; and 5) enjoin NMFS’s implementation of increased hatchery
10 production identified in the 2019 SEAK BiOp until NMFS complies with the ESA and NEPA.

11 **II. INTRODUCTION.**

12 In enacting the ESA, Congress instructed federal agencies to “insure,” at “whatever the
13 cost,” that activities they authorize, fund, or implement will not jeopardize the continued
14 existence of species, requiring agencies “give endangered species priority over [their] ‘primary
15 missions’” *Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill*, 437 U.S. 153, 184–85 (1978); 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
16 NMFS violated ESA mandates by approving salmon harvest levels that will continue to starve
17 Southern Resident Killer Whales towards extinction, relying on undeveloped plans to increase
18 hatchery production that, if implemented, would themselves inhibit recovery of threatened
19 salmonids. Exacerbating these ESA violations, NMFS made these decisions without public input
20 and without considering and disclosing alternatives in violation of NEPA.

21 **III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK.**

22 **A. The Endangered Species Act.**

23 The ESA assigns implementation responsibilities to the Secretaries for the Departments
24 of Commerce and the Interior, who have delegated duties to NMFS and the United States Fish
25 and Wildlife Service (“FWS”), respectively. *See* 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b). NMFS generally has
26 ESA authority for marine and anadromous species, while FWS has jurisdiction over terrestrial
27 and freshwater species. *See id.* §§ 17.11, 223.102, 224.101.

1 Section 4 of the ESA prescribes mechanisms by which NMFS and FWS list “species,”
2 defined to include a “distinct population segment of any species of vertebrate . . . [that]
3 interbreeds when mature,” as endangered or threatened, and designate “critical habitat” for such
4 species. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(16), 1533(a). Section 9 of the ESA makes it unlawful to “take” listed
5 species. *See id.* § 1538(a)(1)(B); 50 C.F.R. § 223.203(a). “Take” includes to harm, kill, or
6 capture a protected species. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). Harm includes “significant habitat
7 modification” that “kills or injures fish or wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral
8 patterns, including, breeding, spawning, . . . [or] feeding” 50 C.F.R. § 222.102.
9

10 Section 7 of the ESA imposes substantive and procedural requirements on federal
11 agencies. *See id.* § 402.03. Substantively, it mandates that federal agencies “insure that any
12 action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the
13 continued existence of any endangered . . . or threatened species or result in the destruction or
14 adverse modification” of such species’ critical habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); *Pyramid Lake*
15 *Paiute Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy*, 898 F.2d 1410, 1415 (9th Cir. 1990).
16 Procedurally, it requires an agency planning an action that “may affect” listed species (the
17 “action agency”) to consult with NMFS and/or FWS (the “consulting agency”). 50 C.F.R. §
18 402.14(a). Such consultation is intended to facilitate compliance with the substantive mandate.
19 *See Thomas v. Peterson*, 753 F.2d 754, 763–65 (9th Cir. 1985), *abrogated on other grounds*,
20 *Cottonwood Env’t Law Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 789 F.3d 1075, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2015).
21

22 Consultation results in the consulting agency’s issuance of a biological opinion (“BiOp”)
23 determining whether the action is likely to jeopardize listed species or adversely modify critical
24 habitat. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h)(3). If the consulting agency determines that the action is likely to
25 jeopardize species or adversely modify critical habitat, the BiOp will suggest “reasonable and
26 prudent alternatives” to avoid jeopardy or adverse modification. *San Luis & Delta-Mendota*
27 *Water Auth. v. Jewell*, 747 F.3d 581, 634 (9th Cir. 2014); 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A). If jeopardy
28 and adverse modification are not likely, or if reasonable and prudent alternatives are identified to
29 avoid jeopardy and adverse modification, the BiOp will include an incidental take statement

1 (“ITS”) defining the amount of take anticipated. *Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Bonneville Power*
2 *Admin.*, 175 F.3d 1156, 1158–59 (9th Cir. 1999); 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(C)(i); 50 C.F.R. §
3 402.14(i)(1)(i). The ITS also includes terms to minimize impacts and monitor take. 16 U.S.C. §
4 1536(b)(4)(C)(ii), (iv); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i)(1)(ii), (iv), (i)(3); *Wild Fish Conservancy v. Salazar*
5 (*WFC*), 628 F.3d 513, 531–32 (9th Cir. 2010). Take in compliance with an ITS is exempt from
6 liability under ESA section 9. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o)(2); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i)(5).

7
8 **B. The National Environmental Policy Act.**

9 NEPA directs federal agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) for
10 “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C.
11 § 4332(2)(C)(i). An EIS ensures that the agency considers detailed information on environmental
12 impacts when reaching decisions and that the information will be made available to the larger
13 audience that may also play a role in the decision making process. *Robertson v. Methow Valley*
14 *Citizens Council*, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989). NEPA requires the environmental information be
15 available *before* decisions are made and *before* actions are taken. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b), (c)
16 (2019).¹ An environmental assessment (“EA”) must be prepared to determine whether an action
17 will have significant environmental impacts if the action is neither one that normally requires an
18 EIS nor one that is excluded from NEPA review. *Hale v. Norton*, 476 F.3d 694, 700 (9th Cir.
19 2007); 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4. If it is determined that no significant impact will occur, the agency
20 must issue a “finding of no significant impact” (“FONSI”). 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(e), 1508.13.

21
22 **C. The Magnuson-Stevens Act.**

23 The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (“Magnuson-Stevens
24 Act”) establishes exclusive federal management over fisheries within the Exclusive Economic
25 Zones of the United States; i.e., the “federal waters” generally located between three and 200
26 nautical miles from the coastline. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1802(11), 1811(a); 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 14,
27 1983). The Secretary of Commerce is charged with implementing the statute and has delegated

28
29 ¹ The 1978 NEPA regulations, as amended, were in effect when NMFS made the relevant decisions here. *See* 85
Fed. Reg. 43,304, 43,305 (July 16, 2020). All citations to the NEPA regulations herein are to that version.

1 responsibilities to NMFS. *See* 16 U.S.C. §§ 1854, 1855(d).

2 **IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS.**

3 **A. Endangered Southern Resident Killer Whale.**

4 The Southern Resident Killer Whale distinct population segment (“DPS”) was listed as
5 an endangered species in 2005. 70 Fed. Reg. 69,903 (Nov. 18, 2005); 50 C.F.R. § 224.101(h).
6 The species is at a high risk of extinction—considered by NMFS to be one of the eight most at
7 risk species. AR 15988–89. “[T]he Southern Resident population has declined to historically low
8 levels.” AR 47276. As of December 2018, there were only 74 whales. *Id.* In early 2019, there
9 were 26 reproductive age females, and only 14 had successfully reproduced in the prior 10 years,
10 and there had been no viable calves since the beginning of 2016. AR 47434.

11 A primary limiting factor for Southern Residents is prey availability, with limited prey
12 contributing to premature mortality and reduced fecundity. AR 47276, 47282, 47286–87, 47434.
13 Females are producing a low number of surviving calves during their reproductive life span and
14 experiencing late onset of sexual maturity and a long average reproductive interval (6.1 years).
15 AR 47276. “[T]his reduced fecundity is largely due to nutritional limitation.” AR 47276, 47434.
16 Indeed, a recent assessment by Dr. Robert Lacy found that “the effects of prey abundance on
17 fecundity and survival had the largest impact on the population growth rate.” AR 47278.

18 Southern Residents consume a variety of fish species. AR 47282–83. However, salmon
19 and steelhead make up to 98 percent of their diet. AR 47283. Specifically, the whales consume
20 mostly larger (i.e., older) Chinook salmon, with 80 to 90 percent of the species’ diet consisting of
21 Chinook salmon. *Id.* This preference for Chinook salmon persists despite low abundance. *Id.*

22 **B. Threatened Salmonids.**

23 The Snake River fall-run Chinook salmon evolutionarily significant unit (“ESU”) was
24 listed as a threatened species in 1992, followed by the Puget Sound, the Lower Columbia River,
25 and the Upper Willamette River Chinook salmon ESUs in 1999. 57 Fed. Reg. 14,653 (Apr. 22,
26 1992); 64 Fed. Reg. 14,308 (Mar. 24, 1999); 50 C.F.R. § 223.102(e). The primary causes of their
27 decline include harvests and hatcheries. AR 01729, 14492, 15761, 15891. Chinook salmon in
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1 these ESUs are harvested in Southeast Alaska, Canada, and other fisheries. *See* AR 47373–419.

2 Hatchery programs harm wild salmonids in several ways, including through genetic and
3 ecological interactions between hatchery and wild fish. AR 47422–24. Hatchery fish become less
4 fit to survive and reproduce in the wild through “domestication selection,” a process whereby
5 natural selection processes occur in an unnatural environment. AR 47423, 39742–46, 13519–20.
6 This domestication harms wild fish when hatchery fish, released *en masse*, mate with wild fish
7 and transfer their maladapted genes, reducing productivity of wild populations. AR 47422–24,
8 30274. Harm through ecological interactions occurs, *inter alia*, when hatchery fish compete with
9 wild fish for resources, including food and rearing and spawning habitat. *See* AR 47424–25.

10 Puget Sound Chinook salmon historically consisted of 31 independent populations; 22
11 remain in five major population groups. AR 01741–42. “To lower the extinction risk . . . , all
12 existing independent populations . . . will need to improve . . . , and some will need to attain a low
13 [extinction] risk status.” AR 01741. All populations are below escapement levels set for recovery
14 and most populations are declining. AR 01747. Most populations suffer low productivity, with
15 “[h]atchery-origin spawners . . . present in high fractions in most populations” *Id.*

16 Lower Columbia River Chinook salmon consists of 32 populations in six major
17 population groups. AR 15905. “The majority of the populations . . . remain at high [extinction]
18 risk, with low natural-origin abundance levels.” AR 15911. “Hatchery contribution to naturally
19 spawning-spawning fish remains high.” *Id.* NMFS funds most hatchery production affecting the
20 species under the Mitchell Act and recently completed a BiOp for the programs (“Mitchell Act
21 BiOp”). AR 13233–767; AR 47244. The Mitchell Act BiOp requires large reductions in
22 numerous Chinook salmon hatchery programs in the Columbia River to reduce harm to the
23 Lower Columbia River Chinook salmon ESU. *See* AR 13267–72, 13666, 13677.

24
25
26 **C. The Pacific Salmon Treaty.**

27 The United States and Canada first ratified the Pacific Salmon Treaty in 1985. AR
28 00523. A primary objective was to ensure that each county receive equitable benefits from the
29 salmon originating in its waters. *Id.* The Pacific Salmon Treaty establishes upper limits on

1 “intercepting fisheries,” defined as fisheries in one country that harvest salmon originating in
2 another country. AR 47194. These fishing regimes are contained in Annex IV to the Pacific
3 Salmon Treaty. *Id.* The original agreed-upon regimes expired in 1992. *Id.* A new comprehensive
4 agreement was reached in 1999 that established 10-year fishery regimes, with the next set agreed
5 upon in 2009. AR 47194–95. The current set of agreements became effective in 2019. *See* AR
6 47195. Chapter 3 of Annex IV to the 2019 Pacific Salmon Treaty defines the management
7 regime for the Chinook salmon fisheries and is effective from 2019 through 2028. *See id.*

8
9 **D. Southeast Alaska Salmon Fisheries.**

10 There is a commercial troll salmon fishery and a sport salmon fishery in Southeast
11 Alaska. AR 00514–15. The commercial fishery harvests primarily Chinook and coho salmon.
12 AR 00540. Harvests are limited annually to a specific number of “Treaty Chinook salmon”
13 according to an abundance estimate established under the Pacific Salmon Treaty. *Id.*

14 The commercial fishery is divided into two seasons: winter and general summer, and the
15 general summer season is divided into spring and summer fisheries. *Id.* The winter season is
16 from October 11 through April 30 and is managed to not exceed harvesting 45,000 Chinook
17 salmon. *Id.* Treaty Chinook salmon caught in the winter season count towards the annual limit
18 for Southeast Alaska set under the Pacific Salmon Treaty. *Id.* The spring fishery begins when the
19 winter season ends and harvests primarily Alaska hatchery-produced Chinook salmon not subject
20 to the Pacific Salmon Treaty, although some Treaty Chinook salmon are also caught. AR 00540–
21 41. The summer troll season opens on July 1 and targets all Treaty Chinook salmon that remain
22 available under the annual quota set pursuant to the Pacific Salmon Treaty. AR 00541.

23
24 All winter and spring harvests and some summer harvest occur in state waters and are
25 therefore not subject to the Magnuson Stevens Act. *See* AR 00540–41. Some of the summer
26 fishery occurs in the Exclusive Economic Zone that is subject to the Magnuson Stevens Act. AR
27 00541. The North Pacific Fishery Management Council, which manages fisheries in the federal
28 waters of Alaska, developed a salmon fishery management plan in 1979 and has since issued
29 numerous amendments. *See* 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(1)(G); AR 00502–03; 83 Fed. Reg. 31,340

1 (July 5, 2018). That plan delegates management authority over the fishery in federal waters of
2 Southeast Alaska to the State of Alaska. *See* AR 00515. However, NMFS retains oversight
3 authority of Alaska’s management of these federal fisheries. AR 00561–65.

4 Under this regime, Alaska manages salmon fisheries “as a single unit throughout federal
5 and state waters” using the allocations set under the Pacific Salmon Treaty. *See* AR 00515,
6 00541. NMFS provides federal funding to Alaska to “monitor and manage salmon fisheries in
7 State and Federal waters to meet the obligations of [the Pacific Salmon Treaty]” AR 47198.

8 **E. NMFS’s 2019 SEAK BiOp on the 2019 Pacific Salmon Treaty.**

9 NMFS first consulted under the ESA on the Southeast Alaska salmon fisheries in 1993.
10 AR 47195. NMFS consulted in 1999 and again in 2009 on the 10-year harvest regimes set under
11 the Pacific Salmon Treaty. AR 47195–96. NMFS reinitiated consultation after completion of the
12 2019 Pacific Salmon Treaty and issued the 2019 SEAK BiOp on April 5, 2019. AR 47173–76.

13 The 2019 SEAK BiOp is the product of an intra-agency ESA consultation; i.e., NMFS is
14 both the action agency and the consulting agency. *See Haw. Longline Ass’n v. Nat’l Marine*
15 *Fisheries Serv.*, No. 01-765 (CKK/JMF), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7263, at *5 n.4 (D.D.C. Apr.
16 25, 2002). The 2019 SEAK BiOp consults on three actions: (1) NMFS’s ongoing delegation of
17 authority to Alaska to manage the portion of the summer fishery that occurs in federal waters; (2)
18 NMFS’s disbursement of funds to Alaska to manage all Southeast Alaska salmon fisheries to
19 ensure compliance with the Pacific Salmon Treaty; and (3) a new grant program whereby NMFS
20 will disburse funds for hatchery and habitat programs intended to partially mitigate harvests. AR
21 47198–204. The 2019 SEAK BiOp analyzes Southeast Alaska salmon fisheries, in both State and
22 federal waters, under the regimes of the 2019 Pacific Salmon Treaty. *See, e.g.*, AR 47366.

23 The 2019 SEAK BiOp acknowledges that Southern Residents are at a high risk of
24 extinction due to low fecundity rates, primarily attributable to reduced prey abundance. AR
25 47276–78, 47434. Under NMFS’s management of fisheries “over the last decade, salmon
26 availability has not been sufficient to support Southern Resident population growth.” AR 47503.
27 In 2017, Dr. Lacy found that prey abundance has the largest impact on population growth and
28
29

1 that **Chinook abundance would need to increase by 15%** to achieve the recovery growth rate
2 target for Southern Residents. AR 47278, 47503. While the 2019 Pacific Salmon Treaty reduced
3 some harvests, it was insufficient for Southern Residents and Puget Sound Chinook salmon:

4 [T]here was a practical limit to what could be achieved through the bilateral
5 negotiation process. As a consequence . . . , the U.S. Section generally recognized
6 that **more would be required to mitigate the effects of harvest** and other limiting
7 factors that contributed to the reduced status of Puget Sound Chinook salmon and
[Southern Resident Killer Whales]

8 AR 47201–02 (emphasis added). Southeast Alaska harvests under the 2019 Pacific Salmon
9 Treaty will reduce Southern Resident prey in coastal waters from 0.2% to **12.9%**, and in inland
10 waters from 0.1% to 2.5%. AR 47439–40. The fisheries will reduce larger Chinook salmon
11 preferred by Southern Residents from the whale’s critical habitat up to 2.5%. AR 47283, 47507.

12 The Pacific Salmon Treaty sets an **upper limit** on fisheries; **NMFS can further restrict**
13 **harvests to protect species under the ESA**. *E.g.*, AR 47436. Instead of limiting harvests to
14 ensure they do not jeopardize species, NMFS manufactured a hypothetical federal “funding
15 initiative” in an effort to partially mitigate harm to Puget Sound Chinook salmon and Southern
16 Residents. AR 47201–03. This initiative includes three elements. AR 47202. First, \$3.06 million
17 per year is to be allocated for Puget Sound Chinook salmon “conservation”² hatcheries; to
18 increase funding for existing programs on the Nooksack, Dungeness, and Stillaguamish Rivers
19 and to fund a new program in Hood Canal. AR 47202, 47420. Second, \$31.2 million is to fund
20 (unidentified) habitat projects to benefit Chinook salmon populations in those same four Puget
21 Sound watersheds. AR 47202, 47419–20. The third component seeks to dramatically increase
22 Chinook salmon hatchery production to provide a 4% to 5% increase in prey for the Southern
23 Residents. AR 47202–03. NMFS proposes spending “no less than \$5.6 million per year” on this
24 “prey increase program” in order to release 20 million smolts annually; five to six million smolts
25 in Puget Sound and the rest in the Columbia River and the Washington Coast. AR 47203.
26
27

28 _____
29 ² A conservation hatchery is designed to preserve the genetic resources of a salmon population, as opposed to a
program designed to provide other benefits, such as harvests. *See* AR 47420.

1 The 2019 SEAK BiOp found that the Southeast Alaska salmon fishery “**is likely to**
2 **adversely affect designated critical habitat**” for Southern Residents “[d]uring the time it takes
3 for . . . hatchery fish [produced under the prey increase program] to return as adults to critical
4 habitat areas” AR 47507 (emphasis added). It is unclear how long NMFS believes that will
5 be, as the mitigation “is not anticipated to be implemented immediately.” AR 47435. Further,
6 any hatchery fish would not be available to Southern Residents until “several years” after release
7 because the whales “prefer to consume larger (i.e., older) Chinook salmon.” AR 47507.

8
9 NMFS nonetheless assumed that this aspirational “mitigation package” will eventually
10 produce beneficial effects when evaluating whether the Southeast Alaska salmon fisheries are
11 likely to jeopardize species or adversely modify critical habitat under section 7(a)(2) of the ESA.
12 *See, e.g.*, AR 47500–01, 47506–07. NMFS ultimately concluded that the fisheries, given the
13 mitigation, are not likely to jeopardize Southern Residents or adversely modify their critical
14 habitat. *See* AR 47508; 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (defining “jeopardize the continued existence of”).

15 NMFS also found that fisheries under the 2019 Pacific Salmon Treaty are not likely to
16 jeopardize four Chinook salmon ESUs, including Puget Sound Chinook salmon and Lower
17 Columbia River Chinook salmon. AR 47485–47501. Despite assuming the supposed benefits to
18 Southern Residents from the hypothetical new hatchery production, the 2019 SEAK BiOp did
19 not evaluate whether that increased production will jeopardize ESA-listed salmonids. *See id.*

20 The 2019 SEAK BiOp includes an ITS authorizing take of Southern Residents and four
21 threatened Chinook salmon ESUs resulting from the Southeast Alaska salmon fisheries up to the
22 harvest limits in 2019 Pacific Salmon Treaty. AR 47518–19. The ITS does not authorize take
23 associated with the hypothetical mitigation—the proposed hatchery and habitat programs—
24 explaining instead that future ESA consultations will be required. *E.g.*, AR 47420, 47428, 47433.

25
26 **V. STANDARD OF REVIEW.**

27 Challenges to a BiOp and to an agency’s compliance with NEPA are reviewed under the
28 Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). *See Bennett v. Spear*, 520 U.S. 154, 174–79 (1997); *W.*
29 *Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink*, 620 F.3d 1187, 1195 (9th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is

1 generally the appropriate mechanism for resolving the merits of such claims. *See Occidental*
2 *Eng’g Co. v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv.*, 753 F.2d 766, 769–70 (9th Cir. 1985). The APA
3 directs courts to set aside agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or
4 otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

5 **VI. ARGUMENT.**

6 **A. The 2019 SEAK BiOp Is Arbitrary and Not in Accordance with Law.**

7 **1. NMFS’s no jeopardy opinion relies on uncertain mitigation.**

8 NMFS’s management of fisheries has pushed Southern Residents to the brink of
9 extinction. *See, e.g.*, AR 47503. The 10-year harvests contemplated by the 2019 Pacific Salmon
10 Treaty will continue to reduce prey to far below what is necessary for the species. *See* AR
11 47201–02, 47278, 47439–41, 47503, 47507. NMFS found that, absent other measures, these
12 fisheries will “**adversely affect designated critical habitat**” of Southern Residents. AR 47507
13 (emphasis added). That finding should require the imposition of reasonable alternatives under the
14 ESA. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A). Instead of imposing such alternatives, NMFS approved the
15 maximum harvests contemplated in the 2019 Pacific Salmon Treaty based on an assumption that
16 it will be able to develop mitigation plans before Southern Residents go extinct. *See* AR 47201–
17 02, 47498–47501 (mitigation also needed to preserve Puget Sound Chinook salmon). NMFS’s
18 reliance on this undeveloped and poorly-defined mitigation violates the ESA.
19

20 To satisfy ESA section 7’s duty to “insure” no jeopardy, NMFS cannot rely on future
21 mitigation to offset negative impacts absent “solid guarantees that they will actually occur.” *See*
22 *Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (NWF II)*, 524 F.3d 917, 935 (9th Cir.
23 2008); *Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (NWF III)*, 184 F. Supp. 3d 861, 914
24 (D. Or. 2016). The Ninth Circuit has adopted strict standards:

25
26 Mitigation measures . . . must constitute a clear, definite commitment of resources,
27 and be under agency control or otherwise reasonably certain to occur. A sincere
28 general commitment to future improvements—without more specificity—is
29 insufficient. The measures must be subject to deadlines or otherwise-enforceable
obligations; and most important, they must address the threats to the species in a
way that satisfies the jeopardy and adverse modification standards. Binding

1 mitigation measures cannot refer only to generalized contingencies or gesture at
2 hopeful plans; they must describe, in detail, the action agency’s plan to offset the
environmental damage caused by the project.

3 *Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bernhardt*, 982 F.3d 723, 743 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal citations
4 and quotations omitted); *see also NWF II*, 524 F.3d at 935–36 (there must be “specific and
5 binding plans” for the mitigation). The proposed funding initiative relied upon by NMFS in
6 formulating the 2019 SEAK BiOp is dramatically deficient under these standards.

7 **a. The mitigation lacks specific and binding plans.**

8 The mitigation measures relied upon by NMFS lack specific and binding plans. *E.g.*, AR
9 47203 (“[t]he **specific details** of how the three activities for which funding would be used **have**
10 **not been developed**” (emphasis added)). This vagueness undermines an analysis of whether the
11 mitigation will be sufficient to satisfy the “no jeopardy” standard of section 7 of the ESA. *See*
12 *Bernhardt*, 982 F.3d at 743 (mitigation must satisfy the jeopardy and adverse modification
13 standards). Further, the lack of specific “deadlines or otherwise-enforceable obligations”
14 frustrates a determination as to whether the mitigation contemplated in the 2019 SEAK BiOp is
15 being implemented. Agencies are required to reinitiate consultation when mitigation is not
16 implemented and they can become liable under the ESA for take. *Id.* at 743–44. Mitigation that
17 is too vague undermines that structure and cannot be relied upon to satisfy the ESA. *Id.*

18
19 The “prey increase” proposal to fund production of 20 million hatchery smolts annually
20 is devoid of specifics. *See* AR 47202–03, 47315, 47432–33. The only detail available is that the
21 mitigation must “increase prey availability by 4-5 percent in areas that are most important to
22 [Southern Residents].” AR 47202–03, 47315. NMFS knows the outcome needed to support its
23 “no jeopardy” opinion, **but there is no plan whatsoever** for achieving that outcome; e.g., what
24 hatcheries will be used; what hatchery stocks will be used; who will operate the programs; where
25 the fish will be released; the age of fish released; the smolt to adult return ratio; the number of
26 fish needed for broodstock; or when, where, or how many salmon will be available to the
27 Southern Residents. *See, e.g.*, AR 47315 (mitigation “is less well defined and does not lend itself
28 to further specification”); AR 47433 (“the details needed to conduct site-specific assessments
29

1 have not been worked out”). The mitigation is exceedingly less-defined than that rejected in
2 *Bernhardt*, where a specific entity was to conduct annual surveys for polar bears dens within a
3 specified radius, but that mitigation still lacked sufficient detail. 982 F.3d at 744–46.

4 Instead of describing the details of how this mitigation will be implemented as required,
5 the 2019 SEAK BiOp directs NMFS to come up with a plan: “NMFS shall design the prey
6 increase program using the best available information” AR 47525. NMFS hopes “to work
7 collaboratively with the state and tribal co-managers [that operate hatcheries] . . . to develop a
8 program that meets the goal related to increasing prey abundance.” AR 47433. This is glaringly
9 contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s explicit holding that a BiOp cannot rely on undeveloped “hopeful
10 plans” in lieu of “describe[ing], in detail, [NMFS’s] plan to offset” impacts. *Bernhardt*, 982 F.3d
11 at 743; *see also NWF III*, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 913 (rejecting BiOp’s reliance on “unidentified
12 projects” to be implemented by others); *Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Salazar*, 804 F. Supp. 2d
13 987, 1004 (D. Ariz. 2011) (A BiOp cannot rely on a “promise—no matter how well-intended—
14 to develop a plan in the future to mitigate the impacts of its proposed action.”); *Ctr. for*
15 *Biological Diversity v. Rumsfeld*, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1154 (D. Ariz. 2002) (rejecting reliance
16 on undeveloped plans that would “identify the necessary mitigation”).³

17
18 Reliance on the “prey increase” proposal is also impermissible because the mitigation is
19 not subject to “deadlines or otherwise-enforceable obligations.” *See Bernhardt*, 982 F.3d at 743.
20 Notably, the 2019 SEAK BiOp does not include any deadlines whatsoever for this mitigation,
21 nor does it include specific requirements by which to confirm that the mitigation is being
22 implemented in the manner and on the schedule needed to avoid the extinction of Southern
23 Residents. *See* AR 47525–26. Instead, NMFS vaguely admits that the mitigation “is not
24 anticipated to be implemented immediately.” AR 47435; *see also* AR 47203 (2019 SEAK BiOp
25 noting that if “funding is not provided in time for actions to take effect during the [10-year]
26 agreement” set in the 2019 Pacific Salmon Treaty, that “**may** constitute a modification” requiring
27

28
29 ³ “District courts in this circuit follow the standard [for reliance on mitigation] articulated by *Rumsfeld. Bernhardt*,
982 F.3d at 743 n.6.

1 new ESA consultation (emphasis added)). Reliance on such “vague” and “indefinite” mitigation
2 measures is inconsistent with the ESA. *See Bernhardt*, 982 F.3d at 743–44.

3 The mitigation proposal to provide funding to four Puget Sound conservation hatcheries
4 is also too ill-defined for reliance under ESA section 7. Remarkably, NMFS cannot even confirm
5 that additional fish will be produced. AR 47420 (funding will “most likely include increased
6 production”). NMFS does not specify how the funds will be spent; how many additional fish
7 could be produced; where fish would be released; the age of fish released; the number of adult
8 fish needed for broodstock; or when, where, or how many adult salmon could be made available
9 to Southern Residents or to aid recovery of Puget Sound Chinook salmon. *See* AR 47420–27.
10 NMFS has thus failed to describe, in detail, how funding these four conservation hatcheries
11 would mitigate harvest impacts. *Bernhardt*, 982 F.3d at 743. This mitigation also does not meet
12 the Ninth Circuit’s standards because the 2019 SEAK BiOp **lacks any** “deadlines or otherwise-
13 enforceable obligations” to guide this supposed mitigation as required under the ESA. *See id.*
14

15 With respect to the habitat restoration component of mitigation, NMFS admits that
16 “while a list of potential habitat restoration projects . . . exists, it has not been decided which
17 projects would be funded . . .” AR 47203; *see also* AR 47420 (“site specific details” for habitat
18 restoration “are not yet available”). Moreover, even the “original project [sic] listed may
19 change.” AR 47427. NMFS does not provide any details about which projects will be
20 implemented, who will implement them, when they would be implemented, or, most
21 importantly, the extent to which they would mitigate harvest impacts. *See* AR 47427–32. The
22 Ninth Circuit has rejected such reliance on lists of “‘possible’ strategies, without selecting a
23 mitigation measure from the incorporated list or committing [the agency] to carrying out any
24 specific number of measures.” *Bernhardt*, 982 F.3d at 746; *see also Salazar*, 804 F. Supp. 2d at
25 1002 (cannot rely on a “laundry list of possible mitigation measures” (quoting *Rumsfeld*, 198 F.
26 Supp. 2d at 1153)). Separately, reliance on the habitat projects is impermissible because there are
27 absolutely no “deadlines or otherwise-enforceable obligations.” *See Bernhardt*, 982 F.3d at 743.
28

29 In sum, the mitigation does not meet applicable standards because there are no details for

1 implementation, nor is the mitigation subject to deadlines or otherwise-enforceable obligations.

2 **b. The mitigation is not subject to NMFS’s control or otherwise**
3 **reasonably certain to be fully and timely implemented.**

4 NMFS’s reliance on the mitigation is also, and independently, impermissible under the
5 ESA because the mitigation is not subject to NMFS’s “control or otherwise reasonably certain to
6 occur.” *See Bernhardt*, 982 F.3d at 743; *NWF II*, 524 F.3d at 935–36 n.17.

7 NMFS does not intend to implement any mitigation itself; instead, it intends to develop a
8 “grant program” to provide funding to others for the hatchery and habitat projects. *E.g.*, AR
9 47447; AR 47201–02, 47433 (NMFS intends to work with “state and tribal co-managers,” which
10 operate hatcheries, to develop mitigation). However, NMFS’s administrative record **does not**
11 **contain a single commitment, legal or otherwise, to implement mitigation** from any entity
12 that would be responsible for implementation; i.e., Tribes, States (Washington, Oregon, and
13 Idaho), and FWS. NMFS’s record does not even contain communications from those entities
14 indicating that they have the capacity or ability to implement the projects. There is nothing in the
15 record to support a finding that the mitigation is subject to NMFS’s “control or otherwise
16 reasonably certain to occur,” and NMFS’s reliance on the mitigation is therefore inconsistent
17 with Ninth Circuit precedent. *See Bernhardt*, 982 F.3d at 743; *NWF II*, 524 F.3d at 935–36 n.17;
18 *Sierra Club v. Marsh*, 816 F.2d 1376, 1385 (9th Cir. 1987) (“This reliance on the proposed
19 actions of others does not satisfy [the agency’s] burden of insuring that its actions will not
20 jeopardize . . . species” (quotation, citations, and original alterations omitted)); *see also Nat’l*
21 *Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (NWF I)*, 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1213–14 (D. Or.
22 2003) (reliance on mitigation to be implemented by third-parties, States and Tribes, where there
23 was no authority or binding agreements to compel implementation, was impermissible). Further,
24 “there is a degree of uncertainty regarding whether Congress will [timely] provide the
25 [mitigation] funding, in whole or in part” AR 47203.

