

## Addendum to C2 Draft Environmental Impact Statement Bering Sea Chum Salmon Bycatch Management

March 26, 2024

This addendum provides corrections to specific text, tables, or figures in the preliminary Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) Bering Sea Chum Salmon Bycatch Management analysis.

### Section 6.1.8.2.2 Chinook Stock Composition Estimates

The title for Figure 6-22 (page 151) was not legible in the DEIS and has been reproduced below.




Figure 6-22 Chinook bycatch stock composition estimates and spatial distribution of the bycatch, 2022


### Section 6.1.9.5.5 Killer whale (multiple stocks)

*The last full paragraph in this section (page 183) has been modified to read:*

While the majority (54%) of killer whale serious injury and mortality events are caused by trawl net fisheries, only 1 mortality (Alaska Resident) from 2017 to 2021 was attributed to the BSAI pollock trawl fishery (Bolling et al. 2023). Takes of killer whales recently occurred in several Alaska commercial fisheries. Of the 11 killer whales taken in 2023, only one interaction was reported for the BSAI pollock trawl fishery and this whale was determined to be dead prior to being caught.<sup>1</sup> Killer whales may also indirectly interact with the fishery through competition for preferred salmon prey.

### Section 6.1.10.2 CDQ Revenue Dependence and Investments in AFA Vessels

*Figure 6-33 (page 192) did not appear in the pdf version of the document and has been included below.*



**Figure 6-33 Annual average gross first wholesale revenues (millions of \$) associated with CDQ allocations by species, 2011 through 2022**

Source: ADFG/CFEC Fish Tickets, data compiled by AKFIN in Comprehensive\_FT; Cdq\_activity(11-30-23)

<sup>1</sup> Press release available at: <https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/feature-story/cause-death-determined-11-killer-whales-incidentally-caught-fishing-gear-alaska-2023>

**Section 6.1.10.2 CDQ Revenue Dependence and Investment in AFA Vessels**

Table 6-29 (page 193) had errors which have been corrected below. The title has been adjusted to include all AFA vessel ownership rather than exclusively AFA vessels that harvest pollock.

**Table 6-29 CDQ direct investments in fishery companies and AFA vessels as of January 2024**

CDQ Group	Name of Company	CDQ Ownership	Vessel Name	Vessel Type
BBEDC	Dona Martita	50.0%	Defender	CV
			Alaskan Defender	CV
			Bering Defender	CV
			Northern Defender	CV
	Arctic Storm Holding Company	18.3%	Arctic Fjord	CP
			Neahkahnne	CV
			Arctic Storm	CP
CBSFA	St. Paul Fishing Company	75.0%	Starlite	CV
			Starward	CV
		30.0%	Fierce Allegiance	CV
CVRF	Coastal Alaska Premier Seafoods	100.0%	Northern Hawk	CP
	Excellence Seafood LLC	100.0%	California Horizon	CV
			Misty Dawn	CV
			Morning Star	CV
			Papado II	CV
CVRF (50%) / NSEDC (50%)	BSAI Partners	75.0%	Alaska Rose	CV
		75.0%	Bering Rose	CV
		78.9%	Destination	CV
		51.0%	Great Pacific	CV
		75.0%	Sea Wolf	CV
		75.0%	Ms. Amy & Messiah	CV
	Bering North	75.0%	Progress	CV
			Sunset Bay	CV
			Half Moon Bay	CV
			American Eagle	CV
			Commodore	CV
			Hickory Wind	CV
			Patricia Lee	CV
			Storm Petrel	CV
	Ocean Hope 3	CV		
NSEDC	Glacier Fish Company	71.9%	Alaska Ocean	CP
YDFDA	Nunam Iqua Harvester	100.0%	Aleutian Challenger	CV
	Kotlik Challenger	100.0%	Pacific Challenger	CV
	Alakanuk Beauty	75.0%	American Beauty	CV
	Emmonak Leader	75.0%	Ocean Leader	CV
	Golden Alaska	58.3%	Golden Alaska	MS

Source: Personal communication L. Price; J. Kauffman; P. Peyton; A. Drobnic; P. Wilkins; S. Kinneen  
 Note that some of these AFA vessels no longer actively harvest pollock. However, access to their associated pollock allocation continues to provide royalties to CDQ owners. Some CDQ groups have additional indirect interest in companies that own AFA vessels and harvest non-CDQ AFA pollock.

**Section 6.2.4 Estimates of Overall Chum Salmon and Western Alaska Chum Salmon Avoided Under an Overall Chum Salmon PSC Limit**

Table 6-46 (page 223) had errors in the last two columns which have been corrected below.