26
27 Additionally, the hatchery components of mitigation lack the requisite “solid guarantees
28 that they will actually occur” in the time and manner contemplated by NMFS because they
29

1 require review and approval under the ESA and NEPA. *See NWF II*, 524 F.3d at 935; *NWF I*,
2 254 F. Supp. 2d at 1208, 1213–16 (NMFS improperly relied on mitigation that had not
3 undergone ESA consultation, including habitat and hatchery measures). NMFS cannot rely on
4 these proposals because, as the Tribes explained in *NWF I*, the mitigation “may never occur, may
5 be substantially modified, or may be found to jeopardize the species upon closer scrutiny during
6 future [ESA] consultation.” 254 F. Supp. 2d at 1208.

7 NMFS has long-recognized that hatcheries harm wild salmonids. *See, e.g., NWF II*, 524
8 F.3d at 935 (“NMFS explicitly found that continued reliance on the hatchery operation itself
9 threatens [the salmon’s] chances of recovery . . .”). Hatchery production is already suppressing
10 recovery of salmonids, including Puget Sound and Lower Columbia River Chinook salmon. *See*
11 *supra* sec. IV.B. NMFS’s proposal to fund even more hatchery production would exacerbate that
12 harm and requires further ESA consultation. AR 47420 (funding Puget Sound Chinook salmon
13 conservation hatcheries requires “further consultation once the site specific details are fully
14 described”), 47433 (“Once the details are known” for the prey increase program, “NMFS would
15 complete site-specific [ESA] consultations.”).

17 ESA consultation on these hatchery programs may determine that they are likely to
18 jeopardize species. *See* 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). That would preclude implementation unless
19 NMFS is able to prescribe “reasonable and prudent alternatives,” such as smaller programs.
20 *Thomas*, 753 F.2d at 763; 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A). Further, any BiOp will include terms to
21 minimize impacts to threatened salmonids, which could alter the hatchery programs as
22 contemplated. *See Thomas*, 753 F.2d at 763; 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(ii). Notably, the Mitchell
23 Act BiOp requires that numerous hatcheries **reduce** annual releases into the Columbia River by
24 2022 by nearly two million Chinook salmon to protect ESA-listed salmonids. *See* AR 13267–72.
25 NMFS cannot rely on hatcheries as mitigation because the programs may be modified or rejected
26 when reviewed under the ESA. *See NWF I*, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 1208, 1213–16.

28 NMFS’s massive new federal grant program to fund mitigation for the Southeast Alaska
29 salmon harvests is also subject to NEPA. *See* 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(a); *Alaska v. Andrus*, 591 F.2d

1 537, 540 (9th Cir. 1979) (federally funded projects subject to NEPA); *see also Ramsey v. Kantor*,
2 96 F.3d 434, 443–44 (9th Cir. 1996) (ESA take authorizations also trigger NEPA requirements).⁴
3 NMFS already violated NEPA by adopting the hatchery mitigation identified in the 2019 SEAK
4 BiOp without first providing any NEPA procedures. *See infra* sec. VI.C.2; *Metcalf v. Daley*, 214
5 F.3d 1135, 1138, 1143–44 (9th Cir. 2000) (NMFS, et al., unlawfully predetermined NEPA by
6 committing to support a specific harvest quota before preparing EIS or EA).

7
8 When NMFS does comply with NEPA for the hatchery mitigation, it will be required to
9 consider reasonable alternatives, including smaller hatchery releases that pose less harm to wild
10 salmonids. *See Native Fish Soc’y v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.*, 992 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1110
11 (D. Or. 2014) (NMFS violated NEPA by failing to consider smaller hatchery releases); *Wild Fish*
12 *Conservancy v. Nat’l Park Serv.*, 8 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1299–1301 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (same);
13 *California v. Block*, 690 F.2d 753, 767 (9th Cir. 1982) (“touchstone” of NEPA is proper
14 “selection and discussion of alternatives [to] foster[] informed decision-making”). NMFS cannot
15 provide “solid guarantees” that the hatchery programs will occur as contemplated in the 2019
16 SEAK BiOp because NMFS has yet to disclose and evaluate alternatives as required by NEPA;
17 reliance on this mitigation is therefore impermissible. *See NWF II*, 524 F.3d at 935.

18 NMFS’s reliance on the mitigation proposals is impermissible because they are not
19 subject to its “control or otherwise reasonably certain to occur.” *Bernhardt*, 982 F.3d at 743.

20 **2. The 2019 SEAK BiOp fails to draw a rational connection between the**
21 **facts and the no jeopardy opinion reached for Southern Residents.**

22 NMFS is required to articulate a rational connection between the facts found and its “no
23 jeopardy” conclusions reached. *E.g.*, *WFC*, 628 F.3d at 525–27; *NWF III*, 184 F. Supp. 3d at
24 909–10 (BiOp “must provide sufficient information so that a reviewing court can educate itself
25 in order to perform its reviewing function—‘determining whether the agency’s conclusions are
26 rationally supported’” (quotation omitted)). NMFS has failed to meet this standard because it has
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29 ⁴ *See also Native Fish Soc’y v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.*, 992 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1107–09 (D. Or. 2014) (NMFS’s approval of hatcheries under ESA regulations is subject to NEPA).

1 not explained how the Southeast Alaska salmon harvests, combined with other west coast
2 fisheries, will not continue to starve Southern Residents into extinction, regardless of whether the
3 hypothetical mitigation is implemented. This deficiency is exacerbated by NMFS’s apparent
4 failure to account for increases in harvests that would result from the prey increase program,
5 reducing any benefits to Southern Residents.

6 In *WFC*, a BiOp that found a local bull trout population was small and vulnerable to
7 extirpation, was declining in size, and was likely to continue declining primarily due to the
8 hatchery operations under review. 628 F.3d at 525–26. FWS nonetheless concluded that the
9 hatchery would not jeopardize bull trout. *Id.* at 526–27. The Ninth Circuit rejected the BiOp
10 because FWS failed to explain the apparent contradiction between the factual findings and the
11 “no jeopardy” opinion. *Id.* at 527–29. While FWS may have believed that the population could
12 be lost without jeopardizing the entire bull trout species, a BiOp can be affirmed only on the
13 bases articulated by the agency and FWS’s record did not include such a finding. *Id.* at 529.

14 The 2019 SEAK BiOp suffers from this same deficiency. NMFS considers Southern
15 Residents one of the species most at risk of extinction. AR 15988–89. “[T]he Southern Resident
16 population has declined to historically low levels,” primarily because insufficient prey
17 abundance is reducing fecundity. AR 47276, 47282, 47286–87, 47434. NMFS’s management of
18 salmon fisheries over the last 10 years has been insufficient to support Southern Resident
19 population growth. AR 47503. NMFS predicts that the “downward trend in population growth”
20 for Southern Residents will continue. AR 47502.

21 A recent population viability assessment found prey abundance has the largest impact on
22 the Southern Residents’ population growth rate and Chinook salmon abundance would need to
23 increase by 15% to achieve growth rate targeted for recovery of Southern Residents. AR 47278,
24 47503. NMFS does not identify the increase needed to merely sustain the severely depressed
25 population size. The 2019 Pacific Salmon Treaty somewhat reduced salmon harvests relative to
26 the prior agreement. *E.g.*, AR 47445, 47504. Those reductions provide very minor improvements
27 in prey availability; *e.g.*, prior Southeast Alaska harvests reduced prey in coastal waters up to
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1 15.1%, while those harvests under the 2019 Pacific Salmon Treaty will reduce prey in coastal
2 waters up to 12.9%. AR 47505. While NMFS assumes that the prey increase program will
3 eventually increase prey by 4% to 5%, that is far below the 15% increase needed for recovery.
4 *See* AR 47202–03. Yet, NMFS concludes that the Southeast Alaska salmon harvests, along with
5 other west coast fisheries, are not likely to jeopardize Southern Residents. AR 47508. NMFS
6 fails to draw a rational connection between that conclusion and the facts found, including the fact
7 that Southern Resident population size is expected to continue declining primarily due to
8 inadequate prey. *See* AR 47502; *WFC*, 628 F.3d at 525–29.

9
10 This failure is aggravated by NMFS’s complete failure to explain the assumption that
11 releasing 20 million hatchery smolts annually will increase Southern Residents’ prey by 4% to
12 5%. *See* AR 47202–03, 47432–33. It is unclear whether that assumption accounts for increased
13 harvests that will also result. Harvests are set annually under the 2019 Pacific Salmon Treaty for
14 Southeast Alaska, North-Central British Columbia, and West Coast Vancouver Island using an
15 abundance index. *See* AR 47205–09. The abundance index reflects the predicted abundance of
16 Chinook salmon available to the fisheries where an index of 1.0 equals the average abundance
17 from 1979 to 1982, and an index of 1.2 is 20% greater. AR 47205. Harvest limits increase with
18 abundance index increases. *See* AR 47208. Hatchery releases will increase the abundance index;
19 as a crude example, using a smolt to adult ratio of 0.7%, an annual release of 20 million smolts
20 could produce 140,000 adult fish that could be included in the abundance index. *See, e.g.*, AR
21 30609 (smolt to adult ratios in the range of 0.5% to 1.0%). That would raise an abundance index
22 of 1.0 (around 1,235,020 salmon) to 1.1 (around 1,375,020 salmon), increasing harvests from
23 390,500 salmon (1.0 abundance index) to 462,500 salmon (1.1 abundance index); an increase in
24 harvest of 72,000 salmon. *See* AR 47208. Under this scenario, over half of the 140,000 adult
25 salmon produced by the prey increase program could be harvested and not benefit Southern
26 Residents. NMFS’s record does not provide “sufficient evidence” to show that it considered this
27 critical issue. *See NWF III*, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 909–10; *Nw. Coal. for Alts. to Pesticides v. U.S.*
28 *Env’t Prot. Agency*, 544 F.3d 1043, 1052 (9th Cir. 2008) (agency failed to provide enough
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1 information to demonstrate a rational connection between the facts and its conclusion).

2 In sum, NMFS has failed to draw a rational connection between the facts, including its
3 predicted continued decline of Southern Residents, and the “no jeopardy” conclusion.

4 **3. The 2019 SEAK BiOp violates the ESA by failing to evaluate whether**
5 **the prey increase program will jeopardize threatened salmonids.**

6 NMFS identified the prey increase program as an “action” consulted on in the 2019
7 SEAK BiOp because it needed to assume the benefits to approve the Southeast Alaska harvests.
8 Yet, the 2019 SEAK BiOp altogether ignores the prey increase program in evaluating whether
9 the “actions” are likely to jeopardize threatened salmonids. That is inconsistent with the ESA.

10 **a. The 2019 SEAK BiOp includes benefits of the prey increase**
11 **program in its jeopardy analysis for Southern Residents.**

12 NMFS explains that the prey increase program was developed because the 2019 Pacific
13 Salmon Treaty did not reduce harvests enough to protect Southern Residents. *See* AR 47201–02.
14 The 2019 SEAK BiOp contends that enough information is available to assume the supposed
15 benefits of that program to Southern Residents: “Some effects of the [mitigation] funding
16 initiative can be described specifically and analyzed quantitatively now (e.g., increasing in prey
17 abundance for [Southern Residents] by 4-5 percent).” AR 47420; *see also* AR 47432, 47447.
18 NMFS’s biological opinion that the actions addressed in the 2019 SEAK BiOp are not likely to
19 jeopardize Southern Residents relies upon the supposed benefits of the prey increase program.
20 *See* AR 47506–08 (“The hatchery production will increase abundance of Chinook salmon . . . ,
21 which will reduce impacts from the [harvest] action during times of low prey for the whales).⁵

22 **b. The 2019 SEAK BiOp ignores harm from the prey increase**
23 **program in its jeopardy analyses for threatened salmonid.**

24 In contrast to the supposed beneficial impacts, NMFS altogether ignores the prey increase
25 program and its harmful impacts in its jeopardy analyses for threatened salmonids.

26 NMFS explains that it is unable to analyze harm to threatened Chinook salmon from the
27

28 _____
29 ⁵ NMFS’s jeopardy analyses and opinions are in the “Integration and Synthesis” section of the 2019 SEAK BiOp.
AR 47484–85.

1 prey increase program in any detail because the program is too undeveloped. AR 47420. The
2 discussion of such effects is barely half a page; NMFS expects of “a range of effects” similar to
3 the Puget Sound conservation hatcheries proposed as a separate mitigation component. AR
4 47432–33. NMFS also lacks sufficient information to conduct a detailed analysis of the
5 conservation hatcheries and instead provides a generic summary of concerns associated with
6 artificial propagation programs in general. AR 47420–27.

7 NMFS’s analyses of whether the actions addressed in the 2019 SEAK BiOp are likely to
8 jeopardize four threatened Chinook salmon ESUs **omits the prey increase program altogether**.
9 AR 47485–47501. Thus, the 2019 SEAK BiOp **does not include NMFS’s biological opinion** as
10 to whether the prey increase program is likely to jeopardize the threatened Puget Sound, Lower
11 Columbia River, Upper Willamette, and Snake River Fall-Run Chinook salmon ESUs.⁶

12 Similarly, NMFS omits the prey increase program when addressing impacts to other
13 threatened salmonids—i.e., those not caught in the Southeast Alaska fishery—such as threatened
14 Lower Columbia River steelhead and Puget Sound steelhead. *See* AR 47528–31.⁷ The 2019
15 SEAK BiOp concludes that the “actions” “are not likely to adversely affect” any salmonid
16 species that is not caught in the Southeast Alaska salmon fishery. AR 47528. When such a
17 determination is made, there is no formal consultation under section 7 of the ESA and NMFS
18 does not issue a BiOp determining whether the action is likely to jeopardize the species. *See* 50
19 C.F.R. § 402.14(b). In concluding that the actions addressed in the 2019 SEAK BiOp are “not
20 likely to adversely affect” numerous threatened salmon species, NMFS considers the salmon
21 harvests only, completely omitting the prey increase program as an “action.” *See* AR 47528–31.

22
23 **c. The 2019 SEAK BiOp’s failure to evaluate whether the prey**
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26 ⁶ In contrast, NMFS provides a cursory analysis of impacts to threatened Puget Sound Chinook salmon from the
27 conservation hatchery mitigation component. AR 47498–99. In doing so, NMFS explains that it has “consider[ed] in
28 this opinion the effects of the [Southeast Alaska] fishery . . . and the effects of the conservation funding initiative,”
29 thereby admitting that its “no jeopardy” opinion for Puget Sound Chinook salmon does not account for the harmful
impacts from the prey increase program. AR 47500.

⁷ The prey increase program will, unquestionably, adversely affect salmonids species in addition to the four Chinook
salmon ESUs caught in the Southeast Alaska fishery. *See, e.g.*, AR 30641–46 (NMFS’s BiOp describing take of
threatened Puget Sound steelhead from Chinook and coho salmon programs).

increase program may jeopardize salmonids violates the ESA.

1 The 2019 SEAK BiOp is inconsistent with the ESA and implementing regulations
2 because it does not include analyses or opinions on whether the prey increase program is likely
3 to jeopardize threatened salmonids. Instead, NMFS’s impermissibly segmented consultation by
4 assuming benefits of the prey increase program in its jeopardy analysis for Southern Residents,
5 while omitting the program altogether in its jeopardy analyses for threatened salmonids.
6

7 The central function of consultation under section 7 of the ESA is formulation of
8 NMFS’s biological opinion as to whether proposed actions will jeopardize species or adversely
9 modify their critical habitat. *See Thomas*, 753 F.2d at 763; 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (“Promptly
10 after conclusion of consultation . . . , [NMFS] shall provide . . . a written statement setting forth
11 [NMFS’s] opinion If jeopardy or adverse modification is found, [NMFS] shall suggest . . .
12 reasonable and prudent alternatives . . .”). The ESA implementing regulations provide:

The biological opinion **shall include** . . . [NMFS’s] opinion on whether the action
is (A) Likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or result in
the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat (a “jeopardy” biological
opinion); or (B) Not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species
or result in the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat (a “no
jeopardy” biological opinion).

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17 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h)(1)(iv) (emphasis added); *see also* 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(4) (NMFS must
18 “formulate [its] opinion as to whether the action is likely to jeopardize . . . listed species or result
19 in . . . adverse modification of critical habitat.”). The Ninth Circuit has reiterated this
20 fundamental requirement of a BiOp: “[d]uring the formal consultation process, the [consulting
21 agency] **must** ‘formulate its biological opinion as to whether the action . . . is likely to jeopardize
22 the continued existence of listed species’” *Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of*
23 *Land Mgmt.*, 698 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added) (quoting 50 C.F.R. §
24 402.14(g)(4)); *see also Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.*, 378 F.3d 1059,
25 1065 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The first requirement of an ESA BiOp is to determine whether the
26 proposed action is likely to jeopardize . . . species.”). The 2019 SEAK BiOp is not in accordance
27 with the ESA because it lacks any analyses or opinions on whether the prey increase program is
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1 likely to jeopardize ESA-listed salmonids, including the Chinook salmon affected by the
2 Southeast Alaska salmon fisheries and other salmonid species affected by the hatcheries.

3 Further, by including benefits of the prey increase program in the jeopardy analysis for
4 Southern Residents, but entirely omitting the program from the jeopardy analysis for threatened
5 salmonids, NMFS impermissibly segmented its consultation on this program. *See Conner v.*
6 *Burford*, 848 F.2d 1441, 1453–58 (9th Cir. 1988). “A biological opinion which is not
7 coextensive in scope with the identified agency action necessarily fails to consider important
8 aspects of the problem and is, therefore, arbitrary and capricious.” *Greenpeace v. Nat’l Marine*
9 *Fisheries Serv.*, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1150 (W.D. Wash. 2000). Regardless of uncertainties,
10 NMFS cannot “‘ignore available biological information [and] fail to develop projections’ which
11 may indicate potential conflicts between the proposed action and the preservation of endangered
12 species.” *See id.* at 1150 (quoting *Conner*, 848 F.2d at 1454) (rejecting NMFS’s argument that a
13 lack of information prevented further analysis); *NWF II*, 524 F.3d at 936 (NMFS improperly
14 relied on hatcheries as mitigation without also considering the “‘impact of prolonging the
15 [salmon’s] hatchery dependence on its eventual prospects for recovery.’”).

17 The BiOp in *Conner* purported to address issuance of leases for oil and gas exploration
18 and “all resulting subsequent activities.” 848 F.2d at 1453. However, the BiOp “concluded that
19 there was insufficient information pertaining to specific location and extent of post-leasing . . .
20 activities to render a comprehensive [BiOp] beyond the initial lease stage.” *Id.* The BiOp
21 therefore contemplated an “incremental-step” process where future ESA consultations would
22 occur. *Id.* at 1452. The Ninth Circuit held that FWS “violated the ESA by failing to use the best
23 information available to prepare comprehensive [BiOps] considering all stages of the agency
24 action, and thus failing to adequately assess whether the agency action was likely to jeopardize
25 [ESA-listed species] as required by section 7(a)(2).” *Id.* at 1454. Regardless of “incomplete
26 information,” the BiOp must use “available biological information” and “develop projections” to
27 “assess whether [all phases of] the agency action [are] likely to jeopardize . . . species” *Id.*
28 The “incremental-step” process would allow the “piecemeal chipping away” of species. *Id.*; *see*
29

1 *also WFC*, 628 F.3d at 521–25 (rejecting temporal segmentation of effects analysis).

2 As in *Conner*, the 2019 SEAK BiOp violates the ESA because it “pay[s] lip service” to
3 the requirement to prepare a comprehensive BiOp by including the prey increase program as an
4 “action,” without analyzing whether the program will jeopardize ESA-listed salmonids. 848 F.2d
5 at 1453; *see also Am. Rivers v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs*, 271 F. Supp. 2d 230, 255 (D.D.C.
6 2003) (“ESA requires that all impacts of agency action—both present *and* future effects of
7 species—be addressed in the consultation’s jeopardy analysis”). NMFS thereby violated the ESA
8 by failing to prepare a comprehensive BiOp using available information and making projections,
9 as necessary, to evaluate whether the prey increase program may jeopardize salmonid species.
10 NMFS instead relied entirely on future “site-specific consultations” akin to the “incremental-
11 step” consultations rejected in *Conner*. *See* AR 47433.

12
13 NMFS’s inclusion of the prey increase program as an “action” in the 2019 SEAK BiOp,
14 without evaluating whether it jeopardizes threatened salmonids, has significant consequences.
15 First, NMFS believes that hatcheries may be appropriate to “alleviate short-term extinction
16 risks,” but must otherwise be limited to protect wild salmonids. AR 47422. Yet, NMFS’s “no
17 jeopardy” opinion for Southern Residents relies on the prey increase program to provide “long-
18 term” benefits. AR 47506. Second, actions that have undergone consultation are assumed in the
19 “environmental baseline” for future consultations. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (defining “environmental
20 baseline”). The 2019 SEAK BiOp explains that the benefits of the prey increase program will be
21 assumed in the baseline in future consultations on other fisheries that affect Southern Residents.
22 AR 47203–04. Thus, NMFS seeks to authorize harvests all along the west coast that will deprive
23 Southern Residents of prey in reliance on the prey increase program before even evaluating
24 whether that increased hatchery production will jeopardize ESA-listed salmonids.

25
26 NMFS’s failure to make a jeopardy determination on the prey increase program—an
27 “action” included in the 2019 SEAK BiOp—for ESA listed salmonids violates the ESA. *See*,
28 *e.g.*, 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(4), (h)(1)(iv); *Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land*
29 *Mgmt.*, 698 F.3d at 1107.

1 **4. The ITS fails to adequately limit take of Southern Residents.**

2 The ITS in 2019 SEAK BiOp authorizes whatever amount of take of Southern Residents
3 happens to result due to harvests set under the 2019 Pacific Salmon Treaty. AR 47519. This is an
4 impermissible limit on take, as the limit is coextensive with the action subject to the consultation.
5 *Or. Nat. Res. Council v. Allen*, 476 F.3d 1031, 1038–41 (9th Cir. 2007); *see* Dkt. 14, at 26–28.

6 **B. NMFS Failed to Ensure Its Actions Do not Jeopardize ESA-Listed Species.**

7 Section 7 of the ESA imposes a substantive duty on NMFS to ensure that any action it
8 authorizes or funds is not likely to jeopardize species or destroy critical habitat. *See* 16 U.S.C. §
9 1536(a)(2). NMFS is in violation of that obligation because NMFS is relying on the 2019 SEAK
10 BiOp, which contains the legal flaws discussed above, to support its continued authorization of
11 and funding for management of salmon fisheries in Southeast Alaska and to support its funding
12 of new hatchery production as supposed mitigation. *See WFC*, 628 F.3d at 532.

13 **C. NMFS Violated NEPA by Failing to Prepare an EIS or an EA and FONSI.**

14 NMFS violated NEPA by failing to conduct any NEPA analysis for its authorization of
15 take resulting from the 10-year fishery regimes set in the 2019 Pacific Salmon Treaty. NMFS
16 further violated NEPA by adopting the prey increase program without NEPA processes.

17 **1. NMFS’s failure to complete NEPA for its authorization of take by the**
18 **2019 Pacific Salmon Treaty fisheries is not in accordance with law.**

19 The Ninth Circuit held in 1996 that NMFS violated NEPA by failing to prepare an EA or
20 an EIS “*before* issuing” an ITS authorizing take associated with salmon fisheries. *Ramsey*, 96
21 F.3d at 443–44 (emphasis in original). Inexplicably, NMFS disregarded *Ramsey* and issued the
22 ITS in the 2019 SEAK BiOp, authorizing take associated with Southeast Alaska salmon fisheries
23 under the 2019 Pacific Salmon Treaty, without any NEPA process. Under the unequivocal
24 holding in *Ramsey*, that violated NEPA. *See id.*

25 NMFS’s ITS in *Ramsey* authorized take associated with salmon fisheries under the
26 Columbia River Fish Management Plan, a “federal-state-tribal compact that controls . . . harvests
27 for fish that enter the Columbia River system.” *Id.* at 438. Like the Pacific Salmon Treaty, the
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29

1 plan did not directly regulate fisheries; state fishery rules were enacted consistent with the plan.
2 *Id.* at 438, 444. Like the 2019 SEAK BiOp, the BiOp in *Ramsey* was the result of an intra-agency
3 consultation; NMFS was both the federal action agency involved in preparing the plan and the
4 ESA consulting agency issuing the BiOp. *Id.* at 438–39. NMFS was required to prepare an EA or
5 EIS because the ITS “is the functional equivalent to a permit because the activity in question
6 would, for all practical purposes, be prohibited but for the [ITS].” *Id.* at 444. NEPA compliance
7 rested with NMFS in its capacity as the ESA consulting agency issuing the ITS because “there
8 was no downstream federal agency [implementing the project] to complete an EIS.” *Jewell*, 747
9 F.3d at 643–44 (explaining *Ramsey*). Rather, Washington and Oregon, which are not subject to
10 NEPA, implement the fishery through rules; “[i]f the consulting agency, the NMFS, did not
11 comply with the EIS requirement in *Ramsey*, then the action would have evaded NEPA review
12 altogether” *Id.* at 644.

14 NMFS responded to *Ramsey* with a 2003 programmatic EIS covering several fisheries,
15 including the Southeast Alaska salmon fisheries, explaining:

16 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in its 1996 decision in *Ramsey v. Kantor* . . . ,
17 clarifies that the actions ensuing from NMFS’ review are the decision of whether
18 to continue deferral of management to the State of Alaska and the associated
19 issuance of an Incidental Take Statement (ITS), and that those actions need to
20 comply with NEPA.

21 AR 47948, 47952–53. The federal actions subject to the EIS included NMFS’s ITS authorizing
22 take associated with Southeast Alaska fisheries under the 1999 Pacific Salmon Treaty (through
23 2008) and the “continued deferral of management [over the fisheries] to the State” of Alaska. AR
24 47953. NMFS recognized that it would be required to comply with NEPA even if it authorized
25 take associated with the fisheries under section 10 of the ESA, applicable to non-federal actions,
26 instead of section 7 of the ESA, which applies only to federal actions. *Id.*

27 The ITS issued with the 2019 SEAK BiOp is identical, in all relevant aspects, to that in
28 *Ramsey*. This new ITS applies to fisheries that “incidentally take[] salmon that are listed” under
29 the ESA; specifically, Southeast Alaska fisheries from 2019 through 2028 under the 2019 Pacific

1 Salmon Treaty. *Ramsey*, 96 F.3d at 444; AR 47518. The ITS was the result of an intra-agency
2 consultation; i.e., NMFS consulted on its own actions, including its disbursement of funds to
3 Alaska to manage the fisheries under the 2019 Pacific Salmon Treaty. AR 47197–47204; *see*
4 *also* 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (requiring consultation under ESA section 7 for actions “authorized,
5 funded, or carried out” by a federal agency). Alaska implements the fisheries through state rules,
6 so there is no “downstream federal agency to complete an EIS.” *Jewell*, 747 F.3d at 644. NMFS
7 was therefore required to comply with NEPA as the consulting agency authorizing take
8 associated with fisheries under the 2019 Pacific Salmon Treaty; otherwise, “the action would . . .
9 evade[] NEPA review altogether . . .” *Id.* NMFS violated NEPA by failing to prepare an EA or
10 and EIS for the fisheries “*before* issuing the [ITS].” *Ramsey*, 96 F.3d at 444.

11
12 **2. NMFS’s failure to complete NEPA for its adoption of a new federal
grant program to fund hatcheries is not in accordance with law.**

13 NMFS further violated NEPA by adopting the federal grant program for new hatchery
14 production described in the 2019 SEAK BiOp without first preparing an EIS or even an EA.

15 As discussed, the Ninth Circuit explained in *Jewell* circumstances under which NMFS is
16 required to comply with NEPA in its role as an ESA consulting agency issuing an ITS. 747 F.3d
17 at 643–45. The court went on to explain that, when the action subject to ESA consultation is
18 undertaken by a federal agency, that action agency’s adoption and implementation of the BiOp is
19 subject to NEPA. *Id.* at 645–46; *see also NWF III*, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 935 (“In *Jewell*, the Ninth
20 Circuit held clearly and explicitly, for the first time, that action agencies adopting a [decision]
21 implementing a biological opinion generally *must* prepare an EIS.”).

22
23 In *Jewell*, FWS issued a BiOp concluding that the Bureau of Reclamation’s continued
24 operations of a water project jeopardizes a species and the BiOp therefore identified reasonable
25 and prudent alternatives to avoid jeopardy; i.e., alternative operations that reduce water exported
26 from northern to southern California. 747 F.3d at 592. Reclamation would be subject to liability
27 under section 9 of the ESA for take of listed species if it chose to deviate from the BiOp’s
28 reasonable and prudent alternatives. *Id.* at 642–43. “Reclamation . . . notified the FWS that it
29

1 intends to operate the Projects in compliance with the biological opinion.” *Id.* at 592. The Ninth
2 Circuit held that Reclamation’s “provisional adoption and implementation of the BiOp triggered
3 its obligation to comply with NEPA.” *Id.* at 642; *see also NWF III*, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 933
4 (Reclamation and Army Corps of Engineers’ decisions “adopting and implementing [NMFS’s]
5 2014 BiOp [for operations of the Federal Columbia River Power System] triggered those
6 agencies’ obligations to comply with NEPA.”). An exception to this requirement may apply
7 where the action addressed in the BiOp does not change the status quo, but the BiOp in *Jewell*
8 resulted in material changes to operations and thus triggered NEPA. 747 F.3d at 646.

9
10 NEPA applies to NMFS’s adoption of the prey increase program in the same manner as it
11 did to Reclamation’s adoption of the reasonable and prudent alternatives in *Jewell*. The
12 consulting agency—FWS—proposed the reasonable and prudent alternatives in *Jewell* as
13 alternatives to Reclamation’s proposal to ensure that the action does not jeopardize species. 747
14 F.3d at 592, 642–43. Similarly, NMFS included the prey increased program in the 2019 SEAK
15 BiOp as an additional action it would implement to ensure that the fisheries would not result in
16 jeopardy or adverse modification. *E.g.*, AR 47506–07. Reclamation needed to comply with the
17 reasonable and prudent alternatives outlined in the BiOp in *Jewell* to be immune from liability
18 under section 9 of the ESA. 747 F.3d at 642–43. NMFS is likewise required to implement the
19 prey increase program included as mitigation/conservation measures in the 2019 SEAK BiOp to
20 be immune from liability for under section 9 of the ESA. *See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S.*
21 *Bureau of Land Mgmt.*, 698 F.3d 1113–15.

22
23 Under the Ninth Circuit’s precedent in *Jewell*, NMFS violated NEPA by failing to
24 prepare an EIS or an EA before the agency’s “provisional adoption and implementation of the
25 [2019 SEAK] BiOp” 747 F.3d at 601, 642 (“We affirm the district court’s judgment that
26 Reclamation failed to comply with NEPA before implementing FWS’s BiOp.”); *NWF III*, 184 F.
27 Supp. 3d at 948 (granting summary judgment where “Action Agencies failed to comply with
28 NEPA” prior to adoption of BiOp). NMFS has unquestionably adopted the 2019 SEAK BiOp’s
29 actions, as it is both the action agency that developed the actions for consultation, including the

1 prey increase program, and the consulting agency that issued the 2019 SEAK BiOp on the
2 actions. NMFS has also moved forward seeking to implement the prey increase program. Dkt.
3 43-4 ¶¶ 10, 14–17; Dkt. 43-5 ¶¶ 5–11; *see also* Second Decl. of Brian A. Knutsen, Exhibit 1.⁸

4 **3. Conclusion on NMFS’s Failure to Comply with NEPA.**

5 “NEPA does not set out substantive environmental standards, but instead establishes
6 ‘action-forcing’ procedures that require agencies take a ‘hard look’ at environmental
7 consequences.” *Metcalf*, 214 F.3d at 1141 (quoting *Robertson*, 490 U.S. at 348). “Proper timing
8 is [therefore] one of NEPA’s central themes. An assessment must be ‘prepared early enough so
9 that it can serve practically as an important contribution to the decisionmaking process and will
10 not be used to rationalize or justify decisions already made.’” *Save the Yaak Comm. v. Block*, 840
11 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5). Further, the “touchstone” of NEPA
12 is proper “selection and discussion of alternatives [to] foster[] informed decision-making.”
13 *California v. Block*, 690 F.2d at 767; *see also Friends of Se.’s Future v. Morrison*, 153 F.3d
14 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 1998); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1. NEPA therefore prohibits agencies from making
15 any “irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources,” or taking any action that would
16 “[l]imit the choice of reasonable alternatives” or “[h]ave an adverse environmental impact,”
17 before NEPA procedures are complete. *Metcalf*, 214 F.3d at 1144; 40 C.F.R. § 1506.1(a).

18
19 NMFS violated these requirements and undermined NEPA’s intent by issuing the 2019
20 SEAK BiOp without first preparing an EIS or an EA. In issuing the ITS, NMFS decided to
21 authorize take of Chinook salmon from fisheries at levels it predicts will continue to suppress
22 Southern Residents and Puget Sound Chinook salmon. In an effort to mitigate that harm, NMFS
23 developed the prey increase program; a program with doubtful benefits for Southern Residents
24 and certain harmful impacts to threatened salmonids. These decisions constituted irreversible
25 commitments of resources and have caused environmental harm; e.g., the fisheries irretrievably
26

27
28 ⁸ The Court should consider extra-record material generated after the 2019 SEAK BiOp that shows NMFS is seeking
29 to implement the actions. Such consideration is appropriate because this claim alleges that NMFS failed to act—i.e.,
failed to complete NEPA procedures—under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), and the record for such a claim is not limited to the
record as it existed at any single point. *San Francisco Baykeeper v. Whitman*, 297 F.3d 877, 886 (9th Cir. 2002).

1 took salmon that would otherwise have been available to Southern Residents or to aid wild
2 salmon recovery. These decisions also limited NMFS’s reasonable alternatives; namely, the
3 alternative of reduced harvests to protect Southern Residents in lieu of new hatchery production.

4 NMFS made these decisions without the public disclosure procedures or alternative
5 analyses required by NEPA. Any subsequent NEPA process would simply be to “rationalize or
6 justify decisions [it] already made,” which violates NEPA. *See* 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5. Accordingly,
7 NMFS’s actions violate NEPA. *See, e.g., Metcalf*, 214 F.3d 1143–45 (NMFS violated NEPA by
8 agreeing to a whaling quota and working to effectuate the agreement before preparing an EA or
9 EIS); *Env’t Def. Fund, Inc. v. Andrus*, 596 F.2d 848, 851–52 (9th Cir. 1979) (The failure to
10 prepare an EIS before deciding to allocate 832,000 acre feet of water annually to industrial uses
11 violated NEPA, even though “the details of subsequent use” were not yet known.).

12
13 **D. The Appropriate Remedies for NMFS’s Violations.**⁹

14 **1. The 2019 SEAK BiOp, including the ITS, should be vacated.**

15 The 2019 SEAK BiOp, including the ITS, should be vacated, along with NMFS’s
16 adoption of the 2019 SEAK BiOp, for NMFS’s ESA and NEPA violations.

17 The APA instructs that a “reviewing court **shall** . . . set aside agency action” that is
18 “arbitrary . . . or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (emphasis
19 added). This provision demands a “presumption of vacatur.” *E.g., All. for the Wild Rockies v.*
20 *U.S. Forest Serv. (Wild Rockies)*, 907 F.3d 1105, 1121–22 (9th Cir. 2018); *see also E. Bay*
21 *Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr*, 964 F.3d 832, 856–57 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[O]ur obligation . . . is to
22 vacate the unlawful agency action.”). The party seeking to avoid vacatur bears the burden of
23 demonstrating that the Court should invoke its equitable authority to withhold the presumptive
24 statutory remedy of vacatur. *See Wild Rockies*, 907 F.3d at 1121–22 (defendant failed to
25 overcome vacatur presumption); *Coal. to Protect Puget Sound Habitat v. U.S. Army Corps of*
26

27
28 ⁹ The APA provides that a court should determine whether an agency action is “arbitrary and capricious” based on
29 “the whole record,” but that limit on the scope of review does not apply to relief issues. *E.g., E. Bay Sanctuary*
Covenant v. Trump, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1107–08 (N.D. Cal. 2018).

1 *Eng'rs*, 417 F. Supp. 3d 1354, 1369 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (“Because there is a presumption in
2 favor of vacatur, defendants . . . will be the moving parties . . . regarding the appropriate relief
3 for the APA violations discussed above.”); *see also Aquall. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation*, 312
4 F. Supp. 3d 878, 882 (E.D. Cal. 2018). NMFS cannot meet this burden.

5 An invalid action will be left in place during a remand “only in limited circumstances”
6 and “only when equity demands.” *Pollinator Stewardship Council v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency*,
7 806 F.3d 520, 532 (9th Cir. 2015) (quotations omitted). Two factors are considered: “how
8 serious the agency’s errors are ‘and the disruptive consequences of an interim change’” that may
9 result from vacatur. *Cal. Cmty. Against Toxics v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency*, 688 F.3d 989, 992
10 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting *Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n*, 988 F.2d 146, 150–
11 51 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). Vacatur is withheld only if it would cause “serious and irremediable harms
12 that significantly outweigh the magnitude of the agency’s error.” *Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands*
13 *Ctr. v. Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.*, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1238,
14 1242 (N.D. Cal. 2015). “In balancing these factors in ESA cases, courts will tip the scales in
15 favor of the endangered species under the [statute’s] ‘institutionalized caution’ mandate.” *Id.*
16 (quoting *Marsh*, 816 F.2d at 1383); *see also N. Plains Res. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of*
17 *Eng’rs*, 460 F. Supp. 3d 1030, 1037–38 (D. Mont. 2020).

19 Violations are generally serious if the remand may result in changes to the agency
20 decision. *E.g.*, *Pollinator Stewardship Council*, 806 F.3d at 532–33 (obtaining adequate studies
21 may lead to different conclusion); *Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr.*, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1243–45;
22 *Native Fish Soc’y v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.*, No. 3:12-cv-00431-HA, 2014 U.S. Dist.
23 LEXIS 33365, at *9–10 (D. Or. Mar. 14, 2014); *League of Wilderness Defs./Blue Mountains*
24 *Biodiversity Project v. Peña*, No. 3:12-cv-02271-HZ, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46279, at *8–12
25 (D. Or. Apr. 6, 2015); *see also Nat. Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior*, 275 F. Supp.
26 2d 1136, at 1145 (C.D. Cal. 2002). In contrast, “technical” violations where the same result
27 could be reached on remand are generally less serious. *Nat’l Family Farm Coal. v. U.S. Env’t*
28 *Prot. Agency*, 966 F.3d 893, 929 (9th Cir. 2020).

1 NMFS’s ESA violations are exceedingly serious. The Southern Residents are at a severe
2 risk of extinction due primarily to inadequate Chinook salmon for prey. Decl. of Dr. Deborah
3 Giles, Ph.D (“Giles Decl.”) ¶¶ 5, 7 9; Dkt. 14-3 ¶¶ 6, 33; Second Decl. of Dr. Robert Lacy, Ph.D.
4 (“Second Lacy Decl.”) ¶¶ 6, 8. Despite the ESA requiring agencies afford endangered species the
5 highest of priorities, NMFS authorized salmon harvest levels that will lead to the Southern
6 Residents’ continued slide towards extinction, while gambling on undeveloped mitigation. *See*
7 *Hill*, 437 U.S. at 185, 194. Even if the mitigation is fully implemented, it would not provide
8 enough prey to support growth of the Southern Residents and, if the mitigation does not produce
9 the maximum benefit hypothesized by NMFS, harvests will continue to reduce prey to levels that
10 cause Southern Residents to decline. Second Lacy Decl. ¶¶ 6, 9, 12–13.

12 Exacerbating the seriousness of those violations is that the supposed mitigation will
13 suppress recovery of salmonids, but NMFS has not even analyzed the adverse impacts of the
14 mitigation or determined whether it may jeopardize listed salmonids. These are not “technical or
15 procedural formalities,” but are instead serious substantive errors that undermine the ESA and
16 cast doubt on NMFS’s reaching the result on remand, making the presumptive remedy of vacatur
17 appropriate. *See, e.g., Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr.*, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1243–45; *Native Fish*
18 *Soc’y v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.*, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33365, at *9–10. Similarly,
19 NMFS’s complete failure to study and disclose alternatives and their impacts as required by
20 NEPA is a serious violation that warrants vacatur of the 2019 SEAK BiOp and its ITS. *See, e.g.,*
21 *Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr.*, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1245; *WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Bureau*
22 *of Land Mgmt.*, 457 F. Supp. 3d 880, 896–97 (D. Mont. 2020); *Se. Alaska Conservation Council*
23 *v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 468 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1151–52 (D. Alaska 2020); *Wild Fish Conservancy v.*
24 *Nat’l Park Serv.*, No. C12-5109 BHS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105689, at *7–8 (W.D. Wash. July
25 31, 2014); *League of Wilderness Defs./Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. U.S. Forest Serv.*,
26 No. 3:10-CV-01397-SI, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190899, at *10 (D. Or. Dec. 10, 2012); *Ctr. for*
27 *Food Safety v. Vilsack*, 734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2010).

28
29 Courts generally prioritize harm to species and the environment over administrative or

1 economic burdens when considering any “disruptive consequences.” *E.g.*, *Wild Rockies*, 907
2 F.3d at 1121–22; *Pollinator Stewardship Council*, 806 F. 3d at 532; *Coal. to Protect Puget*
3 *Sound Habitat*, 466 F. Supp. 3d at 1126; *N. Plains Res. Council*, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 1038–41;
4 *Peña*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46279, at *12–15; *Wild Fish Conservancy*, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5 105689, at *9–10. Any disruptive consequences from vacatur here are significantly outweighed
6 by NMFS’s serious NEPA and ESA errors and by the severe consequences to Southern
7 Residents and Chinook salmon that would occur absent vacatur.

8
9 Accordingly, the presumptive remedy of vacatur is appropriate for the 2019 SEAK BiOp.

10 **2. NMFS’s prey increase program should be enjoined.**

11 The Court should enjoin NMFS’s implementation of the prey increase program until
12 NMFS prepares a BiOp that complies with the ESA and completes required NEPA procedures.¹⁰

13 Generally, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must show: (1) it has suffered an
14 irreparable injury; (2) remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3)
15 considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is
16 warranted; and (4) the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. *Nat’l*
17 *Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (NWF IV)*, 886 F.3d 803, 817 (9th Cir. 2018).
18 However, “Congress intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities” and
19 once Congress has so “decided the order of priorities in a given area, it is . . . for the courts to
20 enforce them . . .” *Hill*, 437 U.S. at 174, 194. Thus, “[w]hen considering an injunction under the
21 ESA, we presume . . . that the balance of interests weighs in favor of protecting endangered
22 species, and that the public interest would not be disserved by an injunction.” *NWF IV*, 886 F.3d
23 at 817; *see also Wash. Toxics Coal. v. Env’t Prot. Agency*, 413 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005)
24 (“the balance of hardships always tips sharply in favor of the . . . threatened species”).

25
26 Irreparable injury is evaluated with reference to the statute being enforced. *NWF IV*, 886
27 F.3d at 818. “The ‘plain intent’ of Congress in enacting the ESA was ‘to halt and reverse the

28
29 ¹⁰ If NMFS would halt the prey increase program in response to vacatur of the 2019 SEAK BiOp, an injunction is not necessary. *See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms*, 561 U.S. 139, 165–66 (2010).

1 trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.” *Id.* (citation omitted). This is achieved
2 through “incremental steps” that include protecting individual members of species; “[h]arm to
3 those members is irreparable because ‘once a member of an endangered species has been injured,
4 the task of preserving that species becomes all the more difficult.” *Id.* (citation omitted). Thus,
5 an extinction-level threat is not required for an injunction. *Id.* at 819; *Cottonwood*, 789 F.3d at
6 1091 (“establishing irreparable injury [under the ESA] should not be an onerous task”). Also, the
7 activity enjoined need not be the exclusive cause of harm and a showing that the injunction
8 would forestall the injury is sufficient. *NWF IV*, 886 F.3d at 819.

9
10 The injury to threatened salmonids from NMFS’s prey increase program easily meets
11 these standards. Threatened Puget Sound and Lower Columbia River Chinook salmon are not
12 meeting recovery objectives due, in part, to excessive hatchery influences. *See, e.g.*, AR 01741–
13 42, 01747, 15911; *see also* Decl. of Dr. Gordon Luikart, Ph.D (“Luikart Decl.”) ¶¶ 24–53.
14 Congress established the Hatchery Scientific Review Group (“HSRG”) to, *inter alia*, develop
15 guidelines to conserve wild salmonids. *See, e.g.*, AR 30242; AR 10419. To limit harm through
16 genetic introgression, the HSRG developed criteria using the metric pHOS—the “proportion of
17 hatchery-origin spawners”—which represents the percentage of adult fish on spawning grounds
18 that are hatchery origin. *See, e.g.*, AR 30260. Generally, the productivity of wild populations
19 decreases as pHOS increases. *E.g.*, AR 13546. pHOS levels that exceed HSRG recommendations
20 are acceptable only where the wild population is at a high risk of extinction and the hatchery is
21 used to reduce short term extinction risk. AR 10419.

22
23 The pHOS levels for most Puget Sound and Lower Columbia River Chinook salmon
24 populations are well in excess of HSRG guidelines. Luikart Decl. ¶¶ 51–53. The recent Mitchell
25 Act BiOp requires reductions in annual releases by nearly two million hatchery Chinook salmon
26 to protect wild Chinook salmon and meet pHOS levels. *See* AR 13267–72. The prey increase
27 program will cause biologically significant increases in pHOS levels “and thereby further inhibit
28 the prospects for the continued survival, much less recovery,” of threatened Chinook salmon.
29 Luikart Decl. ¶¶ 54–64. This constitutes irreparable injury under the ESA for which there is no

1 adequate remedy at law. *See NWF IV*, 886 F.3d at 818–19, 822–23; *Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nat’l*
2 *Marine Fisheries Serv.*, 230 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1140 (N.D. Cal. 2017); *see also infra* sec. VI.E
3 (and cited declarations). An injunction is therefore warranted for the ESA violations, as the Court
4 does not balance hardships or public interests in assessing an injunction for such violations.

5 For NEPA, “irreparable injury flows from the failure to evaluate the environmental
6 impact of a major federal action.” *High Sierra Hikers’ Ass’n v. Blackwell*, 390 F.3d 630, 642
7 (9th Cir. 2004). “The NEPA duty is more than a technicality; it is an extremely important
8 statutory requirement to serve the public and the agency *before* major federal actions occur.”
9 *Found. on Econ. Trends v. Heckler*, 756 F.2d 143, 157 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Here, NMFS decided to
10 implement the prey increase program, which will impede recovery of threatened salmonids, to
11 offset and thereby subsidize salmon harvests without any consideration of alternatives or other
12 analyses or disclosures required under NEPA. This constitutes irreparable injury for which there
13 is no adequate remedy at law. *See, e.g., League of Wilderness Defs./Blue Mountains Biodiversity*
14 *Project v. Connaughton*, 752 F.3d 755, 764 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Environmental injury, by its nature,
15 can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages and is often permanent or at least of long
16 duration, i.e., irreparable.”) (quoting *Lands Council v. McNair*, 537 F.3d 981, 1004 (9th Cir.
17 2008) and *Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell*, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987)).

18
19 The balance of harms and the public interests support an injunction based on NMFS’s
20 NEPA violation because of “the public interest in careful consideration of environmental impacts
21 before major federal projects go forward” *All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell*, 632 F.3d
22 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2011). “[S]uspending such projects until that consideration occurs
23 ‘comports with the public interest’” where NEPA is violated. *Id.* (citation omitted); *see also*
24 *Sierra Club v. Bosworth*, 510 F.3d 1016, 1033 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he public interest favor[s]
25 issuance of an injunction because allowing a potentially environmentally damaging program to
26 proceed without an adequate record of decision runs contrary to the mandate of NEPA.”).

27
28 Accordingly, the Court should enjoin the prey increase program until NMFS prepares a
29 BiOp that complies with the ESA for this program and completes required NEPA procedures.

1 **E. The Conservancy Has Standing to Pursue this Matter.**

2 The Conservancy has standing because: 1) it has suffered an “injury in fact;” 2) the injury
3 is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct; and 3) it is likely, as opposed to speculative, that the
4 injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. *See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t*
5 *Servs. (TOC), Inc.*, 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000). Further, the interests at stake are germane to
6 the Conservancy’s purposes. *Presidio Golf Club v. Nat’l Park Serv.*, 155 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th
7 Cir. 1998); Second Decl. of Kurt Beardslee (“Second Beardslee Decl.”) ¶¶ 2–13; *see also* Second
8 Decl. of William John McMillan (“Second McMillan Decl.”) ¶ 2.

9 The “injury in fact” requirement in environmental cases is satisfied if an individual
10 adequately shows an aesthetic or recreational interest in a particular place or animal and shows
11 reasonable concerns that those interests are impaired by the defendant’s conduct. *Ecological*
12 *Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co.*, 230 F.3d 1141, 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000); *Laidlaw*, 528
13 U.S. at 183–84. Members of the Conservancy derive recreational and aesthetic enjoyment from
14 Puget Sound and its wildlife, and their use and enjoyment are diminished by NMFS’s violations
15 and by the members’ reasonable concerns about NMFS’s violations. Second Beardslee Decl. ¶¶
16 18–19; Second McMillan Decl. ¶¶ 2–34; Second Decl. of Peter W. Soverel ¶¶ 2–23. The injuries
17 stem from NMFS’s conduct addressed herein and are therefore “fairly traceable” to the
18 violations. *See* Second McMillan Decl. ¶¶ 2–34; Second Decl. of Peter W. Soverel ¶¶ 2–23;
19 *Ecological Rights Found.*, 230 F.3d at 1152; *Hall v. Norton*, 266 F.3d 969, 977 (9th Cir. 2001).
20 The injuries are redressable by an order from the Court because proper ESA and NEPA analysis
21 could influence agency actions. *See Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs*, 402 F.3d
22 846, 860–61 (9th Cir. 2005) (procedural); *Covington v. Jefferson Cty.*, 358 F.3d 626, 639 (9th
23 Cir. 2004). Finally, the Conservancy has prudential standing because its interests fall within the
24 “zone of interests” protected by NEPA and the ESA. *See Ocean Advocates*, 402 F.3d at 859, 861.

25 **VII. CONCLUSION.**

26 For the foregoing reasons, the Conservancy respectfully requests that the Court enter an
27 order granting summary judgment and relief as requested herein.
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Respectfully submitted this 5th day of May, 2021.

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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE**

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)
WILD FISH CONSERVANCY,)
)
Plaintiff,)
)
v.)
)
BARRY THOM, <i>et al.</i> ,)
)
Defendants,)
)
and)
)
ALASKA TROLLERS ASSOCIATION,)
)
Defendant-Intervenor,)
)
and)
)
STATE OF ALASKA,)
)
Defendant-Intervenor.)
_____)

Case No. 2:20-cv-417-RAJ-MLP

DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

NOTE ON MOTION CALENDAR:
JUNE 18, 2021

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Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment

U.S. Department of Justice
 P.O. Box 7611
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AABM	Aggregate Abundance-Based Management
APA	Administrative Procedure Act
BiOp	Biological Opinion
DPS	Distinct Population Segment
EA	Environmental Assessment
EIS	Environmental Impact Statement
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
ESA	Endangered Species Act
ESU	Evolutionarily Significant Unit
FMP	Fishery Management Plan
FRAM	Fishery Regulation Assessment Model
FWS	U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service
ISBM	Independent Stock-Based Management
ITS	Incidental Take Statement
MSA	Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
NEPA	National Environmental Policy Act
NMFS	National Marine Fisheries Service
NPFMC	North Pacific Fishery Management Council
PFMC	Pacific Fishery Management Council
PST	Pacific Salmon Treaty
SEAK	Southeast Alaska
SRKW	Southern Resident Killer Whale
WCVI	West Coast Vancouver Island

1 WDFW Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife

2 WFC Wild Fish Conservancy
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INTRODUCTION

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2 In April 2019, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) issued a Biological
3 Opinion (BiOp) that carefully examined the effects of three actions—the delegation of salmon
4 fishery management in the federal waters off of Southeast Alaska (SEAK), the funding of grants
5 to Alaska, and the establishment of a conservation framework for habitat improvement and
6 hatchery production—on seven species listed under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). These
7 actions represent three pieces of a complex regulatory puzzle that includes a bilateral treaty on
8 the management of all the salmon that migrate across state and national boundaries in the Pacific
9 Ocean, the development of fishery management plans (FMPs) by two Regional Fishery
10 Management Councils, and NMFS’s efforts to aid the recovery of not only endangered Southern
11 Resident killer whales (SRKW), but also threatened Chinook salmon, some of which are
12 consumed by SRKW and some of which are caught in fisheries. A careful examination of the
13 evidence in this case shows that NMFS exercised its scientific judgment and reasonably
14 determined that these actions would not jeopardize any species or destroy or adversely modify
15 critical habitat. In doing so, NMFS fully complied with the ESA and the National Environmental
16 Policy Act (NEPA).

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20 The Court should uphold NMFS’s reasoned decisionmaking in this complex management
21 regime and reject Plaintiff’s flawed criticisms. Plaintiff overlooks key aspects of the BiOp and
22 critical pieces of the regulatory puzzle, and fails to acknowledge that the conservation program is
23 a programmatic action that approves a framework for site-specific actions. Plaintiff’s requested
24 relief would remove an integral piece from the regulatory puzzle that will benefit SRKW, which
25 is a species Plaintiff seeks to protect in the litigation. The Court should grant Defendants’ Cross-
26 Motion for Summary Judgment and deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
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STATUTORY BACKGROUND

I. Endangered Species Act

Under Section 7(a)(2), federal agencies must ensure that any action funded, authorized, or carried out by the agency is “not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species” or to destroy or adversely modify its critical habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).¹ The ESA requires that action agencies consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) or NMFS whenever the agency’s action “may affect” a listed species. *Id.*; 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a). If the action is “likely to adversely affect” listed species or critical habitat, the agencies must engage in formal consultation. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14. Formal consultation culminates in the issuance of a “biological opinion” by the consulting agency. *Id.* § 402.14(h). A BiOp includes the Service’s opinion on whether the proposed action is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of its designated critical habitat. *See id.* If the consulting agency reaches a no-jeopardy decision, but the action will result in “take”² of a listed species, the agency must issue an incidental take statement (ITS). *See* 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(i)-(ii). Any take that is in compliance with the statement is exempt from liability under Section 9. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o)(2).

II. National Environmental Policy Act

NEPA serves the dual purpose of informing agency decision makers of environmental effects of proposed major federal actions and ensuring that relevant information is made available to the public. 42 U.S.C. § 4321; *Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council*, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989). If an action does not have significant effects, it is categorically excluded.

¹ Here, NMFS is the action agency and the consulting agency.

² “Take” is defined as “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).

1 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b)(1). If the action is not likely to have significant effects, then an
2 environmental assessment (EA) is appropriate, and if the action is likely to have significant
3 effects, an environmental impact statement (EIS) must be prepared. *Id.* § 1501.4(b)(2).

4 **III. Magnuson-Stevens Act**

5 Congress enacted the Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA) “to conserve and manage the
6 fishery resources found off the coasts of the United States.” 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1). The MSA
7 provides the Secretary of Commerce, by and through NMFS, the authority to regulate fisheries in
8 the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).³ *Id.* §§ 1854, 1855(d). The Act empowers the Secretary to
9 review and implement FMPs, which are developed by Regional Fishery Management Councils
10 and submitted to NMFS. *Id.* § 1854(a). States can regulate fishing vessels in the EEZ when the
11 FMP delegates management of the fishery to a State and a State’s laws and regulations are
12 consistent with the FMP. *Id.* § 1856(a)(3)(B).

15 **FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

16 NMFS’s 2019 BiOp analyzed the relationship between the harvesting of Chinook salmon
17 and seven ESA-listed species, including four types of threatened Chinook salmon. These species
18 are protected and managed under federal law, but given the migratory nature of the salmon, this
19 case also involves international coordination on salmon fisheries under the Pacific Salmon
20 Treaty (PST) and management of fishing in the federal waters off the coast of SEAK.

22 **I. Chinook Salmon**

23 Chinook salmon (*Oncorhynchus tshawytscha*) are anadromous fish that spawn and rear in
24 freshwater and then migrate to the ocean, where they mature. AR 47204.⁴ During this marine life
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28 ³ The EEZ—referred to herein as “federal waters”—extends from the seaward boundary of each coastal state to 200 nautical miles from the coastline. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1802(11), 1811(a).

⁴ Citations to NMFS’s Administrative Record are denoted by AR [Bates number].

1 stage, Chinook salmon can travel substantial distances, and those salmon spawning in the Pacific
2 Northwest often migrate into and through Canadian waters. *Id.* Most Chinook salmon return to
3 their spawning ground in 4-5 years. *Id.*

4 NMFS has listed different types of Chinook salmon under the ESA, which recognizes
5 listing of a subspecies or a distinct population segment (DPS) of a species. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16).
6 For salmon, the population segment is referred to as an evolutionarily significant unit (ESU). AR
7 47218. In the 2019 BiOp, NMFS determined that the proposed actions were likely to adversely
8 affect four Chinook salmon ESUs—the Lower Columbia River, Upper Willamette River, Snake
9 River fall-run, and Puget Sound. AR 47173, 47221. The Lower Columbia River and the Upper
10 River fall-run, and Puget Sound. AR 47173, 47221. The Lower Columbia River and the Upper
11 Willamette River ESUs were listed in 1999 and critical habitat was designated in 2005. AR
12 47222, 47245. The fish in the former spawn in the Lower Columbia River and its tributaries
13 along the Washington-Oregon border. AR 47222-26. The fish in the latter spawn nearby in the
14 Clackamas and Upper Willamette Rivers in Oregon. AR 47245-47. The Chinook salmon that
15 spawn in the fall in the Snake River form a third ESU; this ESU was listed as threatened in 1992
16 and critical habitat was designated in 1993. AR 47252-55. The fourth—the Puget Sound ESU—
17 includes salmon that spawn in rivers flowing into the Sound from the Elwha River and eastward.
18 AR 47261-66. It was listed as threatened in 1999 and critical habitat was designated in 2005. AR
19 47261, 47304. The recovery of these four ESUs has been limited by numerous factors, including
20 degraded habitat, hydropower facilities, poor water quality, fishing, and hatchery-related effects.⁵
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24 **II. Southern Resident Killer Whales**

25 SRKW, also known as orcas, are long-lived marine mammals that occur in the coastal
26 and inland waters of the Pacific Northwest. AR 47276-78; 15988. Females produce a low
27

28 ⁵ Each ESU consists of historical populations of salmon and salmon produced in hatchery programs. AR 47222-23;
see AR 47245; 47252-53; 47262-63.

1 number of surviving calves during their lives, and mothers maintain stable bonds with offspring
2 that undergird matrilineal social structures. AR 47276. SRKW are divided into three pods—J, K,
3 and L. *Id.* These pods spend a significant amount of time in inland waterways during the spring,
4 summer, and fall, and move into offshore coastal waters in the winter months. AR 47280, 16017.
5 SRKW numbers increased between 1974 and 2011 to a total of 87, and experienced further
6 population growth in 2014-2015; however, the population recently decreased to 74. AR 47276.

8 NMFS listed the SRKW DPS as endangered in 2005 and designated critical habitat in
9 2006. AR 47276, 47305. SRKW face a variety of threats, including limits on the quantity and
10 quality of prey, toxic chemicals, oil spills, vessels, and sound. AR 47282-90. In terms of prey,
11 Chinook salmon serve as the primary source for SRKW, though coho salmon contribute up to
12 40% of SRKW diet in late summer months. AR 47282-83. While there is evidence that SRKW
13 can identify Chinook salmon, there is no evidence that they distinguish between wild and
14 hatchery Chinook, both of which likely have the same caloric content and size when they return
15 to their spawning grounds. *See id.* In addition, “hatchery production is a significant component
16 of the salmon prey base returning to watersheds within the range of the SRKW.” AR 47286.
17 SRKW also face threats from pollutants, which can act synergistically with the nutritional stress
18 from reduced Chinook salmon populations, and risks from oil spills; vessels can harm SRKW
19 through both strikes and sound. AR 47287-90, 47278; Dkt. No 43-3 (Barre Decl.) ¶¶ 8, 13.

22 **III. Northern Pacific Fisheries**

24 Because of the Chinook salmon’s migratory patterns, fish that originate in the United
25 States are often caught or “intercepted” by those fishing in Canada, and vice versa. AR 47194,
26 47205-06; *see* Fig. 1 below (AR 47204). In addition, some Chinook salmon that originate off the
27 coasts of Washington and Oregon migrate to Alaska and are harvested in the SEAK fisheries.
28

1 AR 47204. These migratory patterns result in a complex regulatory puzzle for salmon
2 management.




Figure 1. Migratory patterns of major Chinook salmon stock groups.