**Table 6-46 (revised) For an example 200,000 PSC limit, suboption 1 (3-yr average) allocation, the relative date of closure, what period (Early (E), Middle(M) and Late (L) the chum avoided would have come from and the estimated chum avoided and their relative contribution from WAK as well as the total by sector over all (2011-2022) years.**

Sector	Year	Week-end date	what period of time would the remaining chum saved have come from?	Status Quo B Season Chum Bycatch (#)	Potential Number of Chum Salmon Avoided in B Season	Potential Number of WAK Chum Salmon Avoided in B Season
CDQ	<b>Total</b>			<b>227,891</b>	<b>99,035</b>	<b>24,009</b>
	2011			3,758		
	2012			200		
	2013			554		
	2014			2,407		
	2015			4,650		
	2016	8/13/2016	M/L	16,342	3,238	601
	2017	7/15/2017	E/M/L	87,058	72,998	19,012
	2018	7/7/2018	E/M/L	26,586	12,995	3,066
	2019	9/28/2019	L	15,726	3,446	635
	2020			8,582		
	2021	7/17/2021	E/M/L	55,663	6,358	696
	2022			6,365		
CP	<b>Total</b>			<b>961,389</b>	<b>347,317</b>	<b>45,708</b>
	2011		L	44,299	18	4
	2012			1,928		
	2013			10,229		
	2014	9/6/2014	L	63,066	7,424	1,026
	2015			40,046		
	2016	8/6/2016	M/L	134,750	75,009	12,216
	2017	7/22/2017	E/M/L	207,355	110,576	17,830
	2018	7/7/2018	E/M/L	99,447	40,571	7,198
	2019	8/31/2019	L	113,428	18,785	844
	2020	9/12/2020	L	77,138	32,244	805
	2021	7/31/2021	M/L	97,917	37,412	2,956
	2022	8/27/2022	M/L	71,786	25,278	2,830
Mothership	<b>Total</b>			<b>280,145</b>	<b>65,310</b>	<b>13,716</b>
	2011	9/17/2011	L	24,399	5,176	940
	2012			977		
	2013			3,835		
	2014			8,091		
	2015			14,046		
	2016	8/13/2016	M/L	43,262	18,916	6,016
	2017			16,825		
	2018	9/8/2018	L	21,303	2,897	612
	2019	8/31/2019	L	44,860	20,379	3,469
	2020	10/31/2020	L	19,743		0
	2021	7/31/2021	L	50,542	9,694	661
	2022	8/13/2022	M/L	32,262	8,248	2,017
Inshore	<b>Total</b>			<b>1,899,055</b>	<b>340,685</b>	<b>61,460</b>
	2011	10/15/2011		118,861		
	2012			19,067		
	2013			110,496		
	2014	8/30/2014	L	145,322	12,744	3871
	2015	8/22/2015	M/L	174,343	38,094	9289
	2016	9/10/2016	L	144,882	15,397	796
	2017	7/29/2017	M/L	154,610	19,536	6076
	2018	9/1/2018	L	147,369	14,956	3326
	2019	8/17/2019	L	172,798	32,131	9412
	2020	9/5/2020	L	237,632	111,140	10518
	2021	7/24/2021	M/L	341,779	94,626	17535
	2022	8/13/2022	M/L	131,896	2,061	636
<b>Grand Total</b>				<b>3,368,480</b>	<b>852,347</b>	<b>144,894</b>

### Section 6.2.7 Assessment of Forgone Pollock and Ecosystem Effects

*The following text corrections are provided from page 234-235.*

~~Over +~~ **Compared to retrospective catch,** the most restrictive PSC limits and constraints (Alternative 2 200,000 PSC limit) ~~forgone pollock on average in the B season can result in up to 9-14% forgone pollock.~~ **would result in 12-15% annual cumulative forgone pollock (see Table Appendix 6-1).** The effect of the alternatives in general will likely result in a continuation of pollock catches being well below the TAC (i.e., forgone pollock). Relative to the stock, the near-term expectations would be that projected abundance would be higher than if the full TAC were caught. Beyond the change in near term trend, lower pollock removals would result in the expected long-term biomass to be higher. However, since pollock can be highly cannibalistic, a large adult stock may limit the recruitment due to this predation. We note that this relationship is poorly estimated, and recruitment is typically highly variable, depending on spatial and temporal distributions between adults and juveniles (Ianelli et al. 2023).