11 **A. Pacific Salmon Treaty**

12 To help manage the conflicts that arose from the transboundary interception of Chinook
 13 salmon, the United States and Canada signed the PST in 1985. Ex. A. (Fisheries Pacific Salmon
 14 Treaty Between the United States of America and Canada, Jan. 28, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 11091).
 15 Central to this bilateral framework are the fishing regimes aimed at meeting the conservation,
 16 production, and harvest allocations established by the Treaty. AR 47194. The two countries
 17 incorporated these regimes into Annex IV of the PST. *Id.* In 1999 and 2009, the two countries
 18 entered into 10-year agreements that comprehensively updated the fishing regimes. AR 47195.
 19 The countries entered into a new agreement in 2019. AR 47195. The PST agreement governs the
 20 SEAK salmon fisheries as well as salmon fisheries in Canada and the Southern U.S. (off the
 21 coasts of Washington, Oregon, and California). *Id.*

22 A key component of the 2019 Agreement, and the most complex and difficult piece of the
 23 puzzle, was an update to the Chinook fishing regime (Annex IV, Chapter 3), which established
 24 the upper limits for Chinook salmon harvest. *Id.* In reaching this agreement, the parties agreed
 25 that a successful program rested on, *inter alia*:

- 1 (i) science-based fishery management regimes that foster healthy and abundant
2 Chinook stocks by contributing to the restoration and rebuilding of depressed
3 natural stocks while providing opportunities to harvest sustainably abundant
4 natural stocks as well as abundant hatchery produced fish, . . .
- 5 (iii) scientifically sound enhancement activities that provide mitigation to fisheries for
6 habitat loss or degradation. . . .

7 Ex. A at 47-48. Fisheries covered by Chapter 3 are divided into two categories, Aggregate
8 Abundance-Based Management (AABM) and Independent Stock-Based Management (ISBM).
9 AR 47205. Fisheries governed by the former are managed by setting an abundance index that
10 captures the relationship between the abundance of all the stocks in a fishery and a base period
11 (1979-1982). *Id.* SEAK salmon sport, net, and troll fisheries are managed as an AABM fishery
12 and the upper limits for harvest in these fisheries are set forth in Table 1. Ex. A at 63-64. The
13 PST also established a Pacific Salmon Commission to make recommendations or advise the
14 parties; it is composed of two sections, one from each country. After ratification of the PST,
15 Congress enacted the Pacific Salmon Treaty Act. Pacific Salmon Treaty Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
16 99-5, 99 Stat. 7 (1985).

17
18 **B. SEAK Fisheries**

19 Commercial and recreational fishing for Chinook salmon in federal waters in SEAK is
20 governed by the Salmon FMP, which was prepared by the North Pacific Fishery Management
21 Council (NPFMC) and approved by NMFS in 1979. AR 502; *see* 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(1)(G). The
22 Salmon FMP was comprehensively amended in 1990, in part to incorporate the limits from the
23 1985 PST, and it delegated management authority over sport and commercial troll fishing for
24 salmon in federal waters off the coast of SEAK to the State of Alaska. AR 502; *see* 50 C.F.R. §
25 679.3(f). NMFS reaffirmed its delegation of such authority in Amendment 12 to the FMP. *See* 77
26 Fed. Reg. 75,570 (Dec. 21, 2012). NMFS maintains oversight of Alaska's management as
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1 outlined in Chapter 9 of the FMP. AR 561-65. The Alaska Department of Fish & Game sets the
2 annual catch limits each year consistent with Annex IV of the 2019 Agreement. AR 527-29, 531-
3 32. Between 2011 and 2019, Alaska estimates that, on average, 14% of the total commercial
4 fishery Chinook salmon harvest occurred in federal waters in Southeast Alaska. Dkt. No. 43-2
5 (Merrill Decl.) ¶ 22. The recreational sport fishery represents a substantially smaller portion of
6 the harvest in the federal waters of SEAK. AR 552-54.
7

8 **IV. NMFS' 2019 BiOp**

9 On April 5, 2019, NMFS issued a BiOp that considered the combined effects of two
10 related actions and one programmatic action on ESA-listed species. AR 47193-204, 47176. First,
11 NMFS analyzed its own ongoing delegation of authority over salmon fisheries in SEAK federal
12 waters to Alaska. AR 47197-98. Second, NMFS analyzed the federal funding of grants to Alaska
13 that will assist the state in meeting the obligations of the PST. AR 47197-201. Third, NMFS
14 analyzed funding for a conservation program that is designed to benefit both critical stocks of
15 Puget Sound Chinook salmon and SRKW. AR 47201-4. The first two parts of this conservation
16 program will aid Puget Sound Chinook salmon by continuing conservation hatchery programs
17 for three populations and supporting establishment of a similar program for another population
18 (at a cost of \$3.06 million per year) and implementing habitat restoration projects for the same
19 four Puget Sound populations (for a total cost of \$31.2 million). AR 47202. By improving
20 Chinook salmon abundance, the first two parts of the conservation program would also help
21 SRKW by bolstering the amount of prey available. *Id.* The third part of the program is a hatchery
22 production program that has an objective of increasing Chinook salmon available as prey for
23 SRKW by 4-5% (at a cost of \$5.6 million per year). AR 47202-3. NMFS made clear that this
24 funding program was a framework programmatic action, and therefore that the agency would
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1 assess the future, site-specific projects that received the funding to determine whether they are
2 covered by an existing BiOp or require additional ESA consultation. *Id.*

3 NMFS laid the foundation for its effects analysis of these proposed actions by analyzing
4 the status of the listed species and the environmental baseline. AR 47217-366. NMFS built upon
5 this analysis and examined the effects of the proposed actions using a retrospective analysis. AR
6 47366-483. NMFS also ran a retrospective analysis on the percent reductions in the Chinook
7 salmon that would be available to SRKW in both inland and coastal waters. AR 47436-41. In
8 addition, NMFS analyzed the effects of the conservation program. AR 47419-33. Though this
9 section recognized that site-specific analysis would follow the programmatic plan, NMFS
10 considered the general impacts of the hatchery programs and habitat restoration and protection
11 efforts that would help both Chinook salmon and SRKW. AR 47420-32. NMFS concluded that
12 the actions were not likely to appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival or recovery of the
13 species considered in the BiOp or destroy or adversely modify critical habitat. AR 47484-517.

14 STANDARD OF REVIEW

15 Judicial review of administrative actions is governed by the Administrative Procedure
16 Act (APA). 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). *San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell*, 747 F.3d 581,
17 601 (9th Cir. 2014). Under the APA, reviewing courts may set aside an agency's action only if it
18 is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." *Id.* A
19 court must only "consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant
20 factors and whether there has been a clear error in judgment." *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State*
21 *Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). This standard of review is narrow and "[t]he
22 court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency." *Citizens to Preserve*
23 *Overton Park v. Volpe*, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). Courts are at their most deferential "where, as
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1 here, the challenged decision implicates substantial agency expertise.” *Mt. Graham Red Squirrel*
2 *v. Espy*, 986 F.2d 1568, 1571 (9th Cir. 1993).

3 ARGUMENT

4 I. Plaintiff Lacks Standing.

5 Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden for Article III standing. *Contra* Dkt. No. 91
6 (Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Mot.)) at 46; *Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife*, 504 U.S.
7 555, 560-61 (1992). An organization can establish standing as a representative of its members or
8 on its own behalf. *Am. Diabetes Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army*, 938 F.3d 1147, 1154 (9th Cir.
9 2019). In its Motion, Plaintiff Wild Fish Conservancy (WFC) asserts standing on behalf of its
10 members, but fails to demonstrate that one its “members would otherwise have standing to sue in
11 their own right.” *Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc.*, 528 U.S. 167,
12 181 (2000).⁶ WFC relies on the declarations of two members, but neither satisfies the causation
13 or redressability prongs. *Id.*; *see* Dkt. No. 91-7 (McMillan Decl.); Dkt. No. 91-8 (Soverel Decl.).
14 For causation, any injury would need to be fairly traceable to the action challenged in this case,
15 namely the issuance of the BiOp and the reliance on it. While the members complain about the
16 general impacts of fishing and hatcheries, they do not connect the dots between their injuries and
17 NMFS’s challenged actions. This failure is highlighted by the statements in the Soverel
18 Declaration indicating that the decline in fishing opportunities has been occurring for 10 to 15
19 years. Soverel Decl. ¶¶ 7-8. These timeframes precede the issuance of the BiOp. Moreover, there
20 are a number of factors that could affect the members’ ability to fish or see SRKW, and there is
21 not a direct link between the BiOp and an injury. *E.g.*, AR 47260; 47286-90; *see* Dkt. No. 91-3
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28 ⁶ WFC’s Motion does not assert standing on its own, but the Executive Director’s declaration articulates only a procedural injury under NEPA, *see* Dkt. No. 91-6 (Beardslee Decl.), and thus WFC has not shown standing for the ESA claims.

1 (Giles Decl.) ¶ 7 (“Lack of prey, increased toxins and vessel disturbance have been listed as
2 potential causes of these whales’ decline but partitioning these pressures has been difficult.”).
3 The flip side of causation is redressability, and here, the members have not shown that a
4 favorable decision is likely to remedy the harm. Even if the Court grants the requested relief,
5 hatchery fish will continue to be produced, and it is not clear how it will remedy general
6 concerns such as “I will be upset if I catch a hatchery Chinook when I fish in Puget Sound and
7 along the Washington coast.” McMillan Decl. ¶ 32. General statements that merely use the word
8 “remed[y]” are insufficient. *E.g.*, Soverel Decl. ¶ 23.
9

10 **II. NMFS’ 2019 BiOp Fully Complied with the ESA and NEPA.**

11 **A. The Conservation Program Supports NMFS’s Decision.**

12 Substantial reductions in the SEAK, Southern U.S., and Canadian fisheries were achieved
13 through the negotiations that produced the 2019 Agreement. AR 47202. Nevertheless, there were
14 limits to what could be achieved in bilateral negotiations, and the United States recognized that it
15 would need to engage in additional efforts to mitigate the effects not only of fisheries, but also
16 other factors that have contributed to the reduced status of Chinook salmon and SRKW,
17 especially habitat degradation. *Id.* Thus, NMFS developed a proposal to fund a conservation
18 program that includes conservation hatcheries, habitat restoration, and hatchery production that
19 would increase the prey available for SRKW. *Id.* Plaintiff characterizes the conservation program
20 as “ill-defined” and “uncertain” (Mot. at 21-27), but in reality, the program was designed to be
21 flexible versus rigidly specific, as explained below.
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25 **1. The Conservation Program Is Sufficiently Detailed.**

26 Much of Plaintiff’s disappointment stems from a fundamental misunderstanding of the
27 action. NMFS has established a three-part conservation program with a level of detail that
28 satisfies the standard set forward by the Ninth Circuit, yet also anticipates that NMFS will make

1 site-specific funding decisions within each part. This approach is consistent with the ESA
2 implementing regulations. Those regulations define “action” as “all activities and *programs* of
3 any kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies in the United
4 States.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (emphasis added). Here, the conservation program is a “framework
5 programmatic action,” which is “a framework for the development of future action(s) that are
6 authorized, funded, or carried out at a later time.” *Id.* The 2019 BiOp represents a “broad-scale
7 examination of [the] program’s potential impacts on a listed species and its designated critical
8 habitat—an examination that is not as readily conducted when the later, action-specific
9 consultation occurs on a subsequent action developed under the program framework.” 80 Fed.
10 Reg. 26,832, 26,836 (May 11, 2015). And NMFS planned to perform site-specific consultations,
11 as needed, on the effects of the specific hatcheries and projects that are funded.
12

13
14 NMFS established the first and second parts of the conservation program to benefit the
15 weakest populations of Puget Sound Chinook salmon that are considered essential for recovery
16 and those most affected by northern fisheries. AR 47202. Specifically, NMFS planned to fund
17 existing conservation hatchery programs on the Nooksack, Dungeness, and Stillaguamish Rivers
18 and to support establishment of a new hatchery program for the Mid-Hood Canal. *Id.* Because
19 the first three programs are already in place, NMFS provided details about them in the
20 environmental baseline of the BiOp. AR 47343-44; *see* AR 30515-672. In addition, NMFS
21 provided specific guidance on how the expanded or new hatchery programs will operate through
22 its analysis of the factors used for hatchery programs. AR 47421-27; *see* AR 10412-34. For
23 example, NMFS expects each program, “as a requirement of the funding, to use locally derived
24 hatchery broodstock” in order to decrease the risk associated with outbreeding, or gene flow
25 from other populations. AR 47423. The second part of the program directs funding for habitat
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1 improvements. AR 47202. This funding was structured around an initial list of approximately 15
2 high-priority restoration projects developed by Puget Sound co-managers and NMFS in
3 consultation with local experts. AR 47427, 36626.

4 The third part—the prey increase program⁷—also contains specifics. When fully
5 operational, the program will produce 5-6 million smolts each year from facilities in Puget
6 Sound and an additional 14-15 million smolts each year from facilities on the Washington coast
7 and Columbia River. AR 47203. These numbers and locations resulted from a 2018 analysis
8 performed by NMFS at the request of the U.S. Section of the Pacific Salmon Commission. AR
9 37928-30. In that analysis, the agency relied on several sources of information, including the
10 identification by NMFS and Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife (WDFW) of the
11 priority Chinook salmon stocks, the identification of production facilities that either had capacity
12 to increase production or could be brought online quickly, and an estimate of the increase in prey
13 that would result from increased production. AR 37929, 16334-41. “These tools in combination
14 allowed [National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)] to evaluate a scenario for
15 increasing the production of Chinook smolts . . . by specific amounts.” AR 37929. In the time
16 since that 2018 analysis, some of the details for the prey increase program have crystallized
17 further as NMFS has established the criteria for selection of the hatcheries and funded the first
18 year of recipients. Dkt. No. 91-2 (Knutsen Decl.), Ex. 1 at 2, 7-9.⁸ Specifically, criteria 1, 2, and
19 4 enshrine the principles of focusing on priority Chinook salmon and focusing on facilities that
20 do not require major capital upgrades. *Id.* at 2. Criteria 3 clarifies that “[i]ncreased production
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26 ⁷ This program is alternatively referred to as the “Hatchery Production Initiative for Southern Resident Killer
27 Whales.”

28 ⁸ This citation is to the Hatchery Production Initiative for Southern Resident Killer Whales FY20 Report, which was
finalized on January 8, 2021, and which was attached to Plaintiff’s Motion. It and other evidence regarding the site-
specific analysis can be considered by the Court because Plaintiff has challenged the lack of specificity in a
programmatic action that authorized future site-specific actions. *See* 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.

1 cannot jeopardize the survival and recovery of any ESA-listed species, including salmon and
2 steelhead.” *Id.* (emphasis added).

3 Additional specifics relate to Congress’s appropriation of funds for the components of the
4 conservation program. In Fiscal Year 2020, Congress appropriated \$35.5 million to
5 implementation of the 2019 Agreement and directed NMFS to establish a Spend Plan to
6 determine how those funds will be distributed. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. L.
7 No. 116-93, 133 Stat. 2317 (2019); Dkt. No. 43-4 (Rumsey Decl.) ¶¶ 11-12. Consistent with the
8 expectations in the 2019 BiOp, the Spend Plan for 2020 directed \$3.1 million to conservation
9 hatcheries, \$10.4 million to habitat restoration, and \$5.6 million to the prey increase program.
10 Rumsey Decl. ¶ 14. Congress increased the appropriation in Fiscal Year 2021 to \$39.5 million.
11 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, 134 Stat. 1182 (2020); *see also*
12 Ex. B. (Explanatory Statement Regarding the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment to
13 H.R. 133, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021) at H7928. In 2021, \$7.4 million of that
14 funding will be used for the prey increase program. Ex. C (Memorandum to File from Scott. M.
15 Rumsey) at 4. This detailed funding shows more than a “general desire” to make improvements;
16 it “constitute[s] a ‘clear, definite commitment of resources . . . to future improvements.’” *Ctr. for*
17 *Biological Diversity v. Bernhardt*, 982 F.3d 723, 743, 747 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting *Nat’l Wildlife*
18 *Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.*, 524 F.3d 917, 935-6 (9th Cir. 2008)).

19 NMFS also acknowledged in the BiOp that some aspects of the conservation program
20 would be decided in the future. In particular, NMFS understood that its selection of the funding
21 recipients for the second and third parts of the conservation program would be determined each
22 year and that NMFS would perform site-specific ESA and NEPA analysis as needed.⁹ AR 47420,
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28 ⁹ NMFS has completed ESA and NEPA analysis for each of the recipients of 2020 funds, unless those programs were already covered by previous ESA and NEPA analysis. (Purcell Decl.) ¶¶ 11, 21.

1 47427, 47433. NMFS’s approach—which combines concrete mitigation measures that will
2 “address the threats to the species” and future identification of funding recipients—is entirely
3 consistent with a framework programmatic action. *Bernhardt*, 982 F.3d at 743 (citation omitted).

4 Plaintiff’s argument about the conservation program goes awry from the start. Plaintiff
5 contends that NMFS’s management of fisheries has pushed SRKW to “the brink of extinction,”
6 Mot. at 21, yet fishing is only part of the story: approximately 140 SRKW were killed or
7 removed for public display in the 1960s and 1970s, and there are other stressors, such as
8 pollutants, non-fishing vessels such as whale watching boats, and oil spills. AR 47277, 47287-
9 90. Similarly, Plaintiff’s claim about the adverse effect from hatcheries on SRKW critical habitat
10 is taken out of context. Mot. at 21 (quoting AR 47507). Read in full, the sentence in the BiOp
11 states: “During the time it takes for these hatchery fish to return as adults to critical habitat areas,
12 the proposed fishing is likely to adversely affect designated critical habitat.” AR 47507. The first
13 clause is a key qualifier because it indicates that the effect will be offset when the hatchery
14 produced fish grow to maturity in approximately 3-5 years. NMFS added: “larger reductions in
15 prey are not expected to occur in multiple consecutive years or in conjunction with low Chinook
16 abundance in consecutive years during the period before we expect hatchery fish to be available
17 as prey.” *Id.*; see AR 47446-47. These points, combined with the benefits from the prey increase
18 program, supported NMFS’s conclusion that the proposed actions would not destroy or adversely
19 modify critical habitat. AR 47508; see *Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of*
20 *Reclamation*, 143 F.3d 515, 523 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding FWS’s decision that the species
21 “could survive the loss of habitat at Lake Mead for eighteen months until 500 acres could be
22 protected, then survive an additional two years until an additional 500 acres could be protected”).
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1 Plaintiff's argument that the mitigation lacks "specific and binding plans" faces two
2 significant obstacles. Mot. at 22-25. First, it cannot be squared with the evidence discussed
3 above. *See supra* at 12-14. Indeed, Plaintiff brushes aside every detail about the conservation
4 program, ignoring evidence regarding the location of the conservation hatchery programs as well
5 as details on when and where the salmon will be available to SRKW and the types of hatcheries
6 that will be used. AR 47421-27, 47203; *see* Dkt. No. 91-2, Ex. 1. Instead, Plaintiff cherry-picks
7 language from the BiOp to suggest that the mitigation measures are vague. In doing so, Plaintiff
8 conflates future, site-specific funding decisions with the known specifics of the conservation
9 program. *See Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity*, 143 F.3d at 518 (upholding mitigation even
10 though "FWS did not identify specific areas available and suitable for acquisition and
11 restoration"). A closer look at the quoted language, in context, reveals that it either relates to the
12 future funding decisions or another issue.
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15 Second, Plaintiff misapplies the case law. The through-line in the cases cited by Plaintiff
16 is that the mere potential for mitigation measures does not satisfy the ESA. *See Bernhardt*, 982
17 F.3d at 743, 746-47 (stating that "generalized contingencies," "hopeful plans," and "possible
18 strategies" are insufficient); *Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Salazar*, 804 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1004
19 (D. Ariz. 2011) (noting that "promise[s] . . . to develop a plan" or proposals that are "entirely
20 unwritten" are insufficient); *Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Rumsfeld*, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D.
21 Ariz. 2002) (rejecting a "laundry list of possible mitigation"). Yet the conservation program in
22 this case is more than a possible strategy, and therefore it is distinguishable from the mitigation
23 in the cases that Plaintiff cites. In *Bernhardt*, the court rejected mitigation measures proposed by
24 an applicant seeking to construct an offshore drilling and production facility. 982 F.3d at 731,
25 743-47. The four measures involved contacting FWS for guidance if polar bears were detected,
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1 compliance with authorizations under the Marine Mammal Protection Act, possible mitigation
2 measures taken from a generalized list, and plans for operations and polar bear interactions in the
3 event that interactions occur. *Id.* at 743-47. The first two were rejected because they were
4 “unapproved and undefined” and the second two were rejected because they referenced
5 “‘possible’ strategies, without selecting a mitigation measure” and were “offered only as
6 “‘possible’ strategies, without selecting a mitigation measure” and were “offered only as
7 *examples* of possible strategies.” *Id.* By contrast, NMFS’s conservation program here provides a
8 defined plan that embodies a three-part strategy to recover threatened salmon, restore habitat,
9 and increase the prey for SRKW and explains *how* the chosen strategy will work.

10 Neither *Rumsfeld* nor *Salazar* supports Plaintiff’s argument. Mot. at 23-24. In *Rumsfeld*,
11 the court invalidated the BiOp because the mitigation would only be identified *after* the Army
12 developed a resource management plan. 198 F. Supp. 2d at 1153-54. In *Salazar*, the court found
13 the BiOp arbitrary because it relied on a “proposal to develop a ‘targeted mitigation strategy’”
14 that was “entirely unwritten” and noted that the mitigation measures were not “identified [or]
15 included in the BiOp.” 804 F. Supp. 2d at 1004. Here, by contrast, NMFS’s conservation
16 program has identified the specific uses for the funding, described the program and its impacts in
17 the BiOp’s proposed action and effects sections, and developed criteria for the prey program. *See*
18 *Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.*, 807 F.3d 1031, 1046 (9th Cir. 2015).

19 Plaintiff also errs in its attempt to undermine the conservation program based on a lack of
20 deadlines or otherwise-enforceable obligations. Mot. at 23-24. The BiOp explicitly describes the
21 timing for the three parts of the conservation program: the conservation hatchery program will
22 “operate each year for the duration of the [2019] Agreement”; the habitat restoration will be
23 “funded and completed during the first three years of the Agreement”; and the prey increase
24 program will “operate each year” of the Agreement. AR 47202-03. Further, the program is
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1 “included as part of the [action], and so subject to the ESA’s consultation and enforcement
2 provisions.” *Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt.*, 698 F.3d 1101, 1119
3 (9th Cir. 2012). NMFS also made clear that if the funding is not provided or “if the anticipated
4 actions are not otherwise implemented through other means (e.g., non-fishing related restoration
5 activities, other funding sources) this may constitute a modification,” and if so, “reinitiation of
6 consultation would therefore be required.” AR 47203. Here, Plaintiff highlights the word “may,”
7 Mot. at 23, but this overlooks the fact that NMFS would need to analyze any change and ignores
8 the language about reinitiation being “required.”
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10 **2. The Conservation Program Is Reasonably Certain to Occur.**

11 Plaintiff’s misunderstanding of the conservation program undercuts its suggestion that the
12 program’s components are not under NMFS’s control or otherwise reasonably certain to occur.
13 Mot. at 25-27. As an initial matter, NMFS will play a role as the agency determining which
14 entity receives the funding under each part of the program. In that role, NMFS has established
15 criteria for the recipients of the funding for the prey increase program. Dkt. No. 91-2, Ex. 1 at 2.
16 Moreover, the funding initiative is reasonably certain to occur. The best evidence for this is
17 Congress’s appropriation of funds for the program for 2020 and 2021, consistent with the
18 funding expectations in the 2019 BiOp, and the Washington State Legislature’s commitment to
19 provide approximately \$13 million of funding “prioritized to increase prey abundance for
20 southern resident orcas.” *Id.*; *see supra* at 14; *Rock Creek All. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.*, 663
21 F.3d 439, 444 (9th Cir. 2011) (company “has already purchased approximately 273 acres of
22 mitigation land, demonstrating its commitment of resources”).
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26 Plaintiff’s reliance on precedent is misplaced. Mot. at 25. *Sierra Club v. Marsh*, 816 F.2d
27 1376, 1385 (9th Cir. 1987), is distinguishable. There, the action agency relied “only on the
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1 outcome of uncertain litigation to provide replacement habitat” and the consulting agency (FWS)
2 found the conservation measures to be insufficient. *Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity*, 143 F.3d at
3 524 (discussing *Marsh*). Neither of those elements is present here. Likewise, *National Wildlife*
4 *Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Service*, 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D. Or. 2003), does not
5 bear the weight placed on it because there the agency stated that the measures had a “reasonable
6 chance” (rather than a “reasonable certainty”) to be implemented. *Id.* at 1213-14. Moreover,
7 Plaintiff refers to that court’s consideration of the lack of authority and binding agreements, but
8 Plaintiff fails to mention that the court also assigned significance to the unavailability of
9 necessary funding. *Id.* at 1213. Any degree of uncertainty in the funding for the conservation
10 program in this case has greatly diminished with the 2020 and 2021 appropriations.
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13 Plaintiff misses the mark with its argument about the site-specific ESA and NEPA
14 analysis forestalling the hatchery components of the conservation program. Mot. at 25-26.
15 Plaintiff simply ignores the overarching ESA regulations that contemplate site-specific analysis
16 following a programmatic action. 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.02, 402.14(i)(6). The argument also fails to
17 recognize that, as explained in the 2019 BiOp, NMFS will select recipients of the hatchery
18 funding to ensure consistency with both the goals of the conservation program as well as the
19 ESA and NEPA. AR 47433. Indeed, NMFS has established criteria for selecting recipients of the
20 funds under the prey increase program; some of the criteria provide NMFS flexibility in
21 choosing the recipient consistent with the purpose of the program, while criteria 3 states that
22 “[i]ncreased production *cannot* jeopardize the survival and recovery of any ESA-listed species,
23 including salmon and steelhead” and criteria 6 states that “[a]ll increased production must be
24 reviewed under the ESA and NEPA, as applicable, *before* NMFS funding can be used.” Dkt. No.
25 91-2, Ex. 1 at 2 (emphasis added); *see id.* at 5-9 (tables showing programs funded and not funded
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1 in 2020). If a candidate hatchery fails to meet the criteria, a replacement candidate will be
2 selected. Purcell Decl. ¶ 11. Plaintiff also incorrectly assumes that NEPA will be triggered for
3 each site-specific project. Mot. at 27.¹⁰ The trigger for NEPA is a “major Federal action” and
4 some of the projects may not meet this threshold. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).

5 Plaintiff may be dissatisfied with NMFS’s balancing of the needs of the endangered
6 SRKW with the sometimes competing needs of threatened salmon, but this is not grounds for
7 dismantling these pieces of the puzzle. *See Am. Rivers v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.*, No. Civ.
8 96-384-MA, 1997 WL 33797790, at *1 (D. Or. Apr. 3, 1997) (noting that the “agencies are in
9 the unenviable position of having to assess the ‘reasonableness’ and ‘prudence’ of proposed
10 mitigation measures by balancing the needs of the listed Snake River salmon against the
11 competing needs of other threatened species and the needs of resident ecosystems”). NMFS’s
12 conservation program is neither arbitrary nor capricious.

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15 **B. NMFS Rationally Reached a No Jeopardy Decision on SRKW.**

16 Plaintiff attempts to portray NMFS’s decision about SRKW as based on insufficient
17 evidence, Mot. at 27-30, but a full review of the 2019 BiOp’s analysis shows that NMFS
18 thoroughly considered the effects of the proposed actions and provided a rational explanation for
19 its no jeopardy conclusion. AR 47276-90, 47346-59, 47433-49, 47502-8. NMFS’s analysis is
20 cogently summarized in Section 2.7.5. of the BiOp. AR 47502-8. NMFS began by examining the
21 environmental baseline, which includes all of the factors affecting SRKW and all of the fishing
22 activity under the PST. AR 47502-04. NMFS then analyzed the actions against this baseline. AR
23 47504. In terms of the SEAK fisheries, NMFS expects the Chinook salmon harvests to be
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28 ¹⁰ As discussed in greater detail below, the framework conservation program—which Plaintiff describes as a
“massive new federal grant program” for purposes of its NEPA argument and as a “hypothetical” program with
“supposed benefits” for purposes of its ESA argument—did not trigger NEPA. *Contra* Mot. at 26-27.

1 reduced by 7.5% compared to the catch levels under the 2009 Agreement, which will be more
2 than a “very minor improvement[.]” Mot. at 28; AR 47504-05. Yet NMFS estimated that the
3 fisheries would still reduce prey available for SRKW. For the months July through September,
4 the potential reductions range from 1% to 2.5% for inland waters and 0.2% to 12.9% for coastal
5 waters; however, the higher numbers occur when SRKW are typically not in coastal waters, and
6 12.9% occurred in only one year. AR 47505. From October through April, the potential prey
7 reductions in coastal waters would be 0.2% to 1.1%. *Id.* The assessment also included a
8 comparison between the Chinook salmon caught in the SEAK fisheries with the priority stocks
9 for SRKW. “With the exception of the Columbia River salmon stocks, the largest stocks
10 contributing to the SEAK fisheries catch are currently not considered at the top of the priority
11 prey list for SRKWs.” AR 47506.

14 NMFS completed the analysis by incorporating the prey increases anticipated from the
15 conservation program. The program to increase hatchery production will likely produce 4 to 5%
16 more prey in those areas that are most important to SRKW, *i.e.*, inland areas around Puget Sound
17 in the summer and coastal areas in the winter and spring. AR 47506, 47447. This increase “helps
18 to offset some of the reduction in prey abundance.” AR 47506. And it exceeds the reduction in
19 most of the years in NMFS’s retrospective analysis; the only exceptions occur in coastal waters
20 when SRKW are in inland waters. The agency also found that any overlap between relatively
21 large percent reductions and low abundance would be spread out over time, and that habitat
22 actions would also support increased availability of Puget Sound Chinook salmon. AR 47507-08.
23 Weighing all of the evidence, NMFS determined that no jeopardy was likely for SRKW. The
24 agency “articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the conclusions made.”
25 *San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Locke*, 776 F.3d 971, 994 (9th Cir. 2014).
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1 Plaintiff's assertion that NMFS failed to offer a rational explanation on effects to SRKW
2 collapses in the face of this record evidence. *See* Mot. at 28-29.¹¹ First, NMFS was *not* required,
3 as Plaintiff errantly suggests, to base its jeopardy analysis on whether the proposed actions
4 would result in an increase in Chinook abundance of 15%. Mot. at 28-29. The 15% increase in
5 Chinook would be needed to achieve a 2.3 growth rate for recovery as established in NMFS's
6 2008 SRKW Recovery Plan, and not to avoid jeopardy. *See* Barre Decl. ¶ 8. Plaintiff's attempt to
7 conflate the standard by which actions are evaluated in a BiOp with the threshold standards
8 considered in recovery plans is misleading. Under ESA Section 7, the agency evaluates whether
9 an action is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or destroy or adversely
10 modify critical habitat, whereas under ESA Section 4, the agency is required to develop recovery
11 plans which describe management actions necessary for the conservation and survival of the
12 species and that would lead to the delisting of the species under the ESA. *Compare* 16 U.S.C.
13 § 1536(a)(2) *with* 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1). Plaintiff's confusion is further underscored by its
14 strained analogy to *Wild Fish Conservancy v. Salazar*, 628 F.3d 513 (9th Cir. 2010). *See* Mot. at
15 27-29. In that case, the court rejected the agency's no-jeopardy conclusion because it had not
16 explained how a negative population trend in a local bull trout population could *improve* the
17 overall bull trout population. *Wild Fish Conservancy*, 628 F.3d at 528. The court added: "It may
18 be that . . . the decrease in the local population over the five-year period under study would not
19 have an 'appreciable' negative impact . . . [b]ut how it could have a *positive* impact remains
20 unclear." *Id.* at 529. Here, NMFS has not concluded that there will be a positive impact on
21 SRKW population trends; instead, NMFS applied its expertise and decided that the actions are
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28 ¹¹ Plaintiff implies that the NMFS analysis needed to explain how SEAK fisheries and "other west coast fisheries" will affect SRKW, but the BiOp was focused on the SEAK fisheries and other fisheries, which have been consulted upon separately and are part of the environmental baseline. Mot. at 28.

1 not likely to appreciably reduce SRKW survival or recovery. AR 47508. Second, Plaintiff
2 provides a skewed version of the reductions in the SEAK fisheries under the 2019 Agreement.
3 Mot. at 28-29. Plaintiff references only the highest percentage (12.9%), but that number must be
4 placed into context. *Id.*; *see supra* at 21.

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6 Third, Plaintiff misses the mark with its assertions that NMFS failed to explain the 4-5%
7 increase in prey and that it is “unclear” whether NMFS accounted for increased harvests of the
8 prey. Mot. at 30. In order to calculate the prey increase that could result from releasing 20
9 million smolts per year, NMFS relied on three key elements: the list of priority Chinook salmon
10 created by NMFS and WDFW, a list of hatcheries with available capacity, and the Fishery
11 Regulation Assessment Model (FRAM), which is a tool “used by fishery managers to design and
12 evaluate fisheries, and has been used in the past to assess fishery effects on SRKW prey
13 abundance.” AR 37929; *see also* AR 47447, 16334-41. The FRAM allows fishery managers to
14 assess the impact of harvest by linking year-specific stock abundances with catches by fishery
15 and time period. AR 47371. In this specific analysis using FRAM, NMFS modeled all fisheries
16 as rates (as opposed to fixed catch of Chinook salmon) in order to account for additional catch
17 resulting from the expected increases in abundance due to the hatchery production initiative.

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19 Also, Plaintiff’s “crude example” is flawed and fails to advance its argument. *See* Mot. at 29.

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21 The abundance index is determined by more than the raw number of adult fish.

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23 **C. NMFS Evaluated the Effects of the Prey Increase Program and Will Continue to
24 Evaluate Effects Through Site-Specific Consultation.**

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26 Plaintiff assails the BiOp for not analyzing the prey increase program in the integration
27 section on threatened salmon, Mot. at 30-32, but this puts form over substance—NMFS
28 considered the effects on wild fish in other parts of the BiOp and referenced that analysis on the
conservation program in the discussion of Puget Sound Chinook salmon. Plaintiff also assails the

1 BiOp for segmenting consultation, *Id.* at 32-34, but NMFS properly analyzed the broad-scale
2 impacts of the program and determined that it would consider the effects of funded hatcheries on
3 a site-specific basis. *See* 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.

4 In the “Effects of the Actions” section, NMFS analyzed the conservation program
5 (referred to as the “Mitigation Funding Initiative” in the BiOp). AR 47419-33. NMFS recognized
6 that some effects of the program could be described specifically, but that analyzing other effects
7 in detail would require site specific information. AR 47420. As such, NMFS’s analysis “reflects
8 a programmatic level review.” *Id.* Section 2.5.3.3. considered the prey increase program at that
9 level and determined that
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11 at a general level we would expect the effects of this component of the funding
12 initiative to include positive effects to SRKW as described in the next section
13 [2.5.4], and a range of effects from positive to negative on listed Puget Sound
14 Chinook salmon and its designated critical habitat similar to those described above
in Section 2.5.3.1.

15 AR 47433. NMFS noted that it would complete site-specific consultations on the selected
16 hatchery programs using the approach and considerations outlined in Section 2.5.3.1. Thus, in
17 addition to NMFS’s top-level statement, it indicated that it was relying on analysis in the
18 previous and following sections.
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20 In the previous section (2.5.3.1.), NMFS analyzed the potential benefits and risks
21 associated with hatchery-produced fish. AR 47420-27. Here, NMFS relied on a 2018 ESA
22 consultation and summarized that prior analysis, with a focus on the six factors NMFS’ uses
23 when analyzing hatchery programs. AR 47420-21; *see* AR 9838-10434. For example, under
24 Factor 2, NMFS considers the effects of hatchery fish on natural-origin (or wild) fish. AR 47422-
25 25. This analysis included a detailed discussion on the genetic effects of hatchery production,
26 which can range from outbreeding to domestication, as well as the ecological effects. *Id.*
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1 In the following section (2.5.4), NMFS incorporated a discussion on the effects of the
2 hatchery funding on SRKW and wild salmon. AR 47447. NMFS began by noting that hatchery
3 production is a significant component of the salmon prey base returning to watersheds in the
4 SRKW range, and identified the Mitchell Act and Federal Columbia River Power System
5 programs as examples. *Id.*; see AR 13512-656; 22762-64. NMFS added that “hatcheries also
6 pose risks to natural-origin salmon populations” and cited to four studies on the issue. AR 47447
7 (citing AR 45960-66, 44008-18, 41057-63, 40917-1051). Moreover, “hatchery programs are
8 often modifying various program elements to adaptively manage the program in ways that
9 minimize effects on listed species and allow operators to achieve program goals.” AR 47447.
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11 For each of the threatened salmon, NMFS concluded that after reviewing, *inter alia*, the
12 effects of the action, the proposed actions are not likely to appreciably reduce the likelihood of
13 both survival and recovery, and thus incorporated the effects analysis into the jeopardy analysis.
14 AR 47490, 47494, 47497, 47501. Moreover, in the “Integration and Synthesis” section on Puget
15 Sound salmon, NMFS explicitly referred back to its analysis of the conservation program. AR
16 47484-517¹² It explained: “The effects of projects implemented as a result of the third proposed
17 action, the conservation initiative, will be reviewed once the details of the site specific projects
18 are known using the procedures and considerations described in Section 2.5.3. [(“Mitigation
19 Funding Initiative”)] However, we conclude that the adverse effects are likely to be limited. . . .”
20 AR 47500. Some of these effects were discussed in the preceding pages. AR 47498-99.
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22 Much of the agency’s analysis on the impacts of the prey increase program on wild fish
23 occurred in the “Effects” section rather than the “Integration” section, but that does not mean that
24 NMFS failed to consider the prey program in its no-jeopardy determination. *See Locke*, 776 F.3d
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¹² NMFS did not “admit[]” that the no jeopardy opinion did not account for the prey program. Mot. at 31 n.6.

1 at 994 (citation omitted) (“[e]ven when an agency explains its decision with ‘less than ideal
2 clarity,’ a reviewing court will not upset the decision on that account ‘if the agency’s path may
3 be reasonably discerned’”). Taken together, the record evidence belies Plaintiff’s assertion that
4 NMFS ignored the effects of the prey program on threatened salmon. *See* Mot. at 30-32.¹³

5 Plaintiff’s assertion that NMFS “segmented its consultation” also misses the mark. Mot.
6 at 32-34. Rather than segment the consultation, NMFS appropriately consulted at the
7 programmatic level and acknowledged that any necessary site-specific consultation would occur
8 when, and if the specific projects were funded. *See supra*. Plaintiff’s invocation of *Conner v.*
9 *Burford*, 848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988) is off-base. Mot. at 33-34. There, the agency stated that
10 the “action” included “not just final lease issuance but all resulting subsequent activities” yet it
11 did not analyze the impacts on the subsequent activities due to a lack of information. *Conner*,
12 848 F.2d at 1453. By contrast, NMFS’s action here is the framework conservation program; it
13 does *not* cover all resulting subsequent activities. Indeed, NMFS properly indicated that it would
14 consult further, as needed on the future actions. AR 47202-03; *see* Purcell Decl. ¶¶ 10-12. Thus,
15 this case is more like *Cabinet Mountain Wilderness v. Peterson*, 685 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
16 in which FWS’s BiOp detailed the effects of the program and the court emphasized that “[a]ny
17 future proposals . . . to conduct drilling activities in the Cabinet Mountains area will require
18 further scrutiny under . . . the ESA.” 685 F.2d at 687.

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22 **D. The Incidental Take Statement for SRKW Complies With the ESA.**

23 An ITS establishes a permissible level of “takings that result from, but are not the
24 purpose of, carrying out an otherwise lawful activity.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. In the BiOp, NMFS
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28 ¹³ NMFS’ “not likely to adversely affect” determinations were made against the backdrop of the agency’s broad-scale analysis of the prey increase program earlier in the BiOp described above, and the agency is considering any adverse effects in its site-specific analysis. *Contra* Mot. at 31.

1 used the annual level of Chinook salmon catch in the SEAK fishery as a surrogate for measuring
2 the incidental take for SRKW. AR 47519. Plaintiff challenges this level of take because it is
3 coextensive with the action. Mot. at 35. But in 2015, NMFS and FWS explained that even where
4 surrogates are “fully coextensive with the *anticipated* impacts of the project” they are
5 appropriate triggers if “the surrogate nevertheless provides a meaningful reinitiation trigger
6 consistent with the purposes of an [ITS].” 80 Fed. Reg. at 26,834 (emphasis in original). Here, if
7 the annual catch exceeds the allowed amount, then reinitiation would be triggered.
8

9 **E. NMFS Satisfied Its Substantive Obligations to Ensure Against Jeopardy.**

10 Plaintiff asserts that NMFS (as the action agency) violated ESA Section 7 by relying on
11 the BiOp, Mot. at 35, but this argument is premised on the mistaken conclusions about the BiOp.
12 Here, NMFS’s BiOp represented a thorough and reasoned analysis of the proposed actions and
13 their effects as measured against the baseline. *See supra; Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians*
14 *v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy*, 898 F.2d 1410, 1415 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the action agency
15 did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in its reliance on a valid BiOp). Moreover, “even when
16 the [BiOp] is based on ‘admittedly weak’ information, another agency’s reliance on that opinion
17 will satisfy its obligations under the Act if a challenging party can point to no ‘new’
18 information—*i.e.*, information the Service did not take into account—which challenges the
19 opinion’s conclusions.” *Pyramid Lake*, 898 F.2d at 1415. Plaintiff has not put forth any new
20 information NMFS did not take into account. Thus, NMFS satisfied its substantive duty.
21
22
23

24 **F. NMFS Complied with NEPA.**

25 The first part of Plaintiff’s NEPA argument—that NMFS failed to complete NEPA on the
26 ITS—is built on a subtle, yet critical misinterpretation of the action at issue in this case and a
27 misreading of *Ramsey v. Kantor*, 96 F.3d 434 (9th Cir. 1996). Mot. at 35-37. The second part of
28

1 its NEPA argument—that NMFS was required to complete NEPA on one part of the
2 conservation program—relies on a flawed application of the statute to the facts. Mot. at 37-39.

3 **1. The ITS in this Case Did Not Trigger NEPA.**

4 According to Plaintiff, this case is on all fours with *Ramsey*. Mot. at 36. But a closer look
5 at *Ramsey* shows that the comparison is inapt. *Ramsey* involved three types of salmon that spawn
6 in the Snake River. 96 F.3d at 437. After these salmon are born, they migrate to the Pacific
7 Ocean and return 2 to 5 years later. *Id.* at 438. During the journey, the salmon come under a
8 “bewildering array of agencies and legal regimes.” *Id.* When the salmon are in the ocean, the
9 harvest of salmon is governed by the MSA, and the Secretary of Commerce is charged with
10 ensuring the Regional Fishery Management Councils that oversee the fishing in federal waters
11 abide by the MSA. *Id.* When the salmon re-enter the rivers, which are not governed by the MSA,
12 the harvest is supervised by the Columbia River Fish Management Plan, which is a “unique,
13 judicially created, federal-state-tribal compact that controls, through a consent decree, the rules
14 and regulations governing fishing allocations and rights of harvest.” *Id.* This Plan “apportions the
15 fishing rights to the state and tribal members.” *Id.* The states then enact regulations governing
16 fishing in the Columbia River, and “absent regulations promulgated by Oregon and Washington,
17 most fishing could not occur in the relevant area of the Columbia River.” *Id.* at 438, 442. In
18 *Ramsey*, NMFS had prepared a BiOp on the “full range of salmon fisheries that may affect” the
19 salmon in the rivers, and prepared an ITS that “serves as the authorizing document.” *Id.* at 439.

20 The relevant fishery action in this case is distinct. The action here is NMFS’s ongoing
21 *delegation* of fishery management authority *in the federal waters* to the State of Alaska pursuant
22 to *the MSA* whereas the action in *Ramsey* was the *apportionment* of fishing rights *in state waters*
23 to the state and tribal members under the *unique compact* created through a consent decree.
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1 Moreover, unlike *Ramsey*, if NMFS had not delegated to Alaska the authority to manage fishing
2 in federal waters, the fishing could be managed by the NPFMC and NMFS under the MSA.
3 These are distinctions with a difference because the authority to fish in the federal waters in
4 SEAK flows from the MSA and not from the ITS. The flaw in Plaintiff’s analogy between this
5 case and *Ramsey* is evident from Plaintiff’s suggestion that “[l]ike the Pacific Salmon Treaty, the
6 [Columbia River Fish Management] plan did not directly regulate fisheries.” Mot. at 35-36. But
7 NMFS was not consulting on the PST’s regulation of fishing; it was consulting on the delegation
8 of management authority under the MSA. AR 47198; *see* AR 47518 (the PST Agreement “does
9 not itself authorize the conduct of any fishery”).
10

11
12 Plaintiff contends that the *Ramsey* ruling is based in part on the idea that there will be “no
13 downstream federal agency to complete an EIS,” Mot. at 36 (quoting *Jewell*, 747 F.3d at 644),
14 but here there was a federal agency—NMFS—to complete NEPA analysis on the MSA
15 delegation. A look at the record shows that NMFS completed not only the 2003 EIS on salmon
16 fisheries referenced by Plaintiff, but also a 2012 EA in connection with Amendment 12 to the
17 Salmon FMP. AR 47912-8524, 47632-901. The 2012 EA considered the impacts of the ongoing
18 delegation and included analysis of NMFS’s 2008 BiOp on the delegation to Alaska and
19 accompanying ITS. AR 47797-825. The 2008 BiOp had examined the impact of the delegation
20 on species such as SRKW. AR 343-61; 399-402.
21

22
23 Plaintiff cannot salvage the analogy to *Ramsey* by reference to the 2003 EIS. Mot. at 36.
24 The quoted language in Plaintiff’s brief referred to a different part of the *Ramsey* decision that
25 examined a claim that NMFS was required to conduct NEPA analysis on the ocean salmon
26 fishing that took place in the territory under the jurisdiction of the NPFMC, which is the federal
27 waters of SEAK. *Ramsey*, 96 F.3d at 444-45. The court determined that NMFS’s review of the
28

1 delegated authority to Alaska constituted a major federal action. *Id.* at 445. Thus, NMFS’s EIS
2 referred to *Ramsey* in the section on SEAK. AR 47952-53.¹⁴ Plaintiff compounds the misreading
3 by skipping over the EIS’s reference to *Ramsey* in a separate section on Columbia River Basin
4 fisheries, which states: “In *Ramsey v. Kantor*, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, *with*
5 *respect to the Columbia River basin fisheries*, the issuance of an ITS is a major federal action
6 requiring NEPA compliance.” AR 47955 (emphasis added). This reference to an ITS as a major
7 federal action is expressly tied to the very specific circumstances in the part of *Ramsey* that
8 analyzed the Columbia River Fish Management Plan. *See Grand Canyon Tr. v. U.S. Bureau of*
9 *Reclamation*, No. CV-07-8164-PHX-DGC, 2011 WL 1211602, at *11 (D. Ariz. Mar. 30, 2011)
10 (“*Ramsey*’s holding has been construed narrowly”). The decision in *Ramsey* regarding the
11 Columbia River Fish Management Plan does not apply in these circumstances.¹⁵
12
13

14 2. NMFS’ Conservation Program Did Not Trigger NEPA.

15 Plaintiff asserts that the first and third parts of the conservation program are major federal
16 actions subject to NEPA, but the argument is based on a misapplication of the statute and case
17 law.¹⁶ Mot. at 26-27; 37-39. First, Plaintiff contends that this hatchery production constitutes
18 “massive new federal funding,” Mot. at 26, but characterizing funding as “massive” does not
19 make it “major” for purposes of NEPA. Plaintiff’s reference to *State of Alaska v. Andrus*, 591
20 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1979), is a thin reed on which to rest its argument. The *Andrus* court stated
21 that “[m]ost courts agree that significant federal funding turns what would otherwise be a local
22 project into a major federal action,” *id.* at 540 (citing *Homeowners Emergency Life Prot. Comm.*
23
24
25

26 ¹⁴ This section of *Ramsey* did not mention an ITS, and so the EIS reference to the ITS was in error.

27 ¹⁵ This analysis applies to NMFS acting in its role as the action agency. It is well-established that where NMFS acts
as the consulting agency, an ITS is not a major federal action that triggers NEPA. *Jewell*, 747 F.3d at 642-43.

28 ¹⁶ Plaintiff does not argue that NEPA applied to the habitat restoration, which is the second part of the conservation
program. Moreover, the second proposed action—the grants to Alaska—are categorically excluded under NEPA.
See Ex. D (Memorandum for the Record from Stephanie Coleman, June 21, 2019) at 3.

1 v. *Lynn*, 541 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam)); however, there was no federal funding at
2 issue in *Andrus*, and the *Homeowners* case it cited involved \$33.2 million in federal funds, which
3 today would be the equivalent of \$155 million. 541 F.2d at 816; see <https://www.inflationtool.com/us-dollar/1976-to-present-value?amount=33200000> (last visited May 26, 2021). The level
4 of funding here is different in degree and does not rise to the level of a major federal action.
5

6
7 Second, Plaintiff wrongly asserts that the decision in *Jewell* applies with equal force to
8 this case. Mot. at 37-39. In *Jewell*, the consulting agency issued a jeopardy opinion that
9 contained reasonable and prudent alternatives that the action agency should take to avoid
10 jeopardy. 747 F.3d at 592; see 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.14(h)(1)(iv)-(2), 402.02. The implementation of
11 those alternatives constituted a major federal action. *Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine*
12 *Fisheries Serv.*, 184 F. Supp. 3d 861, 935, 947 (D. Or. 2016). The circumstances here are
13 distinct. There is no jeopardy opinion, and thus no reasonable and prudent alternatives that, if not
14 implemented, would expose NMFS to liability to take under Section 9. *Contra* Mot. at 38. Rather
15 than adopting and implementing a BiOp's reasonable and prudent alternatives, NMFS, as the
16 action agency, developed a framework conservation program that included hatchery production;
17 this proposed action was a direct result of implementation of the 2019 Agreement. AR 47193-94.
18

19
20 Finally, the Court should reject Plaintiff's suggestion that any subsequent NEPA process
21 by NMFS for the site-specific programs would "simply 'rationalize or justify decisions [it]
22 already made.'" Mot. at 40 (citing *Metcalf v. Daley*, 214 F.3d 1135, 1143-45 (9th Cir. 2000);
23 *Env't Def. Fund, Inc. v. Andrus (EDF)*, 596 F.2d 848, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1979)). Plaintiff's
24 position is grounded on the theory that NMFS has made an irreversible commitment of
25 resources, Mot. at 39, yet that is not accurate—NMFS has only decided on a decision to fund the
26 program, and if any individual candidate hatchery fails to meet the criteria or site-specific NEPA
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1 analysis indicates an alternative would be preferable, then another candidate will be selected.

2 Neither *Metcalf* nor *EDF* alters the outcome of the analysis. In *Metcalf*, NOAA did not complete
3 an EA related to its proposal to the International Whaling Commission on behalf of a tribe until
4 after NOAA had entered into an agreement with the tribe. *Metcalf*, 214 F.3d at 1144. Because of
5 this timing, the agency had made an irreversible commitment of resources prior to completing
6 the EA. Similarly, in *EDF*, the Department of the Interior developed a marketing program and
7 executed contracts before a NEPA analysis. 596 F.2d at 851. NMFS's approach to the funding of
8 the hatcheries here did not violate NEPA. And in the time since the BiOp was issued, NMFS has
9 engaged in NEPA analysis for all of the hatcheries receiving funding from the prey increase
10 program in FY 2020 that were not already covered. Purcell Decl. ¶¶ 11, 21.

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12
13 **III. If the Court Finds a Violation, the Proper Remedy is Remand without Vacatur, and**
14 **Plaintiff Has Failed to Demonstrate that the Prey Program Aimed to Benefit SRKW**
15 **Should Be Enjoined.**

16 Although Defendants have fully satisfied all of their statutory obligations, should the
17 Court conclude that Defendants have failed to fully comply with the ESA or NEPA, it should
18 remand the matter to the agency to fix any errors, not vacate the Biological Opinion. Mot. at 40-
19 43. Also, Plaintiff has failed to meet the burden for a permanent injunction. *Id.* at 43-45.

20 **A. Vacatur is not Warranted in this Case.**

21 “Although the district court has power to do so, it is not required to set aside every
22 unlawful agency action.” *Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Espy*, 45 F.3d 1337, 1343 (9th Cir. 1995). When
23 equity demands, the action “can be left in place while the agency follows the necessary
24 procedures.” *Idaho Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt*, 58 F.3d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1995).
25 “Whether agency action should be vacated depends on how serious the agency's errors are and
26 the disruptive consequences of an interim change that may itself be changed.” *Cal. Cmty.*
27
28

1 *Against Toxics v. U.S. EPA*, 688 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2012). Courts also look to “whether the
2 agency would likely be able to offer better reasoning” on remand. *Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal. v. U.S.*
3 *EPA*, 966 F.3d 893, 929 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). The Court retains this discretion with
4 ESA claims. *All. for the Wild Rockies v. Savage*, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1155 (D. Mont. 2019).

5 Plaintiff seeks to vacate the Biological Opinion yet fails to identify “serious” errors. *See*
6 *supra*; *Nat’l Fam. Farm*, 966 F.3d at 929 (“EPA’s error—failing to consider harm to monarch
7 butterflies caused by killing target milkweed—is not ‘serious’”). Nor has Plaintiff shown that
8 NMFS would be unlikely to offer better reasoning on remand. Moreover, vacatur of the BiOp
9 would have significant disruptive consequences to the implementation of a conservation program
10 aimed at protecting endangered SRKW and threatened Chinook salmon. Barre Decl. ¶¶ 11-14.
11 For example, NMFS could not continue implementing the habitat restoration and prey increase
12 programs thereby harming the very interests Plaintiff purports to champion. *Id.* at ¶¶ 12, 14
13 (“Disruptions could affect the long-term support and commitment needed to fund this program
14 and provide benefits to SRKW over the next decade and could negatively impact the critical
15 partnerships and momentum for recovery and conservation of SRKW and salmon.”). In similar
16 circumstances, courts have chosen not to vacate agency actions under the ESA where it would
17 “remove beneficial measures which even [p]laintiffs acknowledge provide some protection for
18 the species.” *Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.*, 839 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1129
19 (D. Or. 2011); *see also Native Fish Soc’y v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.*, No. 3:12-CV-00431-
20 HA, 2014 WL 1030479, at *3 (D. Or. Mar. 14, 2014) (“In addition to the fact that vacatur would
21 potentially cause serious harm to the species in the near term, vacatur would also be disruptive to
22 the future operation of the Sandy Hatchery by potentially eliminating the possibility of collecting
23 future broodstock, and to the short-term interests of amici in a sport and harvest fishery.”).
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1 **B. Enjoining the Prey Increase Program is Improper.**

2 An injunction is “a drastic and extraordinary remedy, which should not be granted as a
3 matter of course.” *Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms*, 561 U.S. 139, 165 (2010). And here,
4 Plaintiff has failed to carry its burden on all four injunctive relief factors. *Cottonwood Env’t L.*
5 *Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 789 F.3d 1075, 1088 (9th Cir. 2015). There is considerable tension, if
6 not an outright inconsistency, between Plaintiff’s asserted injury in this case and its request for
7 permanent injunctive relief. Plaintiff has clearly taken the position that it does not seek to enjoin
8 any fishery. Ex. E (Plaintiff’s counsel stated that the Conservancy “is not seeking an injunction
9 against a fishery.”). Instead, Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the prey increase program, despite the fact
10 that Plaintiff contends that it has an interest in the health of SRKW and its experts opine that
11 prey abundance is the single most limiting factor for the health of these whales. Giles Decl. ¶ 11
12 (“There is no question that the Southern Resident killer whales, under existing conditions, are not
13 getting enough food to eat throughout their entire range. Without an increase in the abundance of
14 Chinook, not only will NFMS’ population growth goal not be met, but this population will likely
15 go extinct.”). Plaintiff’s position does not make any sense. Barre Decl. ¶ 12 (“Plaintiff’s
16 declarants assert that prey abundance has the largest impact on the population growth rate of
17 SRKW and that increases in prey abundance are needed for SRKW to recover, and yet enjoining
18 or disrupting the prey increase program would result in reduced future abundance of prey for
19 SRKW.”). It is axiomatic that injunctive relief must redress the asserted injury; here there is a
20 disconnect. *Salazar v. Buono*, 559 U.S. 700, 718 (2010) (“A court must find prospective relief
21 that fits the remedy to the wrong or injury that has been established.”).

22 Further, the requested injunction would compound Plaintiff’s own asserted irreparable
23 harm. Barre Decl. ¶ 14. NMFS spent a great deal of time thoughtfully developing the prey
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1 increase program through programmatic and site-specific analyses, Congress has now
2 consistently appropriated significant sums of money for the program, and current implementation
3 is increasing the prey base while responsibly balancing the effects on wild fish. Purcell Decl. ¶¶
4 19-21. Enjoining NMFS’s efforts is anathema to the health of SRKW. *Defs. of Wildlife v. U.S.*
5 *Army Corps of Eng’rs*, 730 F. App’x 413, 415-16 (9th Cir. 2018) (reversing the district court’s
6 irreparable harm findings where the project was designed to aid in recovery of the species).
7

8 Finally, Plaintiff’s generalized assertions of harm to wild fish are wholly inadequate.
9 Mot. at 44. Plaintiff’s expert failed to evaluate the site-specific analyses performed by NMFS to
10 ensure that the prey increase program is not likely to jeopardize listed species.¹⁷ Moreover,
11 Plaintiff’s expert makes the fundamental and incorrect assumption that all hatchery production
12 will return to the same location. Purcell Decl. ¶ 18. In developing the prey increase program,
13 NMFS carefully balanced the needs of SRKW, while ensuring that effects from the program are
14 not likely to jeopardize wild fish. This is far cry from irreparable harm. Purcell Decl. ¶ 21. And
15 to the extent the Court balances the equities, when there are two listed species at issue in a case,
16 the Court should defer to NMFS as the agency charged by Congress to administer the ESA. *Nw.*
17 *Env’t Def. Ctr. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs*, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1315 (D. Or. 2011)
18 (deferring to NMFS in the context of a preliminary injunction).
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21 CONCLUSION

22 For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant Defendants’ Cross-Motion for
23 Summary Judgment and deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
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27 ¹⁷ Ignoring relevant analyses and data is a basis to strike the Declaration of Dr. Luikart, or at the very least, it goes to
28 the weight of his testimony. *Abarca v. Franklin Cnty. Water Dist.*, 761 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1054, 1069, 1073 (E.D.
Cal. 2011) (“Many cases decided under *Daubert* have excluded opinion testimony from experts who ignored facts or
considerations that must be considered under methods based on reliable principles.”).

1 Dated: May 26, 2021

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on May 26, 2021, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington by using the CM/ECF system, which will serve a copy of the same on the counsel of record.

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HONORABLE MICHELLE L. PETERSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

WILD FISH CONSERVANCY,

Plaintiff,

v.

BARRY THOM, *et al.*,

Defendants.

and

ALASKA TROLLERS ASSOCIATION,
and STATE OF ALASKA,

Defendant-Intervenors.

Case No. 2:20-cv-00417-RAJ-MLP

DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR ALASKA
TROLLERS ASSOCIATION'S CROSS-
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
RESPONSE

Noting Date: June 16, 2021

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

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1 **I. MOTION**

2 Plaintiff Wild Fish Conservancy’s (“WFC”) motion for summary judgment (“WFC
3 MSJ”) (Dkt. No. 91), which requests that the Court vacate the National Marine Fisheries
4 Service’s (“NMFS”) 2019 Southeast Alaska Biological Opinion (“2019 SEAK BiOp”) and
5 Incidental Take Statement (“ITS”) that authorize commercial salmon fisheries in southeast
6 Alaska and enjoin the hatchery production discussed in the 2019 SEAK BiOp, is without merit
7 and should be denied. Defendant-Intervenor Alaska Trollers Association (“ATA”) hereby cross-
8 moves for summary judgment and submits that WFC does not have standing to support its
9 substantive Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) claim that the 2019 BiOp was not in accordance
10 with law or violated the ESA with respect to the impact of the southeast Alaska (“SEAK”) troll
11 fishery on the population of the southern resident killer whale (“SRKW”).

12 Pursuant to this Court’s Chamber Procedures, the ATA conferred with Federal
13 Defendants, Defendant-Intervenor State of Alaska, and WFC over telephone and email between
14 May 20, 2021 and May 25, 2021. Federal Defendants do not oppose the ATA motion,
15 Defendant-Intervenor State of Alaska joins the ATA motion, and WFC opposes the ATA
16 motion. In addition to opposing WFC’s motion and submitting this cross-motion, the ATA
17 generally joins in the arguments submitted by both Federal Defendants and Defendant-Intervenor
18 State of Alaska.

19 **II. INTRODUCTION**

20 **A. The Alaska Trollers Association.**

21 The ATA, organized nearly a century ago in 1925, is a non-profit commercial trade
22 organization based in Juneau, Alaska. Daugherty Decl. (Dkt. No. 35), ¶ 2. The ATA is currently
23 composed of over 400 members that rely on the southeast Alaska salmon troll fishery for their
24 economic livelihood. Daugherty Decl., ¶ 2. The ATA and its members rely on the sustainability
25 of multiple species of salmon, including the Chinook. Daugherty Decl., ¶ 5. Thus, the ATA
26 serves the dual purposes of protecting the Alaska troll fishery and supporting sound management

1 and conservation of salmon. Daugherty Decl., ¶ 5. The Alaska troll salmon fishery is the second
2 largest fleet in Alaska—composed of more than 1,000 individual permit holders operating each
3 year. Olson Decl. (Dkt. No. 39), ¶ 14. The majority of those permit holders are family-owned
4 businesses and more than 80 percent of them reside in southeast Alaska. Olson Decl., ¶¶ 14-15.
5 Typically, the communities throughout southeast Alaska rely heavily on the commercial fishing
6 industry. Olson Decl., ¶ 18. That reliance is currently heightened as the ongoing COVID-19
7 pandemic has significantly impaired the tourism industry in southeast Alaska. Olson Decl., ¶ 16;
8 Alaska Trollers’ Brief in Opposition to Prelim Inj. (Dkt. No. 33), 3. In this matter, WFC
9 threatens closure of the SEAK troll fishery by requesting that the 2019 SEAK BiOp and
10 accompanying ITS be vacated in order to prevent the SRKW population from starving. *See* WFC
11 MSJ, 42. That attempt relies on an overstatement of the relationship between the SEAK troll
12 fishery and the SRKW. The consequences of WFC’s desired outcome would be detrimental to
13 the communities of southeast Alaska while providing only negligible benefits to the SRKW
14 population.

15 **B. Legal Framework.**

16 The subject of this cross-motion and response is WFC’s standing for its substantive ESA
17 claim regarding NMFS’s no-jeopardy finding concerning the SRKW. Accordingly, the relevant
18 legal standards for standing and jeopardy are discussed below.

19 **1. The Endangered Species Act.**

20 Section 7 of the ESA requires that “[e]ach Federal agency shall...insure that any action
21 authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency... is not likely to jeopardize the continued
22 existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
23 modification” of critical habitat for such species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). “Agencies proposing
24 actions that may affect an ESA-listed species must consult with either the NMFS or the FWS—
25 depending on the species involved—which then reviews the proposed action and prepares a
26 ‘biological opinion’ (‘BiOp’) that evaluates whether and the extent to which the action may

1 impact the species.” *Turtle Island Restoration Network v. United States Dep't of Commerce*, 878
2 F.3d 725, 730 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)). If an action is not likely to jeopardize
3 a species but may nevertheless result in incidental take of a listed a species, the consulting
4 agency may permit that take, via an Incidental Take Statement published with the BiOp, ensuring
5 that it does not violate the take prohibition of Section 9 of the ESA. *See* 16 U.S.C.
6 § 1536(b)(4)(i-iv); *Id.* § 1536(o)(2).

7 **2. Legal Standard for Standing.**

8 “A plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he or she seeks to press and for
9 each form of relief sought.” *Washington Envtl. Council v. Bellon*, 732 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir.
10 2013). Generally, a plaintiff must satisfy three requirements to establish Article III standing.
11 *Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992). A
12 plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate that “(1) it has suffered an injury in fact that is (a)
13 concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the
14 injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed
15 to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by favorable decision.” *Friends of the*
16 *Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.*, 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, 120 S. Ct. 693, 145 L.
17 Ed. 2d 610 (2000). An association or organization will have standing to bring a suit on behalf of
18 its members “if its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the
19 interests at stake are germane to the organization’s purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor
20 the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” *Id.* at 181.

21 “The precise manner and degree of evidence required to demonstrate standing will vary
22 according to the stage of litigation.” *United States v. JP Morgan Chase Bank Account*, 835 F.3d
23 1159, 1164 (9th Cir. 2016). “[G]eneral factual allegations of injury resulting from the
24 defendant’s conduct may suffice” at the pleading stage. *Defs. of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. at 561. In
25 response to a summary judgment motion, a plaintiff “must ‘set forth’ by affidavit or other
26 evidence, ‘specific facts,’ which for purposes of the summary judgment will be taken to be true.”

1 *Id.* (quoting FRCP 56(e)); *see also Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA*, 568 U.S. 398, 407-12, 133 S.
2 Ct. 1138, 185 L. Ed. 2d 264 (2013) (plaintiff was required to set forth specific facts at the
3 summary judgment stage when both parties moved for summary judgment). Lastly, any disputed
4 facts regarding standing “must be supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial.” *Id.*

5 A plaintiff’s burden will also vary depending on the nature of the claims presented.
6 Standing may be “substantially more difficult to establish” if the plaintiff is not “the object of the
7 government action or inaction” being challenged. *Summers v. Earth Island Inst.*, 555 U.S. 488,
8 493-94, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2009) (citing *Defs. of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. at 562). In the
9 context of procedural claims, the standing “requirements are relaxed.” *WildEarth Guardians v.*
10 *U.S. Dep’t of Agric.*, 795 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2015).

11 III. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

12 A. Pacific Salmon Treaty.

13 The management framework at issue implicates the Pacific Salmon Treaty between the
14 United States and Canada, first ratified in 1985. AR 47194. The Treaty has been renegotiated in
15 1999, 2009, and most recently in 2019. AR 47194-95. Treaty negotiations have repeatedly
16 resulted in lowered harvest levels for southeast Alaska fisheries—the 2019 Treaty reduced
17 harvest by 7.5 percent after the 2009 Treaty reduced harvests by 15 percent. Lyons Decl. (Dkt.
18 No. 34), ¶¶ 10, 27-30.

19 B. 2019 SEAK BiOp.

20 The 2019 SEAK BiOp was issued after NMFS consulted on three federal actions. First,
21 NMFS reinitiated consultation on the delegation of management authority over the salmon troll
22 fishery and the sport salmon fishery in the SEAK Exclusive Economic Zone to the State of
23 Alaska.¹ AR 47198. Second, NMFS consulted concerning federal funding that NMFS may, in its

24 _____
25 ¹ The management authority was delegated to the State of Alaska from the North Pacific Fishery Management
26 Council in 1999, and Alaska is required to manage the fisheries in the SEAK Exclusive Economic Zone consistent
with a Fish Management Plan, the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the Pacific Salmon Treaty, the ESA, and more.
AR 47196, 47198.

1 discretion, disburse through grants to Alaska to “monitor and manage salmon fisheries in State
2 and federal waters to meet the obligations of the PST through 2028.” AR 47198. The third action
3 was funding for a conservation program for critical prey for the SRKWs—a hatchery prey
4 increase program. AR 47201-02. The 2019 SEAK BiOp concluded that none of the actions
5 would jeopardize the continued existence of the SRKWs or the listed salmon that the whales
6 depend on. AR 47508. Accompanying that no jeopardy conclusion, NMFS issued an ITS that, as
7 relevant to this case, permitted the actions at issue to result in incidental take of Chinook Salmon
8 and SRKWs.² AR 47518-19.

9 **C. Wild Fish Conservancy Claims.**

10 Plaintiff, WFC, is a Washington State non-profit organization. Beardslee Decl. (Dkt. No.
11 91-6), ¶ 2. WFC asserts four claims and requests that this Court vacate the 2019 SEAK BiOp and
12 accompanying ITS. WFC MSJ, 40. In the claim that is the primary subject of this cross-motion
13 and response, WFC alleges that NMFS violated section 7 of the ESA because it did not
14 adequately ensure that delegation of authority to Alaska would not jeopardize the SRKW. WFC
15 MSJ, 12, 27. In that claim, WFC calls into question the BiOp conclusion that, as summarized by
16 WFC, “the Southeast Alaska salmon harvest, along with other west coast fisheries, are not likely
17 to jeopardize Southern Residents.” WFC MSJ, 28. *See also* AR 47508 (“[I]t is NMFS’ biological
18 opinion that the proposed actions are not likely to appreciably reduce the likelihood of both
19 survival and recovery of Southern Resident killer whales....”). Thus, WFC seeks to vacate the
20 2019 SEAK BiOp and ITS that allow the SEAK troll fishery to operate, thereby shutting down
21 the fishery. *See* WFC MSJ, 40. WFC also claims that NMFS did not adequately assess whether
22 the hatchery prey increase program would jeopardize listed salmonids, WFC MSJ, 12, 30; the
23 2019 SEAK BiOp is arbitrary and capricious for improperly relying on uncertain mitigation

24 _____
25 ² Although the State of Alaska manages the commercial troll fishery in federal and state waters as a single unit,
26 AR 00515, only the summer season of the SEAK troll fishery takes place in the federal waters of the Exclusive
Economic Zone, AR 00540-41. Therefore, at the very least, WFC’s attempt to vacate the ITS directly implicates the
summer troll fishery.

1 factors, WFC MSJ, 12, 21; and NMFS did not undertake the environmental review required by
2 NEPA, WFC MSJ, 12, 35.

3 **D. Southern Resident Killer Whale Population.**

4 Central to WFC's claims is the status of the endangered SRKW. The record reflects, and
5 WFC's own expert acknowledges, that "the current small size of the SKRW population was not
6 caused by lack of salmon," but, rather, it is "due in large part to the legacy of unsustainable live-
7 capture fishery for display in aquariums." AR 29608. The record also reflects that the SRKW
8 population needs to achieve a 2.3 percent growth rate to eventually be delisted. AR 38558. The
9 primary threats to the SRKW population are Chinook prey availability, vessel noise and
10 disturbance, and persistent chemical contamination. AR 29604. Multiple threats must be
11 addressed in order to achieve the desired growth rate for the population. AR 29605-06. With
12 respect to prey availability, the record acknowledges "many potential reasons why not all
13 foregone Chinook salmon catch would be available to SRKW." AR 38564. Those reasons
14 include, in part, other predators of Chinook salmon, the fact that harvests are not exclusively of
15 those stocks most important to SRKW, and low ocean harvest rates of Chinook salmon.
16 AR 38563. Thus, the link between prey availability and the SRKW population is not as concrete
17 and linear as WFC implies. *See* Tienson Decl. (Dkt. No. 42), Ex. A, p. 84; Schindler Decl. (Dkt.
18 No. 36), ¶ 8.i. The manner in which the SEAK troll fishery affects prey availability and the
19 SRKW population is even less certain. With the exception of the Columbia River brights that
20 have relatively large run sizes, the [SRKW's] priority stocks are not a high proportion of the
21 SEAK fisheries catch. AR 47508. The 2019 SEAK BiOp determined that the most important
22 stocks to the SRKWs, Puget Sound Chinook salmon and lower Columbia River fall stocks, make
23 up roughly 2 to 3 percent of the total southeast Alaska fishery catch and that catch is "a relatively
24 lower proportion of the total run size of those stocks." AR 47506.

1 **E. WFC’s Alleged Standing Regarding SRKW.**

2 In its motion for summary judgment, WFC attempts to cure the defects of its standing
3 arguments during the preliminary injunction briefing with an additional set of declarations. *See*
4 WFC MSJ, 46. The declarations submitted by WFC purport to include the “magic words” that
5 will satisfy the standing requirements. First, WFC alleges that the health of the SRKW
6 population is “germane” to its organizational purposes. WFC MSJ, 46; 2nd Beardslee Decl.,
7 ¶¶ 8-10. Second, WFC submits member declarations that allege injuries related to the health of
8 SRKW population. One member, William John McMillan, asserts that one of his goals in life,
9 seeing an SRKW, remains unfulfilled. 2nd McMillan Decl. (Dkt. No. 91-7), ¶ 7. As alleged by
10 McMillan, if the SRKW “population[] increased, [his] chance of seeing one would increase.”
11 2nd McMillan Decl., ¶ 7. Another member, Peter W. Soverel, expressed the enjoyment he gets
12 from seeing SRKWs at his home or on his annual trip to the San Juan Islands. 2nd Soverel Decl.
13 (Dkt No. 91-8), ¶¶ 14-15. In the words of Soverel, he fears there will be “a time in the near
14 future” when he will no longer be able to see SRKWs, and if the SRKW “populations
15 recovered,” [he] could enjoy them more.” 2nd Soverel Decl., ¶¶ 15-16. Therefore, with respect to
16 SRKWs, the gist of the injury alleged by WFC is that if there were more SRKWs, its members
17 would be able to see them and enjoy them more in the wild. Here, WFC asserts that that injury
18 will be redressed by shutting down the SEAK troll fishery.

19 In addition to the member declarations, WFC also submits declarations of two experts
20 retained by WFC to explain the connection between prey availability and the SRKW population.
21 *See* Giles Decl. (Dkt. No. 91-3) and 2nd Lacy Decl. (Dkt. No. 91-4). While Dr. Giles explains
22 that it would be “impossible” for the SRKW to achieve an average growth rate of 2.3 percent
23 without an increase in prey availability, she does not conclude that increasing prey is, alone,
24 sufficient to reach the desired growth rate. Giles Decl., ¶ 10. In his declaration, Dr. Lacy
25 acknowledges a recent report that identified Chinook abundance as the largest threat the SRKW
26 population but found that “relationships of Southern Resident Killer Whale birth and death rates

1 to Chinook abundance ... are weaker than had been reported previously.” 2nd Lacy Decl., ¶ 6.f.
2 Dr. Lacy, concludes that, due to those weaker relationships, *more* actions are needed to increase
3 Chinook availability. 2nd Lacy Decl., ¶ 6.f. As an example of how uncertain the analysis
4 presented by WFC is, a year ago during the preliminary injunction briefing, Dr. Lacy estimated
5 that there was a 59 percent chance that the population would become “functionally extinct”
6 within the next 100 years. 2nd Lacy Decl., ¶ 8. Dr. Lacy now estimates that that chance has
7 dropped to 21 percent. 2nd Lacy Decl., ¶ 8. Dr. Lacy also concludes the 7.5 percent reduction in
8 catch by the SEAK fishery will “result[] in less than 0.5% increase in the Southern Resident
9 Killer Whale prey.” 2nd Lacy Decl., ¶ 11. Thus, Dr. Lacy concludes that although increased prey
10 could support growth of the SRKW population, faster recovery will require focus on reductions
11 in noise and contamination than focusing on prey abundance alone. 2nd Lacy Decl., ¶¶ 12, 17.
12 Notably, neither Dr. Giles nor Dr. Lacy conclude that closing the SEAK troll fishery, alone,
13 would be sufficient to increase the SRKW population, or prevent further declines in that
14 population.

15 IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

16 A “court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
17 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to the judgment as a matter of law.”
18 FRCP 56(a). When undertaking such a review, a court will “view[] the evidence in the light most
19 favorable to the nonmoving party.” *L. F. v. Lake Washington Sch. Dist. #414*, 947 F.3d 621, 625
20 (9th Cir. 2020).

21 V. ARGUMENT

22 As the moving party, WFC must demonstrate that, viewing the evidence “in the light
23 most favorable to the nonmoving party,” there are not “genuine issues of material fact” that it has
24 standing for its ESA claim concerning SRKWs. *United States v. Phathey*, 943 F.3d 1277, 1280
25 (9th Cir. 2019) (explaining general standard of review of a summary judgment). Contrary to
26 WFC’s motion, however, the ATA submits that there are no issues of general material fact that

1 WFC does *not* have standing for that claim. With respect to the remaining portions of WFC’s
2 motion, WFC has not demonstrated that the vacatur remedy is warranted at the summary
3 judgment stage.

4 **A. WFC Does Not Have Standing for Its Substantive ESA Claim Pertaining to the**
5 **SRKW No Jeopardy Determination in the 2019 SEAK BiOp.**

6 Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to WFC, there is no genuine issue
7 of material fact that WFC’s alleged injury is neither sufficiently causally related to the SEAK
8 troll fishery nor redressable by the relief sought with WFC’s claim.³ Thus, WFC does not have
9 standing to challenge the no jeopardy finding in the 2019 SEAK BiOp with respect to the SRKW
10 population.

11 The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that the causation and redressability requirements
12 “overlap and are two facets of a single causation requirement.” *Washington Env’tl. Council*, 732
13 F.3d at 1146. Nevertheless, they are distinct in that “causality examines the connection between
14 the alleged misconduct and injury, whereas redressability analyzes the connection between the
15 alleged injury and the requested judicial relief.” *Id.*

16 **1. The Link Between the SEAK Troll Fishery and the Health of the SRKW**
17 **Population is Not Fairly Traceable.**

18 To support its standing, WFC briefly asserts that its members “derive recreational and
19 aesthetic enjoyment from Puget Sound and its wildlife, and their use and enjoyment are
20 diminished by NMFS’s violations and by the members’ reasonable concerns about NMFS’s
21 violation.” WFC MSJ, 46. Thus, according to WFC, its injuries “stem from NMFS’s conduct
22 addressed herein and are therefore ‘fairly traceable’ to the violations.” WFC MSJ, 46. That
23 conclusory statement neither supports its motion for summary judgment, nor, in light of the
24 discussion below, refutes this cross-motion.

25 ³ Because WFC’s arguments are based on injuries to its members and fail to satisfy the causation and redressability
26 requirements for standing, WFC necessarily does not have organizational standing because its members would not
have standing to bring a suit on their own for the same reasons.

1 “[T]he causal connection put forward for standing purposes cannot be too speculative, or
2 rely on conjecture about the behavior of other parties, but need not be so airtight... as to
3 demonstrate that the plaintiffs would succeed on the merits.” *Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac.*
4 *Lumber Co.*, 230 F.3d 1141, 1152 (9th Cir. 2000). Standing does not require that the challenged
5 action “be the sole source of injury,” and “[a] causal chain does not fail simply because it has
6 several links, provided those links are not hypothetical or tenuous and remain plausible.”
7 *Washington Env'tl. Council*, 732 F.3d at 1141-42. Further, “a litigant challenging an agency
8 action need not eliminate any other contributing causes to establish its standing.” *WildEarth*
9 *Guardians*, 795 F.3d at 1157 (9th Cir. 2015). But “where the causal chain involves numerous
10 third parties whose independent decisions collectively have a significant effect on plaintiffs’
11 injuries, the causal chain is too weak to support standing.” *Washington Env'tl. Council*, 732 F.3d
12 at 1142 (ellipses omitted).

13 In *Washington Env'tl. Council*, the Ninth Circuit determined that the plaintiffs did not
14 have standing because plaintiffs had relied on “an attenuated chain of conjecture” to satisfy the
15 causality requirement. *Id.* at 1143. In that case, the plaintiffs challenged an agency’s lack of
16 regulation of five oil refineries in Washington, alleging that the greenhouse gas pollution from
17 those refineries caused recreational, aesthetic, economic, and health injuries. *Washington Env'tl.*
18 *Council*, 732 F.3d at 1135, 1139-40. The court noted that, although the challenged conduct may
19 have demonstrated environmental injury, that alone was insufficient to establish that the
20 plaintiffs’ localized injuries were “fairly traceable” to the challenged conduct. *Id.* at 1144. The
21 court emphasized that the five oil refineries were responsible for nearly six percent of
22 Washington’s emissions, an amount that was “scientifically indiscernible” in the context of
23 global climate change. *Id.* at 1143-44. Ultimately, “the causal chain [was] too tenuous to support
24 standing” because “a multitude of independent third parties [were] responsible for the changes
25 contributing to Plaintiffs’ injuries.” *Id.* at 1144. In cases where the Ninth Circuit has concluded
26 there is sufficient causation when there are multiple causes to the injury, the court has

1 emphasized the traceability of the injury to the challenged conduct. *See WildEarth Guardians*,
2 795 F.3d at 1158 (noting that there were “at most two causes” to the alleged injury and the
3 conduct at issue “contribute[d] very discernibly to that injury”); *Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army*
4 *Corps of Engineers*, 402 F.3d 846, 860 (9th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging that “other factors may
5 also cause additional tanker traffic and increase the attendant risk of an oil spill” but emphasizing
6 that “the link between the new [oil] platform and increased traffic [was] not tenuous or
7 abstract”).

8 Here, the record reflects the tenuous connection between the ability for WFC members to
9 view SRKWs and the operations of the SEAK troll fishery. According to WFC’s expert, Dr.
10 Giles, in addition to the natural threats affecting the SKRW population, the primary
11 anthropogenic threats include prey limitation, acoustic and physical disturbance, and PCB
12 contamination. AR 29607. The ATA does not dispute that salmon abundance is a key factor
13 affecting SRKW population dynamics. *See* AR 29607. Rather, the ATA challenges WFC’s
14 characterization of the relationship between Chinook salmon, the SEAK troll fishery, and the
15 SRKW population. The 2019 Pacific Salmon Treaty reduced the SEAK troll fishery catch up to
16 7.5 percent from the catch allowed in the previous decade under the prior agreement. AR 47445.
17 The 2019 SEAK BiOp concludes that that harvest reduction will “reduce[] effects to prey
18 availability under the 2019 Agreement than under the previous regime.” AR 47504. That
19 reduction comes on the heels of previous significant reductions in prior iterations of the Treaty—
20 the allowable catch for SEAK troll fishery has reduced by 45 percent since the Treaty first took
21 effect. Lyons Decl., ¶ 28. Thus, this is not an instance where the SEAK troll fishery is recklessly
22 harvesting unchecked. Rather, WFC seeks the extreme outcome of closing the SEAK troll
23 fishery, and that does not align with the sacrifices already made and the actual effects that such
24 harvests have on the SRKW.

25 In light of the other threats affecting the SRKW population and salmon abundance, any
26 influence that the SEAK troll fishery has on prey availability for the sustainability and growth of

1 the SRKW population is scientifically indiscernible for the purposes of standing. The record
2 details other factors that affect the link between the SEAK troll fishery and the SRKW
3 population. The SRKW compete for prey with northern resident killer whales, seals, and sea
4 lions. AR 38558. Further, the long-term viability of salmon is affected by habitat impacts such as
5 floods, landslides, and droughts. AR 47345. There are also many other anthropogenic activities
6 that may reduce prey to SRKW in addition to harvests, including agriculture, forestry, marine
7 construction, levy maintenance, shoreline armoring, dredging, and hydropower operations and
8 new development. AR 47347. With respect to harvests, salmon abundance is affected by fishing
9 in Alaska State waters, Canadian fisheries, and fisheries in the Pacific Northwest. Schindler
10 Decl., ¶ 8.h.

11 In the context of those factors, the SEAK troll fishery catch has a tenuous link to the
12 SRKW population. As mentioned, the SEAK troll fishery catch is a relatively lower proportion
13 of the total run size of the stocks most valued by SRKW. AR 47506. WFC emphasizes that the
14 2019 SEAK BiOp estimates that the SEAK fisheries may reduce SRKW prey by 12.9 percent.
15 WFC MSJ, 19. However, the 2019 SEAK BiOp presents a broad range of potential effects,
16 estimating that the effects of SEAK fishery harvests could reduce SRKW prey in coastal waters
17 by as little as 0.2 percent, or as much as 12.9 percent in an extreme scenario. WFC MSJ, 19;
18 AR 47439-40. Additionally, the 2019 SEAK BiOp estimated that the potential reductions of prey
19 in inland waters could range from 0.1 percent to 2.5 percent. AR 47440. The 2019 SEAK BiOp
20 also explains that “[a]lthough the proposed SEAK fisheries could result in up to 12.9% reduction
21 in the prey available to the whales in their coastal range, this would likely occur rarely and
22 during a time period when the whales are more often observed in inland waters.” AR 47445.
23 “Furthermore, these greater prey reductions in coastal waters would be spread across a larger
24 portion of the geographic range of Southern Residents.” AR 47445. Thus, given the many factors
25 affecting salmon abundance and the specific stocks that the SEAK troll fishery targets, the
26 challenged NMFS action pertaining to the SEAK troll fishery has an attenuated connection to the

1 population of the SRKW. Stated differently, WFC has failed to demonstrate that the
2 indiscernible number of salmon that may be SRKW prey if not for SEAK troll fishery, let alone
3 summer troll fishery, harvests is fairly traceable to the alleged injuries regarding the ability to see
4 SRKWs in the wild.

5 **2. WFC’s Alleged Injury Will Continue Unabated Even if the SEAK Troll**
6 **Fishery is Closed.**

7 In asserting that it has met the redressability requirement, WFC identifies that it must
8 show a likelihood that its injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. WFC MSJ, 46.
9 However, WFC only argues that its “injuries are redressable by an order from the Court because
10 proper ESA and NEPA analysis could influence agency actions.” *Id.* Importantly, that standard is
11 the required showing for redressability for a procedural claim. *See WildEarth Guardians*, 795
12 F.3d at 1155. Thus, like the causation requirement, WFC’s arguments are insufficient to establish
13 standing or to refute a lack of standing.

14 As mentioned, the redressability analysis effectively mirrors the causation analysis. *See*
15 *Washington Env’tl. Council*, 732 F.3d at 1146 (concluding that the plaintiffs failed to meet the
16 redressability requirement “for many of the same reasons they fail[ed] to meet the causality
17 requirement”). In *Washington Env’tl. Council*, the court concluded that the plaintiffs’ injuries
18 were “likely to continue unabated” even if the plaintiffs had received the remedy that they
19 sought. *Id.* at 1147. Thus, in order for a plaintiff to satisfy the redressability requirement, there
20 must be evidence in the record that demonstrates a “substantial likelihood” that the injury will be
21 redressed if the plaintiffs receive a favorable decision. *Id.* at 1146. In the same case, the Ninth
22 Circuit emphasized that the agency did not pursue the actions desired by the plaintiffs, but
23 “decided to use its limited resources to pursue other efforts” to address the emissions issues
24 implicated by the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. *Id.*

25 Here, the record is devoid of evidence demonstrating a “substantial likelihood” that the
26 Plaintiffs may be more likely to see SRKW if the SEAK troll fishery is closed. Dr. Giles states

1 that “[i]t is essentially impossible to meet NMFS’ recover goal of an average growth rate of
2 2.3% in the Southern Resident killer whale population without increasing the abundance of
3 Chinook available to the Southern Residents as prey.⁴ Giles Decl., ¶ 10. Assuming that
4 conclusion is true, it does not mean that closing the SEAK troll fishery will necessarily result in a
5 meaningful increase in prey for the SRKW. In fact, the record reflects that reducing Chinook
6 salmon fisheries will not achieve that desired growth rate for the SRKWs. *See* AR 38558. If the
7 fishery was closed, the Chinook that would have otherwise been caught by the fishery would still
8 have to survive fishing efforts in Alaska state waters, Canadian fisheries, northern resident killer
9 whales, fisheries in the Pacific Northwest, and other threats in order to be available prey to the
10 SRKW. Schindler Decl., ¶ 8.h. Only a “trivial amount” of Chinook may become SRKW prey if
11 the SEAK troll fishery was closed. Schindler Decl., ¶¶ 8-9. Ultimately, the 2019 SEAK BiOp
12 represents an effort by NMFS to use its limited resources to address the SRKW population while
13 maintaining the SEAK troll fishery. Even if the SEAK troll fishery was shut down in response to
14 WFC’s claims, WFC’s injuries related to the inability to see SRKW in the wild would continue
15 unabated. Accordingly, shutting down the SEAK troll fishery could not redress WFC’s injuries
16 so that its members could see more SRKWs in the wild.

17 **B. WFC’s Remaining Claims Do Not Warrant Shutting Down the Southeast Alaska**
18 **Troll Fishery.**

19 Regardless of whether WFC has demonstrated sufficient standing on its remaining
20 claims, the ATA submits that the relief sought by WFC at the summary judgment stage is not
21 warranted. WFC alleges that the 2019 BiOp and the Incidental Take Statement should be vacated
22 as unlawful actions under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) due to NMFS’s ESA and
23 NEPA violations. WFC MSJ, 40. “A federal court is not required to set aside every unlawful
24

25 ⁴ The actions contemplated by the 2019 SEAK BiOp are not required to achieve a 2.3 percent growth rate or
26 guarantee recovery for the SRKW. Rather, the ESA requires NMFS to ensure that an action does not “[j]eopardize
the continued existence” of a species—meaning it will not “reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival
and recovery of a listed species.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.

1 agency action and the decision to grant or deny injunctive or declaratory relief under [the] APA
2 is controlled by principles of equity.” *All. for the Wild Rockies v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 907 F.3d
3 1105, 1121 (9th Cir. 2018). Here, the equities do not warrant the extreme relief sought by WFC’s
4 remaining claims and WFC has not established that there are no issues of genuine material fact
5 that would preclude a summary judgment.⁵

6 WFC alleges that NMFS did not properly consider potential harm from the hatchery prey
7 increase program in reaching a “no jeopardy” determination in the 2019 SEAK BiOp for
8 threatened salmonids. WFC MSJ, 30-34. WFC acknowledges that NMFS considered salmon
9 harvests, including from the SEAK troll fishery, in reaching a “no jeopardy” conclusion. WFC
10 MSJ, 31. Thus, to the extent that WFC seeks additional analysis related to the prey increase
11 program, closing the SEAK troll fishery will not redress WFC’s procedural injury that is
12 unrelated to the troll fishery.

13 WFC also alleges a procedural claim that NMFS violated NEPA by failing to conduct
14 any NEPA analysis for authorizing take under the 2019 Pacific Salmon Treaty and failing to
15 conduct a NEPA analysis for the prey increase program. WFC MSJ, 35. Similarly, the prey
16 increase program is unrelated to the SEAK troll fishery and, thus, any potential procedural errors
17 related to that analysis cannot justify shutting down the SEAK troll fishery. That is particularly
18 true in light of the equities in this case. WFC maintains that any harms from vacatur would not
19 significantly outweigh the magnitude of NMFS’s error in this case in light of the SRKW’s
20 endangered status. WFC MSJ, 41-42. That argument, however, overstates the tenuous link
21 between the SEAK troll fishery and the SRKW and fails to appreciate the severe impacts a
22 vacatur would have on the communities of southeast Alaska. Only a “trivial amount” of the
23 foregone SEAK troll fishery may end up becoming prey for the SRKW. *Schindler Decl.*, ¶ 8.i.
24 On the contrary, the effects of vacatur on the communities of southeast Alaska would be direct

25 _____
26 ⁵ The ATA incorporates and adopts the State of Alaska’s and NMFS’s arguments as to why WFC has failed to
demonstrate that summary judgment is warranted on its remaining claims.

1 and severe. Closing the SEAK troll fishery would affect over 1,400 men and women who fish for
2 a living, and another 250 seafood processing plant workers. Calvin Decl. (Dkt. No. 41), ¶¶ 4-5;
3 Donohoe Decl. (Dkt. No. 37), ¶¶ 3-5; Watson Decl. (Dkt. No. 40), ¶¶ 3-5. The total economic
4 impact of closing the SEAK troll fishery on the local community has been estimated to be
5 approximately \$85 million. Olson Decl., ¶ 19. Accordingly, the equities do not support vacatur to
6 remedy a procedural error of a fully informed agency decision.

7 Further, for the reasons laid out by the State of Alaska and NMFS, NMFS was not
8 required to conduct a NEPA analysis before issuing its Incidental Take Statement. Accordingly,
9 WFC cannot establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact that it has procedural
10 standing to vacate the Incidental Take Statement. The redressability requirement for standing, in
11 the context of a procedural injury, “is satisfied when the relief requested—that the agency follow
12 the correct procedures—may influence the agency’s ultimate decision.” *WildEarth Guardians*,
13 795 F.3d at 1156. Here, WFC has not successfully demonstrated that, under the summary
14 judgment standard, NMFS did not follow the correct procedures. As a result, the vacatur that
15 WFC seeks is not appropriate at the summary judgment stage.

16 VI. CONCLUSION

17 WFC’s motion for summary judgment overstates the connection between the SEAK troll
18 fishery and the health of the SRKW population. In doing so, WFC does not have standing to seek
19 the relief identified in its motion. Additionally, the relief that WFC seeks is inappropriate at the
20 summary judgment stage because the equities do not weigh in favor of vacating the 2019 SEAK
21 BiOp and ITS. Accordingly, the ATA respectfully submits that the Court deny WFC’s motion
22 for summary judgment and grant the ATA’s cross-motion.

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DATED this 26th day of May, 2021.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on May 26, 2021, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court for the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington using the CM/ECF system. Participants who are registered with CM/ECF will be served by the CM/ECF system.

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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

DATED May 26, 2021, in Seattle, Washington.

/s Eliza Hinkes

Eliza Hinkes, Paralegal

Honorable Michelle L. Peterson

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

WILD FISH CONSERVANCY,
Plaintiff,

vs.

BARRY THOM, *et al.*,
Defendants,

ALASKA TROLLERS ASSOCIATION, and
STATE OF ALASKA,
Defendant-Intervenors.

CASE NO: 2:20-cv-417-RAJ-MLP

**STATE OF ALASKA'S OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND CROSS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

**NOTE ON MOTION CALENDAR:
June 16, 2021**

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Wild Fish Conservancy (“Plaintiff”) asks the Court to rule, as a matter of law, that the
3 National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) biological opinion (“BiOp”) for salmon fisheries in
4 Southeast Alaska (“SEAK”) was unlawfully adopted in violation of the Endangered Species Act
5 (“ESA”) 16 U.S.C. § 1531, *et seq.*, and the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) 42
6 U.S.C. § 4321, *et seq.*. As a remedy, Plaintiff asks this Court to vacate the BiOp and its Incidental
7 Take Statement (“ITS”), resulting, by default, in the closure of SEAK troll fisheries that occur in
8 federal waters. This is relief that the Court has previously denied because of Plaintiff’s untimely
9 challenge to Alaska’s management of the salmon fisheries under the Magnuson-Stevens Act
10 (“MSA”), and the Court continues to have no jurisdiction to grant such relief. *See* Report and
11 Recommendation, Dkt. 51 at 12-16. Plaintiff also asks the Court to enjoin NMFS from
12 implementing the prey increase program that is designed to provide an immediate and meaningful
13 increase in prey availability for Southern Resident Killer Whales (“SRKW”). Dkt. 91, p. 12.

14 Because NMFS complied with the requirements of the ESA, NEPA, and associated
15 regulations and interpreting case law, the State of Alaska (“State” or “Alaska”) opposes Plaintiff’s
16 motion and asks the Court to deny it. On the basis of the arguments set forth in this brief and
17 pursuant to LCR 7(k), the State respectfully cross-moves for summary judgment that the BiOp is
18 lawful,¹ and for a final judgment dismissing with prejudice any claims by Plaintiff based upon the
19 delegation of management of the SEAK salmon fishery to the State of Alaska under the MSA.

20 On March 30, 2021, the Court granted the State’s motion to intervene. Dkt. 88. Alaska, as
21 a sovereign state and pursuant to its public trust responsibilities, has an interest in managing and
22 conserving all wildlife and other natural resources within its jurisdiction, including SEAK salmon
23 fisheries. Alaska Const. art. VIII, §§ 1, 4; Alaska Stat. § 16.05.020; *see also* Dkt. 76 at 4, ¶¶9, 10.

24
25
26 ¹ Alaska joins in the arguments of Federal Defendants regarding the ESA and NEPA claims and Defendant-Intervenor
27 Alaska Troller’s Assoc. with respect to standing.

1 Section 7 of the ESA provides that taking incidental to an otherwise lawful agency action
2 is not considered to be a prohibited “taking” under the ESA if that action is performed in
3 compliance with the terms and conditions of an ITS. AR 47517. In this case, that action is
4 continued salmon fishing in SEAK. Vacatur of the BiOp and ITS would be an extraordinary
5 overreaction to the untimely claims advanced by Plaintiff and would be inappropriate in this case.
6 Such an order would decimate SEAK’s coastal communities, while providing no colorable benefit
7 to SRKW. Vacatur of the SEAK BiOp would also impact the biological opinion on the
8 Authorization of the West Coast Ocean Salmon Fisheries Through Approval of the Pacific Salmon
9 Fishery Management Plan, because consultation on the Pacific Salmon Treaty (“PST” or “Treaty”)
10 mitigation funding initiative, which is included in the SEAK BiOp, is an important element of the
11 environmental baseline in the West Coast salmon fisheries BiOp.

12 As the record demonstrates, NMFS engaged in reasoned decision making and its
13 determinations are entitled to deference. Plaintiff’s ESA and NEPA claims are entirely without
14 merit and should be summarily denied.

15 **II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

16 **A. Southeast Alaska Salmon Fisheries.**

17 The SEAK troll fishery operates in both federal and State waters, and is managed as a
18 single unit. AR 00540; AR 00515. The Alaska Department of Fish & Game (“ADF&G”) has
19 managed salmon fisheries in federal waters since statehood in 1959 and has made “substantial
20 investments over the years in facilities, communications, information systems, vessels, equipment,
21 experienced personnel capable of carrying out extensive management, research, and enforcement
22 programs.” AR 00522. In 1979, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council developed, and
23 the Secretary of Commerce (“Secretary”) approved, the *Fishery Management Plan for the Salmon*
24 *Fisheries in the EEZ off Alaska* (“FMP”) under the MSA. With the implementation of the FMP,
25 the State has played the major role in managing the salmon fisheries in the federal exclusive
26 economic zone (“EEZ”). AR 00522.

27 The SEAK subsistence, commercial, and sport salmon fisheries are a vitally important and
28

1 longstanding part of the social and economic fabric of coastal communities in SEAK. Dkt. 76, p
2 6, ¶ 14. From a purely economic perspective, the SEAK salmon fishery produced \$806 million in
3 output, \$484 million in gross domestic product, \$299 million in labor income or wages, and
4 provided 6,600 full time equivalent jobs on average from 2012 to 2015. *Id.* The economic activity
5 generated by the SEAK fisheries is critically important to the coastal communities in the region.
6 Dkt. 76 at ¶ 16. The EEZ constitutes approximately 87% of SEAK waters (81,203 out of 93,167
7 total nautical miles squared), a nearly 7:1 ratio of EEZ waters to State of Alaska waters in the
8 region. Dkt. 76 at ¶ 12.

9 The SEAK Chinook salmon fishery is managed to stay within the negotiated annual all-
10 gear PST total allowable catch limit determined by the Pacific Salmon Commission and to meet
11 escapement goals for wild stocks originating from SEAK and transboundary rivers. *See* AR 47318.
12 Chinook catch is allocated through regulations established by the Alaska Board of Fisheries among
13 subsistence, troll, net, sport, and personal use fisheries. AR 00544. Under Article VII, Section 4
14 of the Alaska Constitution, all fisheries must be managed on the sustained yield principle. *See also*
15 5 AAC 39.222 (the Board's Policy for the Management of Sustainable Salmon Fisheries).

16 Subsistence fishing is managed as the priority and all other fisheries are restricted to ensure
17 reasonable opportunity as defined by the Alaska Board of Fisheries. AS 16.05.258. Outside of
18 subsistence, the current allocation plan reserves 1,000 fish for set gillnet fisheries and 4.3% and
19 2.9% of the remaining all-gear catch is allocated to the purse seine and drift gillnet fisheries. AR
20 00544. After the net quotas are subtracted, 80% of the remainder is allocated to the commercial
21 troll fishery and the other 20% to sport fisheries. *Id.* All fisheries are sampled in-season for coded-
22 wire tags and/or genetics, which are processed and used to determine the proportion of catch
23 comprised of Alaska hatchery fish. AR 00541.

24 Annual accounting of troll fisheries occurs on a cycle that begins October 1 and ends
25 September 30 each year. AR 00540. The troll fishery consists of two seasons: (1) a winter fishery
26 that occurs from October 11 to April 30 of the following year and (2) a summer fishery that occurs
27 from May through September. AR 00540. The summer season is further divided into spring fishery
28

1 which occurs May 1 through June 30 and a summer fishery which occurs July 1 through September
2 30. *Id.* The winter and spring troll fisheries are limited to State waters; the summer troll fishery
3 occurs in both federal and State waters. *Id.* The winter fishery is managed to a guideline harvest
4 level of 45,000 Treaty fish and the open fishing area is restricted to within the troll boundary of
5 the outer coast surf line. *Id.* The spring troll fishery (May 1 or earlier, through June 30) is managed
6 to target Chinook produced from SEAK hatcheries. AR 00540-41.

7 The summer troll fishery accounts for the majority of the annual Chinook salmon
8 commercial harvest and is closely monitored and managed to prevent exceeding the troll portion
9 of the annual harvest limit by allowing retention of Chinook salmon during two or more periods
10 in most years. AR 00541. The first summer troll fishery opening, beginning July 1 by regulation,
11 allows harvest in the waters of frequent high Chinook abundance and is managed to not exceed
12 70% of the remaining troll portion of the annual harvest limit. *Id.* Once the July fishery is closed,
13 the troll fleet targets coho salmon, and Chinook retention by the troll fleet is not allowed unless it
14 is determined that additional openings will not result in exceeding the annual harvest limit. AR
15 00541. Coho salmon management is subject to Chapter 7 Attachment B of the 2019 PST
16 Agreement and regulatory provisions established by the Board of Fisheries for allocation and
17 conservation of SEAK coho stocks. AR 00521.

18 The majority of coho salmon harvested in the troll fishery are of SEAK local origin, as
19 coho are less migratory than Chinook salmon and coded-wire tag studies suggest that “none of the
20 ESA-listed coho salmon ESUs on the west coast are likely to range into SEAK fisheries.” AR
21 47530, AR 25190. Accordingly, Washington and Oregon origin coho salmon stocks are not
22 encountered in substantial numbers in the troll fisheries occurring in SEAK fisheries. The SEAK
23 BiOp accurately concluded that SEAK fisheries were unlikely to adversely affect ESA-listed coho
24 stocks. AR 47174.

25 The State relies on information reported on fish tickets to estimate the proportion of fish
26 harvested in the State waters and in the EEZ. AR 00542, 00548. Over the most recent 10-year
27 period (2010–2019), the State estimates that, on average, 14% (28,907 fish) of the total troll fishery
28

1 Chinook harvest and 7% or 90,268 of the troll coho harvest occurred in the EEZ.² Dkt. 36, p. 6.

2 **B. Southern Resident Killer Whales.**

3 The SRKW distinct population segment (“DPS”) was listed as an endangered species under
4 the ESA in 2005. AR 47196. The reproductive rates of SRKW have been found to be significantly
5 lower than those of Northern Residents or Alaska Residents. AR 47347. “Compared to Northern
6 Resident killer whales (a resident killer whale population with a sympatric geographic distribution
7 ranging from coastal waters of Washington State and British Columbia north to SEAK) Southern
8 Resident females appear to have reduced fecundity.” AR 47276. Two of the toxic chemicals that
9 have been found to be present in relatively high levels in SRKW, polychlorinated biphenyls
10 (PCBs) and dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT), can cause reproductive impairment.
11 AR 37742

12 The primary factors inhibiting SRKW population growth include high levels of
13 contaminants from pollution, disturbances from vessel traffic and vessel noise, and reduced prey
14 availability. AR 47276, 47282, 47286-87, 47433, 47434. Oil spills and disease as well as the small
15 population size are also risk factors. *Id.* It is likely that multiple threats are acting together to impact
16 the whales. *Id.* There have been studies that have suggested the low fecundity of SRKW is in large
17 part attributable to nutritional limitations, however, much uncertainty remains. AR 47276,
18 47433. The cumulative effects of the primary factors, along with high uncertainty in Chinook
19 abundance estimates, the low number and long life of the SRKW, and reduced immune function
20 from chronic stress make the findings of those studies more uncertain. AR 47433, 47288.

21 SRKW range throughout the coastal waters off Washington, Oregon, and Vancouver Island
22 and are known to travel as far south as central California. AR 47280. There has been only one
23 sighting in SEAK, in Chatham Strait in 2007. 84 FR 49218. As such, the inclusion of SRKW in
24 the SEAK BiOp is solely within the context of prey resources harvested in the SEAK fishery that

26 ² These data from the ADF&G Mark, Tag, and Age Laboratory are publicly available at
27 <https://mtalab.adfg.alaska.gov/CWT/reports/default.aspx>, last visited May 13, 2021. The Court may take judicial
28 notice of these public agency records. *Kitty Hawk Aircargo, Inc. v. Chao*, 418 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 2005)
(noticing agency document readily accessible on agency website).

1 could potentially otherwise be available to SRKW. AR 47504.

2 **C. Threatened Salmonoids.**

3 NMFS considered the effects of the SEAK fishery on four ESA-listed stocks or
4 Evolutionary Significant Units (“ESU”) of Chinook salmon in the SEAK BiOp: Puget Sound,
5 Lower Columbia River, Upper Willamette River, and Snake River fall-run. AR 47193. The
6 primary causes of declines in the ESUs are loss of freshwater and estuarine habitat, hydropower
7 development, poor ocean conditions, overfishing, and hatchery practices. AR 14492, 15761,
8 15891. Per the ESA hatchery listing policy, several hatchery stocks are now included within each
9 ESU and therefore are within the ESA-listing. AR 01730. However, Chinook fisheries have been
10 reduced under the Treaty in response to these conservation concerns. *See* AR 47504.

11 The record shows that SEAK fisheries have an insignificant impact on endangered West
12 Coast salmon stocks. *See* AR 47589-607. For Puget Sound stocks, the majority of the fisheries
13 impacts occur in West Coast Vancouver Island, Southern British Columbia, and Puget Sound
14 fisheries with small exploitation occurring in SEAK fisheries. AR 08030, 08031, 08039, 08040,
15 08042, 08043, 08046, 08047, 08052. Lower Columbia Fall Chinook stocks are primarily harvested
16 in the West Coast Vancouver Island, Southern British Columbia, and South Cape Falcon fisheries.
17 AR 08023, 08045. Snake River Fall Chinook are primarily harvested in fisheries occurring along
18 the Washington and Oregon coasts. AR 08026, 47593.

19 **D. The Pacific Salmon Treaty.**

20 Prior to the signing of the Treaty in 1985, management of salmon fisheries of the two
21 countries was not coordinated and was often competitive, leading to overfishing and the loss of
22 production to both Canada and the United States. *See, e.g.*, AR 00523. The fundamental goals of
23 the Treaty are to prevent overfishing and to provide for the optimum production and fair sharing
24 of the harvest of salmon. AR 47194. To achieve these goals, the Treaty establishes a process
25 through which the parties interact to establish, implement, and monitor science-based fishery
26 management regimes applicable to their respective jurisdictions. *See, e.g.*, AR 00523. These
27 fishery management regimes are tailored to each of the major geographical regions covered by the
28

1 Treaty, reflecting coast-wide differences in migration and concentration of the various salmon
2 species and stocks. *Id.*

3 Alaska’s obligations under the Chinook Chapter of the 2019 Treaty include managing
4 SEAK fisheries to (1) not exceed the annual preseason catch limit, with the severe penalty for
5 exceeding annual harvest limits of paying back any overages the following year; (2) achieve
6 escapement goals for SEAK and transboundary river wild stocks; and (3) not exceed limits on
7 incidental mortality.³ AR 00541. The Treaty also contains obligations to collect the data necessary
8 to evaluate compliance. AR 47201. Since the 2019 version of the Treaty was signed, Alaska has
9 met all of its obligations set forth in the Treaty.

10 **1. Treaty harvest reductions.**

11 Chinook fisheries have been reduced substantially since the Treaty was first ratified in
12 1985. AR 47202. Significant harvest reductions occurred in association with the 1999 and 2009
13 revisions to the Treaty. *Id.* Further reductions occurred in conjunction with the 2019 revision. *Id.*
14 In response to conservation concerns particularly for ESA-listed Puget Sound Chinook stocks, the
15 2009 Treaty revisions called for negotiated reductions of 15% and 30%, respectively, in catches
16 in the SEAK and West Coast Vancouver Island outside fisheries. AR 47212. These reductions
17 were intended to provide more Chinook to the spawning grounds for ESA-listed Puget Sound
18 stocks as substantial harvest of Puget Sound Chinook stocks occurs off the West Coast of
19 Vancouver Island. *See id.* The 2019 Treaty reduces the allowable annual catch in the SEAK and
20 West Coast of Vancouver Island fisheries by up to 7.5% and 12.5%, respectively, beyond the
21 reductions imposed in the 2009 Treaty. *Id.*

22 All of these measures were specifically designed to reduce fishery impacts in all fisheries
23 to respond to conservation concerns, including the need to provide additional prey for SRKW.
24 This is despite the fact that following issuance of a 2011 biological opinion on the management
25

26 ³ To this end, the SEAK FMP calls for a decrease in “the incidental mortalities of salmon hooked and released,
27 consistent with allocation decisions and the objective of providing the greatest overall benefit to the people of the
28 United States.” AR 00519.

1 plan for Puget Sound fisheries, NMFS convened an independent science panel to critically evaluate
2 the effects of salmon fisheries on the abundance of Chinook salmon available to SRKW. AR
3 47286. The panel concluded that while salmon abundance will likely influence the recovery of
4 SRKW, the “impact of reduced Chinook salmon harvest on future availability of Chinook salmon
5 to Southern Residents is not clear, and cautioned against overreliance on correlative studies or
6 implicating any particular fishery.” *Id.*

7 **2. Treaty funding mechanisms.**

8 Federal funding is provided annually through NOAA, which provides grants to the state
9 and federal agencies conducting the work of implementing the Treaty and for mitigation actions.
10 Public Law 99–5, (Mar. 15, 1985), 99 Stat. 7 (Amended through Public Law 111–8, March 11,
11 2009). Congressional appropriations have increased substantially in recent years to implement the
12 Treaty. Pub. L. No. 116-260 (Dec. 27, 2020).

13 The fiscal year 2020 congressional appropriations bill provided \$35.5 million for Treaty
14 implementation. Pub. L. No. 116-93, 113 Stat. 2317 (Dec. 20, 2019). The spend plan agreed to by
15 the U.S. Commissioners on February 21, 2020, directed \$19.1 million to ESA-related conservation
16 activities, with \$3.1 million for the conservation hatchery programs, \$10.4 million for habitat
17 restoration actions, and \$5.6 million for hatchery production aimed at increasing prey for SRKW.
18 Dkt. 43-4, p. 6 ¶ 14. The fiscal year 2021 Congressional appropriation for Treaty implementation
19 included \$39.5 million in Commerce, an increase of \$4.0 million over the fiscal year 2020 enacted
20 level. Pub. L. No. 116-260 (Dec. 27, 2020). With this funding, the United States invested no less
21 than \$20.0 million to implement the mitigations activities within the SEAK BiOp including habitat
22 restoration projects in Puget Sound, hatchery programs to conserve at-risk Chinook salmon stocks
23 in Puget Sound, and new hatchery production to increase the food available for SRKW. *Id.*

24 The relationship between fisheries in Alaska, Canada, and the Southern U.S. are complex
25 and it was necessary to ensure that all fisheries were reduced to provide benefits for SRKW. AR
26 47202. The U.S. Commissioners to the PST recognized that further mitigation could be addressed
27 through a targeted funding initiative. *Id.* The funding initiative was relevant to NMFS’
28

1 consideration of the SEAK fishery in the BiOp, and became an essential element of the
2 environmental baseline in other BiOps regarding Puget Sound and other Southern U.S. fisheries
3 in Washington, Oregon, and California. *Id.*⁴ The funding of additional mitigation measures,
4 contemplated by the U.S. Commissioners to the PST and incorporated into the SEAK BiOp, is
5 inextricably tied to the fundamental underpinnings of the BiOps for numerous West Coast salmon
6 fisheries. *Id.*

7 **E. 2019 Southeast Alaska Biological Opinion.**

8 The 2019 biological opinion challenged by Plaintiff in this action is only one in series of
9 continued consultations under the ESA. NMFS conducted its first ESA review of salmon fisheries
10 in SEAK in 1993, and continued their consideration of the SEAK fisheries by means of annual
11 consultations through 1998. AR 47195. After that NMFS, consulted on the three 10-year Treaty
12 agreements in 1999, 2009, and 2019. AR 47196-97. The consultation on the 1999 version of the
13 Treaty was the first time that NMFS consulted directly on a fishery management regime that
14 involved specific harvest provisions for both U.S. and Canadian fisheries. AR 47196. The opinion
15 on the 1999 Treaty focused primarily on the effects of fisheries in SEAK and Canada (“northern
16 fisheries”) on the same 4 ESA-listed Chinook stocks. *Id.* The scope of the consultation for the 2009
17 Treaty Agreement differed from that of the opinion on the 1999 Treaty Agreement, as NMFS
18 extended its specified action area to also include all marine and freshwater areas in the southern
19 U.S. subject to provisions of the PST. *Id.* The biological opinion again focused in particular on the
20 effects on the same four Chinook salmon ESUs and Hood Canal summer-run chum, and for the
21 first time, SRKW. *Id.*

22 The consultation in 2019 had a vastly different scope than the previous BiOps as it was
23 focused on the SEAK fishery. NMFS consulted on the delegation of management authority over
24

25 _____
26 ⁴ See also ESA BiOp on Implementation of the PFMC Salmon FMP in 2020,
27 <https://repository.library.noaa.gov/view/noaa/27908>, p 10-11, last accessed May 13, 2021. The Court may take
28 judicial notice of this public record and as an agency action posted on the agency’s website. See Fed. R. Evid. 201;
Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 567 F.3d 595, 606 n.13 (9th Cir.
2009) (noticing local resolution as matter of public record).

1 salmon fisheries in the EEZ in SEAK to the State of Alaska, federal grants to the State of Alaska
2 for the implementation of the 2019 PST, and also included three U.S. domestic mitigation funding
3 actions for a conservation program for critical Puget Sound stocks and SRKW associated with the
4 2019 PST Agreement. AR 47197.

5 Chronologically, the SEAK fishery begins first and with the separation of the SEAK
6 fishery from the remainder of the fisheries subject to the Treaty, the consultation of the SEAK
7 fishery was completed before all others. Presumably, this is the basis for NMFS' inclusion in the
8 consultation of impacts to ESA-listed species from U.S. domestic mitigation actions associated
9 with the 2019 Treaty Agreement which are applicable to NMFS' consideration of all U.S. fisheries
10 subject to the Treaty. The mitigation action for federal funding of a conservation program for
11 critical Puget Sound salmon stocks through conservation hatcheries and habitat restoration is
12 tangential to impacts from the SEAK fishery, as harvests of Puget Sound stocks in Alaska are
13 small. *See* AR 47589-607. The inclusion of federal funding to increase prey availability for SRKW
14 at no less than \$5.6 million per year is likewise intended to mitigate for harvest along the West
15 Coast and Canada. *See, e.g.,* AR 47203; *see also* ESA BiOp on Implementation of the PFMC
16 Salmon FMP in 2020, <https://repository.library.noaa.gov/view/noaa/27908>, p 10-11, last accessed
17 May 13, 2021.

18 The mitigation funding initiative is also relevant to NMFS' consideration in its BiOp for
19 the Pacific Fishery Management Council authorization of ocean salmon fisheries off the coasts of
20 Washington, Oregon, and California, and will likewise be an essential element of the
21 environmental baseline in upcoming opinions regarding Puget Sound and other southern U.S.
22 fisheries. AR 47203-04. "Fundamentally, all U.S. fisheries may be affected by decisions made in
23 the event that funding is not provided." *Id.*

24 **III. STATUTORY BACKGROUND**

25 **A. Endangered Species Act.**

26 Congress enacted the ESA in 1973 "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon
27 which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved...." 16 U.S.C. § 1531.
28

1 Section 7 of the ESA (“Section 7”) requires each federal agency to “insure that any action
2 authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency ... is not likely to jeopardize the continued
3 existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
4 modification” of the species’ designated critical habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). Section 7(a)(2)’s
5 consultation requirement applies to “any endangered species or threatened species.” *Id.*

6 Section 7 consultation requires NMFS to prepare a biological opinion to determine whether
7 the proposed action will result in jeopardy to the species or result in the destruction or adverse
8 modification of the species’ critical habitat. *Id.*; *see also* 50 C.F.R. § 402.14. If NMFS determines
9 the action will not cause jeopardy or adverse modification, or offers reasonable and prudent
10 alternatives that avoid jeopardy or adverse modification, it may issue an ITS. 16 U.S.C.
11 § 1536(b)(4); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i).

12 A finding of jeopardy requires population level impacts that threaten the continued survival
13 and recovery of the species. *Pacific Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of*
14 *Reclamation*, 426 F.3d 1082, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2005) (jeopardy determination requires
15 consideration of the impacts to the species *population*); *Wild Fish Conservancy v. Salazar*, 628
16 F.3d 513, 518-19 (9th Cir. 2010) (jeopardy analysis conducted at the *population* level).

17 NMFS’ only task in a formal consultation is to prepare a BiOp that discusses whether the
18 proposed action is likely to cause jeopardy and the effects of the proposed action on listed species
19 or on the species’ critical habitat. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h). In preparing its opinion, NMFS must use
20 “the best scientific and commercial data available.” *Id.* § 402.14(g)(8). If NMFS concludes that a
21 proposed action will result in the incidental taking of an endangered or threatened species but will
22 not cause jeopardy, it must include in its BiOp an ITS specifying, among other things, “the impact
23 of such incidental taking on the species” affected. *See* 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4); 50 C.F.R. §
24 402.14(i). Under the ESA, a taking that complies with an ITS “shall not be considered to be a
25 prohibited taking of the species concerned.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o)(2).

1 **B. National Environmental Policy Act.**

2 NEPA declares a broad national commitment to protecting and promoting environmental
3 quality and establishes important “action-forcing procedures” to meet this goal. *Robertson v.*
4 *Methow Valley Citizens Council*, 490 U.S. 332, 348 (1989).

5 However, NEPA “does not mandate particular results, but simply provides the necessary
6 process to ensure that federal agencies take a ‘hard look’ at the environmental consequences of
7 their actions.” *Tri-Valley CAREs v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy*, 671 F.3d 1113, 1124 (9th Cir. 2012)
8 (internal quotations and citations omitted); *Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen*, 541 U.S. 752, 756-57
9 (2004).

10 NEPA often requires the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) for
11 “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C.
12 § 4332(C). However, a consulting agency that prepares a biological opinion or issues an ITS has
13 not commenced a “major Federal action” for the purposes of triggering NEPA. *San Luis & Delta-*
14 *Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell*, 747 F.3d 581, 643 (9th Cir. 2014) (“We would not ordinarily
15 consider an ‘opinion’ or ‘suggest[ion]’ a ‘major Federal action[.]’”)

16 **C. Magnuson-Stevens Act.**

17 In the MSA, Congress established eight regional fishery management councils, comprised
18 of state and federal officials and fisheries experts nominated by state governors and appointed by
19 the Secretary. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b). The principal task of each council is to prepare and submit to
20 the Secretary for approval fishery management plans “for each fishery under its authority that
21 requires conservation and management,” amendments to plans, and regulations to implement the
22 plans. AR 00507; 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801(b)(4), 1852(h)(1), 1853(c). Relevant to this case, the MSA
23 establishes the North Pacific Fishery Management Council with authority over fisheries in the EEZ
24 of the Arctic Ocean, Bering Sea, and Pacific Ocean seaward of Alaska. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(1)(G).
25 The EEZ begins three geographical miles from the coast and extends out 200 nautical miles. AR
26 00512.

1 Under the MSA, the United States claims exclusive management authority over all fish in
2 the EEZ, 16 U.S.C. § 1811(a), yet in a section entitled “State jurisdiction,” the MSA allows States
3 to manage fisheries in the EEZ if the fishery management plan for the fishery in which a fishing
4 vessel is operating delegates management of the fishery to a State and the State’s laws and
5 regulations are consistent with such fishery management plan. *Id.* § 1856(a)(3). Such is the case
6 here with respect to the State’s management of the SEAK salmon fisheries under the FMP and
7 state regulations. *See also* AR 00520.

8 Regulations promulgated by the Secretary under the MSA “shall be subject to judicial
9 review to the extent authorized by, and in accordance with, chapter 7 of Title 5, if a petition for
10 such review is filed within *30 days* after the date on which the regulations are promulgated or the
11 action is published in the Federal Register....” 16 U.S.C. § 1855 (emphasis added). This Court has
12 previously found the 30-day requirement to be jurisdictional. Dkt. 51 at 17 (“Given that Plaintiff’s
13 requested relief is circumscribed by the Magnuson-Steven’s Act and § 1855(f)’s 30 day limitations
14 period to bring a challenge, Plaintiff’s challenge is time-barred, and the Court therefore lacks
15 jurisdiction to issue relief.”)

16 **IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW**

17 Courts review agency compliance with NEPA and the ESA under § 706 of the
18 Administrative Procedure Act. *Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior*, 623 F.3d
19 633, 641 (9th Cir. 2010); *Wild Fish Conservancy*, 628 F.3d at 521. Under the APA, the court may
20 set aside an agency’s decision only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
21 otherwise not in accordance with law.” *Ecology Ctr. v. Castaneda*, 574 F.3d 652, 656 (9th Cir.
22 2009) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)); *see also Westlands Water Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior*,
23 376 F.3d 853, 865 (9th Cir. 2004). Under both of these statutes, the traditional deference is “at its
24 highest where a court is reviewing an agency action that required a high level of technical
25 expertise.” *Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.*, 807 F.3d 1031, 1043
26 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing *Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council*, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989)).

1 The Court’s “review of agency actions, including the promulgation of a BiOp, is narrow.”
2 *Alaska v. Lubchenco*, 723 F.3d 1043, 1052 (9th Cir. 2013). As the Ninth Circuit explained, courts
3 should be at their most deferential “when reviewing scientific judgments and technical analyses
4 within the agency’s expertise.” *Lands Council v. McNair*, 629 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2010). It
5 is not the court’s function to instruct the agency, choose among scientific studies, and order the
6 agency to explain every possible scientific uncertainty. *Id.* “Deference is particularly important
7 when the agency is making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of
8 science.” *Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife*, 273 F.3d 1229, 1236 (9th Cir.
9 2001) (internal quotations omitted).

10 Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
11 moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. *Karuk Tribe of California v. U.S. Forest*
12 *Serv.*, 681 F.3d 1006, 1017 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing *Sierra Club v. Bosworth*, 510 F.3d 1016, 1022
13 (9th Cir. 2007)). Because this is a record review case, the Court may direct that summary judgment
14 be granted to either party based upon review of the administrative record. *Id.* (citing *Lands Council*
15 *v. Powell*, 395 F.3d 1019, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005)).

16 **V. ARGUMENT**

17 Plaintiff’s main argument is that the 2019 SEAK BiOp is arbitrary primarily because it,
18 according to Plaintiff, relies on uncertain mitigation and “fails to draw a rational connection
19 between the facts and the no jeopardy opinion reached for Southern Residents.” Dkt. 91, pp. 21,
20 27. Plaintiff also alleges that NMFS failed to comply with NEPA. Dkt. 91, p. 35. Plaintiff’s
21 arguments are without merit and should be rejected. The Federal Defendants have briefed these
22 and other issues in their cross motion for summary judgment. The State agrees with and joins with
23 Federal Defendants’ arguments.

24 Plaintiff also lacks standing to pursue this matter. Intervenor-Defendant Alaska Trollers
25 Assoc. has briefed the Plaintiff’s lack of standing, and the State agrees with and joins in their
26 arguments. In order to avoid replicating arguments, the State will touch on some of these issues,
27 but will focus primarily on the appropriate remedy in the event that one should become necessary.
28

1 In addition, Plaintiff may not challenge actions related to the delegation of management
2 authority to the State under the MSA, nor can it seek any relief that results in the suspension of
3 that management authority. Dkt, 51, 69. The Court previously found that it lacked jurisdiction
4 under the MSA to grant injunctive relief because the Plaintiff’s challenge to authorization of
5 commercial Chinook salmon fisheries in SEAK was an MSA action and untimely. *Id.* The State
6 respectfully requests the Court issue an order dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff’s challenge to the
7 authorization and funding of the SEAK Chinook fishery through the delegation of authority to the
8 State under the FMP for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule 12(b)(1). *See Turtle*
9 *Island Restoration Network v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce*, 438 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2006); *Frigard v.*
10 *U.S.*, 862 F.2d 201 (9th Cir. 1988).

11 Even if Plaintiff had brought a timely challenge under the MSA, its motion is legally and
12 factually flawed, and the requested relief should be denied for the reasons set forth below.

13 **A. Plaintiff’s Focus on the Southeast Alaska Salmon Fishery is Misplaced.**

14 Plaintiff begins the argument section of its brief with the allegation that “NMFS’s
15 management of fisheries has pushed Southern Residents to the brink of extinction.” Dkt. 91, p 21.
16 In support of this protestation, Plaintiff cites “e.g., AR 47503.” Plaintiff is presumably referring to
17 the statement that “[u]nder the existing management and recovery regimes over the last decade,
18 salmon availability has not been sufficient to support Southern Resident population growth.” AR
19 47503. But this ignores several important factors that are impacting SRKW, none of which have
20 anything to do with Alaska or its fisheries.

21 Plaintiff’s focus on Alaska’s fisheries ignores that other omnipresent factors, such as “toxic
22 chemicals that accumulate in top predators,” disturbance from vessels, and oil spills are all factors
23 that are limiting SRKW recovery. AR 47502.

24 **1. Environmental contaminants.**

25 Puget Sound is a “deep-water ford with several sills that restrict mixing and inhibit both
26 ocean inflow and the outflow of toxic chemicals. AR 37444. As a result, “POPs that enter the
27 Puget Sound basin have long residence times, resulting in an increase in contaminant exposure and
28

1 bioaccumulation in local food webs.” *Id.* SRKW’s frequent the marine areas “where relatively high
2 levels of PCBs [polychlorinated biphenyls], PBDEs [polybrominated diphenyl ethers], and DDTs
3 [dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane] are found.” AR 37507. And exposure to these pollutants “may
4 hinder recovery of the SRKW population.” *Id.* Indeed, “[h]igh concentrations of PCBs, DDTs, and
5 PBDEs have been detected in the blubber and scat of the whales. AR 37965.

6 The SRKW recovery plan identified “a number of environmental contaminants that may
7 pose a health risk to killer whales.” AR 37741. Among those environmental contaminants that may
8 pose a risk to SRKW, the following were found at relatively high levels in SRKW and their
9 environment: PCBs, which can cause reproductive impairment, skeletal abnormalities, neuro- and
10 immunotoxicity, terato- and carcinogenicity, and endocrine disruption; PBDEs, which can cause
11 endocrine disruption, liver and thyroid function impairment, autoimmunity induction,
12 immunosuppression, and impacts on lung and neural development; and DDT, which can cause
13 reproductive impairment, immunosuppression, and adrenal and thyroid effects. AR 37742.
14 Other environmental pollutants include dioxins, furans, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons,
15 perfluorooctane sulfonate, tributyltin, dibutyltin, polychlorinated paraffins, polychlorinated
16 naphthalenes, alkylphenol ethoxylates, and polychlorinated terphenyls, which are associated with
17 liver damage, birth defects, reproductive impairment, cancer, cardiac dysfunction, developmental
18 neurotoxicity, and endocrine disruption. AR 37742-43.

19 **2. Vessel traffic.**

20 Plaintiff’s focus on the SEAK fishery also ignores the acoustic and physical disturbances
21 to SRKW that result from vessel traffic in their home waters. The “Georgia Basin and Puget Sound
22 are among the busiest waterways in the world, with several thousand trips made per month by
23 various types of commercial vessels.” AR 20914. And Haro Strait, which is frequented by SRKW,
24 “is one of the region’s primary shipping lanes.” *Id.* “Killer whales are the principal target species
25 for the commercial whale watch industry” and “encounter a variety of other vessels in their urban
26 environment (e.g., recreational, fishing, ferries, military, shipping).” AR 37965, AR 20906.
27 SRKW’s experience “much heavier viewing pressure” than do their Northern Resident
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1 counterparts. AR 20914. In fact, SRKW are so frequently in the presence of whale watching
2 vessels that researchers have not been able to study their behavior absent vessels for comparison
3 purposes. *Id.*

4 The Recovery Plan specifically listed “direct vessel strikes, the masking of echolocation
5 and communication signals by anthropogenic sound, and behavioral changes” as possibly
6 negatively impacting the whales. AR 37965. “Research has shown that the whales spend more
7 time traveling and performing surface active behaviors and less time foraging in the presence of
8 all vessel types, including kayaks, and that noise from motoring vessels up to 400m away has the
9 potential to affect the echolocation abilities of foraging whales.” *Id.* And beyond direct vessel
10 strikes, commercial shipping is a major source of low frequency sound in the oceans that may
11 disturb SRKW. AR 20915.

12 3. Prey availability.

13 When it comes to prey salmon, the SEAK fisheries are not the primary factor impacting
14 their availability to SRKW. The would-be prey Chinook are adversely impacted by land use activities
15 that result in habitat loss and degradation; hydropower systems; climate effects from Pacific
16 decadal oscillation and other events that cause changes in ocean productivity; predation in the
17 ocean by pelagic fishes, birds, and marine mammals such as abundant Northern Resident killer
18 whales other than SRKW; and habitat-altering activities such as agriculture, forestry, marine
19 construction, levy maintenance, shoreline armoring, dredging, and new development that can all
20 reduce prey available to SRKW. AR 47347.

21 Restoring Puget Sound, reducing vessels impacts on the whales, and rebuilding the stocks
22 of prey salmon are long-term projects. But producing 20 million additional Chinook smolt as near-
23 future prey for SRKW provides an immediate improvement to the whales near- and long-term
24 outlook. *See* AR 47447. Regardless, Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the hatchery program that will
25 produce more SRKW prey. Dkt. 91, p. 43. There are many factors impacting SRKW and, unlike
26 toxic pollutants and vessel traffic in Puget Sound, the apparent lack of prey is one where an
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1 immediate remedy exists. The meaningful increase in Chinook abundance will increase prey for
2 SRKW, AR 47202, alleviating one of the many environmental stressors.

3 SRKW's primary marine environment is both heavily polluted and one of the busiest
4 waterways in the world, while many salmon stocks on which the whales forage have been
5 decimated by habitat loss and degradation. These issues provide a clear linear connection between
6 cause and effect when it comes to the population decline of SRKW. The same cannot be said of
7 Plaintiff's proposed relief of closing down the SEAK salmon fishery. While fishing undoubtedly
8 removes some potential SRKW prey from the water, Alaskan fisheries, which are separated from
9 SRKW by a great distance and another country, are not the primary factor in reducing prey. This
10 is likely why independent scientists cautioned against overreliance on correlative studies on
11 implicating any particular fishery as the cause of reduced prey, by stating that the "impact of
12 reduced Chinook salmon harvest on future availability of Chinook salmon to Southern Residents
13 is not clear." AR 47285.

14 NMFS' analysis suggests that over the next ten years SEAK fisheries would reduce
15 available prey in coastal waters by only 5% and in inland waters by just 1%. AR 47439. But again,
16 as explained previously, shutting down the SEAK salmon fisheries would have negligible, if any,
17 impact on SRKW, as any Chinook not caught in SEAK must travel some seven hundred miles past
18 Canadian commercial and recreational fisheries, tribal fisheries, Northern Resident killer whales
19 and Steller sea lions, which are also predators of large Chinook, and Southern U.S. fisheries to
20 reach the SRKWs. *See, e.g.*, AR 16128, 16126, 47363, 36320.

21 If ensuring an increase in prey Chinook for SRKWs is the goal, then the BiOp and the
22 associated mitigation measures must be upheld by this Court.

23 **B. NMFS was Not Required to Conduct a New NEPA Analysis After the 2019**
24 **Treaty.**

25 Plaintiff argues that NMFS "violated NEPA by failing to conduct any NEPA analysis for
26 its authorization of take resulting from the 10-year fishery regimes set in the 2019 Pacific Salmon
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1 Treaty.” Plaintiff is simply wrong. NMFS conducted an Environmental Assessment (“EA”) for the
2 FMP in 2012. AR 47632, AR 00500.

3 Consistent with the requirements of the MSA, the North Pacific Fishery Management
4 Council promulgated an FMP covering federal waters off SEAK in 1979. AR 47634. That FMP
5 was comprehensively revised in 2012. AR 00507. NMFS completed an EA concerning the FMP
6 salmon fisheries impact on the environment. AR 47638. Specifically, the EA stated that the
7 “proposed action concerns the application of federal management in addition to the existing State
8 management for the salmon fisheries that occur in the EEZ.” AR 47638. The EA also concluded
9 that the considered alternatives “would have an insignificant impact on Alaska salmon stocks,
10 Pacific salmon stocks listed under the Endangered Species Act, marine mammals, seabirds, and
11 essential fish habitat.” *Id.*

12 SRKW were specifically analyzed in the EA. “The FMP salmon fisheries occur outside of
13 the range of the SRKW, therefore, there are no direct interactions between the whales and these
14 fisheries.” AR 47824. Given that, the EA focused on SRKW prey. *Id.* And in doing so, found that
15 “the extent of adverse impact is limited by management measures that define catch or total
16 mortality limits on Chinook in the Pacific Salmon Treaty Agreement.” *Id.* As such, “the Southeast
17 Alaska troll fishery is not likely to adversely affect the Southern Resident killer whales or critical
18 habitat beyond those effects previously analyzed in the 2008 BiOp.” *Id.* Of course, since that was
19 written in the 2012 EA, both Alaska and Canada took substantial reductions in their annual catch
20 quotas, thus it cannot rationally be argued that the fisheries pose a greater issue to SRKW today
21 than they may have in 2012. Finally, the EA closed the analysis by stating that “all potential
22 adverse effects to the Southern Resident killer whale critical habitat would be insignificant, NMFS
23 makes a determination that the proposed project may effect, but is not likely to adversely affect
24 Southern Resident killer whale critical habitat.” AR 47825.

25 Plaintiff ignores the 2012 EA that considered the SEAK fisheries’ potential impact on
26 SRKW, as though it does not exist. But it does exist, and it is part of the record. And the record is
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1 clear that NMFS complied with NEPA. As such, the Defendants should be granted summary
2 judgment on this claim.

3 **C. Vacatur Would Not Be Appropriate in This Case.**

4 Plaintiff asks the Court to vacate the "BiOp, including the ITS, along with NMFS's
5 adoption of the 2019 SEAK BiOp." Dkt. 91 at p. 40. Their request lacks merit for a number of
6 legal and practical reasons and should be denied.

7 First, Plaintiff's request for vacatur is simply a convoluted attempt to make an end-run
8 around Plaintiff's jurisdictional issues. The practical effect of Plaintiff's vacatur request would be
9 to imperil the SEAK EEZ salmon fishery and force its closure. The Ninth Circuit foreclosed just
10 such a maneuver in *Turtle Island Restoration Network*. There, the plaintiff attempted to prevent
11 the reopening of a federally authorized fishery on ESA grounds. But as the Ninth Circuit observed,
12 "Standing alone, the Incidental Take Statement [for the fishery] did nothing. It became operational,
13 and allegedly unlawful, only upon the promulgation of regulations reopening the fishery." 438
14 F.3d 937, 945-46. An untimely challenge to the conduct of a fishery authorized through an MSA
15 action cannot be "circumvented by artful pleading." *Id.* at 945. Through its request for vacatur,
16 Plaintiff attempts again to obtain improperly the relief that the Court has previously denied, and
17 its request should be denied again.

18 But even if Plaintiff's challenge was timely, "courts may decline to vacate agency decisions
19 when vacatur would cause serious and irreparable harms that significantly outweigh the
20 magnitude of the agency's error." *Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv.*,
21 109 F. Supp. 3d 1238, 1242 (N.D. Cal. 2015). And in this case the relief that Plaintiff seeks would
22 cause serious and irreparable harms, without producing any tangible benefit. Vacating the entire
23 BiOp would effectively halt a broad range of activities that are not challenged in this lawsuit, and
24 would be disproportionate given the issues that are before this Court. The State requests that if the
25 Court finds Plaintiff's latest request to be timely, and identifies any flaw with the agency actions,
26 that the BiOp and the ITS remain in effect while the matter is remanded for NMFS to cure any
27 defect.

1 **1. Legal standards.**

2 “When a biological opinion is unlawful, the ordinary remedy is to vacate and remand for
3 immediate reinitiation of consultation.” *Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv.*, 184
4 F. Supp. 3d 861, 949 (D. Or. 2016) (citing *Fla. Power & Light v. Lorion*, 470 U.S. 729, 744
5 (1985)). However, vacatur is not the only or automatic remedy in the ESA or NEPA context: “when
6 equity demands, the regulation can be left in place while the agency follows the necessary
7 procedures.” *Idaho Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt*, 58 F.3d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1995); *see also*
8 *California Communities Against Toxics v. U.S. Env'tl. Prot. Agency, (Cal Communities)*, 688 F.3d
9 989, 993-94 (9th Cir. 2012). “Whether agency action should be vacated depends on [1] how serious
10 the agency’s errors are and [2] the disruptive consequences of an interim change that may itself be
11 changed.” *Cal. Communities*, 688 F.3d at 992.⁵

12 **2. Vacatur should not be considered here.**

13 In considering an appropriate remedy for a timely challenge, a district court “has broad
14 latitude in fashioning equitable relief when necessary to remedy an established wrong.” *Alaska*
15 *Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner*, 20 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 1994). Here, like in *Idaho Farm Bureau*,
16 the balance of the equities clearly favors leaving the BiOp, and the ITS, in place if the matter must
17 be remanded. Plaintiff claims that “NMFS authorized salmon harvest levels that will lead to the
18 Southern Residents’ continued slide towards extinction,” but this is simply not the case. Dkt. 91
19 p. 42. Rather, if the BiOp is vacated the incentive behind the prey increase program, which will
20 provide an “immediate and meaningful increase in prey availability for” SRKW, vanishes. AR
21 47202. This would, without question, lead to less prey for SRKW while destroying SEAK’s
22 economy—and it would do so without producing any colorable benefit. If the financing of
23 mitigation measures is found to be unduly speculative, then remanding the matter to NMFS
24 without vacatur is the only outcome that would protect SRKW to ensure the prey increase program

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27 ⁵ This is often referred to as the two-part *Allied-Signal* test, and is explained in more detail infra at 2.a.
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1 continues, while not destroying the economy of SEAK. NMFS can, and, if necessary, should be
2 given the opportunity to conduct any review on remand with the current BiOp and ITS left in place.

3 Balancing the equities is not an exact science; rather it is “lawyers’ jargon for choosing
4 between conflicting public interests.” *California v. Azar*, 911 F.3d 558, 582 (9th Cir. 2018)
5 (quoting *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579, 609 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
6 concurring)). The State’s primary interest in this matter is clear cut: the economic vitality of an
7 entire region of Alaska. Importantly, that interest can be balanced with the health of SRKW in a
8 manner that does not require discarding the protection afforded by the ITS and vacating the BiOp
9 if any shortcomings are identified by the Court.

10 *a. Conservation Interest*

11 The SRKW prey increase program is the most immediate and dependable way to ensure
12 conservation of the DPS. The conservation hatchery and habitat programs would contribute to prey
13 abundance for SRKW over the intermediate and long-term, but the prey increase program is
14 “specifically designed to increase the production of hatchery Chinook salmon to provide an
15 immediate and meaningful increase in prey availability for SRKWs.” AR 47432. SRKW are
16 negatively impacted by pollution and vessel traffic and other issues could be, but are not likely to
17 be remediated, in the near term. *See Supra V. A*. One issue that is immediately remediable is the
18 amount of prey available to the whales, and that is precisely what this BiOp reviews. Producing
19 20 million additional Chinook smolt as future prey for SRKW provides an immediate improvement
20 to the whales near-term outlook. AR 47447.

21 Assuring that the mitigation measures continue is one of the best ways to ensure the SRKW
22 population does not decline. Given that, if remand is ultimately required for any reason, vacatur
23 would not be beneficial to SRKW in this particular situation. Indeed, vacatur of the BiOp may
24 interfere with the one well-defined action that will benefit the whales: production of more prey. If
25 the goal is to protect SRKW, vacatur is not the means to that end and should not be considered.

26 When deciding to remand to an agency, with or without vacatur, the legal standard involves
27 the two-part test articulated in *Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n*, 988 F.2d
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1 146 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The conservation interest can be viewed alongside the first prong, which
2 requires the court to weigh the “the seriousness of the order’s deficiencies.” *Id.* at 150. Under this
3 prong, courts have found that vacatur may not be an appropriate remedy where there is a likelihood
4 that the agency can cure any defects and justify the defective ruling on remand. *See Apache Corp.*
5 *v. FERC*, 627 F.3d 1220, 1223 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

6 When making this determination, courts defer to the expert agency, which Congress has
7 chosen to implement its legislative design, to reconsider and repair its own errors. *San Luis &*
8 *Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell*, 747 F.3d 581, 602 (9th Cir. 2014) (“When examining this
9 kind of scientific determination [under the ESA], as opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing
10 court must generally be at its most deferential.”) (citation omitted).

11 Here, Federal Defendants could repair any error alleged by Plaintiff on remand without
12 vacating the BiOp. Plaintiff complains chiefly that the no jeopardy opinion relies on uncertain
13 mitigation. Dkt. 91, p. 21. The State believes that the record demonstrates the contemplated
14 mitigation is occurring and the matter should not be remanded. But even if the Court finds that the
15 mitigation measures need review, doing so while the BiOp and ITS remain in place allows for the
16 mitigation measures—which will categorically benefit SRKW—to continue occurring while any
17 issues are addressed on remand.

18 *b. Economic Interest*

19 According to the Ninth Circuit, economic impacts are a worthy consideration with respect
20 to the disruptive consequences of vacatur, and thus, this Court should fully consider them. *See,*
21 *e.g., Cal. Communities*, 688 F.3d at 993-94. This is analogous to *Allied-Signal’s* second prong,
22 which requires the court to weigh the “disruptive consequences of an interim change that may
23 itself be changed.” *Allied-Signal*, 988 F.2d at 150-51.

24 The disruptive consequences of vacating the BiOp would be disproportionate and
25 unnecessary and would severely hamper SEAK’s economy while providing comparatively little
26 improvement to the SRKW prey availability.

1 Fishing is critically important to SEAK. From 2012 to 2015 the SEAK salmon fishery
2 produced \$806 million in output, \$484 million in gross domestic product, \$299 million in labor
3 income or wages, and provided 6,600 full time equivalent jobs on average. Dkt 76 p. 6, ¶ 14. The
4 State levies a fishery resource landing tax which is collected primarily from floating processors
5 that process fishery resources outside of the State three-mile limit and bring their products into
6 Alaska for transshipment. Dkt 76 p. 6, ¶ 16. All revenues from the fishery resource landing tax are
7 deposited into Alaska’s General Fund, and 50% of taxes are shared with the respective
8 municipalities or unorganized boroughs in which landings occur. *Id.* The shared revenue provides
9 for municipal school districts, school bond debt, utilities, and other municipal or borough services.
10 *Id.* In addition to the fishery landing tax, municipalities may impose their own taxes, and
11 commercial fishing operations contribute a share of the motor fuel and corporate income tax
12 revenues collected by the State. *Id.*

13 The importance of these fisheries to SEAK cannot be overstated—and vacating the BiOp,
14 thereby effectively closing several of Alaska’s fisheries, would decimate the region. Such a court
15 order would result in the loss of substantial tax revenues to the State and to the communities in
16 which fish are landed, while jeopardizing many of the full-time fisheries jobs.

17 Ninth Circuit case law is clear that economic devastation of the nature contemplated here
18 is a worthy consideration with respect to the disruptive consequences of vacatur. It should be
19 axiomatic that substantially impacting a stable, functioning, and relatively predictable sector of
20 Alaska’s economy is a significant consideration, and the determination of whether to shut down a
21 critically important industry should not be reflexive, as suggested by Plaintiff.

22 Plaintiff addresses the catastrophic economic consequences of the sought relief by simply
23 noting that courts sometimes prioritize harm to species over “disruptive consequences.” According
24 to plaintiff, “[c]ourts generally prioritize harm to species and the environment over administrative
25 or economic burdens when considering any ‘disruptive consequences.’” Dkt. 91, at 42-43. But
26 Ninth Circuit case law does not support that formulaic conclusion.

1 Perhaps the best example of this is the first case plaintiffs cite for support: *Alliance for the*
2 *Wild Rockies v. U.S. Forest Serv. (Wild Rockies)*, 907 F.3d 1105, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2018). Dkt.
3 91, p. 40. Plaintiff claims that *Wild Rockies* supports the proposition that any APA violation
4 “demands a ‘presumption of vacatur.’” *Id.* The actual quote from *Wild Rockies* reveals a
5 considerably more nuanced approach:

6 Although not without exception, vacatur of an unlawful agency action
7 normally accompanies a remand. This is because ‘[o]rdinarily when a
8 regulation is not promulgated in compliance with the APA, the regulation
9 is invalid.’ When equity demands, however, the regulation can be left in
10 place while the agency reconsiders or replaces the action, or to give the
11 agency time to follow the necessary procedures. A federal court ‘is not
12 required to set aside every unlawful agency action,’ and the ‘decision to
13 grant or deny injunctive or declaratory relief under APA is controlled by
14 principles of equity.’

15 907 F.3d at 1121. (citations omitted).

16 In *Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv.*, another case cited by
17 Plaintiff, Dkt. 91, p. 41, the Court ordered vacatur after finding that “the Services failed to perform
18 a cumulative impacts analysis—an integral part of fulfilling NEPA's purpose—of its proposed
19 actions in three different areas.” 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1245. Importantly, the court specifically stated
20 that the possible economic harm in that case did not “rise to the concrete, foreseeable economic
21 harm like that found in *California Communities Against Toxics*, where vacatur meant halting
22 construction of a power plant that would lead to 350 layoffs, blackouts to the community, and
23 additional action from the California legislature.” *Id.* at 1246.

24 Here, however, any possible ESA or NEPA violation is much more circumscribed than in
25 *Klamath-Siskiyou*, and the agency is much better positioned to address any potential infirmity
26 absent vacatur. Similarly, the economic consequences of vacatur on the SEAK region would be
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1 considerably more extreme than shutting down a single power plant in Northern California. There
2 are other powerplants in California. There are no other seafaring economic opportunities in SEAK.

3 It is important to remember that while vacatur would result in catastrophic economic harm
4 to SEAK, far worse than the economic disruption described in *Cal Communities*, it would likely
5 not benefit SRKW in any material way.

6 This Court can and should weigh the economic consequences to Alaska’s economy if
7 determining an appropriate remedy becomes necessary. Vacatur poses the prospect of both current
8 and future irremediable economic harm to SEAK that far outweighs any potential harm to SRKW
9 from remand without vacatur.

10 **3. Vacatur would be overbroad because the BiOp covers much that is**
11 **not challenged in this litigation.**

12 It is important to note that the BiOp covers a significant swath of activity not at issue in
13 this litigation. As previously explained, the BiOp covers three actions: “the delegation of
14 management authority over salmon troll fishery and the sport salmon fishery (the only authorized
15 fisheries currently occurring in the SEAK EEZ) in the SEAK EEZ to the State of Alaska,” the
16 disbursement of “grants to the State of Alaska to monitor and manage salmon fisheries in State and
17 Federal waters to meet the obligations of the PST through 2028,” and the “funding of a
18 conservation program for critical Puget Sound stocks and SRKW.” AR 47198, AR 47534. Any
19 challenge to the first two actions are untimely. Dkt. 51. Even if the Court were to find fault with
20 the funding for mitigation measures, those are the type of issues that could and should be addressed
21 on remand while the BiOp and ITS are left in place so that a majority of the actions contemplated
22 in the BiOp, actions which are not at issue here, may continue to occur.

23 **D. The Court Should Not Enjoin NMFS’s Prey Increase Program.**

24 A court’s decision to issue an injunction constitutes an unwarranted “extraordinary
25 remedy” if a less drastic remedy could sufficiently redress plaintiff’s injury. *Klamath-Siskiyou*
26 *Wildlands Center*, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1247. (citing *Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms*, 561
27 U.S. 139, 165-66 (2010)). If the Court finds a flaw in NMFS hatchery program, or any other
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1 challenged portion of the BiOp, remand is the remedy—but injunctive relief is disfavored. If a
2 “court concludes that an agency invested with broad discretion to fashion remedies has apparently
3 ... omit[ed] a remedy justified in the court's view ..., remand to the agency for reconsideration,
4 and not enlargement of the agency order, is ordinarily the reviewing court's proper course.” *NLRB*
5 *v. Food Store Emps. Union*, 417 U.S. 1, 10 (1974).

6 Vacatur is not appropriate in this matter, for the reasons explained in the previous section.
7 It then naturally follows that the more drastic “extraordinary remedy” of a permanent injunction
8 sought by Plaintiff should also be roundly rejected by this Court.

9 “[A] plaintiff seeking permanent injunctive relief must satisfy a four-factor test by
10 showing: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as
11 monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance
12 of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the
13 public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” *Cottonwood Envtl. Law Ctr. v.*
14 *U.S. Forest Serv.*, 789 F.3d 1075, 1088 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing *eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.*,
15 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)).

16 “[T]he ESA strips courts of at least some of their equitable discretion in determining
17 whether injunctive relief is warranted.” *Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv.*, 886
18 F.3d 803, 817 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing *Cottonwood*, 789 F.3d at 1090). The ESA removes the latter
19 three factors in the four-factor injunctive relief test from courts’ equitable discretion. *Id.*

20 The ESA does not, however, restrict courts’ discretion to decide whether a plaintiff has
21 suffered an irreparable injury. *Id.* at 818. “There is no presumption of irreparable injury where
22 there has been a procedural violation in ESA cases.” *Id.* (citing *Cottonwood*, 789 F.3d at 1091).
23 Plaintiffs must demonstrate that irreparable injury “is likely in the absence of an injunction.” *Id.*
24 (citing *Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)) (emphasis in original). “A
25 ‘possibility’ of irreparable harm cannot support an injunction.” *Id.* And if a court determines that
26 injunctive relief is warranted, such relief must be tailored to remedy the specific harm. *Melendres*
27 *v. Arpaio*, 784 F.3d 1254, 1265 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We have long held that injunctive relief must be
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1 tailored to remedy the specific harm alleged.”) (internal quotations omitted). “Nevertheless, the
2 district court has broad discretion in fashioning a remedy.” *Id.*

3 An injunction should issue only where a plaintiff makes a “clear showing” and presents
4 “substantial proof” that equitable relief is warranted. *Mazurek v. Armstrong*, 520 U.S. 968, 972
5 (1997) (per curiam). But in this matter, Plaintiff does not cite substantial proof required to support
6 the extraordinary remedy sought.

7 For example, Plaintiff states that “[t]hreatened Puget Sound and Lower Columbia River
8 Chinook salmon are not meeting recovery objectives due, in part, to excessive hatchery influences.
9 *See, e.g.*, AR 01741-42, 01747, 15911.” Dkt. 91, p 44. But the administrative record does not
10 support the proposition for which it is cited. The cited document is the 5-year Review Summary
11 and Evaluation of Puget Sound Chinook Salmon. While AR 01741-42 does discuss hatcheries,
12 nowhere in the cited pages does it conclude or indicate that Puget Sound Chinook are not meeting
13 recovery objectives due to excessive hatchery influences. Contrary to Plaintiff’s claim, the Puget
14 Sound Technical Recovery Team recommended “that viable populations of Chinook salmon be
15 spread throughout the region to minimize the risk of a catastrophic loss.” AR 01742. The same is
16 true for the subsequent citations. The team noted that natural-origin fish levels were low and
17 hatchery-produced fish are prevalent in certain areas, but there is no conclusion of a cause of effect
18 relationship as presented by Plaintiff. AR 01747, 15911.

19 The closest the team came to suggesting that hatcheries were problematic was the
20 observation that “the long-term use of artificial propagation *may* pose risks to natural productivity
21 and diversity. The magnitude and type of the risk is dependent on the status of affected populations
22 and on specific practices at the hatchery program.” AR 01788 (emphasis added). But any potential
23 risk is obviated by the finding that “[h]atchery programs can provide short-term demographic
24 benefits such as increases in abundance in periods of low natural abundance and they can help
25 preserve genetic resources until limiting factors are addressed.” *Id.*

26 Plaintiff states that the “recent Mitchell Act BiOp requires reductions in annual releases by
27 nearly two million hatchery Chinook salmon to protect wild Chinook salmon and meet pHOS

1 levels.” Dkt. 91, p. 44. But NMFS has explained that it will “work with hatchery operators and
2 funders to ensure that all increased hatchery production to support SRKW has been reviewed under
3 the ESA (and NEPA as applicable) to ensure that it does not jeopardize the survival and recovery
4 of any ESA-listed species.” ESA BiOp on Implementation of the PFMC Salmon FMP in 2020, p
5 47. Moreover, NMFS specifically addresses this issue in the SEAK BiOp, stating that they expect
6 the risk of “adverse competitive interactions between hatchery- and natural-origin fish will be
7 minimized by the proposed action awarding funding to programs that use the following strategies:

- 8 • Releasing hatchery smolts that are physiologically ready to migrate.
9 Hatchery fish released as smolts emigrate seaward soon after liberation,
10 minimizing the potential for competition with juvenile naturally produced
11 fish in freshwater
- 12 • Operating hatcheries such that hatchery fish are reared to a size sufficient
13 to ensure that smoltification occurs in nearly the entire population
- 14 • Releasing hatchery smolts in lower river areas, below areas used for stream-
15 rearing by naturally produced juveniles
- 16 • Monitoring the incidence of non-migratory smolts (residuals) after release
17 and adjusting rearing strategies, release location, and release timing if
18 substantial competition with naturally rearing juveniles is determined
19 likely.”

20 AR 47425.

21 NMFS plans to address predation concerns by “awarding funding to hatchery programs
22 that can implement the following strategies:

- 23 • Releasing all hatchery fish as actively migrating smolts so that the fish
24 migrate quickly seaward, limiting the duration of interaction with any co-
25 occurring natural-origin fish downstream of the release site.
- 26 • Ensuring that a high proportion of the population have physiologically
27 achieved full smolt status. Juvenile salmon tend to migrate seaward rapidly

1 when fully smolted, limiting the duration of interaction between hatchery
2 fish and naturally produced fish present within, and downstream of, release
3 areas.

- 4 • Operating hatchery programs and releases to minimize the potential for
5 residualism.”

6 AR 47425-26.

7 The entirety of the prey increase plan shows that the hatchery releases are done in
8 accordance with the ESA and are necessary to benefit SRKW.

9 Plaintiff does not come close to the “clear showing” of “substantial proof” that an increase
10 hatchery-origin Chinook—produced for the purpose of enhancing prey available to SRKW—is
11 causing irreparable injury to endangered stocks. As such, the request for a permanent injunction
12 should be denied.

13 **VI. CONCLUSION**

14 For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully asks the Court to deny Plaintiff’s motion
15 and grant the State’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

16 DATED: May 26, 2021.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on May 26, 2021, I electronically transmitted the attached document to the Clerk of the Court using the ECF System for filing and transmittal of a Notice of Electronic Filing to all ECF registrants.

/s/ Linda R. Larson
Linda R. Larson

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